THE AFTERMATH OF THE TUDJMAN-
MILOSEVIC MEETING IN ATHENS
The foreign policy commentator of the Belgrade weekly "NIN",
Dragoslav Rancic looks at the background of the Tudjman - Milosevic
meeting in Athens and the recognition between Croatia and FRY in the
August 16, 1996 issue of that magazine.
The meeting of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman in
Athens was a three day wonder. The announcement of the normalization
of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia was evaluated, even by
some UN officials, As " a step in the right direction towards
establishment of permanent peace and stability in the region", and
then, after the first reactions in the international public and
querried mood in both countries, a quick estimate was made of
something that was already known for a long time: the road towards
more normal relations will be long and treacherous.
Athens was a form of continuation of Dayton, even though the
Greek prime minister Simitis found it necessary to stress that this
time the negotiations were held without "observance". For full three
weeks the Greeks were discreetly preparing the meeting, consulting
with all the key political factors, first of all the Americans.In
their attempts to be of importance in finding the solution of the
crisis, they have skillfully chosen the timing - when the
normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb showed itself
as a necessity - and the prime minister Simitis appeared in the
international public as a unbiased mediator, more than Mitsotakis was
able to do so.
Knowing that after meetings like these each of the sides has
their own interpretation of events, and that this in itself often can
bring in new confusion, Simitis endeared his guests to sign a joint
statement, as some form of a public obligation.
Milosevic evaluated the agreement as a "very big step" in
the interest not only of the two countries, but the region as a
whole. Pro-government press in Croatia proclaimed the normalization
of relations with Yugoslavia as "the final victory in the war", while
Tudjman downgraded the delicacy of the remaining open
question"Prevlaka is problem for some, but not for us".
Judging by the official reactions on both sides, Milosevic
and Tudjman mainly talked about bilateral relations between
Yugoslavia and Croatia, while Bosnia was "only mentioned".
Due to statements like these, and due to meeting between
Milosevic and Tudjman, starting with the one in Karadjordjevo in
1991, usually do not pass by without a conversation on the division
of Bosnia, the conviction remained, that the two leaders had to
conclude in Athens, that the "success of the Muslim-Croat Federation
has to be prevented at any cost".Some Brittish comments even insist
that Tudjman accepted the normalisation of relations wit Yugoslavia,
fearing a possible deal between the Muslims and Serbs, after the
visit of Ejup Ganic to Belgrade.
Tudjman did not garner applause in his public. With the
exception of his ruling HDZ (the official daily "Vjesnik" does not
call Serbia ÿ"fascistic" and "aggressor" anymore, but "a strong
rival"), the opposition is more or less unanimous in negative
reactions, but with differing motives. The Christian-Democratic Union
stresses that president Tudjman "should not have met Milosevic", and
that he "has no right to give up Croatian land to anybody, least of
all fascistic Serbia".
The Socialdemocrats of Ivica Racan say that
it is "indicative with what ease the Croatian president negotiates
with a war adversary of yesterday" and are affraid of "secret
annexes". Only the Action of Croatian Socialdemocrats (Branko Horvat)
sees in the normalization of relations "the necessary step in the
context of general efforts" and warned that the return of all
refugees must encompass the fact that the agreement of the two
states cannot be on the account of a third one.
In Serbia, the Democratic party assessed that the process of
normalization will be "a slow one, although every reasonable man is
in favor that the relations among the states in the Balkans should
truly normalize", SPO asks - "without opposing" the Athens agreement
- why did not Milosevic and Tudjman agree on the normalization of
relations three or four years ago, but only now, when there are
practically no more Serbs in Croatia.
The Democratic Center of Dragoljub Micunovic says that "we
are left with nothing else than the normalization of contacts" and
that the key question is the return of refugees and their full legal
and proprietal security.As was expected, the Radicals of Vojislav
Seselj insist that Milosevic, after Krajina, "signed off" also the
Srem-Baranja region and Prevlaka and that "he was tricked once more".
After such remarks on the normalization, what is to be expected ?
First of all, even though we might be pushed into the
normalization, it signifies the true end of the war and announces,
even though it will be a slow and painful process, oncoming of a new
state. In the recomposed space of former Yugoslavia a balance of
power has been established, and the normalization means the respect
of this reality.
The Serbs have lost the war, and Croats, with international
support, have won it. Croatia became the main ally of the USA from
all the former Yugoslav republics. It is obviously conscious of that,
since it allows itself not to follow fully all the orders from
Bonn.
Behind Tudjman's statement that Croatia became "a
respectable regional power" lies an undoubtful wish that Croatian
armed forces are strengthened further. They will be, as was
envisaged, limited, but modern. Croatia does not necessarily have to
be the regional policeman in this part of Europe, but it is quite
probable that it will be among the first countries to enter NATO,
using the petrified view that the danger in the Balkans still stems
from the Serbs.
Secondly, the situation will be normalized as quick as the
problem of refugees is solved. As it seems, this problem will not be
solved quickly - of which a clear sign is the accusations levelled at
Croatia by the UN Security Council or Elizabeth Rehn, UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Former Yugoslavia.
The Krajina is lost to the Serbs and probably a very small
number of refugees will return there. It is also quite probable that
the Serbs from Srem-Baranja region will seek a solution for
themselves outside of the territory of Croatia, than in "joint life"
about which both sides are convinced is hard to achieve, almost
impossible.
In that context, the expectations of a wider amnesty in
Croatia are almost illusory. Not by accident, in the joint
Tudjman-Milosevic statement the amnesty is "understood" but is not
considered obligatory.
Thirdly, the recognition of Croatia by Yugoslavia for
Tudjman is the recognition of Croatian internationally recognized
borders. If the American approach to the normalization is considered,
seen as respect of former republican borders, Prevlaka will sooner
become some demilitarized point of Croatian territory, than a
strategic Yugoslav base. If it is true that Croatia was offered, in
return for Prevlaka, a part of territory of Republika Srpska, Tudjman
logically did not want to swap something that he considers his own
for something that he does not considered as Milosevic's.
Fourthly, it is an impression that on both sides the
normalization is seen as a forced move, without settled accounts,
meaning contrary to some reprisal or subjective view of godly
justice. For Croats, the Serbs are still aggressors which did not
repent and who still have to suffer. For Serbia and Yugoslavia, the
Serbs could not be the aggressors in their own country, and the war
that was lead was a civil one. The discussion on nature and causes of
military conflicts, will, be, to all accounts passed on to future
generations.
Fifth, it is hard to prognosticate the economic stimuli as
factors in the normalization of general relations. Both countries now
possess petrified and empoverished economies, which still have to go
through the process of transition. Contrary to Yugoslavia which is
attempting to return into international institutions, Croatia has the
support of the IMF and the World Bank for its economic
transformation, under some strict conditions.
These new streams
will define the new economic interest of Croatia for cooperation with
Yugoslavia, while Yugoslavia will welcome anybody who wants to
cooperate with it. From that standpoint, there is unecessary fear in
Croatia of a Serbian touristic "raid" on the Adriatic Coast. There
is a small number of those who could afford themselves Zlatibor (a
mountain touristic resort in Serbia), let alone the Adriatic.
Despite all, many things are gained with the normalization. Peace
is better than war, and the normalization, even a very cautious one,
is better than spreading of hate and prolonged tension.
Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", August 16, 1996
Beba Marusic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" looks at
the same event in the August 16, 1996 issue of this Montenegrin
independent magazine.
The sudden meeting in Athens of Tudjman and Milosevic, the
readiness to quick mutual recognition, according to first reactions
of the world, brought some relief, but also mistrust. first of all,
because of the proven ability of this duo to generate tragic
bloodshed with their opposing political moves. The mistrust is
further strengthened by the fresh memories of the turn of events that
have evolved after their last dual meeting.
Both Tudjman and Milosevic have too many reasons to put the
normalization of relations in the function of closing the gaps in
their internal politics. Tudjman brought Croatia to sovereignity and
international recognition and for the complete aura of "historical
role" he needs the final realization of the peaceful re-integration
of Eastern Slavonia and rounding off of the state border. Along with
that, Croatia, due to autocratic moves of its leader is standing in
fron of the door of the Council of Europe, which is lavishly usedby
the opposition there, and the year of the presidential elections is
ahead. On the other hand, Milosevic insists on the trick of the
recognition of the continuity of FRY with SFRY, heled by Montenegro,
in the attempt to cover up the failure of the Greater Serbian project
and the misery of all, including his own nation.
The motive for the war can be easily modelled and stuck on
the "secessionsts" for the simple folk. The recognition as the
sucessor of former Yugoslavia, would, according to him, open the door
of international financial institutions, which would be more than
necessary for the destroyed economies of Serbia and Montenegro.
The Croatian border towards Montenegro is fortified with the
most advanced fortification objects spread out at every fifty four
meters, a built road leads to each one, also the electricity, water
and a telephone line. It is hard to beleive that somebody who had
serioulsy thought of exchaning territory is building such
"infrastructure". It is really unlcear what could Milosevic offer for
exchange, when Croatia has everything on its side.
As far as
Milosevic is concerned, the "care" for Prevlaka cannot bring him back
the atribute of aggressor, nor threaten him with sanctions, and he is
also sending a message to his public that he is fighting for every
inch of the territory.
What is being hidden from the public here with the
aggressive planting of the exchange story is the fact that there must
be an agreement reached between Croatia and Montenegro, for which
Milosevic "cares" so much, about the passage of boats to the Bay of
Kotor in Montenegro. The president of the Croatian state border
commission, Hrvoje Kacic, has explained to the media there the
essence of the dealienation.
The most important fact in understanding the curent
agreement on Prevlaka lies in the following. Removing speculation and
guessing about the fact if there is movement from basic interests of
Croatia, Croatian officials were quite precise in their statements:
For Croatia the key is that Ptrevlaka is treated as a security, and
not a territorial question. From that standpoint, Croatia is
expressing readiness for cooperation, and possible forms of
demilitarization.
It is hard to be precise which of the possible combinations
for this demilitarization, detailed in international circles could be
utilized- possibly the wide belt from which "long guns" would be
removed, on one side until Ston and on the other until Budva. Or the
gradual one with a smaller range, but still based on reciprocity.
With builidng of tourist capacities instead of arms in the border
belt of both sides, a future of good neighbourly relations between
Croatia and <Montenegro would be offered. But, Belgrade will have
to be asked for that, when this side is in question. The Montenegrin
president will be satisfied any way it is decided.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 16, 1996
Nikola Burzan examines the Tudjman - Milosevic meeting form
the aspect of possible attempts to divide Bosnia in the August issue
of the independent journalists union of Serbia monthly "Nezavisnost".
What does the fact that the statement from Athens does not
mention Bosnia and Herzegovina with a single word indicate?
Was this incidental or intentional? Judging by all things,
Milosevic and Tudjman have already absolved that "theme", five years
ago in Karadjordjevo. They had nothing to add to that agreement to
divide Bosnia this time. It seems quite obvios that Karadjordjevo
agreement is still in force.
If both of them - again- are swearing by the text of Dayton,
why doesn't Tudjman really close down Herzeg-Bosnia, and why doesn't
Milosevic actually cooperate with the Hague tribunal ? Are they
really giving up on the "brotherly" division of "fathers riches":
Herzeg-bosnia to Croatia, Republika Srpska to Serbia ?
And what aboout the Muslims ? Former politician and
historian Ivan Djuic insists that Richard Holbrooke told him, a year
ago, making a prediction that such a Muslim state would last three
years at the most. And afterwards: which kingdom will it choose
Serbia or Croatian? Or, have Milosevic and Tudjman solved that
question in Athens too ?
It is exactly because of thesesecret deals of theirs that
the world does not beleive them anything anymore. Tudjman, sometimes,
when he gets in too deep, goes to have his ears scrubbed in
Washgington. Milosevic not even that: he is "the most important
American man in the Balkans" and his longest confessional distance is
Geneva. Why would Christopher always gather them, along with
Izetbegovic in Geneva ? CIA is surely informed that his great
Serb-Croat brothers work behind his back, and that it is almost
certain that he will bring them in, like school kids, and straighten
them out.
Although, frankly speaking, the Americans do not care much
who will rule Serbia and Croatia. For them it is important that there
is no "furror" there, that they do not have to engage and sacrifice
their soldiers in that stinking Balkan mud.For them, it is not
importantthat Milosevic and Tudjman are autocrats, practically
dictators, it is important that they "do the job" (often a dirty
one) in favor of the American elections. And afterwards ? Well it is
known what is done with sqeezed lemons.
On the other hand, it is probably clear to everyopne that
there is no peace in this region without some form of Serb - Croat
deal, meaning "full normalization of relations". So,all normal people
have to welcome every gesture ewhich leads towards that goal. The
only thing that is scary is the possibility of Franjo-Slobodan secret
deals.
Milosevic and Tudjman had many opportunities to meet "eye to
eye" before they did in Athens - what is not known whether that would
be for (our) good or bad. They were forced to the Athens meeting from
a great need, something is burning under their feet.
What is, then, burning under their feet? For Milosevic, "it
is known" the forthcoming elections, the unification of the
opposition. For Tudjman - sanctions for the breach of Dayton
agreement, meaning the relation towards the return and treatment of
the Serbs, even more so about Herzeg-Bosnia and Srem-Baranja region.
And, when fire is burning under somebody's feet he is ready to do
anything.
Source: Belgrade monthly "Nezavisnost", August 1996
Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" made his
comments on this event in the August 26, 1996 issue of that magazine.
The "lords of war" of yesterday have obiously jointly come
to the conclusion that the war page of the Yugosslav crisis is
closed, with minor "glitches" in Bosnia, and that currently the pair
has more in common one with the other - first of all remaining in
power - hat with - than with the tricked opposition at home or with
slow but persisten sponsors form the outside. Towards the latter a
maneouver was condiucted in the last few weeks wit a few scholarly
precise moves. After his miniature conversation with Clinton, Tudjamn
suddenly insisted that there is no more danger that Croatia will be
pushed into Yugoslavia, which prepared the table for the Athens
meeting with Milosevic, and the final ceremony in Belgrade.
The two sides then stressed that they have arranged their
relations "without involvement of other factors", while Croatian
foreign minister openly said a few days earlier why that is so
important to them:"If Croatia solves its problems with Belgrade
alone, a thesis will fall through that it is necessary to seek the
solution by pressuring all sides and that evverybody, due to that,
has to wait for integration into Europe". In that manner, the
foundations were placed of the new Western policy of two reconciled
neighbours.
With the type of criticism it expressed against the agreemnet
with Milosevic, the Croatian opposition will only rise suspicions in
the world that it is actually favoring continuation of the war (which
actually in part is a fact) and in that manner slow down, rather than
speed up drawing of the line under this war.
As never before, one should wish the opposition, in Zagreb
and in Belgrade, that they do not come out with studdering statements
and undertake bungling moves, since their political opponents, each
in a specific manner, are caught in the net of eventswhich they can
hardly influence. That is why they have fallen into each others arms.
This is particularly true of Milosevic, having in mind that Serbia is
now, without a doubt, on the edge of its strength after destructive
international isolation. It is no coincidence that same day that the
agreement in Athens was signed, the Hague Tribunal opened up its
offices in Belgrade, and FRY finally announced that it has accepted
the conditions for cooperation with IMF.
The real depth of the
Yugoslav crisis is contained in the paradox that the cry "All Serbs
in one state" has been achieved, but that is not a "greater" state,
but empoverished "smal Greater Serbia".
But on these sides of ours, the things are not much
brighter. Although Croatia has enlarged itself relatively more that
its opponent, with this it has only signed the papers for a new war
in its midst, whih FRY does not have to lead anymore, and the price
of that ond other crazy concepts is shown in the enormous number of
unemployed (18 percent). So, if the project of "Greater Serbia" has
failed, it is only a question of time when this will happen with
"Greater Croatia".
By everything it is seen that mutual recognition of two
states is moslt like the attempt of two cripples to help each other -
in the same manner that a blind and a mute can join so that they can
somehow see and hear, and as urgently as possible.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 26, 1996
THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS IN FRY
Nenad Lj. Stefanovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme"
coomments in the August 10, 1996 issue of the magazine on the ongoing
problems among the Serbian opposition ahead of the November 3 federal
and local elections.
Despite that customary party bragging and exaggeration, the
coalition held a series of rallies across Serbia and seemed to
be becoming a respectable political force. It also seemed that
Milosevic would have a hard time winning or at least that his rule
was less secure and lacking that certain majority in parliament.
Just a few months later "Zajedno" looked like it was dying
after knocking itself out in the careless handling of party vanity
and bad deals among the leaders. The people who claimed they would
win the elections and adopt laws to fundamentally change the system
of authority failed to adopt a protocol on cooperation among
themselves. The decision on thef ate of the coalition will be made
public in early September unless inter-party diplomacy can patch
things up.
Regardless of whether it exists or not, the coalition, regime
seems to be very afraid and it will obviously do everything to
prevent opposition leaders from getting together again. Every
calculation shows that the
Socialists, under existing election rules and the media monopoly,
could be shaken only by a wide coalition. That was proved in
many East European countries where the regimes were replaced by
coalitions.
Three months prior to the FRY elections, the offer is huge
but no one could say for sure whether there will be a coalition at
all. The current situation and existing elections rules have raised
a Socialist rock in front of the opposition and they'll get over
it only if they band together.
The latest DS statement shows that the party still
believes the coalition can survive. The DS presidency said there
is still reason enough to reach agreement on a joint stand at
the elections because quarrels can only strengthen the regime.The
DS said many local opposition coalitions have been in place in
Serbia for a while and added that cooperation in them is much better
than at party leader level. Djindjic said the recent incidents can be
resolved but added that the coalition members drew close too soon. He
said now there can only be mention of a minimum of the needed
unity which means agreement on a joint candidate's list including
DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica.
DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica said
the layout of the opposition scene will be known in a few days when
the DSS will finally decide whether to join the coalition or not.
He said the only winning combination is a technical coalition
including the SRS. Any coalition without Seselj, he said, would
achieve very little. A possible DSS-SRS coalition seems highly
unlikely because of fierce resistance inside the DSS and a lack of
interest in the SRS.
The SRS is also the smallest enigma in terms of possible
coalitions.They decided long ago to stand alone in elections
and don't want anyone's company. Their election campaign has two
goals: going againstthe SPS and Zajedno.
One of the most interesting coalition offers came from the
ND, a party with experience in a coalition with the SPS. ND leader
Dusan Mihajlovic is cautious in terms of the coming elections. He
recently told Politika that it's too early to talk of a JUL-SPS-ND
coalition.What's logical is not always the accepted solution
here,'' he said and added that if the SPS realizes that coalitions
are formed on the basis of two party determinations, pro-European
and everyone else, the ND-SPS-JUL coalition will be possible and
probable.
Uncertainty is also dominant on the subject of who's company
the SPS will keep in the elections. An SPS-JUL-ND coalition was
taken for granted for a long time. Recently JUL said they would
stand alone. Mira Markovic said recently JUL will probably not be
in a coalition. Asked about a possible leftist union she said: "You
have to ask the SPS and other parties. As for JUL, we believe a
front of all leftists parties has to be united.''
Sociologist Vladimir Goati said recently JUL and the SPS
are actually rivals. ``The moment those two parties stand alone
in elections, the same voters would have to choose between them,'' he
said and warned that polls show that opposition voters would not vote
for JUL and vice versa.
A coalition decision will be left to Slobodan Milosevic as
well as a decision on whether the SPS will merge into JUL. Some
analysts said that is the only way to stop the political big amy
considering the obvious transng everything the potential coalition
partners said about each other recently, voters can almost swear
they won't turn out. And that is what everyone who wants to topple
the authorities should fear most.
(Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", August 10, 1996)
The main internal politics commentator of the same magazine,
Milan Milosevic, examines the elections issure in the August 24, 1996
issue of the Belgrade weekly.
These elections are quite funny since no one is
interested in its outcome and no one questions whether the state
for which the elections are being organized functions properly. No
one wonders who will count the votes, but primarily, who will vote.
When announcing the elections, President Zoran Lilic
mentioned the concern of the state to facilitate the voting
process by ensuring favorable weather conditions on the polling
day. One ought to believe that the authorities changed the date of
the elections because such a move is likely to increase the
turnout and enable the elderly, who are known to be loyal to the
Socialist Party, to take part in the elections before the annual flu
outbreak.
On average, between 7% and 8% of the electorate (similar
to data obtained in the UK) does not vote due to illness, urgent
business or absence from the election registry.
This year opinion polls suggested indecisiveness on
behalf of the electorate that was on the verge of despondency.
According to some estimates up to 60% of the electorate is
likely to abstain from voting. This is probably an exaggeration,
but it still reflects the risindg tendency of people to give up
any interest in politics and in everything else.
According to Srecko Mihajlovic, a study carried out by the
Institute for Social Sciences in May this year on a sample of 2,000
respondents shows that in 1996, the electorate is unstable. Around
38% of the electorate claim to have taken part in elections in the
past and will continue to do so in the future, while 6% claim they
never voted and never will.This means that 44% of the electorate
behaves in a consistent manner.However, as many as 56% of voters do
not behave in a stable way: 32% are undecided, claiming that they
voted in the past but are not sure whether they will do so in the
future; 17% admit that they abstained but are now undecided; 4% voted
in the past but will not vote again and finally 3% abstained in the
past, and will continue to do so.
The abstention rate might reach 27%, as predicted by the
opinion poll, although only 6% of respondents were confident that
they will abstain. If we add to this estimate the abstention in
Kosovo it becomes clear that the crowd around the ballot box will
be smaller than in 1993, when out of 7 million registered
voters, 4.3 million actually voted (61%), while in Montenegro 69% of
the 430,000 registered voters came out to vote.
This is a continuation of a decrease in voting activity. In
1990, out of 7 million registered voters, 5 million voted---that
is, 71.4% of the electorate. This suggests that between the two
elections, 10% of the electorate, or 700,000 people, became politically passive. In
the 1993 elections for the Serbian parliament, the abstention rate
was 38%, a quarter higher than in 1990, when the same rate was
28.5% (This figure includes the organized boycott by the Albanian minority in
Kosovo).
At the first parliamentary elections in 1990, the turnout
was 71.5%,again lower compared to other former Yugoslav republics
(Montenegro 75%,Bosnia-Herzegovina 77%, Slovenia 84%, Croatia
and Macedonia 85%) or other East European countries (Czechoslovakia
96%, Bulgaria 90%). In Yugoslavia between 1974 and 1986
in the elections for the representatives in the national
assembly, the turnout varied between 82.5% and 92% and was
always lower than in other Eastern European states.
In 1990, the establishment in Serbia called an
election afterconsiderable hesitation and failed to give the
opposition parties equal campaigning conditions. Opposition
parties tried to force the authorities into improving these
conditions by threatening to boycott the elections, which added to
the uncertainty as to whether the elections will take place
at all. This uncertainty certainly contributed to the
extent of the abstention rate. Every election since then has been
marked by an inequality of opposition parties both in real terms and
in terms of media coverage, by conflicts within the
opposition, creation of phantom parties, crises of political ideas,
and pre-election campaigns which resembled a festival of weirdoes.
One of the ruling party's constant strategies was to make the
dissatisfaction of the electorate manifest itself through abstention.
On the other hand, part of the opposition's campaigning
activity in all the elections up to date revolved around the
boycotting of elections, which must have contributed to the
abstention of voters.
Srecko Mihajlovic is also trying to refute a widespread belief
about thelack of political interest amongst the young. He says that
older voters are, on average, less interested in voting than the
young, but are more stable, so the increase in abstention rate is
mostly the result of the behaviour of younger voters.
Results of analyses suggest that abstinence is spreading in
sections of society that are not traditional supporters of the
Socialist Party.
Although it may seem logical for the ruling party to be punished
for the consequences of its own policies, because of a
complicated social paradox it is the opposition who pays for all
the inadequacies of the current government.
In principle, the increased abstinence amongst the voters
suits the authorities since it increases the importance of the
proportion of the voters who always vote for the government.
However, it seems that like in the case of inflation, there is some
kind of a threshold, after which things begin to turn against the
government. This year, in terms of the media,the authorities tried to
keep politics out of public life. It tried to cool down public
opinion by organizing parties, but then again it expressed concern
about the abstention of voters. It directed its so-called
campaign of seduction mostly towards the young. This means that
the reserves of old voters are no longer enough.
Besides the state monopoly over the media, an obvious ,
reason why a substantial number of voters might decide to stay at
home is due to an election campaign that resembles a circus in
addition an overall rise in apathy. Don't people in cities hit by an earthquake just sit and
stare at the ruins?
Psychologist Dr.Zarko Korac says that the images of Skoplje
stricken by an earthquake suggests a state of shock, while what we
are facing is something different---it is the apathy of the unhappy.
We are a country full of unhappy people. A period of absolute emptiness always
follows an outbreak of anger. Mr. Korac describes the current state of our
societyas a society of stagnation and apathy. He sees the causes of
abstinence in the fact that those who lead their people into misery
now pretend to be peacemakers, in the fact that a fall in living
standards always leads to a fall in interests including the interest
in politics, in the fact that opportunities have been wasted, in the corruption, in the
disunity of the opposition and the lack of alternatives to
the present situation. Amongst the important causes he also
mentions the fact that the fate of the federal state has been doubted
by and alienated from the people, leading to a weak
identification of the citizens with the federal state.
From the perspective of those who support the authorities,and
according to the official verdict on the matter,the issue of apathy
has no real meaning. They probably believe that their behaviour is
optimal sincethey understand that they are not the real
participants in the events but only the wise leaders.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", August 24, 1996
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