KOSOVO - REFLECTION OF THE EVENTS IN ALBANIA
Have events in Albania destroyed dreams of a republic of Kosovo or will
they just serve to encourage radical ethnic Albanians ? Veselin Simovic
and Filip Svarm of the Belgrade weekly Vreme and Shkelzen Maliqi of the
AIM news pool examine in the March 22, 1997 issue of this magazine this
issue from Belgrade and Pristina viewpoints.
Whenever Kosovo's ethnic Albanians thought the time had come to get the maximum of their demands (Kosovo as a republic) met from the Serbian regime with the help of the international community they were left without the support of Albania.
Today is no different; the international community put pressure on Serbia to start a dialogue on the status of Kosovo and rebellion broke out in Albania. As usual in the Balkans, that was reason enough to launch conspiracy theories with Serbia, Macedonia and Greece playing the main roles.
The postponement of the scheduled talks between
Serbian and ethnic Albanian intellectuals on Mt. Brezovica shows
that Kosovo Albanian representatives aren't prepared to start even an
informal dialogue until things calm down in neighboring Albania. Spokesmen
for Serbian political parties, with the exception of the ruling SPS,
have a different view: they all feel the dialogue is already
late and some even feel that now is exactly the right moment to
launch a platform on Kosovo.
The opposition has shied away from the Kosovo issue so far, fearing a
possible satanization by the regime but now the entire opposition,
especially the Zajedno coalition, is forced to talk about the problem in
meetings with west European diplomats. SPO leader Vuk Draskovic met with
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel on Tuesday, March 18 and proposed a
European-style compromise: It should remain within Serbia
but the Albanian minority in Serbia which makes up a majority in Kosovo
should enjoy maximum civil, religious, political and cultural rights
and get territorial autonomy.'' We're waiting for a comment from the state
media which will call Draskovic a Serb-hater'' who wants to sell
Kosovo.
You can write a thousand platforms on Kosovo but they can be implemented only by whoever is in power. We as the opposition have to know what the state concept on resolving the Kosovo issue is. For now, President Milosevic is in power and to journalists here it's important to know not who's going to be in power at some point but what the government thinks about an issue,'' GSS leader Vesna Pesic told a VREME reporter angrily. Maybe we won't win the next elections because we didn't force them to come out with a platform.''
VREME couldn't get to Slobodan Milosevic but did talk to Goran Percevic, a member of the SPS main board. In regard to events in Albania, the principled constant stand of our policy is to not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The SPS advocates good neighbor relations with all states. We hope our principled stand on noninterference will be accepted by politicians in Albania which has not always been the case. The deep crisis in Albania has produced consequences affecting the entire region. We advocate the resolution of all conflicts through political means without the use of force. The crisis in Albania cannot spill over. Under a Supreme Defense Council decision our state bodies have imposed all necessary measures including closing the borders.''
The SPS coalition partner New Democracy (ND) is more talkative about Kosovo. Ratomir Tanic, one of the mediators in talks on Kosovo, told VREME that what happened in Albania can't happen in the FRY. Crises can happen as well as serious internal conflicts but the state and the authorities can't fall apart. The state mechanisms in Serbia and Montenegro are the most serious in all of the former Yugoslavia. The crisis in Albania has shown us very clearly that regardless of all failures, all mistakes in our policies, the FRY, along with Greece is a factor of stability in the Balkans and the most stable states in the region.'' Tanic also believes that the crisis in Albania suits Yugoslavia politically in some ways because it confirms its role as a factor of stability not only in regard to Bosnia but also in regard to all future conflicts.'' That is very important to us.''
DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica also thinks the kind of anarchy we've seen in Albania isn't possible in Serbia: The consequences of Communism in Albania are much worse in Albania than in Serbia. Serbia was ruled by a kind of soft Communism compared to the regimes in eastern Europe and undoubtedly the Albanian version of Communism was one of the worst. Some values have been preserved here and that kind of breakup isn't possible here although there's no doubt that the agony of the transition from Communism to post-Communism will take a while in Serbia.''
Vesna Pesic and Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic also excluded the possibility of the anarchy spreading across the region. We are trying very intensely as we did throughout the civil protest to reach a minimum of agreement and prevent a fall into anarchy. That's why we in the Zajedno coalition think it's important to insist on the strategy of talks not the strategy of opposition obstinacy,'' Pesic said. Djindjic thinks what happened in Albania is an autonomous internal problem which has nothing to do with international affairs or the situation in this country. It's an independent political problem which will appear here unless we implement reforms. The same kind of anarchy that's happening in Albania could happen in Serbia. There are two integration mechanisms: the legal system and the economy. Both those systems are in a crisis. Something similar happened in Albania. Luckily, we have some more integration mechanisms but I can imagine a crisis in which everything would fall apart. If we hadn't had the will to keep things peaceful during the 88 days of protest we would have been on the brink of just that. If there had been bloodshed on December 24, who knows what would have happened in Serbia. Unless something is done soon to strengthen the legal system and the economy we'll be very close to what's happening in Albania.''
Tanic said official Belgrade is very concerned that the unrest in Albania will have an effect on Kosovo, that some ethnic Albanian political forces will become even more radical and organize terrorist groups who want to see the turmoil repeated in Kosovo. That same danger, or possibly even worse, is looming over Macedonia,'' he said and added that he's not sorry to see Albanian President Sali Berisha go because his regime showed no friendship towards Yugoslavia or any responsibility for Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. Albania had a direct negative effect because it used a political story which seemed powerful to assure the Kosovo Albanians that a solution is possible outside Serbia and Yugoslavia.''
Djindjic is much more specific in his accusations: It's no secret that Albania was involved in events in Kosovo. Berisha didn't confirm that but there's no doubt that he supported the hard-liners in Kosovo and managed to weaken the moderates, that there were intelligence links between Albania as a state and the radicals in Kosovo, the terrorist elements. Events in Macedonia also saw the involvement of Albanian intelligence services. Now we've got a pause simply because the intelligence services and state structures no longer exist which can deal with Kosovo and Macedonia and we have an opportunity to find a political solution in the meantime and start talks with the political representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to find a solution.''
All opposition parties expect the authorities to be the first to put forward a platform for talks, insisting on the fact that this is a state issue which must be resolved by whoever is in power. Right now, the regime is only abusing the Kosovo issue for internal political duels.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, March 22, 1997
Albanian floundering fatally coincides with moments in which Kosovo
Albanians are striving to maximize their aspirations, with those moments
in which they are most in need of support and assistance from their state.
It is apparent now more than ever that Albania is one of the greatest
victims of communism and totalitarianism. Half a century of total
isolation transpired in which the whole country was transformed into a
concentration camp, and in which unheard of military paranoia on
the part of the regime resulted in the erection of hundreds of
thousands of bunkers, and the production of weapons that exceed
military needs many times. Following profound disappointment in the democratic regime and anger at lost money and property---a disappointment in the dream of a quick and easy way of getting rich---Albanians apparently had to vent their anger, on the one hand, through a nearly complete, crazed masochism of the rubble which shot countless rounds of ammunition skyward, looted, destroyed and burned public property and symbols of the state and of oppression (police stations, barracks, administrative buildings), and, on the other hand, through a nearly complete desertion and collapse of the state. A social and state collapse on this scale had not been witnessed for some time, at least not in Europe. Nearly all institutions of social cohesion came apart overnight. It came to light that the Albanian society and state had only a temporary solution in their social and systemic contract, a kind of pontoon bridge from revolutionary rights and the dictatorship of the proletariat of bygone days.
At key moments in the Albanian conflict, when the
entire southern region was in revolt and beyond the control of Tirana,
for a few days it appeared that what was at hand was a regional
rebellion against the Beris Regime and the revival of
Toskerij aspirations for revenge, autonomy, and even secession
from the rest of Albania.
A CNN reporter had shots taken
of herself at the river Skumbini, which presents a natural
border between Toskerij and the rest of Albania---a border
between the two principal dialects of the Albanian language,
Toskerij and Gega---which she accompanied with very serious
disinformation about the significance of the river Skumbini
as the border between two Albanian entities, Toskerij
and Gega; in her disinformed view the development of
events is pointing toward the beginnings of another
ethnic war in the Balkans. Many hasty and schematic
analyses of this type, despite not making the cardinal mistake
of declaring Gega and Toska as separate peoples, still
forecast the outbreak of war between the south and the
north of Albania, pointing to particular regional
rivalries and religious divisions (predominantly
Orthodox Christians in the south, Catholics in the north,
and Albanian Muslims in between).
Some found a
seemingly more convincing argument for civil war in
the schematic explanation of current political
divisions in Albania. It was claimed that the south
is the traditional stronghold of the Communists, that
it is culturally more oriented toward communal
living, Russia and the East in general, while
the north of Albania has been and remains the
stronghold of pro Western oriented democrats.
Out of Tirana Sali Berisha was disseminating
hatred toward the south from the beginning,
claiming that the unrest in the south of
the country is part of a communist plot whose
object is the overthrow of the democratic
government.
Among Albanians from Kosovo and
Albanian patriots in general, the unrest in
the south caused bitterness and profound
distrust because of the acceptance of the
Serbian, that is the Orthodox symbol---the
raising of the arm with three fingers, in
the place of the democratic symbol, with two
fingers as the sign of triumph, of victory.
The attempts of the opposition's potentates
in Kosovo to interpret the symbol of the
three fingers as the sign of the political
coalition of the left, the center and Berisha's
anti-autocratic right, was subjected to derision.
The patriots from Kosovo and Albania, but
also the surprised international analysts,
initially saw the unrest in
the south as part of a geostrategic
plot that has as its object the
initialization of the dissolution
or the regionalization and
partitioning of Albania (just as in the
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina),
so that Albanians would lessen or
completely lose their aspiration of
imposing themselves as one of the factors
of balance in the Balkans.
Many conjectures were made about the Greek origins of the plot where the
object would be the assumption of strategic control over the south of
Albania, or about its Serbian origins, where the object would
be a weakened and destroyed Albania that would allow Serbia greater
leeway in dealing with its problems in Kosovo.
As we are discussing conspiracy theories, one
of them suggested a conspiracy between oddly coupled
interests of the Albanian Socialists and the
Italian Mafia, where both supposedly planned and
opened banks in which the Mafia profited
enormously, while the Socialists channeled the ire of
the dispossessed citizens toward the destruction of
the democratic regime, partly profiting in the process.
All such hasty and schematic assessments lost all value when the same
unrest and anarchy spread throughout Albania.
For several days there
was mass desertion from the Albanian army and police as the rubble was
going wild. The north behaved just like the south, not showing any
ambitions toward attacking Toska. The appropriation of weapons, looting
and wild shooting at the sky and at the symbols of the government were
replaying the same crazed, bloody carnival, and not some regional or
collective interests. The degraded and the humiliated citizens, those
who under the old regime had been completely crushed both financially
and spiritually, who suffered the traumas of utter mistrust in a society
where everybody was everybody's informer, where all family and social
moral values had been brought into question, ceding to the cruelest type
of egoism---within all this, the democratic regime of Sali Berisha,
during the transitional period, attempted to give open entrance to the
new order with apparent liberation of the space for small business. The
basis of the Albanian economic revival, however fictive its planning,
was largely founded on the support of anarchist individualism and the
black market economy.
When Sali Berisha came to power in 1992, the social and economic
systems in Albania were already in total collapse. Nothing was functioning.
There was no food. All production had come to a halt. Around a million
workers had been on forced leave of absence, receiving assistance from
the state in the neighborhood of $7 to $10. Italy at that time
had sent a special military unit to assist in the humanitarian mission
Pelikan,'' in which food was distributed.
The new government had managed to effect a turnaround
and to stabilize the situation with the help of foreign
aid and money sent home by several hundred thousand Albanian
expatriates, mostly living in Italy and Greece. However, Berisha
failed in achieving political stability mostly because of his
autocratic ambitions.
A strong Socialist opposition in the
Parliament prevented him from making changes in the system of the
sort he fought for. A consensus did not exist around the
new Constitution. Berisha wished to implement a system where the power
in the hands of the parliament would be minimized, and where he, as
president, would be assured absolute power for a long time. His project
did not even pass through the parliament, nor in the 1994 Referendum,
despite a strong print media campaign and absolute control of all
electronic media. The fiasco with the Referendum did not discourage him
from seeking a political consensus with the opposition, instead giving
him cause to turn to the time proven methods of the secret police (SHIK)
in keeping power and protecting democracy.''
In the desire to
secure personal power he initiated expatriation and
forcible confinement of political rivals (the opposition leader Fatos
Nano was in prison until only a few days ago), and led a constant,
fierce campaign against the Communists---i.e. demonizing any
opposition as Communist and restorationist.
In May of last year
the political crisis reached a peak with the elections whose results
were irregular because of drastic ballot tampering and theft.
Berisha, it seems, had misinterpreted the signals from the West,
which favored him over the leftist opposition,
taking that as a cue for impudent, open tampering with election results,
and for forcing the opposition to boycott the elections and to leave the
Parliament. The US., which up to that point had supported Berisha, had
distanced itself from his politics, demanding a repeat of the elections.
Europe was dithering, considering him as one of the factors that could
maintain stability in Albania. Or perhaps Berisha's support in certain
European capitals was dependant on his assurances that he would take a
middle course in regard to Kosovo.
In the mean time, it seems that
Berisha had underestimated the danger of bankruptcy of the financial
system, even though he was warned of the consequences well ahead of
time. But a different opinion exists according to which he is
responsible for inflating the balloon of accumulation of wealth and
prosperity with the object of assuring a second term in office.
However, relying on the secret police and a weak, corrupted
administration were insufficient factors in standing up to the reaction
of the opposition, and even less to the ire of a duped, defrauded
people. The extent of the bureaucratization, sluggishness and
inefficiency of the government machine is best illustrated in the
example of barriers and senseless conditions placed on foreign
investment and aid implementations.
In this way, for instance, the
German company Simens, which was to undertake, with German Government
funding, the complete reconstruction of the only airport in Albania,
Rinas,'' simply gave up on the project after several
months of insurmountable red tape.
When the crisis suddenly went out of control, Albania found
itself precisely in the position it had been in during 1991,
when Ramiz Alija, Enver Hodza's successor, had to bow down in
front of unbridled unrest and to accept a coalition government of
national unity. In the place of the government of Aleksandar Meksij,
Berisha had in the days of greatest anarchy and disintegration accepted
the formation of the Government of National Salvation, led by Baskim
Fino. The Socialists also, despite having initially poured gasoline on
the fire of dissent, realized that things were getting serious and that
the state must be protected against the consequences of total absence of
rule and of the dangers of civil war.
The new government with President
Berisha addressed the world powers with an appeal for urgent
humanitarian, economic and military aid. In the initial reactions of
greatest despair, urgent NATO military intervention was requested, to be
later reformulated -when the extravagance of the request was
realized---to only foreign military protection of specific strategic
positions, such as harbors and the airport in Tirana. The European
Economic Community and the USA took the Albanian crisis seriously and
decisively declared their position on Albanian state unity. They
supported the Government of National Salvation and promised
humanitarian, and even limited military assistance, which does not
directly imply military engagement in the chaotic circumstances in which
Albania finds itself today.
In the meantime, the situation has somewhat stabilized in Tirana and the
greater part of Albanian towns. The new government enjoys the political
support of sensible, patriotic citizens who have come out in numbers on
March 16 for counter demonstrations, demanding the maintenance of the
integrity of the state, the halting of anarchy and of the wildness of
armed individuals and gangs.
The government has managed to regain
control over a part of the police and the military (both have been
promised a pay increase of 300%!), and the appeal for the protection of
the state has been answered by many individuals. The key question for
the government of Baskim Finoa is, to all intents and purposes, no
longer the gaining of control over the crazed, armed free reign of
groups and individuals; that can be achieved gradually. The greatest
problem of the government is Sali Berisha, on whose resignation, it
seems, the rebels from the south continue to insist.
The recent events
in Tirana have detracted slightly from the happenings in the south of
the country. But the fact remains that the south is practically beyond
the control of Tirana, and that it, despite sporadic shooting and
wildness, continues to be the lair for organized units and
self-proclaimed elements of authority which continue to set as their
condition for laying down weapons the resignation of Sali Berisha. Some
opposition leaders in Tirana also see his resignation as the only way
for emerging out of the crisis.
Still, there appears to exist a double fear among the Socialists and part of the Opposition of any sudden demotion of Sali Berisha.
First, if he were to resign today, the Opposition would take over nearly all responsibility for managing a difficult political and economic crisis. For this reason it is in its interest to tow the politically dead Berisha so that he would continue to take full responsibility, while the Opposition would continue to collect brownie points for constructive and responsible conduct in dramatic situations. Second, the Opposition fears the possible reactions of the armed segments of the Democratic faction, which continues to be a strong and respectable influence, decisively supporting Beris; this means that their disgruntled reaction could lead to new unrest and perhaps even to civil war in the struggle for power. As the Premier Fino, who comes from the south of the country and is a member of the Socialist faction, probably counts on having greater success in talks with the rebel south, than he would have in talks with disgruntled, angry democrats, were they to become leaderless. One of the arguments that Berisha also put forth, after renouncing the hearsay about having resigned, is that his withdrawal from the scene is inevitable following the next elections, to be held in June, in which the Government of National Salvation promises fairness and the presence of foreign observers.
It is still to early to jump to any conclusions. The situation in Albania is changing daily and hourly.
As far as the question of Kosovo is viewed from the Albanian perspective, it has generated astonishment and despair. Albanian floundering, as it is quietly observed from here, fatally coincides with moments in which Kosovo Albanians are striving to maximize their aspirations, with those moments in which they are most in need of support and assistance from their state. Thus, on the same evening of June 2, 1990 when the Kosovo Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence, the crisis in Tirana began with attacks on embassies and the mass exodus overseas. Even now, when more serious talks were to have begun regarding the status of Kosovo, Albania is experiencing another economic and military moral collapse. In any case, the Albanians of Kosovo will now be more careful in their
tallying up of available options'' and reassessment of their strategies. The situation constantly demands of them to be rational and pragmatic.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, March 22, 1997
Ylber Hysa of the Pristina Albanian language weekly Koha
examines the same question in the March 12, 1997 issue of that magazine.
What has occurred after the ruin of the pyramidal schemes,
that culminated with a state of emergency and which has reached all
the headlines of the media in the world, has deeply upset and disappointed
Kosova. Living themselves in a "state of emergency" since long ago
and under repressive measures, Kosovars seem not to be able to sober up from
the shock that something of the kind is happening to their brothers in Albania
in their Albanian state.
This disposition seems to have influenced also the very much confusing
statements made by the Albanian political subjects in regard to the events
in Albania.
While Rugova, the #1 one figure of the Kosovar political scene - and once
very close to President Berisha and whose interpersonal relations had become
cold after the wide open support the Albanian official bodies and media to
Demagi - is a bit critical towards Berisha's steps, on the other hand, a number
of Kosovar intellectuals and politicians express a totally opposite posture,
supporting the measures taken by Berisha. And while Rugova uses a very
diplomatic and moderate tone stating theme assures that should be undertaken
for the solution of the problem, political steps that are so similar to the
American demands, Rugova's opponent, Demagi, with a tone of full support calls
Berisha's politics triumph of democracy!
Demagi's pronouncement, following the one made by Rugova, as two diametrically
opposite postures seem to have divided the Kosovar
opinion. Thus, some intellectuals criticized in public Rugova's declaration.
On the other hand, an old critic of Berisha, academician Qosja in an interview
for BBC, similar to Rugova asked for anticipated elections, the creation of a
national reconciliation government and similar political measures.
Also on BBC, Rugova's vice-president Hydajet Hyseni stated that the
situation in Albania was a state of emergency even before it was proclaimed
...due to the losses suffered because of the pyramidal schemes... and the
destabilization of Albania is also partially in function of the destabilization
of the Kosovar political movement of liberation...
The fear that the destabilization could be reflected in Kosova is also
shared by the majority of the Albanian political parties in Kosova which
demand the quick stabilization of the situation in Albania. And, while
awaiting for some developments to take place in Albania, Prishtink suffered
another explosion, in the middle of the town, in front of the Faculty of
Philosophy. Four people were wounded, two Albanians and two Serbs, and its
noise was heard all over the town.
While the previous explosions usually
happened at night and were sort of selective, now the target, the time and
the place seem to have been chosen to send a message of intimidation. In fact,
such an explosion happens in times when the Serbian prisons are full of people
accused of terrorism and when due to police brutality and torture a person was
killed in jail. This also happens in times when the talks on education have
still not given the expected results and when education still continues being
organized in private houses. But, above all, this explosion happens in times
when Albania is experiencing the worse protests ever in its history.
Now, besides the big crisis happening in Albania, a permanent electrifying
situation continues in Kosova, meanwhile the oasis of peace , Macedonia
is surviving the balance of a fragile security that has often been threatened
with interethnic unrest. The anti-Albanian demonstrations of Macedonian
students shouldn't be forgotten in this case...
Such a destabilizing situation of the Albanian lands has been existing since
some time now, and it has been turning into a very dangerous routine, but it
has never happened that the three Albanian geopolitical spaces have been
destabilized at the same time.
What's more, all of this happens in an Balkans
ambient, which is also very much unstable. Perceived thus, the insecurity of
these spaces seems to be total. And this increases the chances for an
eventual explosion of the whole region, where Albanians (but also the others)
would have to pay a high price. If so far the so called Albanian polycentrism
(Tirana, Prishtink, Shkup/Tetovk) has been the axis of the controlled instability,
where one space has been used as valve to discharge the accumulated anger onto
the other space, now a burning hey is threatening to consume the whole region.
The crisis in Albania doesn't recognize only the emotional dimension
of the Kosovars' disappointment, but also that of the threatening
instability. In such a nervous situation, there are divisions of
opinions that go beyond principality, which can be experienced on
both sides of the border as something more than a solely emotional
declaration. If Kosovars, who have spent a good part of their life
under the state of emergency rush to call this democracy then such
a unpolitical and undiplomatic statement could be experienced quite
differently from a considerable number of Albanians.
Perceived as a whole, what is happening in Albania will be a blow,
a shock of long-term consequences in the national and political
Albanian corps, in the whole Balkan. This is the time when there
should be more responsibility for what is said in public and the
100% pro et contra positioning. And this simply because the Albanian
reality doesn't seem to be neither white or black, in order to know it
and ascertain the diagnosis. And this black/white approach seems to
reflect a chronic non-principled positioning in the Kosovar Albanian
political scene.
Thus, a good part of intellectuals and the Albanian
opposition who were very critical towards Rugova because of his close
relations with Berisha and his failure to meet with the opposition,
now after Berisha's taking side of Demagi have started feeling sympathy
for Rugova. On the other hand Demagi, after visiting Tirana several times,
a priori blames the Socialists and its satellites for joining with criminals,
bandits and enemies of Albania in order to gain power .
Thus, the Albanian crisis with its division virus of the opposing
political forces, is threatening to captivate other regions inhabited
by Albanians, which have also the air of unstable lands and are
threatened by others. Kosova, since 1912 and on has always faced
difficult situations, became used to not awaiting for any help
from Albania led by iron-handed politicians, however,
it had never before been so threatened by a possible Albanian-Albanian
confrontation.
In such a situation, preserving a balance,
if not helping Albania, would at least help to safeguard a
situation where there would be no uncontrolled damage - this seems a
realistic objective in total insecurity. Using the situation in order
to pay back old debts would bring not only the politicians but also
Albanians into dangerous inter-Albanian precedents.
Finally, the events in Albania, depending on what will come out, could bring a totally unpredictable situation. If the Albanian army intervenes, there could be massive bloodshed and if the number of armed people in a small space is counted, then civil war could be very probable, and will bring terrible consequences, regardless of who would win. If the situation continues with all its confusion, and produces no suitable political solution, then a situation of chaos will reign, and it seems not to have an end.
If in any way foreign forces would get involved, especially
the military forces, then Albania, willingly or not, would undergo a
trusteeship. If Berisha, who has great problems in consolidating his
armed forces manages to win a military battle, the victory wouldn't be
complete without the political measures that would be acceptable to all.
Especially if the things go as far as the division of the North
and the South...
Source: Pristina weekly Koha, (English language edition) March 12, 1997
President of the National Peasant Party and the regular commentator of the
Podgorica weekly Monitor ,
Dragan Veselinov, tries to answer the question who is guarding Serbias
integrity in the February 28, 1997 issue of that magazine.
Many think that Milosevic will attempt to keep himself in power with the aid of a war in Kosovo. He will create incidents there and will throw the Serbs into the defence of their holy right.
We overlook an obvious fact: the Americans have openly threatened the President of Serbia that they will attack him militarily if he attempts to enter his last battle in Kosovo. They have already forced him in Dayton to halve the number of tanks and planes, and Serbia is not a military power anymore. If he cheats, he will get a rocket in his bedroom, in the same manner Gadaffi did a few years ago.
The nationalists do not think either in an economic or integrationalistic manner, and pushing Serbia into war for territories they have lessened its capability to rise an economy and guard itself as a multinational state. If they would want to go with an army to Kosovo, nobody would return from there, not because of the Albanian supremacy, but because of the Euro - American Storm no. 2. We would lose another Serbian territory, attempting another completely wrong policy.
And the other way around, Kosovo is kept within Serbia
by the Americans, not by Milosevic. If it was upon him, he would venture
into a long term war. The fact that he would additionally destroy the
culture and economy of Serbia, does not mean anything to him, since he held
himself up based on social decadence. Washington is not allowing Rugova and
others to carry out seccession of Kosovo. The integrity of Serbia is guarded,
no matter how strange that seems, by the US, and not by a bunch of chaotic and
conceited Serb nationalists and Milosevics regime.
The manoeuvering space of the Serbian president has diminished considerably, he almost does not have any. He cannot block the development of an alternative to the regime in Serbia through external wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and he cannot instigate a war in Kosovo - let alone Vojvodina. It does not really suit him to opt for the post of the Yugoslav president, as long as the Montenegrins oppose him. He cannot activate his position of the president of the Socialist party of Serbia - because there he would have to destroy the communist party of his wife. She would immediately hang herself around his neck. If he was to change the Serbian constitution and become the president of the Republic for a third term would be of suspicious legal character and politically unacceptable for the sizeable oppositional electoral body, particularly in Belgrade. He is reduced to a pure police protection of a few trustworthy units.
So far, the Kosovo weight is not worrying the Belgrade opposition. Even the Citizens Alliance did not venture to come out with a platform for the solution of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Draskovic froze himself with his not very useful offers of human rights for Albanians and highest European standards for national minorities. This thing is not too clear to Djindjic, because he is surrounded by sterile nationalists, and he himself did not venture yet to courageously fly out with new solutions and lead the game.
It is almost that only the Vojvodina coalition could formulate an approach for the political solution of the Kosovo problem. It is conscious that Kosovo cannot be solved if the Serbs themselves do not realize that the autonomy of Vojvodina is a legitimate act to guard the whole of Serbia. As long as the Serbs in Serbia and elsewhere do not give the autonomy to Vojvodina Serbs, and as long as Belgrade does not realize that Serbia is guarded through the rights of nations and citizens to an independent existence, they will see the Kosovo autonomy as something forced out of them, and not as a natural solution. And they will also seek to trick the Albanians the next day. It is not hard at all to solve the Kosovo burden if Belgrade would only insist on the unchangeable state borders of Serbia, and would offer the Albanians in Kosovo everything except an independent army, customs and currency. This would be supported in the whole world, while Rugova would find himself in the open. It seems that he cannot still understand that the Americans and Europe will never give him independent Kosovo. If the world decided to undertake a military operation against Milosevics ambitions in Croatia and Bosnia, why wouldnt it do the same against Rugovas in Pristina ?
The time has come for normal politicians. Milosevic is on his knees - although he will still keep on falling, it is the end of the Belgrade expansionism program, and so is Rugova. But, who will be the messenger who will bring the letter about the historical agreement in Serbia we still do not know that.
Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, February 28, 1997
MACEDONIA - NEXT TROUBLE SPOT ?
Skopje correspondent of the Belgrade daily Nasa Borba, Dragan Nikolic, discusses in the Sunday edition of March 23, 1997 of that newspaper the possibilities of the movement of the Balkan virus from Belgrade, Sofia and Tirana to Macedonia.
It was expected in Skopje that the Balkan virus from Belgrade, Sofia and Tirana will circumvent Macedonia. But. , some twenty days go, when massive demonstrations of university and high school students started, everything bore the sign of Belgrade iconography. Even the participants in the protest demanded that they be joined by the head of the Macedonian church, Mihail, similar to Patriarch Pavle in Belgrade.
Afterwards, the demonstrators, disappointed by the staunchness of the authorities, began a hunger strike in the park across the Parliament. It was threatened that Bitolj will become the Macedonian Vlorre, and that 100 thousand hungry and cheated will come to Skopje to bring down the incapable government, with all means available. The demonstrators then attempted to enter the Parliament building and take the seats of the members, who according to them are just a voting machine.
Also, when after the electoral victory in Tetovo, it was promoted into an Albanian city, and then after student protests on the other side, when there was also mention of gas chambers for Albanians, Macedonian - Albanian relations fell to the lowest level since Macedonia became an independent state. In such a situation, the proposal of a group of Albanian MPs who wanted the change of the Constitution seemed irrational, asking that the Albanian minority be defined as a nation, and the Albanian language equal to Macedonian in its use. This was taken as the lack of sense and pouring of oil onto the fire. The leaders of the opposing national groups, Ljupco Georgievski and Arben Dzaferi appeared on Bulgarian state TV, labeling this proposal as the attempt to create federalized Macedonia, since, according to these leaders, joint life is impossible. The also mentioned on this occasion the question of borders between Macedonians and Albanians.
Then options about the definitive breakup of Macedonia started to circulate, about the engagement of special services of neighboring countries, as well as their mentors which are working towards recombination of the Balkans, by which both Macedonian and Albanian state would suffer.
After the breakup of the Union for Macedonia and confrontation of the former members of this coalition, Macedonian extremisms got their chance. The oppositional Macedonian parties did not show more serious signs of serious aversion towards nationalism, which are pouring into the streets and squares, hoping that they will gin something out of them, while the incapable government will be the loser. Every event in the street was considered as the creation of the critical mass to bring down the government.
The atmosphere of disbelief in the future of the Macedonian state was created. Leaders of some of the oppositional parties have publicly prophesied its breakup, like that of the Albanian state, and the whole opposition continuously repeats that it is a question of a state in which everybody steals and in which there is an ongoing process of economic- social and state destruction.
In the meantime, the monetary system of the state was shaken, as well as the key state institutions, government and the central bank. In the five to six savings and loans the disappearance of the capital amounted to the level of state reserves. All this created conditions that opposition parties, some openly and some in the background, acquired unionistic ambitions, to place themselves as the leaders of the fired, cheated and socially threatened.
The real danger for Macedonia is the tendency in the majority nation to abandon the policy of equidistance, ntional equality, so that Macedonia would find in one of the neighbors a real ally. At this, most mentioned are Serbia and Bulgaria, and less often Greece.
After the debt in the Parliament about national relations, the statement of president Gligorov to the nation, the adoption of the Declaration on national relations, as well as the visit of the Greek foreign minister Pangalos to Skopje, a beam of hope appeared that Macedonia will not be encompassed into the Albanian chaos and that the engagement of the nationalistic VMRO-DPMNE as the leader of social rebellion will only have limited results.
Source: Belgrade daily Nasa Borba, March 23, 1997
Nebojsa Redzic of the Podgorica weekly Monitor looks at the background of the conflict between Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and
Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic in the February 28, 1997 issue of that magazine.
There is no question that this conflict has opened the question of relations between Serbia and Montenegro, and the epithet that Milosevic has been surpassed is only a metaphor for another drawing of line and the conclusions of the ruling Montenegrin
DPS party, which were made a while ago. So, it is not Milosevic that has been surpassed, but Serbian politics and the liaison of the federal partners. What has been surpassed is Montenegros bearing and its status of a forced war ally, who would like now to find a way out with a new boss. Only one that is a bit more to the West.
Loud cries by Djukanovic against the personality cult of the leader from Dedinje /area of Belgrade where Milosevic resides/, mean that he implicitly admits the blunder with which he has tricked not only himself, but also thousands of gullible citizens of Montenegro.
Reliable sources insist that only in the last few months the federal partner has taken over from Montenegro very profitable transit deals (as the folks say contraband) of cigarettes and other articles which have saved the citizens of Montenegro from complete collapse during the years of the blockade. Somebody has finally realized in Serbia that whatever Montenegro has been doing can be done by Serbia, with sixteen times stronger predispositions.
Suddenly, Djukanovic has found himself on the treshold of no return: after so many loud words about a successful economy and a balanced budget, and at that during the years of the unremembered blockade, the resources have dried up, and the money was missing. And right now, at that, when there are no more sanctions, while the good number of electoral points was garnered on the tail of the story of the successes of authorities that has rid us of that heavy burden. And what was left to the prime minister than to announce the brutal truth in front of the unionists that the situation in the
Montenegrin economy is even worse than they represent it! And something else: there are no social tensions for now, but as it has started, prime minister show his clairvoyance, they will surely arise.
After he addressed the blame to Dedinje, Djukanovic turned towards the search for the path out of the labyrinth. The recipe, although it was known and proposed for a long time, has been finally seen in quick and complete integration into the international community, and the activation of the membership within the UN, OESCE, IMF, World Trade Organization, World Bank. And if that is not possible along with Serbia, why not alone ?
Whether Djukanovic has weighted well enough his options or not, estimating the power of Milosevic remains an open question. What is certain is that an untouched front has been opened, and the outcome can be sensed according to the estimate whether Milosevic will weather this storm.
The alleviating factor for Djukanovic might be the fact that the current conflict was not initiated by a political motive, although it will certainly receive that connotation.
Here we arrive to maybe a central question: did Djukanovic receive, any, and whose support for his newest adventure ? Many analysts are inclined to say that the mention of the foreign factor in the critical commentary of the Serbian TV against Djukanovic is based on realistic premises. Actually, it is hard, almost impossible, to say how the support of the American administration has been secured, but it can be stated with certainty that different Washington lobbyists have done their job. Of course, there was the involvement of the inescapable political - business partner Milan Panic, who is the man behind Djukanovics American position. Actually, what is certain for now, is that the prime minister is strong enough in the US as is strong the strength, respect and influence of Milan Panic. The fact that Panic is on a first name basis with Clinton is not enough for premature conclusions.
It is completely another question whether Djukanovic has coordinated with his party colleagues.. Bulatovic is still wisely quiet, covering himself with his previous statement that individual statements cannot annul previously established positions of the DPS.
Still, only those politically naive can think that the whole thing has not been agreed at the top. Otherwise, 24 hours would not go by before Bulatovic would not raise his voice and silence his party comrade. In this manner, with his excursion Djukanovic has set himself up, to admit in the name of the
Montenegrin top that they have wasted seven years building themselves within a failed project. It is not impossible that due to everything Djukanovic will be sacrificed after all, in the same manner that the version according to which he has done this intentionally is not without ground. A defeat in the conflict with Milosevic would not only enable him to garner an epithet of a reformer who fell due to his ideas, but also to run away from the responsibility for the chaos to which he has given an immeasurable part.
The other, less probable combination, according to which Bulatovic and the ruling party are waiting for the moment to place Djukanovics stance in the realm of free thinking does not give good chances for a success to the prime minister. In a similar situation, the DPS has shown itself (Bulatovics signature in the Hague) as a party that does not have the internal potential to support its exponent. Tied to all this nicely is the reaction from Serbia, which, in the good old Kremlin manner calls upon healthy forces in the Montenegrin leadership , which, probably, is not hard to find.
The fact that the DPS wants to change the policy, can be seen only is their realization that with a surpassed politician and surpassed policies you can keep on going, but only towards the abyss. It is strange though that this Copernican turn is coming about only three months after the elections, won based on a platform of guarding of the joint state. This turn deserves at least somebodys resignation, or the calling of an extraordinary party congress. DPS does not want either of the two, but, in its wish to keep the absolute power and uncontrolled power it wants to do something bout the independence.
The fact that the project has been taken over from the Montenegrin opposition, more precisely from the Liberal Union, is to much to speak about. The fact that the leader of the initial project is taken to court by Bulatovic and Marovic, who are joined in it by Djukanovic speaks for itself. Pushing out of the Liberals and Perovic and squeeze into their political space is the primary goal of the current regime
The dilemma whether Djukanovics timing and the estimates of Slobodan Milosevic are measured well will still remain suspended in the air
Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, February 28, 1997
Belgrade weekly Vreme brought in its issue of March 15, 1997 a detailed look at the start of the functioning of the oppositional governments on the local level by its correspondents Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, Zoran Kosanovic and Zoran Radovnovic.
What we found shows that our job is dramatic rather than serious, Belgrades new city government chief architect Spasoje Krunic told his first meeting with reporters. A few days later in his first interview, Krunic made another qualification to describe what the new local authorities found: the situation is disastrous. Were discovering unbelievable things about the flow of money, manipulation with money and I dont know how long this will go on. Im afraid there is no end to it, he said.
The new mayor of Nis, Zoran Zivkovic, used virtually the same words to describe the situation he met with: We thought the state of the local economy and the city was catastrophic but its even worse. Novi Sad Mayor Mihajlo Svilar complained to a foreign correspondent recently that he discovered that he didnt have anything to take over when he came into office.
The best description of what the new local authorities are facing came from Vozdovac municipality assembly president Nebojsa Atanackovic: I had the feeling we were entering a mined house because everything the Socialists left behind was in catastrophically bad condition. There was a mine in every drawer. The municipality building itself is a mine field and were treading carefully although many of those mines are unavoidable. Our colleagues who are taking over other municipalities at least have the technical conditions they need or enough money. Were being shocked here in Vozdovac both materially and morally, Atanackovic said recently. VREME asked him to describe one of those shocks and he disclosed something unbelievable: during their final term in Vozdovac, the Socialists illegally handed out 157 apartments. Of that number, 97 were handed out in the space of just two days on November 15 and 16, prior to the second round of local elections.
Those statements and warnings indicate that in most of the places the opposition won at the local elections the new local authorities found the same economic situation: vast debts, gaps in the budget, crippled local economies, many traces of hastily removed evidence of tampering. Nis Mayor Zivkovic says just 20% of the 13,800 employees at the citys Electronics plant are working. Under 50% of the employees at the citys other economic giant MIN are going to work (which doesnt mean they are actually doing anything). We have some 35,000 unemployed people in the city right now. The number of people who can work and have jobs isnt over 15%, he said.
The Nis city authorities found a 35 million dinar hole in their budget. Zivkovic (the first chairman of the recently formed association of free towns) said hopelessly empty treasuries are characteristic to all the places Zajedno won. One of the things he discovered as a characteristic of Nis is that the Socialists used city budget funds to finance their election campaign spending millions of dinars. That makes the recent SPS-JUL statement that they will protect the population from the activities of parties financed and instructed from abroad with the goal of toppling the constitutional order, independence and sovereignty of the country seem very cynical.
One of the traces left behind in Nis leads to the privately-owned Pelikan Print company which printed local election ballot leaflets. They were paid 0.68 dinars each for the 200,000 leaflets they printed but later it turned out that they could have been printed anywhere at a cost of 0.02 or 0.03 dinars. The new authorities asked Pelikan Print to return some of the money. No agreement was reached and the whole thing ended up in court. That now makes the elections in Nis the most expensive as well as the most irregular. After everything that was made public on the basis of evidence that wasnt destroyed and confessions by some leftist dissidents, Nis local government chief Branislav Jovanovic seems to be right when he says he cant tell whether the authorities in Nis were part of the Mafia or whether the Mafia ruled the city.
The local authorities in Kragujevac also found the treasury empty and losses registered in funds and public companies and institutions. Some figures show that the economy in what was once one of the most developed Yugoslav towns is working at just 5% of its capacity. Kragujevac today is one of the poorest towns in Serbia and seems like a mining town where the gold veins have been exhausted. Kragujevac town government head Borivoje Radic told VREME that the town is in a hopeless situation because its economic giants arent operating. Those economic giants arent under the jurisdiction of the town authorities but their 40,000 employees, 15,000 young and educated unemployed people and 25,000 impoverished pensioners are looking to their new local authorities. Every third family in Kragujevac is a social services case, Radic said. The new authorities are meeting with huge problems and are mainly dealing with solving the existential problems of people who want to work or need help to survive.
Radics deputy Nebojsa Vasiljevic said the Socialists left behind a budget deficit of 10 million dinars along with chaos in all public companies and funds. The construction site fund has a recorded loss of 4.4 million dinars. Vasiljevic said the local media are also facing a catastrophic situation. Svetlost weekly which was taken over by the state has recorded a loss of 300,000 DEM. Kragujevac TV didnt pay its phone bills in 1996 and they now stand at somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000 dinars. Vasiljevic said that didnt prevent the former TV chief from spending 6,500 dinars a month on his expense account in a town where workers have an average salary of around 100 dinars. The former local authorities also left behind scandals with flour, foreign currency, medication, cars, farm machines. The new authorities are expected to deal with messes the previous authorities left behind which amount to losses of several million DEM. VREMEs Kragujevac correspondent Zoran Radovanovic said some of the people involved in scandals have changed sides.
The least specific information is available on what the new authorities found in Belgrade. We know that last year 85% of the budget was spent and that the city has lost 25 million dinars. The debts left behind stand at 180 million dinars which brings the total deficit to 430 million. For now that deficit isnt being felt because the city treasury is collecting money daily from the citys 3% sales tax. All that is enough to sustain the current situation and pay salaries to people working for the city. There are no other details on what has been left behind.
When they met reporters right after taking over, the new city authorities promised a report on what they found in two weeks. That deadline has just expired and things havent moved too far ahead. That impression is confirmed by Aleksandar Milutinovic deputy city government head. Some strange things have happened since we made that promised and thats why were late, he said. We came in here with the best intentions of working for the city and its people. The people virtually carried us into city hall and expect us to tell the truth. After a few days a number of people who worked in the financial sector, who we expected to help us draft next years budget, resigned. Five key people told us they are leaving overnight. I was amazed by their explanation: they said their party had ordered them to leave although I see no reason why their job should have anything to do with ideology. That party is persistently saying that its main priority are the interests of the people. In the meantime, we had to turn to drafting a budget and thats why were late.
Because of all that Milutinovic didnt want to voice any opinion on the previous city government. This VREME reporter was in Milutinovics office just minutes after one of the few remaining financial experts brought in a draft of the new budget. When you add up what the city gets from the republic and what it will collect from the 3% tax up to March 31 when the tax is being abolished, the total income for 1997 will stand at 1.77 billion dinars. The city needs 2.7 billion which means the income falls short by an entire billion. And thats just to keep thing going. Milutinovic said help could come in the form of the republic giving back what belongs to Belgrade. The way the hand over was completed and indications of obstructions from higher levels dont leave much space for hope that the republic wont hamper the opposition local authorities. Judging by initial indications they are hoping that things will get as bad as possible in opposition ruled cities and towns. All Milutinovic found in his new office when he took over was a red lighter.
All the people who took over the local authorities from the Socialists can use that lighter to light their way in the darkness they face. Some of them dont like being called the new authorities because money usually follows the authorities but not in their case. Serbias cities and larger towns are facing only problems. The new authorities are expected to soften social despair and show that they know how to rule although their hands are tied without the instruments of power. The best indication of the real power of the new authorities is the fact that Novi Sad Mayor Svilar waited two months to be received by his citys police chief who is accountable only to his headquarters in Belgrade as well as Novi Sads fire chief.
The indications of how things will work is evident in Belgrade where big companies under regime control have stopped buying monthly tickets from the city transport company leaving it without a major source of income.
The obstruction has begun but well explain that to people and if need be well whistle for 200 days more because theres no other way, Milutinovic said.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, March 15, 1997
Dragos Ivanovic of the Belgrade by-weekly Republika writes in the magazines issue of February 1-15, 1997, on the current developments in the political scene in Serbia.
At this moment, when his rule is threatened, Milosevic cannot do anything else but return to his roots - the famous group of his wife Mirjana Markovic, with whose direct help, ten years ago he came to the state and party helm. This group later on turned into JUL, which, although not numerous in its membership, became the true personnel party in the best sense of the Bolshevik tradition.
The whole truth about the stubborn survival of Milosevic in power, in spite of the broad and prolonged movement of the rebelled population does not solely rely on JUL and pure police force. It must be said that he is also surviving due to a dual game of his pronounced allies, including those in the opposition that formally proclaim themselves to be against him, but who actually, through their actions, suit him perfectly.
Fore example, from Montenegro, some voices, including those from some high officials, there come threats for secession, but in essence, the partnership relation between the SPS and DPS remains. The same goes for the New Democracy party. It is true that it has requested that the results of the local elections should be recognized, but nothing important has happened to indicate that Mihajlovic will leave the regime coalition.
One of the cornerstones on which the regime is holding itself still is the behavior of the part of the opposition. Seselj does not even have to enter a coalition with Milosevic, because he represent invaluable help to him the way he is now. His criticism of the government is fairly toothless, and his most poisonous arrows are directed towards the Zajedno coalition and the students, whom he accusing of selling out to the Americans.
Kostunicas game is somewhat more complex, but indirectly, it aids Milosevic. In its recent Declaration on internal and foreign policy, DSS has confirmed that it remains on a clearly nationalistic option. And this is exactly what suits Milosevic the most, because with this kind of the opposition he has superiorly won in the multiparty elections held so far. With such an adversary , the SPS will always fare better than with an ally. Many branches of the DSS are falling apart due to this, and some respected intellectuals have left the top of the party, alienating themselves from such a suicidal policy.
It seems that the Zajedno coalition is shedding itself from these mortgages of the past, at least its main partners, SPO and DS, since the GSS did not have these burdens. Its principled insistence on the fact that the results of the elections have to be recognized and the orientation on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, garnered respect of the domestic and the international public. But, the possible pitfalls should not be forgotten while this frenetic unity and fiery speeches last at the Republic Square. According to all signs the challenges for the Zajedno coalition are cropping up from all sides and are not so minor. Quite often, from within the country and abroad, sometimes with nervous hurry, questions are being raised of the new constitutional solutions for Kosovo, Vojvodina, Montenegro, a more definite word is demanded from the coalition concerning Bosnia and Croatia, or concerning war criminals.
If we could simply reduce the current stance of the Zajedno coalition to one sentence, it could, approximately, be worded like this: Lets first achieve the minimum of democratic preconditions (except the results of the elections that includes parliamentarianism, the achievement of the principle of electoral change of the authority, solution for the media, judiciary), and then we will confront these themes. This order really seems logic and pragmatic, since it tends to spare the internal cohesion of the coalition of premature internal problems. But, there are those who are convinced that too long a prolongation of pronouncements can hurt the coalition itself. Their starting point that within this general civil movement there are different streams in the fight for supremacy (even nationalistic ones), whose only bond is the negative stance towards Milosevic, while everything else is different.
Then, there is another question: Are all members of the Zajedno coalition, without any reserve, loyally concentrated only on the achievement of basic preconditions for democratic changes, or whether within it the hidden internal conflict has begun for achievement of advantages in the post - Milosevic period which is behind the corner ? One day one of the persons proposes the creation of a Democratic forum, another day, another person from the same party faction, denies this as a mix up. Some search for a new Havel as the future president of the Republic, while others have public dreams of a monarchy, which interprets the recent statements of Aleksandar Karadjordjevic that people are only waiting for him. Is the role of a constitutional parliament forgotten ?
The regime is sizing up whether these sparks will turn into a fire of conflict among the partners, so that it could maraud the coalition so that it could destroy it from within. It has a few years of experience at that, and actually quite some success.
The students are a specific story with a multivalent meaning in this three month old story. One of their main characteristics is continuous insistence on their autonomy towards all political parties, which of course, cannot be taken maliciously by anybody. The students are simply an integral part of the general civil movement in Serbia. They have no ideological charge which were so popular at one point in time here and abroad, but it comes out that they are not completely out of current political trends. It seems that in the ideological sense closest to them is the spirituality of the Orthodox church, with which they had closest ties so far. Who sincere that religiousness is, and who much it is just a cover up to guard themselves from other possessiveness and influences is yet to be seen.
Source: Belgrade by- weekly Republika, February 1-15, 1997
Regular commentator of the Podgorica weekly Monitor , Slobodan Inic, estimates in the March 21, 1997 issue of this weekly the possibilities of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to remain in power.
If Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic does not resort to his well known political tricks so to force himself for the third, this time unconstitutional manner, on Serbia - then he is not left with anything else but to move in the direction of the Federal presidential top. Of course, unless Montenegro attempts to prevent this attempt, which is neither to be expected, nor is it politically viable. There re adequate signs about this already, since his supporters recently started speaking more and more bout the strengthening of the federal state with an obvious message that such a strong figure cannot have such a weak position.
It would then remain for Milosevic to make an effort at the same time to find a loyal political heir in Serbia, who would in that respect be similar to Lilic on the federal level, which at the first glance does not seem like a hard task knowing the spineless character which otherwise surround Milosevic.
But, the problem for Milosevic is in that such a desirable candidate of his, would at least have to win the election, since all those loyal characteristics would not amount to much.
The possibility that Milosevics candidate would win at the presidential elections in Serbia - in a situation when Milosevic himself is not able to win them - would equal a miracle. This then leads to a conclusion that in the expected case - the defeat of the Milosevic candidate and victory of the appositional one - Serbia would become the biggest opponent to Milosevic, this time as the federal president.
The opening of the hole, as the Americans say, in Serbia from this side would further complicate Milosevics position on the federal level. If the largest part of the victorious Serbian opposition sticks to its main goal - to restore the monarchy - this would be counterproductive to the federal partnership with Montenegro.
The complications for Milosevic in that respect would be even greater if along with all, his SPS party would lose the parliamentary elections in Serbia.
This would particularly have as an effect that he would confront the disloyal Serbia with extraconstitutional strengthening of the federal state at any cost, which could stimulate further resistance of Montenegro towards Yugoslavization. This resistance would not flow at the same time and towards the ungrateful Serbia, since the Serbian opposition, as Milosevic himself - tends towards unitary Yugoslavia.
In a conflict with rebelled republics - Serbia and Montenegro - Milosevic could not remain for long at the helm of the country, But such a conclusion would be one - sided unless different motives that would lead Serbia and Montenegro towards rebellion re taken into consideration. rebelled Serbia would in any case be against Milosevic, even though it shares his unitarist views on the character of the union.
Montenegro, on the other hand, is against the unitrization of the union, and with this against Milosevic, but this does not mean that it is a natural ally of the anti - Milosevic Serbia, since its such ambitions will not be extinguished simply by his departure from the political stage.
It would be very hard that Milosevic would have the possibilites to resist the rebelled republics from the highest, mainly protocol position. If his candidate and his party lose the elections in Serbia - it will be almost impossible for him to find allies in his republic for its disciplining. This is also true of Montenegro, having in mind the stance of the political duo Djukanovic - Marovic. A beam of hope is a possible alliance with Kontic /current federal prime minister from Montenegro/ and particularly, Bulatovic.
The other and finally the last possibility for Milosevic to hold on against the rebelled republics is the introduction of extraordinary measures, but this act would not have long - term perspectives. This would also lead him to a conflict of no return with the EU and the US.
Any form of dictatorial rule demands adequate measures for its conduct. Milosevic not only does not have all resources for brutality, but he is neither able to operationalize them. In spite of the strength of his numerous police force, it still has a more defensive role. The situation in the Federal army cannot be heartening to him either - from the fact that this an army which lost a war, to the obvious proof of disloyalty of the parts of its top command personnel.
Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, March 21, 1997
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