"Monitor"
gives an overview of the
situation in the media in view of recent
events in Serbia
SITUATION IN BOSNIA
The editor in chief of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" comments in
the February 20, 1997, issue of that magazine on the correlation of
the situations in Brcko and Mostar.
Mostar and Brcko, just like it was thought out, re showing
themselves as the two key points through which are reflected all
political/criminal games, all our blunders, all our amateurisms, and
all world "concepts" connected with Bosnia, if there are any. The
people are told, you see, that Brcko is our defeat, and that Mostar
is our victory. Like, in Brcko we lost what we had a right to and
what was ours. In Mostar, on the other hand, like we have "Our" part
of the city, and that is, for the beginning, enough for satisfaction.
It is a story in itself why and how we are surprised, even shocked by
the fact that the world in its Brcko "arbitration" opted for
Republika Srpska, and not for the Federation. The only ones that
could be surprised are those that do not know anything about the
international political logic, and the sole demand which is
insurmountable for them: here not one of their soldiers should be
killed, at any price.
Every operation of "resettlement" of those that
have been holding Brcko for the last four years would lead to a new
war, new planes, new NATO operations, etc. Secondly, the return of
Brcko to the Federation would mean the final death sentence for
Republika Srpska, and Dayton has, as it is known, given birth to this
creation, and it is a completely crazy thought that it will give up
on it now. The question of Brcko, at this moment, is not a question
of justice or injustice, but of political reality looked at, not
from our angle, but from the angle of those who have stopped the war
here, not allowing anybody the feeling of victory.
In this reality,
on the other hand, is the only chance for these regions. It is not
the most important question who is the owner of this or that
municipality, if the people really return to their homes, their human
rights are guaranteed, they get what is theirs, ND they re able to
use it the way they want. So, if the world persists at that which
goes along with the decision on formal giving of Brcko to Republika
Srpska, if the access to the port is secured, free passages, etc, all
of this will be better in "their" Brcko, than the current situation
in "our" Mostar.
The concept of resolving the status of this city, the way it is
envisaged, is not in is foundations a national one.
In Mostar, it is completely different. There the genes are
still consistently pushed in front of the rights and reason ND there
no "agreements" will ever help, because all is based on terrorizing
of the other only because he is "theirs". There the question is
whether we will take the Boulevard or won't we, and when we take it
from "them", then we will know who will be able to walk there ND who
will not.
Brcko could become a model for reconciliation, with the concept
that is offered, although this concept the "nationals" consider as a
defeat. Mostar, the way it is, will always be a model for warfare,
because that is of crucial and survival importance for the idiots who
still think that the whole world is still divided on Croats, Serbs
and Bosniaks, and not in any other manner. The key question in Brcko
and Mostar is not to whom they will belong to, but whether one will
be able to lead a normal life there. As it is known, Zavidovici,
Bugojno, surroundings of Sarajevo and many other places are formally
"ours", but in essence, unfortunately, they are really "theirs"
unless the difference between ours and theirs is drawn by
intelligence, democracy ND civilisational values, and not by forced
and fake genetic gluttony, for which you have to die to the last son.
Somebody else's.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", February 20, 1997
The current situation in the city of Mostar is further examined
in the same issue of "Svijet" by Vlastimir Mijovic.
It is generally a big question how much Zubak ND the people
from HDZ who are sitting in Sarajevo have the influence on the
Croatian national politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, how much they
are actually the puppets ND political hostages of the true masters
who are sitting in Zagreb, Grude and Mostar. The only one who has no
doubts about the answer to this question is Haris Silajdzic. After
the Bairam massacre of innocent civilians he has stressed on number
of occasions that the directors of the Croatian policies and this
crime are sitting in Zagreb, ND their executioners in Western Mostar.
Zubak is not mentioned. A fundamental dilemma is opened in that
manner: is it worth to make any kind of agreement with the HDZ people
on temporary assignment in Sarajevo ? How much essential power and
competencies do they have so to channel the implementation of the
agreements which they are achieving with the Bosniak and SDS tops ?
Those knowledgeable into the situation in Mostar - Fatima Leho,
Alija Behram and Hamdija Jahic are convinced that Zubak and his team
have no practical influence on the ringleaders form Western Mostar,
that Brajkovic, Puljic, Topic, Radic and Naletilic are sovereign
rulers, that their political option is much stronger. Behram says
that the sole motivation of this group are not solely nationalism and
politics: "They really got wealthy in this war, and they still
attempt to hold on to these privileges".
Edo Batlak, the head of the Directorate for the Reconstruction
of Mostar is of the same opinion. He is of the opinion that nothing
in the Federal, ND particularly Mostar life can be achieved without
the deposing of the extremist Mafia lobby form the other side of the
Neretva river. Batlak thinks that the key role there is to be played
by the international community and its pressure on the leadership in
Zagreb. Tudjman has to be openly threatened with sanctions, says
Batlak, who considers that Tudjman's influence on the events in
Mostar is not seen only by those who intentionally avoid to see
that which is obvious.
The parallel between Brcko and Mostar is marked by SDA
official dr. Halid Genjac. According to his opinion, the incident in
Mostar was intentionally staged ahead of the Brcko decision, with the
goal to prove even in this manner that the Federation is impossible.
Some secret connection tangled itself between the two cities
which are 350 kilometers from each other. The most logical
explanation, besides the one by Genjac is possibly the one that the
Mostar extremists have estimated that in the short term the
international factor cannot adequately deal with two sizeable
problems, so they used exactly the international and domestic
preoccupation of the fate of the city on the Sava River for their
dirty deed.
They would, according to the opinion of Fatima Leho, do
anything that Brcko remains with the Serbs, since then the Bosniaks
would still be oriented towards the port of Ploce, that is through
the area under their control. "That is their main ground which they
are defending at any price. If we would get an alternative exit
through Brcko, the Western Mostar Mafia would loose its trump cards
with which it is blackmailing us now".
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", February 20, 1997
THE CURRENT EVENTS IN CROATIA
Chief commentator of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", Marinko
Culic, examines in the magazine's issue of January 27, 1997,
President Tudjman's yearly report on the "state of the nation".
After Tudjman's speech in the Parliament the whole country is
connected to the same therapeutic machines as he is. Because it also,
fearful, has to hope that he really will "die slowly", so that his
too early a departure would not lead to a crash caused by insatiable
pretenders to the throne belonging to his party.
What is worst, all chances are that this was a calculated wish,
that is, that Tudjman consciously went for an open blackmail of his
compatriots. He, who has created all the dangers that come to this
country from the HDZ, now is offering himself to hold this party on a
long stick, but under the condition that it is health card is not
being discussed, but, on the contrary, that he is given the
possibility for another presidential mandate.
It is understandable that along with such irrational proposal
Tudjman had to thoroughly dress up some parts of his speech. In it,
for the first time, things like "Croatian national unity" (among the
parties) is mentioned, or "national state" (which has to serve the
citizens). Even a communist - like patch that only the happy, rich
and satisfied Croats will defend and build the Croatian state.
Due to this, Tudjman's speech, which is full of empty phrases
about better and more harmonious life, is on the contrary very stingy
when currently the most important question is raised, and that is
that he will share the power according to the electoral results. On
the contrary, it says that "true democracy presupposes the advantage
of that party which has won the relative majority at the elections".
This opens the possibility that the Zagreb "model" is applied at the
forthcoming elections elsewhere, including the state level (1999).
By this a message has been indirectly sent to the oppositional
parties that if they want constitutional changes so much, they have
to have HDZ interests in mind. And it, is admitted, is loosing
voters, but would still not like to lose the power ! This means that
by Tudjman's speech only a new in a series of offers for partnership
has been formulated concerning the guarding of the continuity of
power, that after forthcoming elections this could turn into
something more concrete. With this, Tudjman obviously calculates that
with some luck in bargaining with the opposition, ND even more so in
the elections he will be able to patch up some solution which will
help HDZ survive, and will not really bring into question the
viability of the state.
This is one of the most daring endeavors he embarked on, but
now on the edge of life itself, ND obviously spent ideas. His idea
that Croatia should be forbidden to join Balkan associations, could
bring him some electoral points, but that is still an empty phrase
dummy which he does not mean anything for the country, on the
contrary, it brings into question its self-being ND
self-consciousness. Proclaiming of the exiled Serbs as those "that
have opted for that" is completely unnecessary challenging of them
and the international community, because it is a question of a
precise legal term, and not something that has been patched up for a
daily ideological use.
Still, ignoring of constitutional changes cold prove to be the
"worst" idea which came to his mind. Or it already is.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", January 27, 1997
The same author takes a more detailed look at the forthcoming
elections in Croatia in the February 10, 1997, issue of "Feral
Tribune".
This week will see the calling of local and county elections in
the whole of Croatia at the same time, that is in Podunavlje. If
there is any change, it is a matter of them being postponed only for
week or two.
This small movement of the term could first of all be explained
by calming of passions among Podunavlje/Eastern Slavonia/ Serbs, who
only for a brief period , two or three days rejected the Croatian
Letter of Intent, which was supported by the UN Security Council ,
but who then corrected themselves, in principle not rejecting the
possibility that they enter these elections.. For this turn key was
the visit of the representatives of both factions - the radical
(Hadzic, Keravica) and moderate one (Stnimirovic) to Belgrade, where
they were informed by Milan Milutinovic that Milosevic supports the
second one. But some effect was also made by some statements form the
Croatian side that some territorial changes in Podunavlje are
possible after the elections, which would partly accept the Serbian
demand for "their own" county (creation of some firmer union of
Serbian municipalities).
Judging by all, this are given some set norms for the longer
term solution of the position of Serbs in Croatia. Even in the case
of their more massive return from FRY and BiH, they will not be able
to territorialize political rights which they will demand form Zagreb
(the reconstruction of two regions for the Constitutional law on
minorities), because a conclusion is fermenting within the World
organization that here lie the causes of the wars that were lead
during recent years in these areas.
On the other hand, territorializations were the goal tended to
by all, and which has been partly approved by the international
community (Republika Srpska, Herzeg Bosnia), so it cannot simply be
said: this was valid so far, now it cannot be ! That is why the Serbs
in Podunavlje will achieve somewhat greater level of autonomy that
cited in the Letter of Intentions - but still without the elements of
statehood (army, police) - to what they are actually motivated by the
Croatian side, creating a completely autistic mood that at the polls
"the Croats have to outvote the Serbs".
Still, the Croatian political parties will note enter the
elections, as demanded by the HDZ, as a unified block, because the
largest opposition parties did not want that, and even some ruling
officials (Canjuga, Vrkic) publicly came out with statements that
this would not be good. But, still the Croatian and Serbian parties
will line up against each others (even the unification of Pupovac ND
Djukic Serb parties is possible, even though they been looking
starkly at each others for years), so that there is no indications
that somebody will put on their lists a name for the other side of
the ethnic divide. With this, the first elections in which "rebelled
Serbs" will participate, will only fill in the cracks created by the
war, but these will remain visible and open to the possibility of
further tear, and that without new open conflicts.
As far as the elections elsewhere in Croatia are concerned,
they are still under the sign of a possible change at the helm - even
more probable by the fact that Croatia is one of the really rare
European countries in transition where the ruling team has remained
unchanged for seven years - but that possibility is not so open as it
was ten days ago. First of all, HDZ is daily undertaking measures
which have a clear goal that the elections are won even before the
polls are open, and these are not only standard pre - electoral
tricks aimed at short - term sucking up to certain categories of
voters. What is being undertaken now is a direct electoral
engineering, which sometimes borders with direct electoral theft, ND
sometimes well crosses it.
In that manner, Tudjman has kept the right to confirm the mayor
of Zagreb, which means that the Zagreb crisis will not be over with
the elections, which was promised to European representatives, but
could theoretically be stretched indefinitely. Besides that, the
demand of the opposition for multi - party electoral commission has
been rejected again, which according to an old admission of Josip
Manolic re formed in such a manner that HDZ members temporarily
return their membership cards, then they re elected into the
commissions, and after the job is concluded they return to the party.
Still, the decisive help to HDZ could come from the opposition
itself, which will appear at the polls only with one weak relatively
loose coalition (HSLS, HSS). This has brought a lot of joy to the
ruling party, so that Ivic Psalic is already stating that such
coalitions, contrary to unions from far left to right, mean " a step
forward on the Croatian political scene". It seems that the goal of
the dual coalition is not taking over of power, but only taking over
of the leading role in the opposition, even though the position of
the HDZ would remain untouched.
The HSS-HSLS coalition is beginning to play a very risky game,
since anything except its obvious domination over the SDP - small
parties coalition would mean a heavy electoral crash. With a partly
result it would only split the oppositional scene into two parts,
which would open it to rage of the electorate at the next elections,
which is more ND more showing a mood of for and against HDZ.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", February 10, 1997
One of the editors of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", Filip Svarm
, writes in the January 11, 1997 issue of this magazine on the
current situation regarding Eastern Slavonia.
The new year for the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Srem began under the sign of the Memorandum on
Completing the Peaceful Reintegration sent to them and relevant
international community members by the Croatian government.
That letter of intent said the territory now under the
control of UNTAES will be divided into two areas (the
Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srem districts). The possibility of
forming a Serb ethnic community which would unite those two
districts was allowed but with no hint of political
autonomy.
In regard to participation in the authorities,
ethnic Serbs were offered the posts of district deputy chiefs,
three seats in the Croatian parliament house of representatives
and one in the chamber of districts along with several posts in
parliament bodies and ministries. The right to vote in local
elections on March 16 will be given to Serbs who lived in
Eastern Slavonia in 1991 and refugees who were also allowed to
``vote in their place of residence.'' Both will vote as
citizens of Croatia which means they have to get all the
necessary documents before the elections.
The Memorandum also allows Serb men of military age not to
serve in the Croatian army (HV). If they want to they can choose
a working duty as conscientious objectors. Finally, all Serbs who
want to leave the region will be ``secured adequate compensation''
by the Croatian government.
For now there have been no serious reactions by the Serb
authorities in Eastern Slavonia. Most likely, they're
discussing the Croatian government document with UNTAES chief
Jacques Klein and waiting for his final word. A positive
opinion on the document came from Milorad Pupovac, head of the
Alliance of Serb Organizations in Croatian and a member of
parliament, and similar tones were included in a Christmas
message from Milan Djukic, leader of the Serb National Party.
That message was sent by him and the HV transitional
administration chief for Eastern Slavonia Ivica Vrkic.
The main issue in the peaceful reintegration of Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem is the return of
refugees, both Serb and Croat. General Anse said the return of
Croatian refugees will be an extremely important job as well as
solving the position of Serbs from other parts of Croatia living
in Eastern Slavonia because Zagreb's stand on that issue is
clear. Vrkic said no one should hope to stay in a Croat
house. The essence of the whole thing is the return of some 80,000
Croatian refugees to Slavonia and the return of Serb refugees to
the their homes in the Krajina.
It's hard to believe that there is any way for the Serb
authorities in Eastern Slavonia to prevent Croatian refugees from
returning and Zagreb from taking over. Vrkic is clear: the
proposals in the Memorandum are not Croatia's problem. If they
are refused, the Serbs can choose whether to accept Croatian
authority individually or leave. The war is lost and the Erdut
agreement which defined everything was signed long ago.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 11, 1997
EVENTS IN SERBIA
Radenko Udovicic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" writes in the
January 11, 1997 issue of that magazine on the reactions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina to the events in Serbia.
Neither political circles in Sarajevo nor the public in
Bosnia have come forward with a common stand on current
developments in Serbia. The media have shown a fair amount of
ignorance about what is going on with the exception of the Sarajevo
daily Oslobodjenje and its pro opposition Belgrade correspondent,
who has been reporting in detail about the events in the Serbian
capital.
State-media reporters have so far declined to comment on
the protests in Serbia. Their delight with the fact that Serbia has
once again been pushed into instability was more than apparent, but
it seems that none of them are prepared to take sides in the
regime versus opposition conflict. The prevalent opinion among
Bosnian officials and reporters in the early stages of the
protests against the election fraud in Serbia was that some
leaders of the Zajedno coalition could pose an
incomparably bigger threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina and its population
than Slobodan Milosevic himself. None of them have forgotten
that Zoran Djindjic had supported Radovan Karadzic in his conflict
with the Serbian president. Much less are they prepared to
forget Vuk Draskovic's outbursts of nationalism, as they put it,
before the war broke out.
Both Draskovic and Djindjic had the opportunity to
clarify their positions in interviews for Sarajevo's
Television 99. It seems that Draskovic has succeeded in boosting
his reputation from bad to worse by advocating a Serb-Moslem
federation on 85 percent of Bosnia's territory, which would then
be firmly integrated with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
During the interview, the television staff received
hundreds of phone calls by individuals who swore at Draskovic and
his hosts in a less than civilized manner. Zoran Djindjic, on
the other hand, had two interviews but picked his words very
carefully on both occasions. It is most interesting that he
stressed his strong support for the Bosnian Serb Republic and
his reputation of a ``hard-line nationalist,'' but explained
that his nationalism went only to lengths not threatening the
interests of other nations. He underscored he would keep
supporting the RS only if it acted in a democratic manner and
respected human and other rights of its population.
An association of intellectuals called Circle 99 organized
a round table debate on the events in Belgrade. Although
Zarko Papic, a Belgrade intellectual employed by an
international organization in Sarajevo for several months now,
did his best to underline and explain to his hosts the
significance of the struggle for democracy in Serbia, the Sarajevo
side was notably reserved about his viewpoints. One of the
participants, film director Mirza Idrizovic, called the Zajedno
coalition the worst group of nationalists he had ever seen and
said they would go as far to ``paint themselves black to gain
power.''
One of the few who voiced their support for the Serbian
opposition was another film director, Vladimir Gojer (also
vice-chairman of the SDP). He said it was important that not only
Milosevic must be forced to step down, but so should the present
authorities in Bosnia and Croatia. The dilemma of how to
declare one's self on developments in Belgrade is probably best
reflected by the Circle 99 conclusion that support should be
given to the Belgrade protest, but not the people leading it.
The first and so far only reaction by the Bosnian authorities
came after the violent clashes in Belgrade. Vice-president of
the Bosnian council of ministers Haris Silajdzic condemned
police action, but warned that Bosnia would support the Serbian
opposition only if it was prepared to recognize and
respect the integrity and sovereignty of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his opinion, the Zajedno coalition has not
done so yet.
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic said in an
interview a few months ago that a weak Serbia and a democratic
Croatia were the best options for Bosnia's survival. That
strategy is in complete discord with the present position of the
Bosnian government, who are officially in favor of a democratic
Serbia. A democratic state can by no means be weak, so it is
possible that Izetbegovic changed his opinion. However, one must
not rule out the possibility it is still his belief that only
totalitarian regimes can be strong.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 11, 1997
The same January 11, 1997 issue of Belgrade weekly "Vreme"
brought the parallel view from Zagreb by Boris Bratic.
Latest events in Serbia are being followed with unbelievable
restraint in Croatia. Most media are acting as if all this is
happening somewhere in Latin America. What is more, news from
Belgrade are broadcast as ``elsewhere in the world today,''
after the hostage crisis in Peru and some other events Croatian
television considers more important. As none of the ranking HDZ
officials have come forward yet to comment on what is going on
next door, all assessments have so far come from state-employed
newsmen. Most shocking was a recent prime time news comment by
Obrad Kosovac, who said without any hesitation that an
undemocratic Serbia was most convenient for Croatia as it is, and
that a democratic Serbia would actually pose a serious threat to
Croatia!
A similar but somewhat more subtle comment was made two
weeks ago by Carl Gustav Stroehm, who said Djindjic and Draskovic
were more dangerous for Croatia than Milosevic himself, because
he thought they were Serb nationalists still dreaming of a
greater Serbia. Stroehm believes that they could start another
war for Serbian territorial expansion if they came to power.
The belief that Slobodan Milosevic is the best man for
Croatia is based on two things. One is that Croats can easily
be persuaded that since Milosevic spells disaster for Serbia,
Croatia's enemy, he also spells advantage for Croatia itself.
That is what Kosovac was getting at. The other explanation is
slightly more profound but more exact too: Milosevic is
Croatia's strategic partner in the division of Bosnia, he is
``one of us,'' as Croatian president Franjo Tudjman has said on a
number of occasions, so it would be dangerous to replace
him with someone else.
The uncertainty factor is there too, for Tudjman's
and Milosevic's eventual departure will inevitably spell radical
changes in Croatia's internal and foreign policy. The Bosnian
issue is more open than ever. Tudjman is just about the
only ranking Croatian politician advocating the division of
Bosnia, but not one of the opposition leaders is either strong or
determined enough to prevent that from happening.
The Belgrade protest marches were in the focus of
attention during a rally by Zagreb's citizens against the state
takeover of Radio 101. Everyone, including the opposition, was
furious about the fact that Milosevic and Tudjman, Belgrade
and Zagreb, Serbia and Croatia were given equal treatment in
the world those days. ``Any sort of comparison, not to mention
drawing a parallel between Milosevic and Tudjman, is an insult
not only to our president but also to all Croat citizens, for
Croatia is a democratic country unlike Serbia,'' said Zdravko
Tomac, vice-president of the Racan-led SDP.
Nevertheless,
Tomac---one of the most outspoken adversaries of Bosnia's
division---supported the struggle for toppling the Serbian
regime. ``The west knows that the Serbian opposition is not
democratic, apart from Vesna Pesic. However, even if it is worse
and less democratic than Milosevic's regime itself, the west will
insist on recognizing the election results of November 17 and free
media as the basic prerequisites for getting a democratization
process in Serbia underway.
It is in our best interest
that neighboring countries are democratic too, so we should
support all those in favor of fair elections and free media, no
matter what we think of the Serbian opposition,'' Tomac said. He
assessed that only those who want to stall democracy in Croatia
had a valid reason to support Milosevic, and that replacing a bad
Milosevic with an even worse Draskovic would eventually result in
a genuine democrat coming to power. Other Croatian opposition
leaders have not made any comments on events in Serbia to this day.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 11, 1997
Podgorica weekly "Monitor" brought an article by its regular
contributor Esad Kocan in its issue of January 17, 1997, concerning
the shifting position of Montenegro in the current crisis in Serbia.
Nobody had it harder in the last few weeks that the Montenegrin
president. The three most important people from the ruling party,
including himself, have practically raced each other who will bring
joy to the opposition and the students in Belgrade. Talking to Paris
paper "Le Figaro", Bulatovic said that he was only an unwilling
partner in the Milosevic story; Prime minister Djukanovic threatened
that Montenegro will activate all constitutional capacities with the
goal of self - protection, and that it will go to towards the West by
itself: Parliament president Marovic admitted that a thought is going
through his head that the ruling DPS should leave the Federal
Parliament.
All domestic optimists had it clear that the DPS finally
intends, after eight years, to divorce itself from Milosevic. Either
us or JUL - the three of us cannot go on together. The help came, it
could be said, from an unexpected side. First, the leaders of the
oppositional "National Unity" coalition called upon the
representatives of the official Montenegro, bearing in mind its
formal support to democracy in Serbia, to join them in the formation
of a democratic union, with which Milosevic would remain alone in the
world. A perfect position arose - Bulatovic got a chance to get rid
of Milosevic, remain in FRY, and that nobody could stick treason of
Serbdom in one take.
Approximately at the same time, a group of professors from the
Montenegrin university, also inspired by the situation, sent a public
call to the leaders of the Montenegrin parties to sit down and reach
an agreement on pulling out the Republic from under the feet of the
Serbian regime. So, in an important moment, the leadership of the DPS
had a chance to choose how to rid itself of the "unwilling
partnership". If it really secretly dreams of an sovereign state, the
University proposal came to them as God's gift.
Torn between the possibility to participate in the democratic
reconstruction of the FRY, or to move towards the supporters of
sovereign Montenegro, Bulatovic manly decided - Milosevic is our
destiny.
The University letter was not even registered by the state
media, so it was normal that the President did not even address the
letter. The coalition leaders had better luck. They received a letter
which in essence said: there is no place for the DPS in "some
democratic block", since in the case of a storm, the foundations of
FRY would be undermined. There is not even moral grounds for the
ruling Montenegrin party to betray its coalition girlfriend in the
joint parliament: the Socialist Party, though, stole local elections,
but the Federal situation is clear. The things have to be put into
perspective - who normal would, due to small thievery in a few
municipalities in Serbia would threaten the blood bonds between the
two parties. In comparison to the jointly covered trail, the police
brigades on Belgrade streets could be treated as winter magic of the
Serbian marriage partners.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 17, 1997
Nenad Lj. Stefanovic of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" , writes
in the magazine's February 1, 1997, issue about the internal problems
within the ruling SPS party.
Those press reports (probably compiled from the notes
of some SPS official present at the session), don't really
shed light on what Milosevic really wanted to tell his
people. Probably he intended to shake them up, encourage them
and convince them that things aren't as bleak as they seem as
well as remind them that the real match is later this year
during the republican elections when the real fight for power
will take place.
There are indications that the Serbian president will try
to find a way out of the worst crisis his regime has ever
faced by taking the initiative. A few spectacular personnel
changes, a reshuffle of the government and announcements of
serious economic reforms might make the local election fraud and
protests across Serbia fade away, at least according to the
plans of the SPS leaders. A lot of changes will take place
inside the ruling party so that the once powerful party can take
the initiative. Elections could come soon at every level of the SPS
and the latest SPS main board session mentioned the word
differentiation, once very popular in the party.
As for the events
on the streets nothing will change: ``soft repression''
against the demonstrators when necessary, ``small concessions,
diplomatic dithering to drag the whole story out and perhaps even
acceptance of the Gonzales report in the end but in a way that
can be interpreted as the result of foreign pressure and the good
will of the Socialists, not as a concession and withdrawal in the
face of ``fifth column'' opposition demands.''
An SPS official told VREME that the consolidation of the
party ranks will take place primarily through elections inside
the party wherever the party lost the local elections. Right
now, everyone in the SPS is analyzing what happened over the
past few months and are blaming each other. The party chiefs are
saying the local elections were lost in the big cities because
of the failures of local party chiefs. Gorica Gajevic, the
SPS general secretary, told the main board session that the
elections were lost in some places because some SPS and JUL
members didn't grasp the importance and essence of the joint
election list but fought against each other. She also complained
that ``some candidates weren't the right ones'' and some she
blamed for spending more time in their cabinets than they spent
campaigning.
At the same time, lower ranks are blaming party chiefs,
mainly Gajevic and Nikola Sainovic, claiming their incompetence
was the main cause of the election failure.
At present, only the people who stuck out most have been
purged: Nis SPS chief Mile Ilic for shameless fraud at the
elections and Belgrade Mayor Nebojsa Covic for speaking openly
about the fraud. Both expulsions from the SPS were later
placed in the context of ``creating unity and strength in the
party.''
The example of Serbian PTT director Milorad Jaksic shows
that many in the SPS have reason for anxiety. Jaksic was known
as a powerful and reliable SPS man and he was dismissed from
his post the day the PTT issued a statement saying it had
bought 10% of Politika newspaper publisher shares (5.1 million
DEM). Jaksic was dismissed by the Serbian government but VREME
sources said the rumor in the SPS was that he had done something
horribly wrong. That does not mean Jaksic won't be given some
other influential post soon because there are many examples of that
in the SPS. At the same time, many directors of important SPS
controlled companies have lost their good reputations, especially
after newspaper reports that burglars stole ``150,000 DEM and
large amounts of gold'' from their homes. When that happens in
combination with local election failure at a moment when all
authorities-controlled institutions are showing serious signs of
erosion, the best thing to do is start a party purge with the
people who stand out in any way.
Ognjen Pribicevic of Belgrade's Social Sciences Institute
recently told VREME that many people who no longer need the SPS or
JUL will soon speak up. ``The ruling elite in the SPS and JUL will
face a situation when an increasing number of profiteers among
the state leaders will defend their own existence. They will
no longer be interested in Milosevic, only in their personal
survival and business. Suddenly, they will no longer care what
he thinks,'' Pribicevic said.
The average SPS official, can hardly predict whether the
Belgrade city assembly will be constituted or not and who will
hold a majority of seats in it. The SPS leaders haven't
changed their stand that ``the opposition must not get
Belgrade.'' In the meantime, the whole mess, primarily the
legal mess, is going in the direction of an imposed
management of the city. February 4 is the deadline to constitute
the city assembly. Covic is persistently saying he can only call
a session of the city assembly elected on November 17, and that
means a Zajedno majority. The city election commission has to
verify the councilors' mandates and it does not seem to be
planning to change its mind. Time is running out and Belgrade is
getting very close a management imposed by the Serbian
government.
``That solution was mentioned at our latest meetings
although I can't exclude the possibility of the party leaders
deciding on something else at the last moment,'' an SPS source
said. ``What I do know for certain is that Covic ruined
everything when he betrayed us in Belgrade. If he had called an
assembly meeting early in December when we asked him to, there
would be no one on the streets by now. The new assembly would be
on the Serbian state TV every day, working diligently and
everything would be forgotten. Just like New Belgrade. They
protested there for only three days after the municipal assembly
was constituted.''
Covic can't be the only person to blame for Belgrade.
Serbian Democratic Party (DSS) leader Vojislav Kostunica said
Belgrade is an example of how internal and outside pressure
affected Milosevic. If he had tried to grab Belgrade through
the courts Milosevic would have burned all his bridges opened
a Pandora's box releasing what politicians call
``unforeseeable consequences,'' Kostunica said.
Debates inside the SPS show that party members are prepared
to break off with New Democracy (ND). Party leaders told
their members that the phantom December 1 parliament group is
just waiting to step in and replace the ND and its ministerial
posts but that the party leaders are still thinking about it. The
SPS main board debate showed that no one is allowed to dig into
relations with JUL. Some main board members who tried to raise
that topic were told by Radmilo Bogdanovic that there's nothing
to discuss.
Recent steps are confusing everyone, even leftist party
members. For example, Serbian deputy prime ministers promised
protesting students that their demands would be met and that
becomes the news of the day on radio Belgrade's three o'clock
news but is later completely disregarded on that station;
despite public promises that the Belgrade university rector
will resign the university council kept him in place through a
secret ballot and extended the crisis; just a day after the
justice ministry claimed the Gonzales fact-finding mission got
things wrong in several towns, FRY President Zoran Lilic
attended a closed session of the SPS main board and wanted the
complete report adopted and respected; a few days later, the
Socialists constituted the Smederevska Palanka town assembly
although the Gonzales report said they lost the elections there;
the police blocked central Belgrade for days to prevent students
from marching and later let them walk through the city whenever
they want.
Part of the explanation could lie in what SPS MP Radovan
Radovic said a few years ago about his party: ``We're a team
that always wins because we have fighters and organizers.''
Things seems to have changed in the meantime. The
organizers can't be seen and the fighters aren't the achievers they
once were.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", February 1, 1997
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