Issue 40/41, Vol. 2, September 10, 1996
IN THIS ISSUE:
Issue 40/41, Vol. 2, September 10, 1996
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There is infinite politicizing and double face activity by
the key electoral actors and organizers,in particular, the
international sponsors and domestic governing parties. They are
doping everything so that otherwise complicated September festivity
is even more tangled, as is their goal to mangle the minds of the
voters as much as possible.
This was best felt by the refugees and expelled persons
which find themselves abroad, which started their voting three weeks
before their compatriots in Bosnia. As soon as the voting start was
announced, a signal was sent from Sarajevo, that ballots should not
be sent to collection points. SDA estimated that voting has to be
temporarily suspended, until the fate of the infamous form P2 is
solved, which contentious from the beginning, and which finally got
the role of the Trojan horse in destroying pre election procedure and
atmosphere.
The starting wrong move from which everything stemmed was
taken by the OSCE, when it insisted on the introduction of the P2
form by which the refugees were given the right to chose where they
will achieve their electoral right: in the city of their permanent
abode, or where they are temporarily. As much as 300 thousand people
decided, mainly under the pressure of the party machinery of SDS and
HDZ, to vote in the place of their exile. It was easy to conclude
from that that the elections are promoted as the confirmation of
ethnic cleansing conducted during the four years of war.
Unfortunately, it took three months to conclude, at the last moment,
that the local elections have to be postponed.
With its decision to postpone local elections, OSCE admitted
its mistake and naivity. The fate of the P2 form remains undecided.
Because of the misuse of these forms the local elections were
postponed, while they were not put out of force. This has left open
space so that the validity of the conflictious form can be confirmed,
meaning the policy that has produced it.
This has served as a good excuse for the SDA to stick a
wrench in the already motioned electoral wheels. The local public
pays quite attention to what this party does as it obviously made
political calculations, pushing its threats and blackmails forward at
the last moment.
This is only further complicating already tangled and
particularly tight elections, which are brought into question.
The essence of holding elections is again coming to the
fore. This is actually very hard to define in the situation when
there is no minimum of good conditions for democratic expression of
citizens will. The only solid reason, as is often said, would be
that, on the basis of the elections, there would finally be installed
legitimate institutions on the level of the whole country, so that
Bosnia and Herzegovina would, finally, get a legitimate and legal
leadership. But this reason is valid only under one condition: that
the international community, as the sponsor of peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, starts applying from that monet different criteria and
stronger regime towards those who would continue to undermine Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
It seems there is no mood for that at the moment in
world capitals, and for that reason SDA and some other parties from
Sarajevo, meaning in essence Izetbegovic's leadership, is attempting
to gain time, to prolong the elections for a moment when the
international community would be able to stand behind its promises.
Favoring this is the flood of electoral promises of
politicians from Republika Srpska. They simply race in promising the
Serbian people as firmly as possible that Republika Srpska will
become a state after the elections, and Bosnia and Herzegovina only a
geographical term.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" September 5, 1996
A question can be posed no only will he, but whether can
Franjo Tudjman dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia? After a somber conversation
in Zagreb, when Ejup Ganic sharply insisted on the dissolution of
Herzeg-Bosnia, Kresimir Zubak stated that the Croatian people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are sovereign and that it will decide by
itself about its institutions. He insisted that nobody can influence
him in that respect. On the question whether that includes Franjo
Tudjman, Zubak answered: "Not even him".
Zubak, the President of the Federation, is not a person who
can say that. His political position stems from Franjo
Tudjman.Croatian president literally invented him when a civilized
surrogate was to be found to substitute extremist Mate Boban. When he
stepped out of bounds of the official Croatian politics due to the
allocation of the Posavina region into the Serb entity in Dayton,
Zubak tried to emancipate himself, but soon gave up. His statement
that Franjo Tudjman cannot influence the decisions of the Croatian
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina says that the Croatian side, copying
the Serbian one, is now acting out a game of distance between the
center and the periphery.
As if Zagreb has no control over
Herzeg-Bosnia. Supposedly, Franjo Tudjman is attempting to tame the
extremists there, the world has to thank him, since without his
reigns they would destroy the whole Dayton project.
That game is slim though. Croatian president is surely in
better relations with Herzegovina leaders than Slobodan Milosevic is
with those in Pale.There is a deep strategic unity between the first
two, and there is no rivalry. There was an attempt to promote Radovan
Karadzic as Milosevic's rival: neither Mato Boban, nor Kresimir
Zubak, nor anybody else had such a temptation.They are only left with
the role of the aide or subordinate officer. They are carrying
through Tudjman's policies, which boil down to annexation of the part
of a neighboring state. They have no personal authority, they are
recruited from the ranks of former party secretaries, presidents of
the counties. Zagreb put them to be leaders of the Bosnian Croats,
they are responsible to it.
But, there are people in Herzegovina, who can slam their
fists on Tudjman's table. Or, at least ignore his slamming. They do
what they please and don't listen to anybody. Their power is of
economic and informal nature. They have recently being called
criminals and mafiosos. Michael Steiner, Bildt's assistant says that
"ethnic gangsters stand behind Croatian obstruction of Mostar
elections".
There are, actually good relations between these Herzegovina
bosses and official circles in Zagreb. For example, cancelled
Yugoslav dinars were being sent to Herzegovina, and being exchanged
for hard currency. Or, during the war, the oil was coming to the Serb
territory from Croatia across Herzegovina.The question here was of
deals with state coverage. Foreign specialized sources speak of
Herzegovina narco-mafia, which has networked more than Croatia.
Godfathers are buying Croatia. Companies apartments, anything that is
for sale.The state is impregnated with Herzegovina interests. It has
become the economic factor with which Croatia has to count. Such
domination would not be possible if it did not have political
support. But, today it has such power that the politics has to watch
out how it will handle it.
Franjo Tudjman needs Herzegovina, as much as Herzegovina
separatists need Franjo Tudjman. If there was no support from them,
the secret desire of Herzegovina Croats to cede to Croatia would only
be one of the options, not the dominant one. If he did not empower
them to have a smuggling state, they would be left with Herzegovina
poverty and misery, Herzegovina would not be, as many who witnessed
it say, the riches part of ex-Yugoslavia, Herzegovina lobby would not
own half of Croatia.On the other hand, with Herzegovina help, Franjo
Tudjman secured in advance ten percent of the vote. Besides that, the
family of the state president has also developed its business. In
ruling Croatia, Franjo Tudjman and Herzegovininans are skillfully
helping each other.
Franjo Tudjman got Herzegovina, but lost Croatia. This
partly due to such a relation towards Herzegovina and
Herzegovinians.His policy of overtaking parts of the territory of
another country does not have the support of the Croatian public. His
turning the Croatian state into an economic and political hostage of
Herzegovina is creating bitterness.The international community is now
pushing him to give up on Herzeg-Bosnia.But, anybody will hardly give
him back Croatia. The president has lost the support of the liberal
part of the political scene and he is currently supported solely by
radical nationalists.
He has found himself in a situation in which it is hard to
win. If he exposes Croatia to international isolation due to his
support Herzegovina separatism and crime, his credibility will erode
further. If he gives up on Herzegovina, he will lose those that have
supported him so far. Tudjman will attempt to balance, but the space
for manipulation is narrowing down.
(Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", August 15, 1996)
The issue of the dissolution of Herzeg-Bosnia is also
considered by Zlatko Dizdarevic in the leading editorial of the same
magazine of August 29, 1996.
Some more courageous jokers from Bosnian regions have made
up a story even at the beginning of the war, which still circulates:
"After each big conference, Alija Izetbegovic came back home with
less of Bosnia in his pocket". Still the "fateful meetings for Bosnia
continue", and the president still goes to them, speedily getting
older. There is really less and less of Bosnia, although there is
rarely a person who wants to admit that. On the contrary, all new
defeats are represented with fake promises to the crazed population
as big and grandiose victories. One of those was the most recent one
in Geneva, where "Herzeg-Bosnia was finally dissolved". This decision
was even confirmed through the "gentlemen's agreement" of the SDA and
HDZ parties in Sarajevo.
The news seemed to good to be true. Actually, it turned out
that there are worse things than impossible. Facts came out to the
surface, which are, simply said, defeating.
The whole secret of "reduction of Bosnia" in the last Geneva
meeting is only in one word. There, actually, was no dissolution of
Herzeg-Bosnia there. It was actually dissolution of Bosnia. The
dismantling on the basis of the "gentleman's agreement", although the
war gave no confirmation that there were too many gentlemen, became
to be conducted immediately. The currency of another country,
Croatian Kuna, became an official payment source in Bosnia, along
with already existing German mark.
According to Jadranko Prlic,
Izetbegovic also accepted formation of Croatian counties in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and it is a question of time when he will accept the
dissolution of one state security service, named AID. This service,
of course, is dangerous to the extremists of all kind in Bosnia,
while both Pale and Grude are solving their intelligence need through
not contested intelligence services in Belgrade and Zagreb.
While the missing word in the context of "dissolution" is
concerned, everything is clear. Herzeg-Bosnia will be formally
dissolved, while the dissolution of the other will be essential and
practical.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", August 29, 1996
This question is also adressed by Zoran Daskalovic of the
Split weekly "Feral Tribune" in the August 5, 1996 issue of that
magazine.
By refusing to accept the results of the June elections, HDZ
of Mostar, along with the fact that it stopped the implementation of
the pilot programme in Mostar, threatened also the fragile
implementation of establishment Bosnian and Herzegovinian
Federation.At the same time, it enabled the Bosniak federal partner
to bring into question in front of the international public the
sincerity of the Croatian side in the implementation of the peace
agreement, and to try to gain the support in dissolving Herzeg-Bosnia
ahead of the elections.
The call from Washington, which did come suddenly after all,
despite assurances to the contrary from the Presidential palace and
his propagandistic team, shows that Ejup Ganic did not shoot from an
empty gun, when he sent a message, even from Belgrade, that with the
help of USA and Germany, the Herzeg-Bosnia question will be solved
soon.. While Western Mostar and Zagreb concentrated on the attempt to
force from the EU the repeating of the Mostar elections, they have
suddenly found themselves in the situation to save Herzeg-Bosnia
instead, which they have attempted, in any possible way, to smuggle
through September Bosnian elections.
With the entry of a great number of Bosniak MP's in the
county councils in Western Mostar and their dominance in the City
council, even if it is brought by "Serbs and others", with elections
in Mostar, a threat was already evident to the intention of the
Herzegovina HDZ to keep ethnically as pure the rule on the territory
of Herzeg Bosnia even after the September elections, and then, in a
new form and with a different organization of rule enable its
continuance until better international conditions for its formal
establishment as a state within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnian HDZ, but also its Croatian motherhead have realized
where they have made a mistake, so it is not a surprise that they
have entered a campaign of animating and persuading of expelled
Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina to vote in the places which they
inhabited before the war during the forthcoming Bosnian elections.
The fact that they tried to apply the Zagreb example of not
recognizing the results of the elections in Mostar, returned as a
boomerang in the form of the demand to expressly dissolve
Herzeg-Bosnia.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 5, 1996
Podgorica weekly "Monitor" brought in its August 2, 1996
issue the text of its military external affairs editor Vladimir
Jovanovic on the possible developments with Radovan Karadzic.
John Deutch and Patrick Hughes, heads of the renowned
intelligence companies CIA and DIA, have started a wave of
speculations about what could soon happen to Radovan Karadzic. In
their statements they have opened up the possibility of his
"internship", which is consistently being tied with the territory of
Montenegro. Deutch and Hughes used the terms of"physical removal from
Pale", without so far used self understanding term of the Hague as
the last "station" of Karadzic.
Some new slants in the American position on removal of
Bosnian Serb leader from the public scene have appeared, apparently,
during Richard Holbrooke's visit to Belgrade. They are most often
tied to the supposed American promise that they will not enter the
action of Karadzic's capture at the moment, which was publicly
confirmed, but that does not exclude the pressure on the Serbs that
their former leader has to leave Pale.
Two combinations seem to be in the game: that Karadzic
returns to Montenegro, where he would be politically immobilized(!),
or to accept the offer of the Serbian Orthodox Church, to go to
Hilandar, becoming a monk and receiving some form of church asylum.
Since then, Karadzic has appeared at some locations in Montenegro, in
which he has relatives (mother and brother), a certain circle of
sympathizers and a number of smaller companies registered under other
people's names.
The second combination seemed more serious, since the
envisioned host (Serbian church), in difference to the Montenegrin
authorities, has offered itself the recluse.
There is relative certainty that Karadzic still pulls the
strings in the background, while his successors are hardening the
positions on the matter of cooperation with the Hague tribunal, Brcko
arbitration, visit of Ejup Ganic to Belgrade and other.
In the meantime, the official Belgrade is applying a light
media pressure on Karadzic. Milosevic still cannot bring the matters
fully into the clear: the verbal accusations of Karadzic still do not
have the desired sharpness, since there is no valid strategy what to
do with the psychiatrist in the long run - the global Serbian side
still does not fully recognize the Tribunal. The compromise that
would bring Karadzic to Serbia maybe directly threatens security of
Milosevic in front of the expected electoral fury in Serbia.
So its Montenegro ! Karadzic could find his recluse in his
birth place which he left some thirty years ago. Based on what can be
hear in the well informed circles in Belgrade, the "Montenegrin
combination" with dr. Karadzic is not without its chances. It is a
strange combination of different interests and actors which are
interested for his fate - from the US State Department, across
Milosevic, up to bishop Amfilohije and one influential parlamentarian
party in Montenegro, which wants to threaten the ruling Montenegrin
establishment with Karadzic's transfer.
The sacrificial lamb though, is still being sought from
Milosevic, at which the significant difference in cries against
Karadzic and Mladic are becoming quite interesting. The BBC reporter
registered a statement of an anonymous functionary of Republika
Srpska in the midst of the Srebrenica massacre debate, that the full
responsibility for those events lies with the BSA, meaning general
Mladic. Anyway, he was seen there, photographed and videotaped,
Karadzic wasn't. Then came the statement of general Zdravko Tolimir,
Mladic's assistant and the head of the BSA counterintelligence, who
said that the Serbian troops would "remain indifferent" in the case
that there was an attempt to arrest Karadzic... Has the bond been
broken ?
According to Jovanovic's sources, they are, which estimate
that the relations between Karadzic and Mladic are worse than poor.
General Mladic was not present at the celebration of the SDS
anniversary at the end of June, where inflammatory speeches against
Milosevic were heard, in the same manner that Radovan Karadzic did
not appear the same day at the BSA army anniversary in Han Pijesak,
where Mladic was being held up after the brain stokes he had
suffered. As the things stand, and that is not only of recent,
general Mladic is the supporter of closer cooperation with Belgrade,
including the ideological one. This means that he is closer to
Bosnian Serb Socialists than to the SDS.
Karadzic, on the other hand, being more skillfull, first
sends a Belgrade lawyer to "check the terrain" in the Hague, then a
team of American lawyers, and finally the Republika Srpska minister
of justice. Mladic , on the other hand, has only one Greek
lawyer-volunteer, who is defending him from Athens by collecting
petitions and with the belief in Orthodoxy.
The Srebrenica horror, meaning the process in the Hague, is
more and more become a factor of division between Karadzic and
Mladic: across it are also reflected the current political
calculations connected with loyalty to Belgrade, old mortgages of
responsibility for defeats on the Western, Central and Northern
Bosnia, latent conflict between Bosnian military and police/security
and other.
Later reconstruction of the Serbian operation of overtaking
of the Srebrenica enclave, the size of gathering of troops and the
timing of the attack, do not leave space for doubt that dr. Karadzic
actively participated in the planning. Mladic's troops grouped mostly
in the Drina corps (Zvornik) under the command of generals Zivanovic
and Krstic, have done the main job of cutting the line Zeleni
Jadar-Podravanje, and than moves towards the town from two
directions, Zeleni Jadar-Bojna-Srebrenica and Pribiceva-Srebrenica.
But, behind the army units of the RS Interior ministry rolled along,
which have conducted the 'terrain mop up", and what Mladic is for the
army that is Karadzic for the police.
So, in that "terrain mop up" on the line Zuti List- Potocari
and towards Djogazi and Milicevici, came the special unit of the
Interior ministry, under the command of Ljubisa Borovcanin, than the
police unit of Dusko Jovic, and in Srebrenica itself then acting
minister of interior Tomislav Kovac was seen.
Brotherly division of responsibility, as is seen, is in the
past and the matter is getting close to that dangerous line, on which
there is writing in Belgrade hand script - who will get whom. There
are reports from Bosnia that the internal chaos is hardly being
patched up in public these days: the politicians want to make massive
cleanup in the army: the special place in those purges would be
reserved for general Tolimir, the source of most previous troubles
for Karadzic, particularly the attempted coup in Banjaluka of
September 1993. His closest aide, colonel Beara ' for security
reasons" has already left for Belgrade, where he is to attend courses
at the military academy.
General Momir Talic, the commander of the
1st Krajiski Corps, supposedly wants to be pensioned, since "he has
had enough", although he is diverted from this by the Command in Han
Pijesak and local Banjaluka Socialists, while general Novica Simic
from the Eastern Bosnia corps (Bijeljina), a man of general Mladic's
confidence, is making combinations with the Belgrade military top -
this does not exclude the top position in the BSA, with Mladic's
agreement...
Karadzic is still waiting for the global change in the
balance of power and mood, and these include the hardening in the
Muslim-Croat relations, a complete fiasco of the Bosnian elections at
which he and his SDS would take most of the Serbian votes and the
atmosphere of general tiredness of the entity named "international
community" and the removal of IFOR troops.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 2, 1996
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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA -
Vlastimir Mijovic of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" gave one
of the most recent reports ahead of the Bosnia and Herzegovina
elections in the September 5, 1996 issue of that magazine.
ELECTIONS
DISSOLUTION OF HERZEG-
Jelena Lovric writes from Zagreb in the August 15, 1996
issue of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" on the political possibilities
for the Croatian president Tudjman to dissolve the self-proclaimed
entity of Herzeg-Bosnia.
BOSNIA ?
BOSNIAN POLITICAL EVENTS
THE POSSIBLE POSITION OF RADOVAN KARADZIC
Balkan Media & Policy Monitor
and its regular supplement is a by-monthly publication.
Editor: Ruzica Zivkovic.Contact address: Celebesstraat 60 , PO 85893, 2508 CN The Hague, The Netherlands,
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fax 354 26 11.
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