The pre-electoral situation in Montenegro, particularly the
formation of an oppositionary coalition there is discussed by Darko
Sukovic in the August 30, 1996 issue of the Podgorica weekly
"Monitor".
Until the elections, the oppositionary coalition will have
the chance to show how much it is able to prepare a specific
democratic system, in which none of the coalitionary partners,
disregarding its strength and size will not feel threatened or
deprived. The conviction of "Narodna Sloga" (Nationa Unity) in the
pre-electoral campaign will be equal to homogenity amog member
parties.
The coalition is a matter of voluntary choice of each party,
but is also the matter of the neccessity forced by the electoral law
pushed in by the ruling party.For each member of the coalition,
particularly the weaker ones, leaving it would be political suicide.
It would be like resigning to acquiring f two or three unimportant
mandates, which would again float helplessly in the DPS majority.
That is why the Liberal and National party should not stress
their leadership in the coalition, as well as they cannot run awy
from greater responsibility for its functioning. That is actually the
curse of those who want true democracy. The leadersship of the
Liberal Union has already shown on number of occasions that it is
ready to compromize. The ladst time was when it accepted that the
coalition be give the pathetic populistic name of "National Unity".
But that is minor to the decision of the National Party to unite with
the parties which, until yesterday, it branded as anti-Serb.
Although it is fascinating, even unexplanable with what ease
the Liberals and Nationals are able to agree on joint actions so far,
the widening of the coalition will signify the end of the idyllic
state without conflicts. Some elements of the "Agreement of an
electoral Union" that has been signed by the two strongest
oppositionary parties, without a doubt, will not please the rest of
those that are siupposed to form the "great coalition". The first,
key variable, this document does not regulate precisely. The stance
that "the parlamentary mandates that are won will be divided
according to the proportion of mandates won at the December 1992
elections", is not applicable from the moment that DS and SDA parties
enter the coalition. Tha party of the Albanians stayed without a
parliamentary mandate for a few hundred votes, while SDA did not even
participate in those elections.
The Democratic Union (DS) will
probably demand two or three places, while the aptetite of the SDa,
if it enters the coalition, will be double that.. So, while the SDP
decided to swallow the "measly" five mandates, there is an inevitable
tumbling of proportions, wiithin the planned number of 36. That
sensitive job will be more politics than mathematics, and probably
the biggest temptation of the solidity of thge coalition.
There might also be a problem concerning the coalitionary
program prepared by LSCG and NS jointly. The parties that did not
participate in its writing will probably have something to add or
change. Still, having in mind the strategic stance that the key
contested questions be put "ad acta", a stronger debate should not be
expected.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 30, 1996
Pristina Albanian language weekly "Koha" brought two
comments on the forthcoming federal elections in its issue of
September 2, 1996; one by Ylber Hysa, the other by Baton Haxiu.
With the approximation of the Serbian elections in November,
the question of Kosova's inclusion in them becomes ever more
interesting. Albanians declared themselves, as Rugova stated, in
favor of not participating in these elections that belong to others,
which makes one think that the old game is to be played according to
the well known rules.
The non participation of Albanians will be a
known reality, especially knowing that the international community
doesn't seem interested at all to exert pressure on them, but in the
case of Kosova Serbs, this doesn't seem so. Our sources inform us
that the Serbian Resistance Movement is making its last efforts to be
registered as a political party, which would enable its participation
in these elections. Moreover, according to the SRM itself, this issue
seems to have reached Milosevic's table and there is still a dilemma
about the name of the organization itself. "If Milosevic would have
founded us, we would have asked him for the name", says a senior
official of the "Resistance", who later on admits that there are
fractions within their organization.
One of them has suggested the
name "The Serbian Democratic Movement", but the initiative has not
gained the support of the radical part of the organization. Anyhow,
the SRM is trying to come out in front of the public and the Serb
electorate as an organization of bigger political ambitions than just
a group of protest of the Kosova Serbs against the policy of
Belgrade. In fact, this purpose was announced in their last meeting
in Graganica, not attended by Milosevic, the main invitee. Milosevic
didn't come, says a SRM official, for simply he didn't know what to
say. "Right now, it is impossible to satisfy all parties, Serbs,
Albanians and the international community with only one statement".
Following all the meetings of the SRM, that can't be considered
successful, and after having gathered 43 thousand signatures of
Kosovan Serbs in a very ambitious petition, SRM seems to have used
all possibilities of public presentation, and now feels to be strong
enough and come out presenting the interest of the local Serbs as a
political force. But, this platform has also an idea standing behind.
To have a coalition come out in the Serbian elections. It would be
formed by the "bloc of the national-democratic forces". The condition
to become part of this coalition is to accept the Graganica platform.
The coalition would include both democratic parties of Djindjic and
Kostunica as well as Seselj's radicals "so the votes are not
dispersed in Kosova". The aim is clear: break down the SPS in Kosova!
The preparations have gone as far as the organization of a meeting
between Kostunica's deputy, Vucic and SRM's leader, Momcilo
Trajkovic. In fact, the members of the SRM have lately been visiting
a determined number of influential people in Belgrade, including
Dobrica Cosic, whom they are apparently trying to convince to come
back to politics, which doesn't seem achievable.
Anyhow, Cosic and
the others similar to him that have direct reasons to get involved
against Milosevic, are quite engaged as advisors. But, it is hard to
say whether the Kosova Serbs will come out in the elections as a
coalition against Milosevic and the SPS. Especially having in mind
that they have been absolutely on the side of the government. Even
though things have changed after Dayton and the fall of Krajina,
Kosova Serbs have never expressed their dissatisfaction in public
against the Serbian government.
In these circumstances it is hard to believe that the people
of the Serbian president will allow someone to play the game in front
of them, especially in Kosova. This probably because of the reason
that Kosova will be a priority in the agendas of the next Serbian
government as a result of the international pressure. Therefore, it
is logical to have control over the local Serbs too.
And it is
precisely the SRM that sees its chance for political promotion in the
politics of eventual concessions of the Serbian government towards
Kosova. Therefore, the public threat that Serbs will leave Kosova
massively if some unfavorable change for them takes place (which,
according to some information, was told to Mira Markovic by the
Kosova Serb leader) is in fact in the function of the pressures and
blackmail against Belgrade. The statements issued by the leaders of
the SRM regarding education, are connected to this. "If we give in
the issue of the University, we're done", one of SRM's delegates had
declared in one of the meetings held at the National Library. "We
defend our cause in the University" - it was said in one of the
meetings of the Kosova Serb representatives.
Meanwhile, there is
intensified rumors about the conversations between Albanians and
Serbs regarding the return of the first to their school buildings.
But, anyhow, the threat expressed by the SRM that the Kosova Serbs
will abandon it massively and go to Serbia, seems not to be one
relying on strong grounds, in the situation when the whole of Krajina
is in Serbia and this fact has not upset much the quite shocked Serb
public. Kosova Serbs are not in the same position as the Bosnian
Serbs, that despite the dependence from Belgrade, do have a state and
a government. The Kosova Serbs know this, and Belgrade knows this
too. This is maybe why the Kosova Serbs restrain themselves. This
equation will maybe make the mathematics of the elections much
simpler...
Source: Pristina weekly "Koha", September 2, 1996;
November 3 is the date set for the elections in the so
called FRY. On the same day, there will be local elections in
Montenegro. According to new rumors, Milosevic is observing the
possibility of having new elections in Serbia the very same day.
Having in mind that the political control over this area is under
Milosevic's dictatorship since long, new elections are a challenge
for the opposition. At the same time, the elections are a good chance
for the change of the structure of government in Serbia and
Montenegro. If feasible! Albanians consider this a new challenge -
whether there should be participation or not! It is not easy to
decide what is the best right now, especially having in mind all the
suffered experiences so far. What the opposition and the
international community declare is that Albanians should participate
in them, for their participation is the only way to change the
politics in Serbia (sic!), to develop democracy, to change internal
relations... Albanians, it is understood - all relevant factors,
consider the participation in the elections, as national treason.
President Rugova considers that these elections have nothing to do
with Albanians and the latter are not interested in the elections in
a state that has been applying an anti-Albanian course. Naturally,
the electoral system in Serbia proves clearly the discriminating
approach against Kosova.
For example, in Serbia proper, a total of 65
thousand voters elect one MP to the Federal Parliament, meanwhile in
Kosova, 150 thousand votes are necessary for one post. Although the
international community is trying to liberalize the dictatorial
foundations in Serbia through the opposition, the debates so far have
proven that the opposition hasn't showed anything new, nothing
positive about the solution of Kosova's problem. The only thing the
international community has done is to condition Serbia with the
outer-wall sanctions, which was recently verified by the IMF, that
conditioned the reprograming of debts, the loans and the lifting of
the sanctions with the democratization in Kosova.
The Serbian
opposition has not showed anything new and has not differentiated its
politics with the improvement of the position of the Albanians and
the status of Kosova. This is the reason why Albanians are sceptical
that they could change their position and that they can democratize
Serbia with their participation in the elections. Even if the
problems were eliminated, another big problem created by the Serb
hegemony remains as a ghost. There are so many discriminatory laws.
Even if these laws were eliminated, democratization in Serbia, the
Albanians consider, depends the least on Albanians. The impression is
that the Albanians can be only a reason for the new application of
the Serbian national(istic) policy. The others, too, give other
reasons for non-participation.
One of the other reasons that makes
Albanians boycott these elections belongs to the purely
constitutional nature, i.e. the position of the status of Kosova
after the constitutional changes in 1989. The Serb imperative, the
Albanians consider, was the ruin of the constitutional position of
Kosova. Therefore, there can't be any models of cooperation and
agreement with the ones that created and applied the policy of
discrimination and the destruction of the status of Kosova.
Naturally, these are signals that would show that discussing the
possibility of participating in the federal elections would be formal
and would give legitimacy to the government that discriminates. The
purpose is not to refuse everything that is suggested, but it is
understandable that the participation of Albanians in elections,
besides the factors mentioned above, can't change much in the state
that doesn't respect its constitution and laws. And, naturally, a
national consensus has been reached in Serbia, when it comes to
Albanians. These are sufficient reasons that make us ascertain that
we are not equal partners, but a stranger in the new Serbian state,
i.e.the FRY.
Finally, wasn't the participation of Hungarians in the
Serbian parliament enough proof of this? If the problems are treated
as they have been so far, e.g., in regard to the Hungarians, then it
is easy to conclude that the participation of the Albanians in the
elections would only serve as a decoration to the Serbian democracy.
The reasons stated above allow the assertion that Albanians have no
reason to participate in federal elections. It could be said that the
arguments for non-participation exist, but we can't say that these
elections are not of our interest. Maybe, we should discuss our
eventual participation in local elections, but whether we will remain
silent about the elections, this will actually depend on the
political attitude of our political factors in Kosova. At the end, an
eventual participation would mean the masochist contribution of the
Albanians to a discrediting and discriminating policy. But,
naturally, boycotting the elections should not be a reason to keep
the status quo.
Source: Pristina weeklt "Koha", September 2, 1996;
CROATIA-INTERNAL POLITICS
Bozo Matic of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", looks in the
August 2, 1996, issue of the magazine at the developments on the
Croatian internal political scene, and the lack of a real strategy
among the opposition.
Government representative Bozidar Skegro, during his
negotiations with the unions, came to the conclusion that every
normal nation needs only six months of well being before it forgets
all the bad things the government has done.
Although it is boiling everywhere, Skegro insists on
convincing the unions that the situation is not catastrophic. "The
catastrolphics" (as he calls all those that are following their
financial downfall with open eyes), says Skegro, do not have it
right, even though the consumer basket is 35 % more expensive than
last year, even though the phone bills are higher and higher, and
that after the introduction of a VAT tax and stupid customs policy
everything that is not essential for bare survival becomes expensive.
Hopefully, the unions are not accepting such explanations, but are
also not giving the right ultimatums to Skegro.
Only after two months, the Croatian citizens forgot the
military operation "Storm" and have "wrongly" voted in Zagreb. Skegro
is afraid to turn on the tap of well being too soon, wasting a pile
of money, while the nation will forget it when the election time
comes and decides to vote for somebody else. Of course, if it will
have anybody else to vote for, since one of the most recent public
polls indicates that none of the party leaders is seen as the
alternative to president Tudjman and his ruling HDZ party.
That is why the salaries are still on ice, and the currency
is being dealt discreetly, so that the inflation isn't noticed. All
of the money is being safeguarded for the so called state of
emergency, which could develop in two directions. The first
possibility is that the Parliament will meet in September after all
and designates electoral units, and based on that, calls elections in
a forseeable time frame. In that case, it is expected from the HDZ to
financially back its electoral lists and secure Tudjman easy
presidential elections.
The second possibility is that the government of National
Unity is constituted to the wishes of Tudjman, that HDZ and the
opposition cut off all contacts in Zagreb (since while it might favor
Tudjman, it still has no face to sell out the Zagreb mayor's seat)
and that Tudjamn comes into the Autumn with great unease (since the
pressures from the outside are not vaning). If the unions finaly time
their actions as the God wishes, they will be more organized and
conscious of the mood of its membership then up unil now, which could
further complicate the situation. If the wish of the HNS party
(Mesic, Manolic), which is constantly pushing its idea of gathering
of all parties around the center to form a Croatian "Olive" comes
true, it could be expected that the rating of the HDZ and Tudjman
falls further, where even the ordered optimism of the state media
would not help. In that case, there is no doubt, the president and
his closest aides (compising one, but unchangeable minister - Gojko
Susak,defense) could go for that other state of emergency.
The
pressure and purges in the media, the announced change of Zlatko
Matresa, as well as those ministers whose reputation is still
unblemished, give the indications that this is something that is
counted with. In that case, a lot of money would be needed for the
police and army, for eavesdropping and other, so it is good that
thetreasury is full.
Of course, Tudjamn would prefer that peaceful variant,
according to which the opposition should, along with a seat or two in
the government, cobver all the mistakes HDZ made, and excuse the
existence of that party in the last five years. That is why it is not
a surprise that the pressures on leaders of other parties are
growing, and that they are more and more retreating.
With the exception of Radimir Cacic, the man who decided to
go for all or nothing, and Savka Dabcevic Kucar, who has no reason to
fear the truth, everybody else is drowning in petty calculations.
There is more and more "sucking up" in their public appearances, more
and more cheap politicizing and less and less open criticism of the
economic catastrophe. Since the regime is more and more sensitive to
this, since it knows quite well that this is the real sore point, as
usual, the opposition is retreating, reaching out with a saving hand.
Indstead to "ride" daily on the facts that 20 % less of
domestic tourists went for holidays to the coast this year (meaning
that their buying power has decreased by 20 % this year), and that
private capacities on the coast are gaping open; that one thousand
inhabitants of Zagreb ends up daily on the unemployment list and that
at the same timethe aid that they have been receiving for two years
as unemplyed has been cancelled; onsted of "screaming" about the
catastrophic position of tohse emplyed, who are working in unhuman
conditions; about the sick and hungry pensioners, who have nobody to
complain to, and about the robbed owners of military appartments and
returnees who nobody wants, Zdravko Tomac and company, receive and
letter to and form Zlatko Canjuga (general secretary of thevruling
HDZ), come respectfully to negotiations with the president nad
peacefully look as the media in which they could get some space are
slowly being stiffled.
Instead of using the moment, they plan their
vacations ! Instead of alligning themselves with the unions, they
present the social situation as "relative" putting it themselves in
the context of anti-state activity. Mayebe they suffer from amnesia,
or what ? Or maybe they are waiting for overturned cars, broken and
robbed stores, explosions in public places.
If they cannot handle Canjuga and other president's men
today, who will give them the mandate for something bigger tomorrow ?
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", August 2, 1996
Dejan Jovic of the same magazine, examines in the August 30,
1996 issue of that magazine the activites already undertaken by
president Tudjman to win the presidential elections set for next
year.
Why was president Tudjman in a worse mood than ever on
August 5, in Knin, on the day he celebrated "the biggest victory of
Croatian arms" and "the solution of the Croatian question for the
centuris to come" ?
Talking on August 5 of this year about August 5 of last
year, it could be seen on Tudjman's face that is thinking all the
time about the August 5 of next year. The speech in Knin was actually
his first public appearance in the last year of (this) presidential
mandate. According to the Croatian constitution, the presidential
mandate lasts for five years, so the next ones have to be held by
August 2, 1997, at the latest.
Tudjamn saw in Knin that already, half way to the finish,
that August 5, 1995 is already letting in water and only with it he
can hardly reach that election day, when the gratitude of the state
to the president could be mathematically expressed through the number
of votes. But what else could Tudjamn, regualr elections winner
during the war, could offer so that he could evade a defeat in peace
?
The presidential elections next year will be fought around
the question: is it possible to imagine Croatia without Tudjman as
its president ? The whole strategy of Tudjman's election campaign (of
course, under the premise that Tudjman himself decides to run and
that this is not contested by some legal or inter-party wranglings)
will be geared towards a clear goal: show that there is nobody who
could replace him. That strategy was successful in 1992 already.
The public opinion polls made at that time have shown that
65 percent of the voters have thought ,already at the time that the
elections were announced, that Tudjman will be elected for president,
and 60 percent beleivet that the HDZ party will win the absolute
majority of mandates in the Parliament.The strategy of the HDZ
election campaign was exactly in that to formulate the inevitability
of the election results , and that any oppositon to "what must be"
is in advance shown as futile.
The presidential election campaign that is to come will have
the same formula, but will be garnered with other "spices", like
songs about Tudjman.
Tudjman's campaign will be "fatherly" and he will be
represented as "Croatian Daddy". This is actually in complete unison
with Tudjman's corporativistic beleif that a nation is a big family.
The creators of such a campaign will spread the beleif that voting
against Tudjman, father of the nation, would be a political
equivalent of paternicide.
That media pre-election campaign has already started is shown
by the factthat immediatley after Tudjman's speech in Knin, the TV
daily started showing special programmes about the "Storm".
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", August 30,1996
Milan Gavrovic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" looks in
the August 12, 1996 issue of that magazine at the reasons behind the
fear of Croatian politics to enter any form of regional
cooperation.
At the first moment it could seem that president Tudjman
jumped into his own mouth, and in a very spectacular manner at that,
so that he probably deserves a gold medal in a discipline in which
the Balkan politicians are already at the top of the rating list in
the world. Although the statement after the meeting in Athens said
that the two sides support the principle of free movement of
citizens, capital, goods..." and so on, only two days before that he
rejected that in his speech in Knin. there he said that the
representatives of EU and NATO "have directly asked me to accept that
Croatia becomes a part of a Southeastern European union, a union
where there should be a freedom of movement of people from Pancevo
and Pozarevac until Knin, freedom of movements of goods, unified
telecommunications etc. Such a union would be worse for the Croatian
people than was former Yugoslavia".
Still, although he annoucedin the statement, what he has
already angrily rejected in his speech, President Tudjman remains
consistent in his policies. He has accepted the freedom of movement
of people, goods and capital - but only to his measure. Milosevic and
himself will solve that as it suits them, and not in the manner the
international community sees it.
That is the essence of the message from Athens. The problem
is not with the "union" that is supposedly, in conspirative but
consistent manner, being asked by th4e world powers. The problem is
not in the form, but in the content, which is explicitly stated by
Tudjman himself. Will we allow people to come freely to Croatia, from
Pancevo and Pozarevac, particularly to Knin, which finally became
"clean" ?
In that manner, national politics conflicted again with
economy, where, unfortunately, it is already clear who will lose.
Only Milosevic and Serbian nationalists share Tudjman's vision of a
divided world, whose "crack" passes right between "them" and "us".If
things "go wrong", they could, again, loose in peace what they have
gained in war. And they have gained ethnically pure states in which
they guard apsolute power, feeding the hungry population withplates
amply filled with fear from internal and external enemies.
Looking from an economic angle, Croatia should use all its
efforts to establish at least a customs union on the territory of
former Yugoslavia. If other countries would join - that much for the
better. Albania and Romania ? Why not ! In former Yugoslavia, Croatia
was, after Slovenia, the most developed republic. The weak ones build
walls around them, the strong ones bring them down. Croatia could
only win from such an arrangement.
This beginners lesson in economy, for example, is not only
accepted by Slovenia, but it is actually using all its powers to put
it in its economic practice.There is no more joint state, no federal
budget, no underdeveloped fund. What should it be afraid of ? Every
arrangement is only a result of a developed calculation, whether the
gain is greater than loss.
But the nationalsits want to streengthen the results of
"humane resettlements", they want to conduct colonization and
conclude the joint work started with Milosevic in March of 1991 in
Karadjordjevo. The nationalists now where the trick is and why the
international factors are at this moment insisting on economic ties
in the region of former Yugoslavia. That is a bait they will not
swallow.
In the meantime, the economic freedoms will be tailored in
an agreement with Milosevic, and "their" people will be given proof
that others are the ones that are stealing and robbing us, that dark
forces have made a conspiracy against us and so on.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 12, 1996
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO
Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" published in its weekly edition
of September 7/8, 1996, an editorial comment concerning the latest
agreement Milosevic-Rugova.
When the Albanian children enter school buildings, Serbia
will again enter Europe and the world. So called outer wall of
sanctions will be brought down, foreign capital will flood into
Serbia, all of the horrors of terrible policies, which is lasting
almost a decade, will be forgotten and negated. Judging by the first
official reactions and according to (un)told expectations of the
representatives of the regime, this is how it should look the
scenarion of the political outcome which will ensue after the signing
of the agreement on the use of school buildings between the leader of
Kosovo Albanians and President of Serbia.
The normalization of the situation in Kosovo supposes, on
the other hand, a much wider palette of measures and much deeper
changes so that this, most desirable version of the outcome would
come about. "The victory of the civilization", of which the Agreement
speaks, will not take place as a simple consequence of concessions to
outside presures on paper. It will be neccessary that the
consciusness which recognizes that national equality, respect and
protection of human rightsare the real essence, but also a measuring
stick of civilizational maturity of a certain society and not a sign
of political dexterity to gain big political gains in the West by
making small concessions, takes over in Serbia. Such maturity takes
time, since the opppositon here did not differ much of the regime
here in the neglect towards elementary civilizational values and
their ignoring.
To really normalize the situation in Kosovo, both the
conscioussness, but also the political habits of Serbs will have to
change, but so will the political ambient and constitutional order of
the state that is today cold Serb, or Yugoslav. Neither will Serbia
be able to remain whole, in the manner in which it was in the last
six years, nor will the new state be composed of less than three
parts. and, of course, it will not be "Srb", but a state of its
citizens, nor will there be only one nation and its leader.
Indicating this is a small detail in the Agreement itself,
which remained unoticed and without comment. President, although a
"frozen" one, of the ruling party in Serbia, signed the Agreement
with the leader of Kosovo Albanians in the capacity of the Serbian
president and in that manner determined (future) status of the
co-signatory. When one of the following documents is signed in
Albanian language, it will be probably clear that we are witnessing
the begining of the constituting of the state of Kosovo Albanians.
What will be the relation of this state towards Serbia and Montenegro
is too eraly to speak, but but one should be ready for that
conversation, but with better arguments than those that can be found
in bad heritage and ramblings of nationalist extremists on both
sides.
The President of Serbia is given a chance to pass a
redeeming examination on kosovo concerning knoledge of civilization
and modern world, which comprises more parts. In front of an
international comission he will be asked about Bosnia, Kosovo, the
Hague Tribunal, succession and international monetary institutions,
and in front of arms makers, other metal workers, teachers, peasants
and pensioners he will show what he learned about domestic economy
and society. If he satisfies both comissions, the mandate of his
authority will be extended, to joint satisfaction. But, we have to
hget ready for the situation where he will fail the exam, but will
remain in power.
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", September 7-8, 1996
Belgrade weekly "Vreme" brought in its issue of August 3,
1996 an article by Violeta Orosi of the AIM news pool from Pristina,
concerning recent political developments in Kosovo
The two-day visit by Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic
was full of already used evaluations of the political situation in
Kosovo, with accusations over what he called the years old
political self-isolation of the separatist leaders and the obligatory phrase that no
deals will be done with Kosovo. But Marjanovic fitted into the more
recent trend of statements that talks should be held with the Kosovo
Albanians. He said: "On the basis of full equality for all citizens of Kosovo, we can
reach agreement and find solutions for all problems in the economy,
education, health care, culture and all other material and spiritual
fields.''
What no one can hide is the intensified engagement by
Carl Bildt's people in creating conditions for the Serbian-Albanian
talks neither side can avoid however much they'd like to.
Bildt's associates are reported to be shuttling between Pristina and
Belgrade all the time but it's almost impossible to get details
of what they're saying to both sides. We know reliably that the focus is on how to normalize
conditions in Kosovo which would be proof of the good will of
the Serbian authorities to finally start solving the Kosovo
problem. The agenda includes education, health care, information,
culture, sports and other issues such as the problem of political
prisoners.
So when will some more public meetings take place? Analysts
say not this year perhaps next year.Cynics say there already
are some regular contacts. Some of the Belgrade press claims that
the talks will take place in New York this autumn. The opposed political sides say
they want to talk.
Source: Belgrade weeklyn "Vreme", August 3, 1996
Chief commentator of the same magazine, Stojan Cerovic,
focused on the Kosovo situation in his regular column in the August
24, 1996 issue of "Vreme".
Only a statement from one of the leaders of the Democratic
Union of Kosovo (DSK) arrived, claiming that Albanians from Kosovo
will not take part in the elections since these elections have
nothing to do with them. By refusing to vote, the Albanians are once
again saying that the state in which they live is none of their
business, a position shared by many Serbs who themselves show little enthusiasm at the
prospect of exercising their democratic right. Although the
statement from the Albanian leadership had been expected, the
state hurried to emphasize to be on the safe side---that they, that
the affairs of the Albanian minority, is none of its business
either.
Not long after Lilic called the elections, Radmilo
Bogdanovic, former Serbian first policeman, accused Rugova and
his DSK of being behind the recent terrorist attacks in Kosovo.
With the authority of someone who is not exactly at the bottom of
police hierarchy, Bogdanovic threatened that Kosovo Albanians might
end up being treated as foreigners. Albanians might be able to
interpret this as a promise of receiving better status and
treatment.
What is important is that the state and the Kosovo
Albanians, or at least Bogdanovic and Rugova, are unanimous in the
opinion that they will not meet at the next election. It appears
that such interpretation of Bogdanovic's statement escaped many, so
attacks on Bogdanovic came not only from those who are concerned
about democracy and human rights.
Probably many who are part of the regime also thought
that such an undiplomatic incident is doing harm to the state
which aspires to improve its image, and once again seems
respectable.
That is why Bogdanovic subsequently had to explain that,
according to his expert opinion, Albanians are seriously
considering taking part in the elections. That, therefore is the
bottom line. That is also why, after first accusing, insulting
and threatening them (and after police one again demonstrated its
might), Bogdanovic invited the Albanians, as well as the Muslims
from Sandzak, to be so kind as to vote.
It is quite likely that the Kosovo Albanians are still far
from being willing to vote, but the very possibility of Albanians
turning out to vote---which cannot be excluded---is frightening to
Belgrade. These are federal elections, which means that if Albanians
do take part, in doing so they will be recognizing the legitimacy of
the unstable and slightly problematic Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Rugova of course would rather avoid this, but since
the last election the position of the Albanians, the status of
Milosevic's regime, and the approach to the problem by the international community have all
changed considerably.
While the outcome of the Bosnian war was still
uncertain, and when no one was sure if and where new borders will be
drawn, Kosovo Albanians had their reasons for pinning their hopes on
the affinity and support of world powers who were eager to stop
Milosevic. After Dayton, it is stilltrue that Washington has not
recognized Belgrade yet, but European Union countries have, and it
appears that everyone agrees that the solution to the problem lies
within rather than outside Serbia or Yugoslavia.
Therefore, this time it will not be that easy for the
Albanians to justify their boycott of the elections. In fact, it is
quite likely that they will be pressured to take part, thus
making the whole thing comically absurd. Neither Milosevic nor
Rugova want to see Albanians voting at the election. It appears
therefore that any international pressure on the Albanians to
vote only creates a problem for both parties: It suggests to the
Albanians that they cannot ignore the state they are living in, and
to Serbia, of Yugoslavia that it cannot pretend not to notice almost
two million of its inhabitants.
The police regime and the Albanian boycott have been going on
for far too long. Everyone is exhausted; both Albanian and Serbian
population, and Serbia itself. In such situations, the state is
obliged to make the first move, to recognize the problem and attempt to solve
it. For Milosevic however, the interests of the state and those of
his own rule stand in a ratio characteristic of dictatorships and
this is clearly illustrated by the present example.
He never had a better opportunity to, in the interest of his
people and with strong international support, start mending
what, to a large extent, he himself destroyed in Kosovo. However,
the Albanian vote would increase the chances of Milosevic's party
and Family ending up in the minority, and such a prospect fills him
with so much grief that he would rather help Rugova by providing
him with convincing reasons for boycotting the elections.
This is the main purpose behind Bogdanovic's threats and
accusations.
If compelled to deal with the problem of Kosovo,Milosevic is
likely to do so after the elections. This however, should worry
those who believe and think that Kosovo is and should remain part of
Yugoslavia, that is, that the solution lies in autonomy rather than secession. It
is very important for Albanians to take part in these elections,
both federal and local, because they might turn out to be the last
chance for such a solution; for stabilization, peace, and for
averting the spiral of violence---the glimpses of which are already
discernible.
The naked force of inertia,as well as the power-retention
instinct will guide Milosevic towards the risky and dangerous
enterprise of partition and demarcation, which seems impossible
without weapons, terror, ethnic cleansing and crime. The relations between the two people are
beyond hatred. This is worse than inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia
ever were.
In such a situation partition seems logical and natural, but
impossible even with the help of potential international
arbitration. Even the beginning of negotiations on the issue,
which implies an "exchange of population,'' would itself provoke an outburst of fear and
violence.
There is no doubt that after all these years of terror, the
Albanians find it difficult to accept these elections and indulge
in any kind of cooperation with Belgrade. Probably even Washington
and all Kosovo leaders together would not be able to persuade the Albanians to
do any such thing, although their non-violent boycott is no longer an
efficient tool of resistance. They are facing a uncontrolled
and unstoppable slippage towards desperate and hopeless terrorism,
and the loss of all international support.
On the Serbian side, at least the opposition, (that is the
better, more responsible and democratic part of the opposition),
should demonstrate their awareness of the importance and extent of
the problem. Here the responsibility is not only that of the
regime, and there is not much point in relying on the omnipotence
of external forces. No one around here will feel any better if in
the end Milosevic, Rugova or America are blamed for the disaster. The
issue goes beyond that of the elections and calculations about who
profits or loses from the Albanian boycott.
From the perspective of Belgrade, Kosovo is such an
unpleasant problem that few want even to think about it. However,
whoever has any influence on public or political affairs should look
in that direction and realize the danger of the terrible dead-end in
which the Kosovo Albanians have found themselves. If pushed
towards terrorism, there will be little peace even outside Kosovo.
In such a situation no one can look forward to the blooming of
democracy in Belgrade. No one will be able to regret he absence
of room for free press of the opposition. Neither ``Together'' or apart. I can easily imagine a future in which
many of the things which we now find unpleasant and unbearable will
seem like luxury. Five years ago we also did not live very
comfortably, while in fact we were doing great.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", August 24, 1996
Balkan Media & Policy Monitor
and its regular supplement is a by-monthly publication.
Editor: Ruzica Zivkovic.
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