KOSOVO
Belgrade weekly "NIN" examines in its January 24, 1997, issue
the current situation in Kosovo, in the light of the recent
assassination attempt against the rector of Pristina university.
After more frequent requests on the Albanian political scene
that the resistance to the "occupation regime" is intensified, the
announcement of the Albanians that they will take over the university
and high school buildings, suicides of a number of Serbian youths,
due to which stories circle around Pristina about Satanists, strict
respect of the order that the cafes stop operating after midnight -
car bombs in the densely populated Pristina are a new threat to the
puzzled Serbian population.
The previous assassination attempts, that is, terrorist acts,
even when they would exit the realm of innocent victims (five dead in
a restaurant in Decani, in April of 1996, for example), and passing
on to selected victims, have occurred in villages and mainly by
shooting. Remote activation of car bombs, which due to its late
activation did not cause too many victims, is at the same time the
demonstration of cruelty - destroy the human body to pieces, and of a
more sophisticated approach.
The reasons for a complete insecurity are obvious when added to
the assassination is a sharp electoral campaign among the Serbs, lead
during the Autumn, the unclear picture about the events in Belgrade
and other Serbian cities, counter meetings, as well as the visit of
the special rapporteur for human rights Elisabeth Rehn, who stated at
the press conference that she could not say anything about the
"announcement of the Liberation Army of Kosova" because she has too
little information.
The new circle of fear among the Serbs was open after the
sudden signatures of Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova on the
Agreement on the return of Albanian students to schools, on September
1, of last year. The surprise and resistance of the Serbs in Kosovo
was not only characteristic for the Radicals and Serbian Resistance
Movement, its first presenter was actually the university rector
Papovic, even though a SPS parliament member. The demand from the top
that he should support the agreement in front of the TV cameras
Papovic flatly refused, and according to the unofficial bragging of
the local Socialists, their delegation, which included Papovic, after
being unable to prevent the signing of the agreement, was able to
forge a delay in its implementation.
The silence of the Ministry of internal affairs concerning the
previous terrorist attacks leaves a very heavy impression, a
possibility is mentioned that the police in Kosovo is not even
capable for such jobs. The demands were heard that "we should not
deal anymore with vote theft, protection of positions, but the police
should return here to protect the people", which could mean the
condemnation of the protests in Belgrade, but also of the
authorities. One of the mentioned options is "taking matters into our
own hands".
The mentioned demands for the replacement of Papovic, have been
coming last year form the United Left (JUL), which is, according to a
statement of one SPS official " our biggest enemy here after the
Albanian Separatists". Kosovo and Metohija are the only part of
Serbia where SPS and JUL, not only were not in coalition for federal
elections, but where they directly agitated against each other. In
that manner, all 24 MP's from Kosovo are members of the SPS, although
some of them would say that "We know that we are on the hit list with
the Albanians, but also for replacement with those in Belgrade".
The current estimates that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
will create turmoil in Kosovo so to shift the focus of attention from
the events in Belgrade, Papovic's rejection to praise and implement
the Agreement and the demands of JUL for his replacement, have
created a situation where the theory about the involvement of the
Serbs in his assassination attempt was not present only among the
Albanians.
The implementation of the Agreement on education the Serbs see
as the Damacles knife over their heads. In the last month the
Albanians have swung with it - the students of their parallel
university have signed a petition for "president Rugova", in which
the first demand is entering the school and university buildings. The
start of the second term in their schools has been moved for two
weeks due to a supposed danger of "spontaneous" taking over of
buildings by young Albanians.
The tension among the Serbs is brought further up by the
articles in the Albanian press, like the one in the last issue of the
weekly "Zeri", which estimates that the implementation of the
Milosevic-Rugova agreement is starting. The Albanians speculate with
the possibility that Belgrade is now interested for the
implementation of this agreement, so that by relief of tension in
Kosovo it would please the West to leave it open hands towards the
opposition. Supposedly it has also sent the signals that it will
recognize the status of a nation to the Albanians, that the future of
Yugoslavia depends on a Serb - Albanian agreement, so that it would,
in that manner, evade the involvement of the international factors in
the negotiations.
With the concluding formation of a more radical stream in the
Albanian movement under Adem Demaqi, Rugova and his party re forced
to a more active approach. On the other hand, the option is mentioned
that the terrorist acts suit Rugova, because they strengthen his
position of a reasonable negotiator, which is counter - balanced by
the thesis that the bomb actions compromise his ability of control of
his compatriots. Directly asked to comment Papovic assassination
attempt and his possible connection with the non - implementation of
the Milosevic - Rugova Agreement, Rugova stated for NIN: "These
explosions create insecurity in Kosovo. We continuously stress that
there is no personal or collective security in Kosovo, but thanks to
our movement of non - violent resistance, we have a favorable
situation, compared to its overall heaviness".
The regime propaganda which insists on a supposed co. -
ordination of the Belgrade opposition and the Albanians headed by
Demaqi, puts Kosovo Serbs in a tragic position of fearing the
Albanians, JUL, opposition, precariousness of Milosevic. Not favoring
any kind of a change, they will be forced to adapt to terrorism of
the "Liberation Army of Kosova" or - leave.
The assassination attempt on rector Papovic in any case speaks
about new degree of escalation of the conflict which must worry both
sides, and shows the inability so far, and the lack of will for the
problem to be solved, and more and more obvious slipping way of the
possibility of a peaceful solution. Papovic is known as a radical
opponent of any change in the current political course, but the
attack on him could, unfortunately, that as a paradox, he is being
proven right: that one - sidedness and violence re the only
perspective of Kosovo.
Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", January 24, 1997
AIM correspondent from Pristina, Shqellzen Maliqi, writes on
the current situation in Kosovo in the January 18, 1997 issue of the
Belgrade weekly "Vreme".
The Albanian position on the crisis in Serbia is quite
interesting. The leadership of the ethnic Albanian movement in
Kosovo was surprised not only with the impact of the discontent
and rifts in Serbia, but also the effects of these developments on
life in Kosovo and Albania. The moment the reaction of the
opposition and citizens in Serbia exceeded the form of a protest
and became something much bigger---a drive to change the system
and oust the regime, rifts in the top of the ``parallel'' ethnic
Albanian authorities in Kosovo appeared simultaneously.
Forces advocating status quo came under strong pressure from
those wanting changes and a quick way out of the crisis both in
Belgrade and Pristina. The lonelier Milosevic got as the
Belgrade protest went on, the harder Rugova found it to cope with
cross fire coming from left and right. Some thought the fate of
the two leaders will be related. Should Milosevic fall, he
will take Rugova down with him, some commentators said.
However, it seems that conclusions of this kind are hasty and
inculcated.
There is a big and essential difference between a
militant and Machiavelli styled political like Milosevic, and an
endlessly patient Rugova, who wants a political solution to the
problem. That is where the paradox of Rugova's internal
difficulties rests---his policy came under heavy criticism at a
time when he confirmed his high rating in the offices of the
great powers, notably the United States.
This time, however, the US support did not have the
desired effects. Rugova was simultaneously criticized in Pristina,
Tirana and Paris (some believe it is no coincidence). All three
attacks were inspired by events in Serbia. His policy was
discredited in Pristina by Adam Demaqi, who called it weak,
colorless, calculated and capitulating. Rugova's strategy of
waiting and relying on foreign arbitration was confronted by
Demaqi's active Ghandi-styled resistance, non-violent but aimed
at protecting national and political rights in spite of the
risks and possible casualties.
A campaign against Rugova and his Democratic Alliance
of Kosovo was organized by Albanian television, watched via
satellite or directly throughout Kosovo. The campaign culminated
with an interview by the most prominent Albanian writer, Ismail
Kadare, who accused Rugova and the DSK of compromising the cause
and jeopardizing a just solution to the Kosovo issue with their
half-hearted policy.
On the other hand, Demaqi's public support to Serbian
opposition, received well in Belgrade and among democratic
forces in Kosovo itself, had a worrying counter-effect: the
Belgrade regime jumped on it as evidence of Albanian
involvement in the Belgrade events, calling Vuk Draskovic and
other opposition leaders ``Albanian mercenaries!'' Public support
to the awakened and democratic-oriented Serbia has become a
delicate and ungrateful issue.
Hence Demaqi and official Tirana stopped with euphoric
statements and assessments of events in Serbia, to avoid playing
into the hands of the Belgrade regime.
Rugova and his party modified their position from a
total lack of interest to general support for democratization
in Serbia, keeping a healthy distance until the Serbian
opposition declares itself on the Kosovo matter. ``The
democratic movement in Serbia should be given as much support
as it deserves for its actual character. Our long and bitter
experience prompts us not to be euphoric and refrain from
identifying our cause with the Serbian opposition. As we are aware
of the relation between democratization in Serbia and ways of
settling the dispute in Kosovo, we cannot turn a blind eye on the
inconsistencies and shortcomings of the Serbian opposition.
Although the Kosovo issue is crucial for the democratization
of Serbia, the Serbian opposition remains silent,'' says
Fehmi Agani, vice-chairman of the Democratic Alliance of
Kosovo (DSK). Agani, who isn't involved in the latest
inter-Albanian disputes, maintains that the current process in
Serbia is of vital importance for the fall of the Milosevic
regime. He warns his compatriots that they ``must be prepared
for that day,'' which will come---as he put it---in no longer
than a year's time.
Demaqi's takeover of the chief opposition party in
Kosovo, the Parliamentary party of Kosovo, indicates that things
are about to change on the Albanian political scene. Demaqi
could rally a number of small political parties and strong
individuals. However, the crucial battle is being fought inside
the DSK, where Demaqi is believed to have a strong influence on
one of the factions, controlling the majority of the votes in the
party's main bodies.
Some even mentioned the possibility of a final rift in the
party and an eventual division of the DSK into two, a thing
which has already happened in Macedonia. After the initial
attack on Rugova and the DSK, Demaqi no longer seems to be in a
hurry for a radical outcome. He will apparently wait for the
outcome of the crisis in Serbia before he decides whether to
try to topple Rugova or form a coalition with him. Rugova
faces the same dilemma and has equally limited options.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 18, 1997
Ylber Hysa of the Pristina Albanian language weekly "Koha" also
comments on the recent events in Kosovo in the February 12, 1997,
issue of that magazine.
The last week in Kosova was characterized by the Serbian police
action of massive arrests accompanied by raids, simultaneously in
several municipalities. The last wave of arrests, according to some
sources has reached 100 people. The first arrests have started on 26
January and continued till 3 February, resulting with around 70
arrested. Fifteen of them were released (mainly relatives of the
other arrested), and over ten persons were looked for by the police,
but were not found at home...
During this massive action of the
police, many houses were searched (and a lot of material was
confiscated, as well as books, video-cassettes, photographs, etc.),
and many people were mistreated as the raids were conducted (as was
the case of Islam Shehu who was hit with the butt of an automatic
rifle in the presence of his parents, Ilir Gashi who was beaten in
front of his relatives, Nait Hasani, who after being beaten so much
in prison, was transferred to the Prishtina hospital in deep coma,
and other serious cases reported by KIC's, the Informative Office of
the Republic of Kosova's sources and the statements of the defending
attorneys).
The arrested come from different municipalities of Kosova, a total
of 15. The biggest number is made up by those from Ferizaj (13),
Degan (10), Obiliq (9), Vushtrri (6), Mitrovick (5), Podujevk (4),
Pejk (4), Gllogovc (3), Prishtink (3), Lipjan (3), Rahovec, Kaganik,
Malishevk, Istog, Suharekk, etc. As it regards their social and
professional structure, 10 of the arrested are university students
(and other five of them were not found), there are also unemployed,
teachers, workers, doctors, an MP that is fugitive, etc. Many of the
arrested are also members of the CDHRF, the LDK, PPK, and UNIKOMB.
Therefore, a broad structure of people, with a relatively wide
regional extension. The first news coming from the Serbian police,
which were few, suggested that this was the capture of a terrorist
organization. The first mentioned argument was Avni Klinaku, from
Mazgit (Obiliq), who was qualified as one of the "leaders of the
terrorist organization". In fact, Klinaku, known previously as member
of illegal organizations of the eighties and former political
prisoner, is chairman of the National Movement for the Liberation of
Kosova (LKGK). And the problem appeared immediately in the beginning
when the spokesman, the "legal representative" of the LKGK, Sejdi
Veseli, communicated that in principle, LKGK was in favor of the
armed struggle but does not apply terrorism and has not committed any
armed attack in Kosova since its establishment in 1993.
Moreover,
Glirimi, LKGK's organ (by the way, whose illegal print-shop was
confiscated by the Serbian police) stated that only UGK has been
organizing attacks in the field! So the issue is how come LKGK is
accused pursuant Art. 136:2 (hostile activities), in conjunction with
Art. 116:1 (threat to territorial integrity of FRY) of the Penal Code
of FRY, while Klinaku is accused of terrorism (Art. 125 in
conjunction with Art. 26)?
Investigating Judge, Danica Marinkovic grounds her accusation
on the information "gathered" by the police claiming that LKGK has
created the "Rexhep Mala Guerilla Group" (after an activist working
in illegality, killed by the Yugoslav police in 1984), which counted
five members and which, according to the accusation, had gone to the
field twice in Prishtink, to kill members of police patrols, but
hadn't done it!
In fact, the District Court has already decided to
"expand its investigations" and now allows the police to continue
with the interrogations. This group is composed by 15 people.
And,
according to the attorneys, it seems that the intention of the
district attorney is to classify them in three groups. The
indictments are expected to come out soon... Such posture of the
Serbian judiciary seems to have been inspired by the logic and the
fact that this is a heterogeneous group, made of different people,
members of different parties or associations, and is difficult to put
them all together in one category. The defending attorneys have also
noticed the phenomenon that all these people are being kept captive
in Prishtink, although they originate from 15 municipalities, meaning
that the courts in their municipalities should be competent to pursue
their cases. The concentration of the interrogations in one place (it
is expected that they could last quite long), could also bring the
trial in only one court - make a similar show as was the case of the
trial against the "Ministry of Interior of Kosova", which was
celebrated in the premises of the Kosova Parliament...
It is hard to talk about the conclusion of the court, however
it still remains to be seen how will the judge put all of them
together, how will she select LKGK, UGK and LPK, whose members are
also arrested, according to the Serbian press. The latter also claims
that among the arrested are some types of persons that have been
directly engaged in "terrorist actions" undertaken lately in Kosova.
Moreover, the Serbian press based on police sources states that there
is no dilemma that this is "only one part of the terrorist
organization and following these arrests, new actions, even bloodier,
can be expected". And, for the time being, the only trace of UGK in
the hands of the police and the Serbian judiciary is the murder of
three Albanians: Zahir Pajaziti, Hakif Zejnullahu and Edmond Hoxha.
The Serbian police qualified them, especially Pajaziti, as members of
UGK's headquarters, and this was corroborated by UGK, whoever it may
represent, in its Communique #30, which says: "On 31 January, in the
late hours of the afternoon, three members of our military units
headed to accomplish a special task, confronted many Serbian
occupying police forces. After a heroic resistance, in an unequal
battle, they gave their life for the liberation of the country".
Thus it comes out that the Serbian police has only three members
of the UGK, who are dead...
The characterization of a part of the text of the communique:
"...headed to accomplish a special task", deserves a more detailed
analysis. According to "Nedeljni Telegraf" which is grounded on
police sources that had been involved in the police action in which
the three of them were killed, the three members of UGK, on which the
police had exact information and had been following in the "Japanese
style", were headed to Vushtrri in order to turn towards Drenica,
where the other part of the organization was actually stationed. And
this was being done for reorganization sake, because they had noticed
that something strange was happening and that they could be
discovered following the massive arrests.
But, as experienced illegal
activists - as the Belgrade weekly states - the moment they noticed
that they were being followed, they turned and attacked the police,
on which occasion three Serb policemen were wounded. But, shots
against the Lada came from another police car that was participating
in this action, and this is how the Albanians were killed.
The description presented by NT and based on police sources
looks very much alike the description we find in UGK's Communique:
"...headed to accomplish a special task"! According to this, they
were on a mission trying to save their people, they discover they
were being followed and they decided to confront with the police,
maybe conscious that they make this happen in a place as far as
possible from the destination they were headed to. In fact, NT states
that the intention of the police was to catch UGK in flagrancy, but
all of it was made impossible when the people in the LADA started
shooting!
It is interesting how Lkvizja Popullore e Kosovks (The People's
Movement of Kosova), once an illegal organization in Kosova which
came out from illegality at the beginning of the '90s and whose seat
is currently in Switzerland, analyzes the last action of the Serbian
police: "...(this action)... aims at several things: to break the
increasing morale of the people following the actions of the UGK.
Second: to find out where UGK is, by arresting and interrogating
people. Third: the occupiers intend to intimidate the people, so they
stop supporting the freedom warriors. To incite panic among the
people, to subjugate it, and to accept functioning politically within
the frames that Serbia determines..."
In fact LPK, since some time ago and through its organ "Zkri i
Kosovks", has supported UGK, as illustrated in the following
sentences: "The attack of the strong occupying police forces in
Kosova against those who fight for the liberation of Kosova, has
failed completely, although Belgrade's propaganda speaks strongly of
the successes in their `struggle against terrorism'". Further on it
says: "LPK calls all its members, sympathizers and all Albanians
wherever they are to strengthen the trust in their forces, to become
stronger in the struggle for liberation. To materially and morally
support the fighters for freedom...". And, at the end of the
communique, it is said: The struggle of our people for national
liberation can't be stopped and will be crowned with the victory.
Long live the Albanian people! Long live UGK! Glory to our martyrs!"
Thus, once again does LPK support UGK and puts itself on the
latter's side. And can LPK be called the political wing of the UGK? -
this can't be replied to exactly, unless LPK or UGK would confirm
this. But, one thing is sure - that there is a whole front of those
who propagate another form, alternative, of political struggle for
the solution of Kosova's question, differing from political parties
in Kosovk, especially symbolized by the largest one, LDK, which is
criticized by both LKGK and LPK and in a way even the UGK!
But, coming back to the last events in Kosovk. In order to
undertake such a broad action, the Serbian police should have had
exact information and good sources, in order to arrest and kill so
many people. The Serbian police - which talks about the existence of
illegal groups, whose members it claims to have arrested - should
have had at its disposal first hand information in order to have
arrested the #1 leader of LKGK in Kosova or to apply "the Japanese
persecution" and kill the members of UGK's headquarters. But, one
thing remains unclear. Why did the Serbian police, which, as stated
by NT and its police sources, has had information on Klinaku and who
had him followed for six months, has done nothing to prevent and
arrest him, knowing that in the past six months, many bloody
incidents have occurred!? In other words, why has the Serbian police
decided to undertake this action right now?
Maybe one of the possible replies could be linked to the actual
situation and political moment, which Milosevic has decided to use.
So, in the same time in which Karadzic publicly states that if Brcko
will not be given to the Serbs, then war will start again (!), and in
the same time when the Serbian opposition demonstrators are beaten
brutally by the police in Belgrade, at the same time we have a large
concentrated and brutal police action in which 100 people are
arrested - this is a public question asked also by Haris Silajdzic!
And, all of it is happening in times when official Tirana has
suffered the pyramidal knock-down and when Bosnia is visited by the
American envoy... In fact, the Americans have been refusing, since
some time, to send their senior envoys to Belgrade, but Milosevic's
last manoeuvre has forced them to establish a hot-line with their
representative in Belgrade, Miles, who has spent all his time in
Belgrade, expressing the official concern...
And, immediately after a
surprising demonstration of the "radical face", in a very short
period of time, Milosevic changed his political course for 180
degrees. He meets his police officials and congratulates them on the
"successful action in Kosova" (thus proving that he is the master of
the situation in the South) and immediately sends a letter to premier
Marijanovic, in which he admits OSCE's suggestions and the
opposition's victory! Milosevic's step is, of course, supported by
the diplomatic centers, although they don't have it altogether clear
what is Milosevic doing now. But, one thing is certain. In such a
situation, there are no chances for a war about Brcko and that there
will be never that open concern about what is happening in Kosova!
Especially if after the "police stick" action in Kosova comes the
political carrot, in form of concessions on the educational
agreement...
Judged upon thus, Kosova and its reality prove to be present in
the political relations, but always as an object and not as a
political subject! In these circumstances, it is expected that the
trial against "the terrorist organization" continues without the
initial noise but with the possibility with "UGK's revenge", as it is
stated in its last communique!
There will be noise in Kosova again...!
Source: Pristina weekly "Koha", February 12, 1997
GENERAL SITUATION IN THE BALKANS
Bozo Nikolic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" examines in the
magazine's issue of February 14, 1997, the current overall political
situation in the Balkans.
From Albania to Bulgaria, and from Serbia to Greece, the
passions have risen and the world is again thinking that the Balkans
are unpredictable and explosive, even when there is no brutal war in
the peninsula. The poverty and politics have brought in the past
weeks hundreds of thousands of people to the streets of Balkan
capitals and other cities.
Some international observers think that the Balkans are
burdened by an insurmountably complicated history of violence, which
is still very much alive, and that remains a breeding ground of
nationalist, ethnic, and religious passions which are often misused
by politicians. This, though, could be hardly understood by
foreigners which think that by the late 20th Century they have left
such problems behind them., assess these observers.
But, in recent days other international observers re stating
their opinion, who say that the history of cliches is in question
which use explanations such as a supposed theory of "primordial
hatred in the Balkans". But, according to them, the current crisis in
the Balkans is a consequence of economic and political reasons, at
whose root is also a century of blind Western politics in the region.
Consequently, if the West continues to evade its responsibilities in
the Balkans, the war can break out there again, these observers warn.
Since Dayton peace agreements by the end of 1995, BiH has
received the largest part of the Western diplomatic and financial
help. But, now the serious instability is threatening to move to the
South - towards Albania and the Southern Serbian province of Kosovo,
as well as Bulgaria.
According to these observers, in the center of this instability
is Serbia, whose society is deeply torn by Milosevic's treatment of
the results of the local elections of November 17. To that effect,
Montenegro considers that the federal relations, that of FRY with the
world, are threatened, possible Serbian - Montenegrin conflict is
one of the possible bloodiest scenarios, think these observers.
Confronted with the continuation of systematic breach of rights
of ethnic Albanians some of their more radical politicians are
advocating more radical forms of resistance towards the regime in
Belgrade. During the last year, the number of ethnically motivated
murders and terrorism grew.
In Albania, the government of Sali Berisha, which is looking
for a way to channel the attention from its current crisis, could
come to the idea to enlarge the support to less compromising
Albanians in Kosovo, these observers warn.
The crisis in Albania is only one of more catastrophic
consequences of the economic discrimination which the West practiced
since the fall of the Berlin wall, and which is mainly carried out by
the EU and IMF.
The result of the policy that the Balkans have to wait after
help is given to favored Northern /former East European / partners,
the countries there are further lagging behind. This particularly in
a situation when the burdens created by the transition to market
economy were much more evident in the Balkans than in Northeastern
Europe. This is most evident in Bulgaria, which due to the hyper
inflation that exceeds 300 % per annum is confronted with an economic
collapse.
These observers also say that although the Balkans cannot be
the sole responsibility of the West, neither can it blame for
everything 50 years of Communist rule. Because since the Berlin
Congress of 1878, when the world powers tailored the Ottoman empire,
with very little consideration towards the nations in the Balkans,
Western Europe and Russia have drawn borders, moved the population
and pressured local economies.
If the war is to be prevented in the Balkans, conclude these
observers, the countries within the Balkans have to feel as a part of
the integrated Europe, and not as incorrigible mutants.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", February 14, 1997
Gojko Beric of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet" examines in the
magazine's issue of February 6, 1997 the views on the project of co -
operation in Southeastern Europe.
The bogeyman in the form of the American initiative on Co -
operation in Southeastern Europe is circling former Yugoslavia. Even
though Washington announced this idea a year and a half ago, the
furor among the ruling nationalistic elites in the Balkans only arose
when the European Union joined the American initiative. A joint
agreement in 12 points was reached, and its goal is to perform an
economic integration of the countries of Southeastern Europe. In the
main focus are the impoverished and mutually conflicting states which
sprung into existence on the territory of former Yugoslavia, whose
nations went each of their own way in the meantime.
But, certain countries strongly resist this idea, first of all
Croatia. Even the US President's special envoy for these questions,
Richard Sifter, was not able to soften Tudjman in his rejection that
Croatia should have anything to do with the Balkans.
If the economic co - operation between neighboring states - to
which this initiative is formally contained - is the most natural
thing in the world, what then is the problem ? The answer is quite
simple: the question here is first and foremost about politics, and
economy is only secondary. To understand the essence of things, it
has to be had in mind that Tito's Yugoslavia did not fail under the
burden of economic problems, but from the onslaught of nationalism,
first of all Greater Serbian one. To new nationalist leaders, the
economic prosperity was completely unimportant.
The creation of the independent Croatian state, which was the
wish of the majority of Croats, Tudjman sees as his historical
legacy. He gets a fits of rage whenever the name of the former state
is mentioned. That is a natural, logical and expected reaction of a
nationalist who was able to achieve the dream of a pure ethnic state.
Milosevic cannot boast with the same feat. He did not create "Greater
Serbia", and the state he rules remained the most nationally
heterogeneous in the Balkans. Of course, this does change the fact
that he is the main destructor of Yugoslavia, so it is understandable
that Milosevic does not mention that corpse. In Slovenia it is spoken
about the former joint state as history, without specific emotions,
either positive or negative. Milan Kucan insists that he was for a
long time alone in his confederal offer to Milosevic, and when
Gligorov and Izetbegovic supported him, "it was too late".
This gradation of individual accomplishments for a general
breakdown is important for better understanding of current positions
of the main actors in the Yugoslav crisis. Even though these
accomplishments are different, it is funny to expect the same people
who have brought down something, to shyly start raising it up again.
Their fear of a raising ghost, although irrational, is actually a
product of a doubt that the job maybe has not been done properly,
that is, that it could have been done in a less expensive manner.
"From Vardar to Triglav" there is general resistance towards any kind
of ties within this region. The West has different ideas about that,
and is not giving up on diplomatic pressures.
Zagreb wants to unify its resistance to the American initiative
with Ljubljana, but there are serious differences between them on
this. "There is no doubt that the scenario is a political one. But,
that is not the reason for an obsession with Yugo scenarios. We
should have some more self - confidence", writes the Ljubljana daily
"Delo", Despite this, Slovenia is not in a dilemma.
It is obvious
that it cannot refuse the American offer, but on the other hand
entering into a Balkan economic union at the moment when the country
is still outside of NATO and EU represents a risk for Slovenia, but
not as much as it does for Croatia. Traditionally rational, the
Slovenians are on a standpoint that in this case too it has to be
seen how much the whole will profit. The reasoning is logical: if
Slovenian neighbors are going to profit, some Slovenian problems
would also be diminished.
The advantage of Slovenia is that in comparison to Croatia it
can prove much more easily that it does not belong to the Balkans.
But even its proof is not full proof.
The Germans like to say that the Balkans already begin in Munchen.
There is even more of those who say that Trieste is the most Western
Balkan city. Balkan is not only geopolitical space, but also a
certain form of sensibility. Forgetting these facts, Tudjman fell
into a trap from which he cannot pull himself out. He thought that
you can run away from the Balkans with a simple decree. Constantly
repeating that Croatia does not belong to the Balkan but to the
Western civilization, Tudjman has shouted out this thesis so much,
that it seems completely unconvincing, particularly since traces of
racism stem out of it sometimes.
Hypnotized with too easy promises of running away from the
Balkans, Croatia feel a shock from the Co-operation project. The
crescendo of this rejection came in the form of Tudjman's proposal
that the Croatian joining of any form of union of states of
Southeastern Europe is constitutionally prohibited. The Croatian
president supports the normalization of relations between countries
of former Yugoslavia, which includes economic cooperation, but
energetically opposes any forms of integration. The West received his
rejection with a big dose of disappointment, even anger, but this at
the moment has no consequences for the Croatian president. America
obviously counts on his and Milosevic's departure from the political
scene. But, this will hardly change the situation in the Balkans,
where national interests are already cemented, judging by all, for a
longer period of time.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", February 6, 1997
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