THE ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
The different aspects of the forthcoming
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are covered by the following
magazines:
In its issue of May 2, 1996, Sarajevo weekly "Svijet"
brought a report of Zlatan Karovic concerning the election rules in
Bosnia, decided upon by the electoral commission.
The choice between
bad and worse could hardly be called a free choice. In that manner, it is
clearer in which situation does Bosnia and Herzegovina find itself, which
is constantly in this kind of "dilemmas". To make the paradox greater,
the choice is not even give by the elections. At least that is the
impression that crops up after the announcement of the election rules,
directed by the Temporary Electoral Commission, lead by the veteran
american diplomat Robert Frowick. The announcement of the rules started
an avalanche of reactions, particularly from the opposition parties.
But, all political forces on the territory controlled by the BiH Army
agree in one thing. They estimate that the election rules legalize the
war politics of ethnic cleansing,, by which the design of the Bosnian
ethnic carpet have been drastically changed.. The article in question, of
course, is the one which enables the refugees (inside Bosnia) to vote in
their new places, for the authorities in those. Simply put, the elections
have to legitimize their temporary residences as permanent. Frowick
commission explains this rule with very convincing arguments: the people
have to be allowed to vote somewhere and for somebody, and to decide
themselves where they want to live. Essentially, everything is
controversial: by this rule the re integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is destimulated, and at that, in its key part - the return of refugees to
their original residences.
Frowick's decision perpetuates ad
infinitum the key question: Is the international community really working
at the re-integration or on the final ethnic division of Bosnia and
Herzegovina ? Not only the rule on the refugee vote, but also the rule by
which the Serbs in the Federation, and the Bosniaks and Croats in the
Republika Srpska practically have limited voting rights,show that the
international community is formalizing "the reality" arrived at through
crime, genocide and expulsion. Talking about the past, it directly
influences the future. Since, even with the said shortcomings, the
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina should bear the epithet of
"democratic".
The finger is pointed at the international community,
since, through the Frowick's commission, it took the right upon itself,
but also the obligation, to decide instead of us what should the
democratic elections look like. That is why there is the strengthened
conviction that the world powers, under the guise of "democratic", are at
work on legalizing the ethnic cleansing and definitive three-part
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This pre-election direction deals
directly with the voters, but even more so with the political parties
which have to enter these elections. It should not be doubted that the
nationalistic parties will know how to capitalize Frowick's gift and earn
on the refugee misery the majority of political mandates. This includes
not only the Serbian SDS and Croat HDZ, but also the Muslim SDA party.
It is really hard to assess whether it is good for Bosnia and
Herzegovina that the elections be held at any cost. A good reason for
holding the elections are found in the fact that they would lead to a
change in power in the Serb entity, finally removing Karadzic from the
helm there. In the best instance, the criminal policy will be somewhat
softened, but essentially not changed. The Pale-Banja Luka republic is
dominated by the opponents of the Bosnian- Herzegovinian statehood and
proponents of unification with Serbia and Montenegro. Secondly, even
after the elections, Karadzic could keep the essence of power in his
hands, as the head of the SDS party. He will surely not move from that
position. The only chance of the political elimination and removal of the
Bosnian butcher is in his arrest and taking in front of the Hague
Tribunal.
The postponement of the elections or its boycott are
important also for the fate of the internal political processes in the
Bih Federation, more precisely said - in the territory under the control
of the BiH Army, which is the only place where the multi-party system is
taking hold.. But even there it is not taken to the essential democratic
level.Even there, some party advantages for the SDA are drawn from the so
called reality. The most important part of that reality is the monopoly
of this party over the key electronic media. SDA has a hundred percent
political control over the biH TV and the republican radio waves. It does
not show any readiness to give up on this monopoly.
Frowick cannot
help there . Even with proclaimed rule that all parties have equal access
to the media, it is known that this will not happen. All the parties will
formally get proportionally equal time, but the SDA, as it was so far,
will be installed in all programs .It is clear that SDA will enter the
electoral race with a few meters of advantage. That is why there is ample
reasoning why the suspense over the participation of the majority of the
parliamentarian parties from the territory under the legal rule of the
B/H authorities should continue. The reasons for the boycott are clear,
but on the other side, so are the shortcomings that come along with it. In
that manner, all the power would concentrate into the hands of the
nationalistic parties.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", May 2, 1996
Dragan Todorovic of the Belgrade weekly
"Vreme" looks at the pre-electoral situation in Bosnia among the Bosnian
Serbs.
Slobodan Milosevic at the Congress of the Socialist Party
of the Bosnian Serb Republic held in Banja Luka on 1 June told his
dear comrades'' that he wanted unification of all progressive---Left
and democratic powers in the Bosnian Serb Republic---parties, movements
and individuals into a joint and strong front'' and that all that is
progressive and democratic in the Bosnian Serb Republic should
stick together.'' The socialists, to whom these wishes were
addressed, announced that a Leftist election block would be formed
and that, apart from the socialists, it would include also the
Party of Private Initiative, Social-Liberal Party and Independent
Dodik.'' The state-controlled media in Serbia also recognized the
progressive and democratic'' in the Left block, so that is all they
are informing about. Others do not exist. And they do exist, even out of
the too independent SDS.
With an insight into the situation and
Banja Luka Major Radic's statement that time has come to choose
healthy forces, to refresh the Government, the Parliament and SDS''
and that he who wanted to lead the people must be morally clean and
prove that he had taken nothing during this war, VREME in early April
foretold that the forces gathered round Radic, Kasagic and Koljevic
and the military authorities such as the Panther'' commander Major
Mauzer would try to transform SDS from within, so the party cleared
of the sinful people and deeds would win the elections. However, this
did not happen. Kasagic was dismissed, there was an attempt to do
the same with Radic, Pale is holding the reins even tighter. What is
SDS doing nowadays? It is trying to control the media in order to
remain where it is, with the help of Seselj's radicals or numerous
satellite parties.
As Seselj seems to have demanded too much, they
will have to try on their own to stay in the saddle.
Therefore, they decided to surprise the people---during the
campaign, they will formally carry out privatization by distributing
shares. As the deadline for nomination of presidential candidates and
deputies has been shifted from 27 June to 4 July, a reliable source
tells us that a few days prior to nomination SDS will hold a party
assembly in which they will choose the candidates. Aleksa Buha is
planned for the party president, Biljana Plavsic for the presidential
candidate and Momcilo Krajisnik for the Serbs' representative in the
Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And where is Karadzic?
Although certain
SDS boards hope that if world power wielders ease, he might
become president,'' there is no way---the elections regulations
clearly say that the lists with candidates for the Hague are not valid.
Koljevic is at a crossroads. Before the nominations are handed in, there
is going to be a meeting with Milosevic and Koljevic hopes he
might be the compromise solution because Bosnian Serbs do not want
a Leftist'' president and the world dreads Karadzic's Rightist''
extremists. The news is that the Party of Democratic Center
from Trebinje, Fatherland Party from Banja Luka, National Radical
Party Nikola Pasic'' from Banja Luka, Peasant-Radical Party from Kozara
Dubica and Democratic Party from Bijeljina formed the Democratic
Patriotic Block in Bijeljina on 8 June, which is as of 13 June
headed by Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic, as a person of special
patriotic and democratic determination.''
The Democratic Patriotic
Block declares itself as a block in the center, the lower limit of the
Bosnian Serb Republic's sovereignty is the Dayton agreement, their aim
is to unite with other state units of the Serbian people, to develop
good, primarily economic relations with the Muslim Croat federation,
the state should be based on the observance of the constitution and
laws, have independent judiciary, free media, professional army,
market economy, take care of refugees, take care of the families of
people killed in the war, members of ethnic minorities and their
rights... In a capsule, patriotism can go along with democracy. If
the people accept this program, will Milosevic admit that this is what
is progressive and democratic.''
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", June 22, 1996
Gojko Beric of the Sarajevo
weekly "Svijet" takes a look in the June 27, 1996, issue of that magazine
at the political situation created by the recent attack on the former
Bosnian prime minister and current presidential candidate Haris Silajdzic.
After the incident in Cazin, some people from the American
political establishment have stated some of the strongest accusations at
the account of Alija Izetbegovic and his party, attributing them with
"violence over political opponents". At a first glance, the US is making
it known that it will be brutally open and intrusive in giving lessons
from democratic behavior within the space of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
would definitely have some sense if the American pressure would be evenly
spread.
But, what is with two other ruling parties. In the kingdom of
power whose spiritual monarch is HDZ (the key national Croat party in
Bosnia, and ruling party in Croatia itself),there is no place for any
other political party, which still does not bother the official
Washington much. The situation in Republika Srpska, more precisely in
Banja Luka, is only somewhat different. There are some opposition
parties, of which two were installed by Milosevic, for the future use of
ceding half of Bosnia to Serbia, but the power is still completely held
by the nationalistic SDS. Still, some thing are now a bit clearer. It was
known from before that the Americans have chosen Silajdzic as their man
in Bosnia. They were only troubled to eliminate Izetbegovic least
painfully, who does not only have the authority of the leader of the
majority of the Bosniak population, but also strong connections in the
Islamic world.
The attack on Silajdzic in Cazin enabled Washington to
openly place itself on the side of the recent Bosnian prime minister and
promote him as their man for the September elections. For that purpose a
political and media stereotype has been created, according to which
Silajdzic is for a unified and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Izetbegovic supposedly is not. Although neither of the two has given
enough proof yet for the positions which the mentioned stereotype
attributes them with, which does not mean that there are great
differences in their political concepts. The problem, though, lies in the
fact that Silajdzic cannot keep multiethnic Bosnia if this is not desired
by the Serbs and Croats, as Izetbegovic cannot destroy it by himself. The
essence of the matter is not in this or that personality, but in the
state of the spirits.
Current national parties are not political parties
in the classic sense of the word, but populistic movements. That is why
these parties do not have either clear ideology or economic or social
programs. The cult of the national is propagated as a general living
principle, and the one that does not accept this principle is branded as a
national traitor.
According to the currently accepted standards of
Serbdom or Croatdom, the status of a prestige Serb or Croat is given to
former criminals, persons from the bottom of the pit, marginal characters
and primitives which have affirmed themselves in this war as murderers
and pillagers. One of those, promoted through the media as the hero of the
home war, killed Tudjman's minister of tourism, paid with the sum of 15
thousand Deutch marks.
The guy would, probably, for a larger sum,
accept to shoot Tudjman himself. Bosnia is also abundant with these
types. During the war, they have represented the striking fists of the
militarized national parties, enriching themselves on the way through
pillaging and contraband. Today, these are local power brokers, who do not
allow anybody to pass through, the leaders of the gangs which practically
control the entire public life in their area. The only order in the
Western part of Mostar is the one established by Mladen Naletilic named
Tuta. The mayor, police, and other handles are only a cover for Tuta's
rule. If somebody thinks that Tudjman can remove Tuta when he wishes to,
they are mistaken. And why would he, when he might need Tuta again. Tuta
will always convince the Herzegovinians that he is a greater member of the
HDZ than Tudjman himself.. The one that proves that he is a greater HDZ
supporter is the one that will survive. And, as the communists have
spoken, it is the movement that is important, not the individual. Mr.
Izetbegovic himself probably has a problem with a Tuta of his own. Or a
few of them. The basic idea of such a movement has the role of the brain
and the blood vessels at the same time.
Izetbegovic is maybe
intimately against the attackers on Silajdzic, but does not understand
that the beating stick was in the hands of the nature of the SDA party
itself. Even if somebody wanted it, it would be completely unnecessary to
plan such an incident in the key board room of this party. It could be
actually said that Silajdzic hit himself in the head.Up until recently,
he was the second ranking authority of the ruling party, the right hand
of Alija Izetbegovic. Leaving it, he has automatically acquired the brand
of the destroyer of the Bosniak political and national corps. With this,
the hunting season on Silajdzic was open. And, in Cazin, quite a number of
hunters found themselves, ready to carry the execution in the name of the
nation.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", June 27,1996
Ljiljana Smajlovic of the Belgrade weekly
"Vreme", discusses in the magazine's issue of June 29, 1996, the
commencement of the election campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If all refugees return to their homes, Serbs will be a minority in their
own republic. When the senior EU official in Sarajevo says that, he does
not conceal this thought pleases him. And the best would come after the
elections. If everyone votes in their former hometowns, Serbs will be
left without power in their own republic. The spirit of Dayton will
triumph and Bosnia-Herzegovina's reintegration will have been
achieved.
What is most important is that the latter can be achieved
without the former. Moslem refugees do not have to return home to
vote in the Bosnian Serb Republic, but the outcome of the elections can
dramatically improve their chances of returning home after the
elections. This is precisely what makes the Dayton elections the
most complex ballot-casting in the history of democracy.
Freedom
of choice can be defined in various ways. Never have the Bosnian citizens
had the freedom to choose the residence where they will vote as they will
on September 14, 1996; and they never will, most probably. If they want
to vote in the place they lived in the spring of 1991, during the last
census, they can do so, personally or in absence, be they in Malme,
Sweden, or Belgrade, Yugoslavia, or, in any other Bosnian town. If
they want to vote in the place they have moved to in the meantime,
either since the spring of 1991 or after the Bosnian war broke out in
April 1992, they can. If they want neither, if they want to vote in the
place to which they intend to move one day, i.e. neither in the place
they lived in in 1991 nor now, but in a third, desired and planned one,
they can. In that case, they have to appear in that place and vote, even
if they still have not moved there.
Under this criterion, therefore,
these elections will be the most free in history. Besides parties and
leaders, Bosnian citizens will also choose their voting sites. They
would probably be glad to exchange this freedom for some more elementary
and relevant freedoms and goods. They can thank their leaders and
their international sponsors, and the haggling that had gone on
among them, for this chance of being the guinea pigs of the first
elections of the kind.
In keeping with the principle that refugees
and displaced people have the right to return to their homes, it was
first said in Dayton that it is expected'' that all Bosnian
citizens vote in their prewar hometowns, personally or in absence.
This was simultaneously a concession to the Moslem side. The Moslems,
partly because they make up the majority of the Bosnian population, are
interested in achieving the prewar Bosnian population.
Subsequently,
through talks and concessions, haggling and pouting, the Serb side
cajoled the Frowick Committee and OSCE into adding to the election
rules the exception that those who do not want to vote in their prewar
hometowns, will be able to cast ballots in the places in which they
have settled in the meantime. Bosnian Serbs are not vociferously
demanding to go back to their homes (except maybe back to Drvar and
Grahovo) and the option of everyone voting in his current place of
residence probably suits their leaders the most. The Serb third of the
former Bosnian population has settled in half of the former Bosnia,
holding a convincing majority there after the ethnic cleansing. It
is highly probable that the Bosnian Serbs will turn the exception into a
rule and vote in the Bosnian Serb Republic as a rule.
The problem
Bosnian Serbs have, however, is that there are not as many of them
and that the refugee Bosniaks can frustrate their designs, if they
decide to merely vote in absence in the places where they had made up
the ethnic majority before the ethnic cleansing. As in Srebrenica, for
example.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", June 29, 1996
Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" (author Gordan Kovac) discusses
the same question in its issue of July 4, 1996.
The September
elections are tailor made for losers. A more hypocritical decision than
the one which set the Bosnian elections for September 14, has not been
taken in a long while, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is used to
such treatment of its destiny from the international community. The
international monitors came to the conclusion that the conditions for the
holding of the elections do not exist, but that they still have to be
held. Admitting that the conditions are not fulfilled is supposed to calm
the conscience. On the other hand, calling the elections, fulfills the
political imperative of taking some, so much needed, great step in
Bosnia.This potency should be the life line for the next three months,
until the election results. Then, a series of new circumstances will crop
up which will make it possible to create excuses for the bad electoral
effects. What would be at work is a well tried Bosnian scheme, which,
unfortunately, at this balance of power and relations there is no real
alternative. Bosnia is doing what it is forced to, and not what it needs
to do.
The decision on September elections did not surprise anybody ,
particularly the political parties which have started with the electoral
campaign much earlier than Cotti's decision. In this manner, the time
pressure was evaded, in which the parties would realistically fall
into.
It is hardest for every party during electoral preparation to
enter (or not) a coalition block. Ahead of Cotti's Vienna decision, most
of the stronger parties have solved that question, mostly according to
expectations. The only, although not such a big, surprise is the promises
given in the so called political center. The agreement between Haris
Silajdzic, Muhamed Filipovic and Rasim Kadic has been broken at the last
moment. The parties of the center (Bih Party, The Liberals, LBO), will
enter the elections singlehandedly. The deal was broken on the division of
portfolios. This is how it is done in coalition deals, the barbecue is
being readied even before the game is caught.
But, the mentioned
threesome has maybe overestimated its capabilities to gain by themselves
as much sympathies it would gain through the coalition. It is then to be
expected that these parties will court other partners., which could lead
to breaking of somewhat stabilized division of power on the right, in the
center and in the left. All of the three mentioned parties have the
programmatic and personnel potential to move more or less painlessly to
either side. If they make those moves, this could visibly strengthen the
positions of the left or right, depending on which kingdom they would
choose.
Here, the main importance lies with the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In the areas controlled by the BiH Army, it is the strongest
party after the ruling SDA, somewhere along with the SDP, but with the
possibility, due to the course of events, to rise further more
significantly.That is why it could, from the local perspective, be the
key holder of the whole elections. If Silajdzic would again get close to
Izetbegovic, then the SDA party would not have to be afraid that it will
not gain exceptional advantage. If contrary is the case, by eventual
alliance with the parties of the so called "Joint list", Silajdzic would
push the weight to the other side of the scale, even dramatically so.
That is why the Cazin attack on him caused such a furor, where the
leftist parties are attempting to definitively burn the bridges which
still tie Silajdzic to SDA policies.At that, the count that they would
profit enough with the breaking of that potentially unified party block,
let alone if they would draw him to their side.
The party positions
are somewhat simplified with the division on the usual standards
(left-center-right), while the division is actually being distinguished on
the relations the regime-opposition. The so called "Joint list" itself is
composed of such different components, that some of them even cancel each
other out. What joins together SDP, MBO,UBSD,HSS and the Republican party
is the intention to push from power SDA, HDZ, and SDS, the three ruling
parties.
The clear exclusivity of the HDZ in the "Croatian ghetto",
remains undisputable, but in the territory of the Serbian entity a
frontal gathering is visible against the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS).
It is also mainly motivated by the smell of wanted power, and not by
principled differences in the outlook on the solution of the key political
problems.
The removal of Radovan Karadzic will show that it will have
almost no effect on the elections. Behind Karadzic, his "work" remains.
Even without Karadzic the Pale political and election option remains
dominantly in his shadow. In itself, it does not promise anything good to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. A lot can happen until the elections, but the key
role in Pale will be played by the SDS or SPRS (Socialist party - branch
of the ruling SPS party in Serbia), meaning the Karadzic or Milosevic
line, and in that respect an anti-Bosnian one. From its protagonists it
is hard to expect to contribute to the institutionalization of the
Bosnian and Herzegovinian state. But, it is actually the one element,
chosen by the international community through the process of negative
selection in favor of the September elections, that will have key
importance.
It is thought that the true integration of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and this is correct, cannot even begin without the
creation of the institutions which were set up in Dayton, but is expected
- which is unrealistic - that this will be enabled by these elections as
they are., particularly under these circumstances.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", July 4, 1996
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