CROATIA -
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TUTA CASE AND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS
Jelena Lovric of the AIM news pool writes from Zagreb for the Podgorica weekly
Monitor about the political implications of the Tuta case - the recent arrest of the notorious Herzegovina paramilitary leader Mladen Naletilic - Tuta.
For the moment, it is possible to discern three possible reasons for Tudjmans
turnaround and undertaking of a purge in Herzegovina. Some very cautious
German diplomats think that the clash with Herzegovina criminals should be
observed in the context of forthcoming elections in Croatia. It could almost
be said that this is a part of Tudjmans electoral campaign. There is a quite
serious dislike of Herzegovinians in the Croatian public and there is no doubt
that with their suppression Croatian president would region some of the sympathy
for him. There is also no doubt that there are close connections between the
official Zagreb and what is called Herzegovina Mafia.
During the war they were
connected through war profiteering, and the good business cooperation has
obviously been continued after the war. The official Croatia has in many ways
given help to its Herzegovina partners, often at the expense of its own
citizens. Herzegovinians are in power from Zagreb to Dubrovnik. The poor
people of Zagreb work for recently gold plated Herceg- Croatians; the poor
in Dalmatia are shopping in recently opened shopping centers in Herzegovina,
where the goods from Croatia is at least some thirty times cheaper then
where it has been produced; the impoverished Dubrovnik high class are
watching how the rural types from the mountains behind them are becoming
the owners of their tourist pearls through dirty money.
Secondly, the surprising arrests can be connected with the situation in Mostar. After bloody Bairam in that city, Zagreb initiated a fierce media war against the Bosniaks. The media close to the regime, particularly Zagreb TV, constructed a version of the events which had no connection with what really happened. According to them, the fault was with Bosniaks, which started off towards Western Mostar with the intention to create disorder at the carnival.
The turnround occurred when the international community, upset also with such a stance of the Croatian media, slammed its fist on the table, signaling that enough is enough. . Supposedly, Croatia was threatened with the suspension from the Council of Europe. Zagreb was forced to take some resolute measures. He could not evade them anymore, particularly since Naletilic, who was in Zagreb for a while, started off for Mostar. The Croatian regime came to the conclusion that he should not reach it, since he would definitely not be working on the calming of the already electrified situation. The political gossip says that if Nletilic remained in Zagreb - he would not have been arrested.
The fact that main Herzegovina godfathers are now under arrest could mean that those that backed them in Zagreb re also under serious pressure.
It is also possible that the arrest of the Herzegovina ruler and his taking to Zagreb is connected with the newest requests from the Hague. The ICTY has recently been very unpleasant towards Croatia, event the Croatian defence minister Gojko Susak has been ordered to submit urgently proof concerning the Blaskic case. Supposedly, this call has shaken Susak considerably, since he read this as a sign that the Hague investigators are sneaking around his doorstep. There are some other indications about this. Reliable sources state that an indictment has already been written against ministers favorite boy Mate Boban, and that it is only a question of time when it will be set into procedure. The Hague investigators were recently in Zagreb, and some media here say that the Croatian top came to the conclusion that something has to be given to them. Maybe Naletilics detention is preparation for a trip to the Hague ? Or did Croatian regime protect him in this manner ? Naletilic definitively knows a lot. As a close collaborator of Susaks he could give good information on the connection of Zagreb with HVO during the Croatian - Bosniak war, which interests the Hague tribunal quite a lot at this moment.
Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, March 14, 1997
The same question is examined by Vjeran Grkovic in the March 17, 1
997 issue of the Split weekly Feral Tribune.
It is quite certain that all those that live in Herzegovina, particularly in Mostar, do not see in the same manner the gossip that Tuta is returning among Herzegovinians. Those who have been recently putting up posters Tuta - our victory, are surely in minority, but they re surely better armed, organized and re louder. The are, in difference to the silent majority,, ready to do anything, including most radical solutions.
The circular court in Zagreb accuses Tuta for heavy crimes committed in the Herzegovina area during 1993, 1994 and 1995, without giving any further details. The only story to reach the public is the kidnapping of the HOS member Robert Nosic, from Ljubusko, who has been taken in Mostar four years ago. His body was never found. Except this story that is tied to Tuta, almost nothing is known it the public about the three day kidnapping of Kresimir Zubak, carried out three years ago in Mostar during broad daylight, also assigned to Tutas men. The wrath of Tuta was also felt on the skin of former chiefs of staff of the HVO, Slobodan Praljak and Ante Roso. The first almost lost his head in Prozor, and latter paid the unwillingness to cooperate with the big boss with the three hour capture in the Posusje headquarters.
Tuta, though, possesses dual Bosnian - Croat citizenship, so the Croatian courts can try him for the crimes committed in Bosnia only with the consent of the Supreme court of the neighboring state. The fact that goes in Tutas favor is that the establishment of the Bosnian Supreme court is not yet in sight.
By placing Tuta behind bars Franjo Tudjman attempted to put a blindfold over the eyes of the international public, after the tragic events in Mostar park Lisak, for which the blame was squarely placed on the Croatian side. According to some sources, the strongest pressure on Croatia was made by German diplomacy, which could be brought in connection with their intentions to rid themselves of a great number of Bosnian refugees. But that is not possible if in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina war criminals are still in power.
As far as Tutas trip to the Hague is concerned, it still does not seem probable, because the both Gojko Susak and Mate Boban could immediately come along. With the arrest of Tuta the Croatian state top wanted to make the international (and domestic) public happy, while Tuta would still be accounted for, Maybe it wont go !
Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune, March 17, 1997
Nikola Viskovic, a professor of law at the University in Split and a former member
of the Croatian parliament wrote an overview of the forthcoming election in
Croatia in the March 10, 1997, issue of the Split weekly Feral Tribune.
The electoral race has begun. We re seeing again how Tudjman and his feudalists and bureaucrats are taking over hours of TV time with their speeches, meetings, nd party commentaries, while the appositional gatherings and statements are again given some ten seconds of TV time.
We cannot be surprised with what the HDZ and the regime are doing, since it is known for a long time what they are like. But we can be surprised at one thing: what kind of an idiotic opposition this is when it can stand this and when it does not respond to this violence in an adequate manner ? How come the representatives in the HRTV Council are not handing in their resignations due to one party misuse of key media channels ? What kind of appositional members are these who do not leave the Parliament due to this long term barbarianism ? How come they do not call the public to demonstrations and open this electoral campaign in such a manner ?
How come that the Liberals and Social democrats re also acting in this manner, for whom we should assume that they are lest infested with the authoritarian illness, which is infesting this society ?
The opposition will definitely loose the elections if it is not capable to prevent the ruling quasi - elite in its usurpation of all dimensions of social power, first of all the means of mass communication. The problem seems to be in that the opposition in Croatia either does not have its truth which is significantly different that the HDZ truth, or does not have the courage to speak its truth up - so it is not interested in such a media freedom which is essential in a true political match.
The largest part of the so called opposition in all truth shares the same nationalistic frustrations and monstrosities which move the Its known party, so that it has for years become the repository of such renegades from the ruling party, which it can, as has been previously seen, buy and bribe at any time. The other part of the so called opposition, that is their leaders, re political cowards nd career seekers which keep, and will keep quiet about basic truths about our political nd moral reality until it becomes safe for them to do so - which is obviously far away in the future.
Due to all this, as well as some other things, HDZ will not lose these elections even there where it will formally lose them - since even after these elections it will have enough reserve players in the so called oppositionists from municipal, regional and middle governing bodies of power, as well as all other scared nd calculating ones, with whom it can conduct, unhindered, its strategy of crazed nationalism, theft and dumbness.
So, why does the opposition need the free media ? What new could it, or dare say ? Nothing . That is why it calmly bears that the President of the Republic and the ruling party do with radio and TV, as well as with many other things, all that would be cause enough for demonstrations in the normal world.
Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune, March 10, 1997
The same theme is explored by the regular commentator of the Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin, Bozo Matic /editorial pseudonym/, in the March 14, 1997 issue of that magazine.
Launching a series of stories of tomorrows better life (including the rebirth of long time hibernated University hospital), the HDZ still keeps parity to the count - lacking and unrecognizable opposition. It turns out, it seems, that the citizens re equally unimportant to the opposition as they are to the HDZ. The appositional politicians too do not address the public in a sincere manner. Logical party economic programs hardly exist, nd everything is often based on long heard phrases which mention better life after smart voting. As soon as they do this number, Tomcic, Budisa, Gotovac and Tomac, turn against each other and do everything do grab a small moves for themselves in the future division of power, to beat each other concerning the future presidential candidate, that they throw out of the game small and even smaller partners and impose themselves as the only partner to the HDZ.
This is the essence of the matter. Instead of joining forces in a legitimate democratic effort to push from power the party that made so many mistakes, which missed in its model of social order nd which has inaugurated suspicious values like overnight richness nd lack of right for large segments of the society (minorities, women, unemployed), they mainly concentrate their efforts to fight out a position for themselves which would enable them to negotiate with HDZ. The question is, actually, about the division of power.
HDZ counts exactly on this. Conscious that incapable opposition has no strength to gain key positions of power (nd that mens the ones that decide about money), HDZ is offering the usual division, the one that has already achieved results with unemployed and pensioned - small power for little cash.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin, March 14, 1997
Regular commentator of the Split weekly Feral Tribune, Marinko Culic,
in light of the forthcoming Croatian elections attempts to answer the question whether we will be witnesses this year of the defeats of presidents Tudjman and Milosevic in the February 24, 1997 issue of that magazine.
First of all, the two presidents that only recognize elections when they win on them, have lost the external support which they had at the time of Dayton, nd now probably nobody would be sorry to see them go. But this still does not mean that this is directly desired and speeded up (when the departure of Karadzic and Boban was demanded, this was stated without any doubts). The reason for this is most probably that there is not enough coefficient of internal pressure that is needed for them to go.
This is particularly true in the case of Croatia, where it is not hard enough to imagine a situation where in a situation where the international community would make a rougher move against Tudjman, part of the opposition would jump onto its patriotic feet due to meddling into our internal matters. In that respect, the Croatian opposition obviously lags behind the Serbian one (which has established wide contacts in the world), nd that is why it sounds very childish when its key people (Tomicic, Tomac) protest when the regime media treat them as Croatian Djindjics. If somebody should be offended with this comparison, it is above all Djindjic, since it is quite clear that there is nobody in Croatia, except doubly marginalized Paraga, who would do what Serbian opposition did for three months.
Moreover, the key people of the opposition here publicly boast with what should be hidden away, and that is that by evading from public protests, they supposedly show political wisdom. If anything is shown, than that is that Croatia is today probably the only European country where rare manifestations either occur spontaneously, or they are organized by the regime itself.
The particular story here is the divisions within the opposition, which is a traditional illness on both sides of the Drina river. But, while the Serbian one has now shown, for the first time the capability to remain together, when it is most important, this was not enough for Croatian opposition to remain in one group. Instead of that - it went separate ways in the most critical moment - ahead of the elections.
That is why it is not to be excluded that decisive changes will come along soon, so that some larger parties will sink, and some smaller ones throw the water out of their lungs and start swimming. It is less probable whether significant changes will occur in the global balance of power at the forthcoming elections, including the dilemma whether Tudjman and Milosevic will finally pay their heavy debts and lose the presidential elections, which they enter with mixed chances.
Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune, February 24, 1997
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEDIA
Uros Komlenovic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme writes in the magazines
issue of March 15, 1997, about the media situation in Serbia, in light of
possible processes of democratization.
Encouraged by the example of Dr. Mirjana Markovic who attacked the
independent media with greater venom than ever before,
the politico-journalistic exponents of the ruling conjugal couple are
returning to the rhetoric and the slightly forgotten qualifiers of 1992 and
1993 with epithets like traitors, foreign flunkies, sycophants...
Milorad Komrakov, the president of the pro-government Society of Journalists
of Serbia (UNS), having forgotten that several hundred of his colleagues
lost jobs in recent years at the Radio Television Serbia (RTS),
where he now works and where Dr. Vojislav Seseljs extensive
singling out of nationally undesirable journalists and Serbian
traitors was liberally aired in the evening news-having forgotten all
this, Komrakov began to audibly bewail the sad fate of journalists and
producers of local media who got the boot or were reassigned, and whose
original employers were taken over.
At the same time, the only paper factory in the country, Matroz of
Sremska Mitrovica, is promising that it can fulfill the demand of all
domestic journals. This indirectly confirms the unofficial news that a
limitation on the import of paper for newsprint is in the making, which
would at once free Matroz of its surplus and also go for the jugular of
those journals which print unsuitable news. The distribution network
for the daily Politika (by far the most extensive with approximately
1500 kiosks throughout the country) is increasing its rebate
to 40%, forcing many journals (Vreme, NIN, Nasa Borba,
Duga, Intervju...) to forgo the services of Politika at the
risk of not appearing at all in smaller towns.
As if by consensus or according to someones order, inside of a week
conflicts arise in several Belgrade journals: Duga is abandoning its
photo journalistic documentation of the citizens protest; rumors are
circulating about the possible replacement of the editor in chief of
BIGZ, and bout the dividing up of this publishing house; according to
his competitor, Demokratija, the director of Blic is making
statements about money laundering at his company, statements which
he quickly retractsthis does not prevent Politika from recanting on
a daily basis the opinion of an anonymous expert regarding money
laundering at Blic; the Board of Directors at NIN are replacing
the editor in chief, Dusan Velickovic, because of which the majority of
NIN journalists are going on strike, insisting that the replacement of
Velickovic is the result of outside pressures being exerted on the
editorial staff.
In contrast to underground tactics applied at NIN, Blic and
Duga, BK Television is subject to a frontal attack: RTS has denied
it the use of its transmitters in Misenluk, Crni vrh, Goles, Jastrebac
and Venac. The general manager of RTS, Dragoljub Milanovic, cites as
reasons for this the expansion of system connections at RTS, as well
as outstanding BK Telekom accounts with his company.
As BK Television
reacted by calling upon Milanovics admission that mutual demands and
obligations of RTS and BK Telekom are resolved, and by claiming that
what is at stake is the suppression of the freedom of the media,
Dragoljub Milanovic decided on a rebuttal. From a statement of March
10 of this year, among other things, he points out that The very
act with which BKTV decided to present to the public
the annulment of its agreement, and the media campaign which
it is waging against RTS throughout the entire business world
that BK Television constantly calls upon, are sufficient
reasons for discontinuing all business cooperation.
Thus the actual reason finally comes to light.
I think that the real reasons for such actions on the part of RTS
lie in their fear of competition, Radojicic-Potparic, director and
editor in chief of BK Television told Vreme. According to the latest
poll conducted by the agency Markplan across the entire territory of
Yugoslavia, out of a representative sample of 2404 people questioned,
those who believe our television are in the majority (18.4% of those
questioned), whereas local stations are in second place with 4.5%, and
RTS places third with only 4.1%...
It seems to me, therefore, that the
request on the part of RTS to annul the agreement of commercial and
technological cooperation with BK Television is directly related to
clause 6 of the Law of Information, which does not permit private owners
to transmit radio and TV programs to more than 25% of the population of
the Republic.
Beside this restriction, the part of Article 6 which
does not permit private companies to own more than 20% of journals in
the Republic attracted the greatest attention at the presentation of the
first draft of the Law of Information, made public at a press conference
on March 10.
This restriction is widely interpreted as the strengthening of the
monopoly held by RTS and its associated public media. In the draft
there is also a decree that all media which receive aide from abroad
must explicitly state so in every issue they publish, as well as in
every radio and TV program they broadcast. In independent press circles
this decree was immediately branded the police line of all
independent media.
Beside these decrees, it has been noted that the
draft of the Law of Information is filled with after thoughts and
awkward formulations, which is sufficient reason for the rough reception
it has received among all who chose to voice their opinions regarding
its content. These include the producers of the independent media, all
significant opposition factions, with the exception of the radicals, the
Independent Society of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS), the Independent
Society of Journalist of Vojvodina (NDNV)...
Admittedly, the question
concerns a working copy which, according to the words of the Minister of
Information, Radmila Milentijevic, ought to be open to suggestions by
all those whom it concerns. In the draft of the Law of Information
there is no mention of how radio television frequencies will be assigned
(the Minister promises that a proposal for the solution to this question
will be tabled by the time this number of Vreme will have appeared
on the newsstands); nor, which is highly significant, is there any
mention of RTSa separate law is being expected for the radio and
television.
Besides that, the restriction to 25% of the public for the
private medias under single ownership can be easily bypassed by a system
of links, just as the restriction on foreign investment of at most
49% in national medias is dealt with in similar fashion.
Thus, as the draft of the Law of Information does not solve any
significant problem, the question arises, why the hurry in making it
public? Perhaps the answer should be sought in Ms. Milentijevics prior
submission of the summary of the contents of the first draft to all
directors of foreign diplomatic missions in Belgrade who gave their
blessing, with the qualification that the opposition should be included
in the drawing up of the final version and in the discussion on how the
law, after it is ratified, should be implemented. As we learn, the
Minister managed to mutter a promise that the first positive steps
will be taken, and that by the next ministers meeting in Brussels on
March 24 Yugoslavia could be allowed preferential treatment in the areas
of trade and commerce.
When one takes into consideration the European
Communitys tabling of a law permitting pluralism of media which will
limit the influence of media magnets like Berlusconi and Mardoka to 30%
in the area of a single medium, and to 10% for those that operate in
several media, the intentions of the Serbian Government become clearer:
to somehow fight their way to commercial exemptions by demonstrating
to the civilized world that even here the monopolies of powerful private
companies are regulated.
Such decrees against monopolies in Serbia are
nothing short of comical, since the authorities and the companies under
the control of the regime for all practical purposes posses monopolies
over all systems of communicationover assigning of radio-television
frequencies, placing of transmitters, manufacturing of paper for
newsprint, press distribution and selling, control of the biggest
publishing houses... Radmila Milentijevic forgot to point out such
details as in press conferences in New York and Washington she waved
her packet of independent journals as proof that in Serbia
there is a budding of a thousand media flowers.
The real situation is slightly different. The situation of the medias
in Serbia is hardly rosy, states Prvoslav Plavisic, director of the
Center for Research of Public Opinion, Programming and Audiences at RTS.
Before the war we were next to last in Europe (in front of Portugal)
in our media presence, that is in the number of copies printed per
capita, in the number of TV sets per household... In recent years the
number of copies printed has been rising, although the average number of
copies per edition has been dropping off, which is contrary to trends in
the developed world. The numbers of copies printed are small, and the
readership is weak. According to our research, half the population does
not read the press, a quarter reads on a regular basis, while others do
so sporadically.
These figures do not surprise: according to the 1994 census, 34% of the
Serbian population has no education, or has not completed elementary
school. Another quarter have completed elementary school, 32% have
completed high school, while 9% have completed training school programs
or university degrees. When it is observed that Albanians have refused
to participate in this census and that traditionally education in Kosovo
is behind the rest of the country, it becomes clear that the real
situation is even worse.
As they do not like to, or do not know how to read, Serbians watch TV:
87% of the population above age 10 regularly (five to seven times a
week) watch TV, 68% listen to radio, and 22% read regularly. According
to the research conducted late last year by the Center for Research of
Public Opinion (before the mass protests because of local elections),
95% of the population watches Channel 1 of RTS, 91% watches Channel 2,
and 86% watches Channel 3. Other television stations (Pink TV60%,
Politika TV35%, BK Telekom33%, NS Plus29%, Studio B25%... )
lag behind mainly because they cannot be seen in the greater part of
Serbian territory.
Because the biggest stations are concentrated in
Belgrade, the situation of the media in the capital is considerably
different: Studio B is watched by half the citizens of Belgrade, while
Politika TV, Palma TV, and BK Television are watched by 40%, Pink TV is
watched by 30%, while the three RTS Channels of RTS are watched by
20-25% of citizens of Belgrade. For this reason RTS programing
throughout Serbia is untouchablethe viewers watch only what is
available. The most regularly watched information program in the
country is, of course, the RTS evening news: sometimes it is viewed by
five million people, and on a regular basis, by three million, which far
outnumbers the totals of all published copies of all daily newsprint in
the country. The numbers of viewers and listeners of electronic
medias are on the rise, even though their credibility is
on the declinemore people are watching TV, but less viewers
actually believe what they see, explains Prvoslav Plavisic.
A quarter of the population believes everything they see,
a similar percentage expresses disbelief, while 40%
are merely skeptical. To the question Has TV
changed your opinion on some issues? Only 10% of those
asked gave a positive answer.
The problem, however,
is that a large number of people would have no access
to information without television. Its influence
continues, despite issues of credibility. Otherwise,
2319 newspapers and journals are published in Serbia,
while there are 14 television and 87 radio stations
that broadcast legally. The government controls
nearly all, either directly or indirectly.
According to the estimates of the Ministry of Information there are
another 20 television and 100 radio stations that broadcast illegally in
Serbia. The authorities do not harass them mainly because they steer
clear of politics.
The number of TV stations has grown incredibly, but this has not had
the effect of enriching our information flow, claims Prvoslav
Plavisic. The majority of these new stations lack their own
production teams, and lack any kind of informative content, except for
that acquired from informational services. These stations are mainly
geared toward entertainment programming that lures away a considerable
number of viewers with the end result that the population is less and
less informed.
It is noteworthy that, by contrast with other, more active media
regions, Vojvodina, despite being the most developed region and the
greatest consumer of information, remains in deep provincial
isolation. There are no local TV stations, there is no independent
daily press, and in the past 9 years Novi Sad has seen the appearance of
only two independent weekliesNezavisni gradjanski list and the tabloid
Svet. Admittedly the new city authority in Novi Sad is attempting to
form local radio, television and a weekly journal. That, however, is not
free.
Having taken over power in the biggest cities throughout Serbia, the
coalition Zajedno has assumed control over those local media which
did not manage to quickly change their status and to come under the
protection of RTS. Nearly all producers have been replaced (some were
even fired), and new people have been put in their place. A part of the
public has been seized by fears that the behavior of the new authorities
toward local media will not differ greatly from that under the old
regime, fears fueled by harangues of the government media. Prvoslav
Plavsic also warns that the media are becoming a prize for which fierce
battles will be foughtpolitical battles, not civilian ones.
In Serbia the systemic concerns with media are background, surfacing
only in political conflicts. Some factions (the radicals, for instance)
openly admit that once they assume power, they will manage everything
under their jurisdiction. That is the reason behind the penetration
into and the abuse of the media, instead of their support toward their
ultimate democratization. I fail to see significant differences between
the views of certain factions, even though it is clear that the factions
in power are most to blame for this state of affairs.
It is a fact that new city authorities throughout Serbia, even if they
wished, could not make any worse the situation in those media that are
under their controlthe Socialists and JUL have already made a
thorough job of it. Some news from the provinces are somewhat
encouraging: the local journals Velika Kikinda and Zrenjanin are already
printing nearly twenty thousand copies, a huge circulation in comparison
to the potential readership. Nezavisna Svetlost from Kragujevac is also
doing well, as are nearly all local journals which are not mere replicas
of the journals from the nations capital.
Pro-government newspapers are generally losing out to the independents
both in quality, and slowly even in circulation. For five, six years
already, from the infamous downfall of Epoha, the ruling authorities
are not attempting to create a serious political weekly of national
importance that could compete with Vreme or NIN. Last years
appearance of Dnevni Telegraf, Blic and Demokratija, along with the
existing (and best rated) Nasa Borba, have changed the
climate in the market for daily press: the circulations of Politika
and Ekspres Politika have appreciably fallen off, especially during
the civilian protests in the past several months. The die has fallen on
Vecernje Novosti which more and more often prints useful
information.
It could be concluded from this that the leading factions are slowly
abandoning the press. The electronic medias, on the other hand, are
something different, especially state television. The recent inception
of the grotesque program Foreign Chronicle only showed that the
authorities will not budge an inch from the existing, political approach
to production at RTS. It is left to Dr. Ratko Markovic to amuse himself
by altering old laws, and writing new ones, which will not change
anything.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, March 15, 1997
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