Vreme discusses the current media situation in Serbia.
SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Belgrade weekly Vremes Bosnia commentator, Ljiljana Smajlovic,
takes a look in the magazines issue of March 8, 1997, at the signing
of a special relations agreement between FRY and Republika Srpska.
Vreme has learned in Washington that the story started that the State
Department is pressuring Milosevic to finalize his relations with
Sarajevo. Milosevic said he will but he also asked about the special
relations with the RS which he has a right under the Dayton
agreement. The US said thats OK but the whole thing has to be speeded
up to an exchange of ambassadors with Sarajevo. Milosevic stuck to his
priorities and embraced Momcilo Krajisnik since Biljana Plavsic didnt
show up for the signing. The US was silent again and then mildly rebuked
him over the sequence of steps.
That version seems credible with a few details from Belgrade and Pale.
The text of the agreement was very carefully worded with obvious care
taken not to disrupt the spirit or the letter of the Dayton agreement.
The list of areas in which comprehensive cooperation will be developed
seems eloquent but the part of the agreement that says it will take
effect only once the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament ratifies it is short
and clear. Belgrade does not want to antagonize Washington, Paris or
London needlessly. Krajisnik told Pale TV that he is personally
convinced that the ratification of the agreement by the Bosnian
parliament is needed only by Belgrade: that article was included on the
insisting of the FRY to prevent interpretations that the agreement is
aimed against the sovereignty of Bosnia. Krajisnik said he doesnt care
whether the Bosnian parliament will approve or not.
Washington kept quiet for a while before speaking up. There are a lot of
things that arent clear and the public has been left in the dark about
the only thing that matters: to what extent is Milosevic working with
Washington, i.e. how much and for how long is Washington still counting
on him?
Milosevic is far more obvious; his decision to sign an agreement with
the RS was the start of the election campaign in Serbia. Some news
agencies reported that the campaign actually started four days later, on
Tuesday March 4, with a joint SPS-JUL statement on the unity of the
left. That was a program statement in which the left announced its
determination to stick together to the end and promised the people it
would protect the dignity of kindergartens, schools, universities and
theaters and dismiss officials who cant achieve the dignity of those
institutions.
Informed sources believe the real sign for the start of the campaign
came on Friday, February 28 at a reception after the signing of the
FRY-RS agreement. The Belgrade authorities took care not to irritate
Washington but that was just political caution. The agreement is aimed
primarily at the domestic political field. Milosevic gave out of the
defensive stance the Zajedno coalition forced him into for a moment.
This is his first offensive step and he managed to kick the ball into a
field which he feels is better for him. He chose the field (Serb
national interests), the discipline (helping brethren across the Drina)
and the rules of the game (statesmanship). He was always the winner in
that game in the past.
One of his close associates said that, at least in the initial stage,
Milosevic achieved his goal completely, bringing political confusion
into his opponents ranks. He first wanted to remind the public of the
treasonous behavior of the non-national political parties and their
leaders and then wants to create rifts between them. He assessed that
the agreement with the RS is the kind of step the opposition leaders can
counter only by inflicting damage on themselves.
If thats true, the Zajedno leaders have given him everything he wants.
Vesna Pesic and Vuk Draskovic reacted immediately. SPO leader Draskovic
called the signing ceremony a senseless parade and the agreement empty
words. He added that he wants normal, not special, relations with the
RS. GSS leader Pesic stressed her unconvincing care for the statesmans
authority and political dignity of RS President Biljana Plavsic. The
third Zajedno leader, Zoran Djindjic, took an obviously different stand
saying the agreement is positive in general.
A Serbian state TV (RTS) comment on March 1 said parts of the opposition
had grown apart from the people and added that the agreement cant be a
problem to anyone reasonable and with good intentions. The mild and
delayed reaction from Washington made it seem that the agreement
bothered Zajedno more than Washington. An American journalist in
Belgrade noted: If Milosevic proved he could walk on water the
opposition would probably criticize him for not being able to swim.
Things were the same on the other side of the Drina in the RS. The RS
opposition criticized Krajisnik for producing political fog. Slavko
Zupljanin of the Serb Patriotic Party said Krajisnik is incompetent and
added that the agreement promotes Bosnia as a united state. Serb Radical
Party (SRS) in the RS leader Nikola Poplasen identified the political,
not the national, motives behind the agreement and Milosevics need to
preserve his authorities in Serbia with a new patriotic declaration.
JUL in the RS has broken away from the RS Socialist Party and JUL leader
Mico Carevic said the agreement is about a political document more than
it is about relations between two states.
The heated debate, however understandable, creates the impression that
Milosevic and Krajisnik are endangered in similar ways and are standing
up together. That analogy is not quite right. Krajisnik isnt facing any
important elections soon and his clash with Plavsic is nowhere near the
kind of challenge Zajedno presents to Milosevic. Plavsic did stay away
from the signing ceremony but that was due to a conceptual difference of
interpretation between her and Krajisnik. No one can say that Plavsic
hates Milosevic more than Krajisnik does. Krajisnik is the more
pragmatic of the two and he thought he could use the enemys current
weakness to win another step in drawing the RS closer to the FRY.
Dont expect either of them to sacrifice the interests of the RS to
their personal interests. Krajisniks position is stronger and Plavsic
still cant play an all or nothing game.
In all the political bickering in Serbia and the RS, few people really
care about the agreement itself. The best measure of the agreement came
from Washington which assessed that the document doesnt merit too many
words. Milosevic did nothing against Dayton and all in all he did very,
little.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, March 8, 1997
Podgorica weekly Monitor brings in its issue of March 7, 1997, an analysis by Drasko Djuranovic, who takes a look at the background of the Agreement, as well as the Montenegrin involvement in the FRY - Republica Srpska agreement on special relations.
With the agreement on special relations between FRY and RS Milosevic played maybe the only card that he has available: to reaffirm his shaken power in Serbia with a return to the already failing project of the Serbian state. The analysis of some key elements shows that Milosevics new (old) policy is directed primarily towards legal unification of the areas of the imagined state and that the Serbian president is again drawing the nationalistic card ahead of the forthcoming republican elections. At the same time, the key article of this agreement does not have support in reality. - it presents an idyllic vision of a Serbian custom union which has a serious flaw - the Serbian entity in Bosnia is not an independent, recognized state.
What is also interesting is the establishment of the special military cooperation, with which FRY and RS greed to make all efforts in accordance with the UN charter towards stopping an eventual aggression of a third party. But this article too - the brotherly military cooperation - will hardly be implemented. It is almost unthinkable that the international community, after their previous experiences with the Serbian president, will allow the creation of stronger military ties which would disturb some form of military balance in the Balkans.
It could be said then, that the idea of the sudden signing of the Agreement is motivated by Milosevics pragmatic reasons. The Serbian boss will not be too excited if the agreement remains a dead letter on paper: the essence of the game is to place the political essence from Serbia to its surroundings.
Very few people in Montenegro are impressed with the Agreement. But, in the multitude of chosen faces in the Belgrade gathering the most interesting was that of the Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic. Even his activity was most noticeable: while Lilic and Krajisnik were putting their signatures on the historical document, the first man of Montenegro was smiling all the time, exchanging, some obviously spirited remarks with the Serbian president.
From the angle of the interests of Montenegro the signing of the Agreement on special relations between FRY and Montenegro is really not a historical moment, but has real base pragmatic interest for the Serbian president. It is unclear what centuries old interests motivated president Bulatovic to be in the company of one surpassed politician and be a helping hand in a farce which can only damage Montenegro. Observed from a political angle, the role of the Montenegrin president and the president of the DPS party in Belgrade is a specific message - for the supporters of the DPS and others - that this party will ,without a question, follow Milosevics policies. It could be said that Bulatovic has switched from, an unwilling as he himself has stated, to a smiling and willing partner of Milosevics policies.
After the interview of Montenegrin prime minister Djukanovic to Belgrade weekly Vreme, the relations of the coalition partners have toughened. The Montenegrin prime minister was the first and only member of the DPS who came out in public with very negative statements about the working and ideological characteristics of Milosevic, using biting phrases, characteristic for the American administration. From the SPS top came a fierce response, through the state controlled media: the Montenegrin prime minister was accused for treason of the joint policy and the attempt to destabilize the joint state. A call was made to healthy forces within DPS to hold the situation under control.
Could it then be only an accident that the Montenegrin president - only a few days after his part colleague and former close collaborator characterized Milosevic as a wasted politician - appeared next to the Serbian president ? It is quite certain that Bulatovics move will cause very negative reactions of the international community and concrete damage for the international image of Montenegro Some confidential sources even say that Djukanovic and Montenegrin parliament president Marovic learned of the agreement from the daily TV news !
Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, March 7, 1997;
Dragan Janjic of the independent BETA news agency, writes in the February 16-28, 1997, issue of the Belgrade by-weekly Republika on the decision of the arbitration commission concerning Brcko.
The decision of the Arbitration commission , in essence, has shown that the political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not matured enough for the solution of such large questions as is the strategically important city of Brcko.
The Serbian side insists on the right to territorial connection within the Serbian entity and on the stance that Brcko is inhabited by Serbian refugees who have been expelled from other parts of the country (mainly from Central Bosnia and Sarajevo) and who cannot return to their homes.
The international community, judging by Bildts words, intends to engage sizeable funds so to make Brcko financially attractive for both Bosnian entities. Obviously, Krajisnik has that on his mind, when he found it necessary to stress, as one of first reactions to the decision of the Arbitration commission, that the economic aid to Brcko could lessen the tensions.
The key challenge will be anything that is connected to the return of refugees, the civil coordinator stressed, saying that the international policemen will have to deal with everything that is connected with the securing of law. According to his words, the general tendency in the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the mistreatment of people.
The authority within the state is still deeply divided, not only between the two entities, but also between the federal partners - Muslims and Croats. The possibilities for improvement in the coming year are quite remote.
The change of rule in Brcko would in current conditions lead to great disturbances within the Serb entity. The Banjaluka region, where the majority of Serb population is concentrated, would become dependent on the authorities of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, and there would be a threat of massive exodus.
The Bosnian Serbs are trying to prevent a massive return of refugees, since the rightly believe that they would loose the control of the city in that case. Before the war Brcko had a Muslim majority. In 1992 most Muslims and Croats were expelled from it, while a large of long time Serb residents also left. They want to return, and the central authority in Sarajevo has a political interest to stimulate this wish.
Serbian refugees from Central parts of Bosnia and Sarajevo which are now located in Brcko, do not want to move anywhere. Due to this, new tensions are to be expected when the refugees attempt to return. These tensions will be stimulated from both sides. Since the whole area will be under additional international supervision, it will be very hard for the Serbian side to successfully organize resistance to the return of Muslim refugees.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika, February 16-28, 1997
March 1, 1997 issue of the Banja Luka by-weekly Novi Prelom brought a commentary concerning Brcko arbitration by its contributor Dragan Marcetic.
Due to its position, role, and importance for the existence of the Republika Srpska, Brcko is by far more important than the municipal elections which are forthcoming. With the so called Solomonss solution, nothing has been solved, that is, Brcko was not taken way from the RS, but neither was it given to it. The problem not only remains unsolved, but will be further complicated by the municipal elections and its results. It is almost certain that by the 15 03 1998 the so-called international community will attempt to water down the current Serb ethnic majority in that city and around it, and not only through the municipal elections. With this, the Brcko problem, ahead of its solution, will acquire new, until now unknown dimensions.
From the military political standpoint, it was not realistic to expect that the West will solve the Brcko problem in the manner and in the time frame determined by the Dayton agreements. That something like this will happen was shown for a while now by two indicators. The first was, supposedly the loss of maps which were determining the subject of contention in the Brcko area. The second is, at least shameless change of the subject of contention, in front of the whole world, and bypassing Dayton, whereas instead of the part of the inter - entity delineation in the Brcko area - under pressure was put this city and its surroundings. At the same time, to those in the know about the work of those implementing the Dayton agreements it was clear for a long time that the Brcko problem will not be solved before the municipal elections in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The key in all this is finding of answers to questions - why are things like that and what is to be accomplished by this. There is a multitude of answers which can only partly shed light the essence of the prolongation of the solution of that problem.
Brcko is one of the rare remaining possibilities of the West to hold Republika Srpska in continuous suspense concerning its existence through the implementation of the Dayton agreements. This situation stems from the fact that with an unfavorable solution RS would be brought into a very unfavorable geopolitical and geostrategic position and into an almost desperate military - political and economic situation. With such a divided RS, very favorable conditions would be created for the re - integration of the RS into an unitary Bosnia, particularly if the economic, political, and even military pressure would intensify on it.
For the period of one year for which time the solution has been prolonged for, and with the implementation of the international supervision, the West is given wide possibilities to soften the Brcko areas for a definitive solution. Due to this, along with special IPTF forces, the strengthened military presence in that area, what should also be expected is the greater care of the supervisors for human rights, freedom of movement and return of refugees. It should be no surprise if during the next year in the Brcko area there is cropping up of complete settlements for the placement of exiled Muslims and Croats, so that this would influence the final decision.
At the same time, there should be no doubt that the US will use the status of Brcko in the forthcoming year to prove to the EU its inability to solve the problem of Mostar. That is why it will, in all possible and impossible manners, tend to bring into the Brcko area as many non-Serbs as possible, so that they would establish multi national life under their control. If they succeed with this in Brcko, why not in the whole of RS, and then in the whole Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina ?
It is quite certain that the Brcko problem is not used only for the control of the RS, but is also a hook for the BiH Federation, which wants so much to finally come to some results in the realization of the Dayton BiH through cutting RS in half. That is why, surely, the West holds the FBiH in uncertainty too.
But, all this that the West is doing surrounding Brcko should be understood as its last attempt to establish multinational life somewhere in Bosnia. Based on this result depends the future relation of the West towards Dayton BiH, RS and FBiH. If it does not succeed in the Brcko rea either, this will, probably, be the end of the illusions of the U.S.A. and NATO about the unitary and multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would, surely, lead to a radical shift in their foreign policy, most probably in the sense of the division of Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina into three sovereign and independent states of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. This would satisfy all (the West, RS, Herceg Bosnia) except Alija Izetbegovic, who in the global sense in this, has a peripheral role.
As far as the future of Brcko is concerned, it is most probable that the final decision will be taken on 15 03 1998. This would fit into the departure of SFOR from these regions, which is envisaged for 15 07 1998.
Source: Banja Luka by-weekly Novi Prelom, March 1, 1997
Gojko Beric of the Sarajevo weekly Svijet examines in the March 6, 1997, issue of that magazine the current refugee situation in Bosnia, and the political aspect of their return.
There are three small para -states functioning in Bosnia, and nobody serious is counting upon the possibility that they will return in some massive numbers to the towns they lived in before the war. In the best case, they will return in limited numbers, in accordance with political will of the current regimes. Even in that case the refugees will not annul the new national entities, but will prevent these entities of becoming ethnically pure and to grow into fascistic monsters, the symptoms of which are already present in Republika Srpska and in the so called Herceg-Bosna. Besides that, with their return the current nationalistic regimes would loose their monopoly, with which the process of true integration of the country would gain some chances.
But, who really wants that the refugees return to places from which they were expelled. The West doesnt, because with its policies it directed the war in Bosnia toward ethnic homogenization and territorial delineation of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. The price was thousands of dead, injured and destitute people. The borders of the entities have been firmly drawn, everybody got theirs, the cards of power have been dealt, and the state structure is in no way firmer than the models made out of match sticks.
Neither the current authorities care about the return of the million strong mass, because that would mean pouring of water in their nationalistic wine. Here also the committed crimes against others have proportionally determined the level of exclusiveness. The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs opposes the return of refugees the most. The Croats are only somewhat more tolerant, but more in a declaratory manner than that they really want to be. As far as the Bosniaks are concerned, it is the impression that they neither are not ready to return things to beginning. The Serbs and Croats have solved thing through trade of territories, while Bosniaks have partly compensated the loss of series of towns through taking of Sarajevo. The divisions have stimulated extremists and local sheriffs to organize mining and burning of others houses, no matter whether the members of other nations have been minority or majority in that town before the war. Due to this, flying in the air re also a re only recently renovated houses, the money for which was give by the international community.
Some 250 thousand of refugees returned to Bosnia, mainly Bosniaks. Only a very small number of them had the chance to open the doors of their homes. According to some estimates, a few hundred thousand of them remain in Europe, of which 320 thousand in Germany. The government in Bonn wants to rid itself of this heavy burden, stating that it has no more will or interest to determine political and other relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina Michael Stainer has much more understanding for the position of these people. He supports the ambitious project according to which the refugee project would be solved according to the principle all for all. The idea is that all refugees would return to their homes at the same time. But who dares determine this day of return, which seems quite unrealistic at this moment.
It is a question how many of the refugees really wish something like this. Because, among them too, as is the case at home, the ethnic division has been made. Their outlook on Bosnia is quite different, and their massive support of national parties testifies that this mainly is not a political energy with which the supporters of the civil and democratic society could count on. It is also a fact that quite a number of Bosnian refugees is leaving Europe seeking refuge in third countries. And usually, it is the most vital part of our refugee population.
Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet March 6, 1997
Emir Imamovic of the Sarajevo monthly Dani examines the situation regarding the forthcoming local elections in Bosnia in the March issue of that magazine.
According to latest information, the local elections will be held on July 12 and 13. The regulations have already been prepared, but in all truth, not yet completed. Along with the possibility of voting in the places of residence during the last conducted census, the possibility of choosing new residence in new city has also been given. To simplify the matter and say that the right to vote and the right to choice of residence are some of the most elementary human rights, means showing total ignorance about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Attempting to solve the problem in such a manner so to leave only the possibility to vote in the place of residence before the war would automatically represent the breach of the Dayton peace agreement.
So how then to prevent the possibility of turning a democratic process into an effective recipe for freezing current state and a final move in the game surrounding the division of Bosnia ? The simple and precise answer is: very hard. The only possibility then, say the lawyers, lies in the electoral rules, which will leave open the possibility of the return of the refugees and be in accordance with the Dayton Annex 3, that is, enable the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to vote in their new place of Residence. Whether the regulations of the organizers can prevent the games of the participants, we will probably know after the counting of votes.
The biggest problems in the preparation of the rules was created by the paragraph number 505, which deals with the participation of the refugees in the electoral process. OESCE has from the start divided the exiled Bosnians into two groups. First is comprised of those resettled within the state borders, and the second one by those living in the so called third countries. In brief, different groups different rules.
Along with the rules, the problems re created for the organizers of the elections by the administrative - political questions. First obstacle is the list of the municipalities. Twenty percent of the municipalities in Bosnia are divided by inter - entity border line. Also, the situation is further complicated by the demand of the HDZ for the formation of municipalities with a Croatian mark. As long as the list of counties is not established, it is not possible to make the registration of parties and candidates for the elections. The ministry of justice in the Federation government is working on finding a solution, but there is quite a number of misgivings. Mainly due to political reasons, the problem of the divided municipalities is tied with the law on the organization of the new federal municipalities.
The equal uncertainty is tied with two very much specific cities: Brcko and Mostar. The OESCE says that they are preparing for the elections on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that changes are possible, that is, that the elections would not be held in the electoral centers of Posavina and Herzegovina.
Another sizeable problem is the implementation of the elections, particularly after the events in Belgrade caused exactly by the disrespect of the victory of the opposition in the Serbian municipalities. It is still not known who will implement what the voters decide.
In the end a question poses itself: what is the sense of local elections with so many unknowns. It is hard to resist the feeling that the goal of the whole thing is the satisfaction of the form, while the essence will only be another in the line of tricks.
Source: Sarajevo monthly Dani, March 1997
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