SITUATION IN THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
Deteriorating situation in the Yugoslav military is discussed
by Filip Svarm in the February 1, 1997, issue of the Belgrade weekly
"Vreme".
Marija (16) lives in an army barrack in Belgrade. Her
father is a Yugoslav Army (VJ) officer who left a three
room apartment in Ljubljana. She lives in a room with her
parents and sister. The same building is home to another 30
similar families. They share a small kitchen with one washbowl
and two cookers as well as washing machine. They also
share four shower cabins and two toilets. ``Every day we see men
shaving while women put makeup on and mothers washing their
children,'' Marija says. It's all at a cost of 200-300 dinars a
month.
Marija will tell you that she's doing fine. She heard
that some army families share 14 bed sleeping quarters. Those
people are the ``most endangered category'' of army personnel.
They're listed as people whose housing problem hasn't been solved.
Official figures say the VJ provides some form of accommodation
for 15,000 people. Others share the way of life with civilians.
Their salaries are small and late.
The persistent demonstrations have shown that the
population of Serbia is not happy with the regime that brought it
to where it is now. Since the VJ keeps saying it is part of
society, the conclusion could be that they're not happy either.
``Once I truly believed in Milosevic,'' a high-ranking
officer in Belgrade said. ``Now I was the first to start
making noise in my building during the main evening news. My
eyes weren't opened by Slovenia, the Krajina or Bosnia but by
the fact that I can't buy shoes for my child.''
The army's Vojska weekly revealed how things stand. Of the
4.215 billion dinars the VJ was approved in 1996, 700 million
was never paid. On January 9, 1997, the army owed a total of
876 million dinars; 401 million dinars in salaries and pensions
and 475 million to suppliers.
So what can they expect in 1997? The federal government
predicted that prices and the dinar will be stable, the social
product will rise by 13%, living standards by 12% and exports by
48%. Vojska said the federal budget was adopted on the basis of
that prediction (6.5 billion for the armed forces) and added
that ``a large number of prominent economy experts'' were
skeptical about those predictions.
In that context, the weekly
stressed the foreign trade debt of over two billion dollars at
the end of 1996, a general lack of funds, the fact that just 40% of
the economy was operating. ``Those facts show that a
deterioration in VJ financial operations is possible,'' Vojska
said.
``If the flow of funds from the federal budget stays the
same as in the past three months, the VJ will reach a
completely absurd situation by the end of the year, owing more
than what will be allocated for the army in the 1998 budget,''
Colonel Radisa Djordjevic, head of the defense ministry budget
department, told Vecernje Novosti daily. ``That means there will
be very little money for the army in 1998 and the military
organization could die out on its own,'' he added.
Colonel Djordjevic said the defense ministry and general
staff proposed measures to get some money somehow. Specifically,
they want to pay the 160 million dollars they owe the military
industry in dinars taken from the state through the Yugoslav
National Bank (NBJ); to sell arms and equipment in accord with
the Dayton agreement; to give away they weapons they can't sell
because their maintenance is expensive; to sell off or rent
unnecessary military facilities. Djordjevic admitted that very
little consideration was given to those proposals. He offered
two answers to why that was done.
First, the regime decided to strengthen the Serbian
police as much as possible and practically turned it into a
military armed force.
As confirmation of that he said the police were being trained
to drive tanks and use anti-aircraft guns and added that a
multiple rocket launcher was being built specially for the
police and that the police academy had published an army
textbook on tactics while the VJ didn't have the money to print
it for its needs.
Second, the overall state of the economy affects
military financing. There isn't enough money for anyone and as
long as the regime keeps doing what it does there won't be
any money. The authorities are scraping the bottom of the
barrel and using what they can gather together for what they
think is important.
Since there is very little a demobilized artillery or
infantry officer can do in Serbia today, anxiety and mistrust is
running high. That was also why VJ personnel who talked to
VREME insisted on complete anonymity. Their salaries are small
and late, but something is better than nothing. Marija, the
officer's daughter, thinks most of her neighbors in the
barracks support the students but she added that no one is making
noise during the main evening news or going to the
demonstrations. Also, they only talk about everyday things,
never politics. You never know if you might loose what little you
have if you open you mouth carelessly.
Many experts have left the VJ and the shortage of money
means the army is saving on training exercises and target
practice. Now, some reserve artillery officers do better during
live ammunition drills than young active officers. Also, the fact
that active military personnel are banned from ``any activities
which run counter to VJ interests'' isn't attracting young men
to the army. It's a public secret that many officers and non
coms make a living on smuggling and selling goods at markets or
through small businesses in their wives' names.
``If VJ chief of staff General Momcilo Perisic ever
came to one of Belgrade's markets and shouted `Attention' at
least half the men there would jump,'' one officer said.
Vojska weekly said a further deterioration of VJ financing
is expected in the first quarter of this year. It said ``that
makes the state of political and social tensions in Serbia
following the elections even more complex.'' It also warned that
dramatically of ``numerous negative consequences, especially in
the field of training, morale and overall combat readiness in
the VJ.''
Obviously, the VJ chiefs have started distancing
themselves from the regime cautiously in an effort to stop being
one of its pillars. The shortage of money in the VJ was there
in the past few years but no one said anything about it apart
from a few clumsy statements. The moment chosen to speak out
about the problem shows that the only people who can make a
living there are the people who know where the 10-20 million
dinars a day allocated to the VJ go. A statement after General
Perisic met with a student delegation is indicative because it
calls for an urgent return to the international community.
At
a moment when Mira Markovic was talking about a planet-wide
plot against the Serbs and psychological warfare, Perisic's
statement can be interpreted only as an appeal to have the
November 17 election results reinstated. Everything that has
happened since is taking the country further away from the
money it needs for the economy (and army) which everyone agrees can
only come from abroad.
We shouldn't expect a coup from the army. Most likely, it
is using the current political crisis to grab what it can as an
interested party. In simple terms: if the regime wants to be
sure some units commanded by dissatisfied officers won't take to
the streets if there's violence, it should pay up. The
authorities can't do that and it has nothing to pressure the
army chiefs with. If they dismiss Perisic he will become a
popular public figure at a moment when any threat of further
budget restrictions is senseless.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme" February 1, 1997
The regular military commentator of the Podgorica weekly
Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, takes a look at the situation within
the YA from the aspect of the recent events in Serbia.
Jovanovic says that "Monitor" sources within the Army say that
there is not enough elements to draw the conclusions that the Army
could exit the sphere of strict regime control: the supposed
anti-Milosevic course of the Army still does not exist in its top,
these sources assess, reminding that the principles of subordination
and discipline in carrying out the orders and the proclaimed
apolitical stance of the officers profession, curtail the political
maneuvering space of the army.
The Army presents towards the Serbian regime an, although quite
substantial para. - political objection which is reduced to its
financial situation.
The massive protests of the oppositional Serbs meant a
challenge for the lower and middle military ranks - from the
commanders of the platoons up to the brigade commanders. Chief of
staff, general Perisic, often would say that "the army has to share
the fate of the nation and the state", thinking about the social
situation, but it turned out that this demand - in the situation when
the enriching of the regime bullies in the provincial towns is
becoming visible with a naked eye - represents throwing dust into the
eyes. In the proclamation of the officers of the Third army sent
Milosevic the accusations that he "degraded them in the 91/92 war,
attempting to turn them into minor persons in this country" and that
"once we fell for your trick that for the fall of the former country
of ours the only responsible party is the former JNA".
It must be that the named proclamation created excitement in
the Chief command, not only because of the connotations of a
confrontation with the regime, but because general Perisic knows the
commanding personnel of this group.
But, the particularly interesting detail - which has remained
unregistered in the public - deals with the 63 Parachute Brigade
which is based the Nis airport and which is considered the leader in
the operation "proclamation". This brigade actually does not fall
within the structure of the Third army, but within the Corps for
special tasks, which is directly subordinate to the chief of staff of
the army himself, that is his closest aides.
In this case, it is the
question of professionals with thick experience, and not confused
beginners - meaning there is no joking with them; due to this, many
tie the fact that only in Nis the police did not block the center of
the city to prevent the protests, bearing in mind the intervention
possibilities of the 63. Parachute Brigade.
Completely different mood is present among their colleagues in
the 1 Guard motorized brigade in Topcider /Belgrade/, whose commander
Ljubisa Stojimirovic, represents the "iron line" of the military
establishment close to the ruling SPS. This core could be certainly
personified in the commander of the Belgrade army, general Sava
Kovacevic, and the deputy chief of staff of the Army, general
Dragoljub Ojdanic. "Monitor" sources say that they re the ones who
are open proponents of brotherhood and unity with the Serbian police
during the Chiefs of staff meetings, but that the other members of
the command, lead by general Perisic, Radoslav Martinovic, Miodrag
Panic (assistant chief of staff for land forces), mostly with support
of the heads of numerous departments, represent proponents of
"equidistance".
Apparently, that does not understand the threatening
of the regime, which has won the convincing victory at the federal
elections.
This does not, on the other hand, does not reflect the essence
of the military stance. There is little probability that the domestic
generals have suddenly lost their ideological reflex of disgust
towards the West, its Hague Tribunal, and lastly, its anti - Serbian
character ! If it comes to internal disturbances on a larger scale,
possibly armed clashes, the position of "equidistance" would - under
the guise of the threat to the stability and integrity of the country
- easily evolve in open alignment with the "institutions of the
state".
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 17, 1997
COMMENTS AND ANALYSES
Chief commentator of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" , Stojan
Cerovic , recently won an independent journalists' prize for his
recent comments on the events in Serbia. Here is one of his more
recent ,of February 8, 1997.
Just as he had made a proper decision to accept the OSCE
recommendations and recognize all the results of the local
elections, the jinxed Slobodan Milosevic was presented with a
new bill which was due for payment.
He would immediately have to call some similar commission
to tell him what he was guilty of in the meantime and how much
he still owes whom. The creditors have multiplied to such an
extent that there is no way that the man can pay them all up. His
efforts not to notice them were in vain, he sent messages how he
had larger and more important obligations than paying off debts,
he accused, threatened and intimidated.
The opposition,
students, church, citizens, young and old, practically all who
know how to blow a whistle were on his back. Trying to stop the
retreat with riots, Milosevic once again employed the
classic combination of beatings and concessions, yet once
again with no luck. Either that combination no longer works
here, or its dosage hasn't been right, so that there were too
many beatings and too little concessions. In any case, his
debt has increased, and the creditors have not lost the will to
collect both that and all preceding ones.
Therefore, in only two days we saw Milosevic's two faces, one
devilishly leering, the other generous and apprehensive, yet
neither one left a deep impression. Those who were beaten up
were back on the streets the next day as living proof that there
is no salvation for tyranny. There was nothing left to do
other than return what was stolen and here Milosevic all of
a sudden decided to leap over the entire judiciary, whose work
load he had overloaded. He chose the form of a letter to the
Prime Minister Marjanovic, which should remind one of a royal
decree, yet since this king has been deprived of his dignity,
since he is confessing to theft with that very decree, it all
turned out to be comical.
Excluding a part of his clique, no other subjects are left
here who need his decrees. It all seems to me that the people
would most gladly tell him to sit in his time machine and return
to the century from which he had come. He no longer only has the
liberated citizens on his back, but also a larger part of the
government structure which he had in the course of these two
and a half months trampled over and humiliated in all possible
ways. What, for example, can the judges now think and what do
they think that the people think of them? They have adopted so many
decisions, disputed, explained, interpreted the law, called
upon the authority and court independence, and now Milosevic has
spat on all that and on all of them as well.
What are all those journalists to do who had uncovered
swastikas at the demonstrations, and would like to remain in
Belgrade and to occasionally drop into the local pub? Where can
the Parliament Speaker Tomic, who had recognized neo-fascists
amongst the students hide and those who are to take over local
government in Belgrade now? Or all those who had organized
and taken part in the third round of elections and had in
certain places even constituted local assemblies which are no
longer valid? Among those people and in such professions
there aren't that many of them who are capable of employing an
easygoing attitude towards themselves, as the renowned local bum,
author of the book How I Became an Ox, can.
Finally, I suppose that even the police isn't all too
pleased with its performance. Even if they enjoy beating people
up, they most definitely enjoy it more when it isn't in vain. All
in all, what is left is a large number of faces which shall not be
forgotten, and plastic surgery isn't overly developed here.
Namely, there are those such as Ljubisa Ristic who, to someone
who will recognize him, shall find it difficult to prove that it's
a case of mistaken identity, that he isn't the one, but only
looks like him.
Therefore, things are looking up for plastic
surgeons, as well as for hairdressers, beauticians and wig-makers.
Recognizing the results of the local elections Milosevic
has called upon higher state interests and relations with the OSCE
and the international community. As far as he is concerned,
those relations have hopelessly been destroyed anyway, which he
had actually already completed. Word is simply of adopting a
stately posture, while the real problem remains in the fact that
here, at home, his time is up. He would easily deal with
Clinton, Kohl and Chiraque, yet he doesn't know what to do with
Vesna, Vuk and Zoran.
This threesome, whatever they mess up in the future,
deserves the greatest credit for these 77 days so far. Up
close and inside they didn't always look as good as outside,
they had their ups and downs, some more some less, yet they
endured and bore enormous strain. It is true that this
liberation movement has its life and its soul, yet the three
leaders felt its pulse extremely well and upheld its
direction. They have inevitably imposed an obligation upon themselves
to back each other up, even if they aren't utterly conscious of
it.
During the protest, which has brought misfortune
of internal disintegration to the regime, a reverse process must
have been unfolding on the opposition side. The cohesion of the
coalition Zajedno, however, still hasn't been upgraded in the
organizational sense, just as the very protest movement didn't get
an independent representative body. It would have been better if
it had, since in that manner other demands could have been
stressed more easily which do not directly deal with party
interests, yet there wasn't much time for organizational work, and
it isn't too late even now. Namely, things have reached a
point when an organizational form shall be sooner and easier
derived at, then for the protest to diminish due to its lack.
Psychologically, all is prepared for a new beginning. Many
people have politically matured at great speed; the true
problems of society have been uncovered; smaller parties and
marginal people who did not take part in this battle are
disappearing from the scene; all the energy is focused on
internal restructuring and a change of order, and can no longer
be lured to some different terrain.
After so many days, the demonstrators have acquired
self-confidence and a stabile routine, which means that they can
always be counted on. In the future, this pre-tested weapon
which shall not misfire, shall probably be employed a number of
times in the future.
Namely, I suppose that Milosevic shall now be in a
great hurry to implement his decision on returning what has been
stolen and shall offer some form of a dialogue on other
matters. If that proves to sound sufficiently serious, the
opposition shall not be able to refuse and shall stop the
protest, or at least their participation in it. This is why it
is important to know, in case the negotiations don't run
smoothly, that hundreds of thousands of whistles are always at hand.
Yet, after recognizing the results and the opposition's
entrance into the local assemblies, the battle against the
tyrant shall have to acquire some other forms. Even though
it enters into all future dialogues with an enormous
advantage, the opposition shall need much patience, a sense of
reality and caution. Milosevic is a bag with holes, yet no one
still knows what lays hidden inside it, while his spies know more
than they want to about the opposition. The regime also has
financing and television on its side, even though funds are thinning
out and they need to be hidden more carefully, and no
one believes television.
Despite all that, when the dialogue
commences, the opposition shall have innumerable ammunition
at its disposal which the stupidity of the regime has armed
them with as of November 17. Such a lawsuit could not be lost
even by an elementary school pupil of mediocre intelligence, yet
three geniuses could lose it if they were to start clashing,
tripping each other up, forgetting their mutual goal and begin
fighting over seniority. Which is why I feel Draskovic, Djindjic
and Vesna Pesic cannot avoid initially sitting down and
accomplishing the harder part of the business, which consists of
a stable regulation of their mutual relations. If they cannot
live without each other, if they have to stand together at the
republican elections, if the world is trying to accept and
support them, then they would also have to draw up a small joint
platform. Only a few simple sentences which will sound more
articulate than the sound of the whistles.
The issue here is only of the chronology of the moves and we
should only worry over such a mistake. Namely, the current
coalition can peacefully fall apart and all three leaders are
free to go their own ways, but absolutely not before they make
the final move in the game against Milosevic. His last hope
lies exactly in that, one second before the end, before his
fortress collapses, someone from the opposition shall trip up
someone else.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", February 8, 1997
President of the "National Peasants Party" and regular
commentator of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Dragan Veselinov,
looks at the effects of the decision of the Yugoslav Army to "be
neutral" in the situation in Serbia on the political situation there
in the January 10, 1997 issue of that magazine.
With the declaration of neutrality of the Yugoslav Army,
Milosevic's regime has fallen. A living political corpse is moving
through Dedinje / plush residential area of Belgrade where Milosevic
lives/. The problem of the opposition is how it will enter in the
pawn finish against the stripped king. The triumphant ovations have
already started with eggs, pots and pans, cartoons and dolls, jokes
and games. The ritual of victory has been established a month and a
half ago, and it is reaching its peak; half a million people held
each others hands on the Christmas Eve in Belgrade, with the same
political prayer on their minds. The Patriarch only gave it the
religious excuse.
Milosevic still does not understand that he is finished. As if
he thinks that he will celebrate tenth anniversary of the Eighth
Party Session of 1987. He does not have anymore neither economic, nor
political reserves to keep the power. The fixed capital in the
country has been ruined a long time ago, and money stolen and spent a
long time ago. There is no question of a similar inflation to that
one of 1993. Then the Deutch marks were there, now they are not. The
ten year rule of Slobodan Milosevic has shown itself good only to
prove to us how big our inherited capital from Tito's era was.
Milosevic has not built anything during his era, he has only spent.
You can only spent for ten years without work in an industrialized
country. Marshal's /Tito/ economic legacy is wasted, and now we are
at the bookkeeping zero, finally aware of the defeating parasitism
and banditism of the regime.
The president of Serbia made a fatal mistake when he betrayed
the Socialist Party of Serbia so that he could satisfy insatiable
command ambitions of his wife - so that her party could be the ruler
of the whole infrastructure in the country. Maybe he thought that he
is not ruling through a party anyway, but through the secret and
uniformed police., so that he could get rid of the civil mirage
anyway. He showed himself in that manner not only as the betrayer of
laws, ideology, reform, Serbs, nationalism and regions, communism and
the inherited political culture, but as an absolute traitor, to who
absolutely nothing is sacred.
The suicidal nature of the spirit of
his family has uncovered that he coldly sacrifices all his people so
that he could play a sole ruler. That is why his party followers feel
that they are unprotected and exiled, so that even they become
revengeful.
The declaration of military neutrality has suddenly placed him
in the hands of the police. President of Serbia will not be able
anymore to use the underground wolf den's of the Army, where he would
always run away when there was trouble in Belgrade. He remains on the
surface, on the Belgrade concrete. Between him and the rebelled
people now only remains Sokolovic /minister of police/, an awful
personality, which can be only created by Serbian politics.
How much
can he rely on the police ? Probably not much, because even the elite
units "Grmija 1" and "Grmija 2", could not make much progress in a
conflict with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. If he would end
up to defend himself with special police, he would be overcome
quickly, since the Serbian population is armed. There could be a
civil war in Serbia, but it would be of a pocket size nature and
localized to Belgrade, where Milosevic does not have the power
anyway. The conflict would be ferocious, since both sides accuses
each other of national treason and does not tend only towards simple
defence, that is change of those holding the power, but also towards
the release of enormous hatred which was stimulated through the years
by the TV and printed media. Serbia could witness localized Bosnia.
The Army would come out at the crucial moment with its tanks and
would play a revenge on Milosevic for the mistreatment , treason and
officer's poverty.
If only two tanks would line up in front of
Sokolovic's police headquarters in Belgrade street of Knez Milos, and
shoot two grenades into the building, the policemen would run away
like chicken in front of a charging fox.
This year does not in any manner resemble 1991 and the Ninth of
March. It does not resemble 1992 or 1993 either, until the Vance/Owen
Plan for Bosnia. Until that time Milosevic could also count on help
from Karadzic. Bosnian Serbs have threatened the opposition in
Belgrade that they will attack it and clean Belgrade of infectious
democracy. Now Biljana Plavsic is laughing into Milosevic's face, she
is enjoying his troubles, and has also suddenly started to love
democracy herself. Neither Tudjman can help him now with the
instigation of a conflict with Serbs in Croatia. Milosevic cannot
instigate an external conflict with which the oppositional revolt
could be diluted with patriotic phraseology.
He cannot even provoke the Albanians in Kosovo. He particularly
will not be able to do that with Demaqi, who has taken over the
competing party to that of Rugova. He is secretly negotiating with
the opposition in Belgrade and will sooner call the Albanians to a
peaceful demonstrational resistance to the regime, rather than gamble
with arms. Demaqi may be in the end is concluding the Serbian
problem, since he is check mating Milosevic in Kosovo. Demaqi will
surely be open towards the idea of certain institutional status of
Kosovo in Serbia - as a possible long-term provisional status - and
in that manner relieve the Belgrade opposition of the fear that
Milosevic would proclaim it treasonous.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 10, 1997
In the light of the forthcoming elections in Croatia, Dejan
Jovic of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" makes in the January 17, 1997
issue of the magazine the comparison of approach the elections by
presidents Tudjman and Milosevic.
The question "who else" went into the headline of the
interview, which was given on the eve of Croatian presidential
elections in 1992 to "Nedeljna Dalmacija" by president Tudjman. "Tell
me who else could govern Croatia", was a rethorical question of
Tudjman to the Croatian public, in a good old manner that the ruler
expects from the populous to be his mirror with which he communicates
always in the same manner.
For a long time, Milosevic communicates with his voters in the
same manner. He even does not give interviews, even to the most
reliable journalists. "There is no uncertainty with us", his main
electoral message at all elections so far has completely corresponded
to Tudjman's "It's known!" who is the only one who can be the
Croatian president. That is known, since "only with us there is no
uncertainty".
This proclamation of victory in advance, the tendency to
convince the people that any thought of another ruler is droll and
senseless, because the state cannot be ruled by minute parties with
their crazy leaders has proven in cases of both Milosevic and Tudjman
as a particularly effective electoral strategy. Both were able to
convince the voters that they really have no electoral choice. If
they really do not want to vote for them, well, they have the right
to abstain. Abstaining from a choice at least they will save face,
since they will not vote for somebody who is funny and marginal.
Besides that, by voting for them, the voters will not "throw
away" their vote. If they vote for somebody else, that is as if they
did not vote at all. Because the votes for others are counted and
recognized only if there is too little of them. If there is enough of
them to become relevant - the whole thing will simply be ignored. So
where is the reason in those who after all this still vote for the
opposition ?
Tudjman and Milosevic have been convincing their voters that
the victory of the opposition in Zagreb and Belgrade would lead to
chaos and conflict. In Zagreb, it would threaten the security of the
state and of all that has been achieved since 1990 on. It would lead
to the restoration of communism, and it would not only lead Croatia
back into old Yugoslavia, but into a worse one: into the one where
there would also be Albania and Bulgaria, and no Slovenia. The
Belgrade win for the opposition would threaten not only what has been
achieved in the last five, but in the last fifty years. It would
return the monarchy, chetnik movement, civil war, sanctions, poverty
and misery. It would return everything that "people do not want", but
cannot resist to vote for it.
But, spreading panic and chaotic scenarios, Tudjman and
Milosevic where the ones introducing the state of emergency. Out of
Milosevic's kitchen came the (literal) statement that their rule was
won in blood, and that it can only be lost in blood, as if it wasn't
true that this rule was won through a combination of meetings and
elections and that it could also fall through such a combination.
Didn't Tudjman keep convincing the Croatian public that in no manner
would the victory of the forces that would annul all Croatian
achievements made during his rule be allowed - and in his
interpretation this would mean: anybody except me. Such talk is the
talk of a state of emergency. That is the same speech with which the
military top of former Yugoslavia explained how it will come to
chaos and conflict if they lose the power. And when they lost it -
they created chaos and conflict behind them. And then to themselves
too.
Both Tudjman and Milosevic are the rulers of state of
emergency. Not only did such a state follow the whole era of their
rule, but they have to thank it for what they became. The war enabled
the strategy "who else" to look completely convincing. Neither Serbs
nor Croats are crazy enough to change their leaders in a midst of a
war. You should unite and not divide around them. A community should
be established around them, not parties. Everybody should be together
and not apart.
For both Tudjman and Milosevic the war was a controlled and
limited one. It would flame up whenever one of them needed to insure
his electoral victory, and it would calm down when it was necessary
to show economic and diplomatic achievements. Milosevic and Tudjman
recognized each other as equals and helped each other whenever
possible.
But, Tudjman was much more successful. The quantity of success
he brought Croatia to some measure justifies his political style,
including there tactical games and pacts with Milosevic. Milosevic
was the complete war looser. And when one side becomes a looser, and
the other one winner - they don't recognize each other as equal. They
cannot give legitimacy to each other. Because, what does it mean for
the Croatian voters today to receive recognition from Belgrade ?
Probably as much as a recognition from Zagreb to Belgrade voters five
years ago. Not much.
That is why the Croatian diplomacy attempted to show the
recognition from Belgrade, not as a victory, but as an agreement of
equals. That is surely, from a long term perspective, a politically
smart move which will make it possible that Serb - Croat problems are
solved quickly, when they come to the table one day.
The only thing Milosevic and Tudjman never experienced was the
real opposition and unbound electoral conflict, in which nothing is
known in advance and which is unpredictable for everybody, including
them. In the old regime, Tudjman was opposition within the elite.
Milosevic was not even that. That is why Zagreb elections of November
1995 and Belgrade of November 1996 represent first real defeat of
both of them.
Their magic power suddenly stopped. Instead to understand the
message from "Cinderella ", so that they would change clothes and
return home on time, they act like the queen from "Snowhite". They
broke the mirror the first time they heard from it what they did not
want to hear. Like two dressed up boys, they simply ended the game,
threw themselves onto the floor shouting: "This is injustice, true
injustice!"
The elections in Zagreb and in Belgrade have shown to Milosevic
and Tudjman that the only time when there was no uncertainty for them
was the wartime. In a normal political situation - uncertainty is a
normal state. And they are not people of normal state.
Milosevic felt this in recent days in a manner from which
Tudjman was spared due to a series of reasons: because he was able to
deliver to the Croats the compensation for his rule (although it
could be debated what he has delivered, in what state and for what
price), because he was not able to stifle strong voices of the "other
Croatia" and because - due to unlucky coincidence - he got tragically
ill.
But, this does not mean that the Croatian voters will not, in a
few months - at the polls - if they do occur, send a message with the
identical content to their ruler of state of emergency: that the
state of emergency rule is finished both for those that have "won" in
it, as well as for those that have "lost" in it. That the time of
ethno politics was over at the moment when there was no relevant
ethnic "opposition" in the country anymore. And that after this he
has only two choices - to transfer to "Slovenian model" or to
establish the true, real and open dictatorship.
L?ets not fool each other: that dictatorship is possible. But it
does not in any manner depend on the strength of the regime. It
depends completely and solely on the strength of the opposition. It
depends whether the opposition will be able to show that not only can
every Chausescu be replaced, but also every Iliescu. It depends on
the fact whether the opposition will comprehend that the provocation
of the state of emergency is something that the rulers of dangerous
waves would pay them for in gold, and that the civil disobedience -
the one that is currently occurring in Belgrade - is the road on
which for them there is no uncertainty.
The rule which only understands the language of force and
revolution does not know how to respond to civil disobedience. It has
no spirit. It is boring. It language is wooden and illegible. It is
not only deaf, it is also dumb. It only knows how to speak to its own
mirror.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" , January 17, 1997
The chief commentator of the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" comments
in the January 17, 1997 issue of the magazine on the approach of
Zagreb "alternative" towards the current events in Serbia.
Lets imagine that somebody has these days undertaken to make a
comparison between the two largest cities of the failed Yugoslavia,
Belgrade and Zagreb. This person would most easily answer this
question: which of these two cities is a European metropolis, and
which one is the backward Balkan province ?
If he would for a moment be doubtful in his final decision, it
would be enough for him to listen to the program of the Zagreb 101,
local station that represents a cult symbol of something "urban,
civil, modern, liberating, European and democratic Zagreb"! With a
little luck, he could run into the voice of the editor in chief,
popular Zrinka Vrabec-Mojzes! Catch her at the moment when, for
example, she is reading the news from Serbia, for example about the
demonstrations in Belgrade, which is quite a current subject these
days. Our hypothetical arbiter would then hear how this editor and
anchor comments the news she is reading in an unusual manner - with a
mocking imitation of Belgrade slang.
This mocking does not follow some specific news content, but is
a comment to the simple fact that this news item - whatever it is - comes
from Belgrade, from Serbia. Moreover, 101, has jingles of similar
content and form , which have the same function - a priori mocking of
whatever comes from Belgrade, from Serbia, that is, mocking Belgrade
and Serb identity.
And how is this constant, almost ritualistic exercise of
primitive chauvinism received by the Zagreb public of Radio 101, the
one that holds itself as urban, cultural and above all European ?
Perfectly !
Not only that it does not have anything against it, not only
that it is not bothered by it, but supports such behavior, even holds
it as charming. For example, the mentioned editor and anchor Zrinka
Vrabec - Mojzes has been voted as the woman of the year.
So what kind of a spirit is the one that is shamelessly
characterized by primitivism and which enjoys the charm of
chauvinistic assault ? The spirit of province ! That is, the
authentic Zagreb version of this spirit.
It is this over pathological chauvinistic mockery of 101 which
reflects the pinnacle of opportunism. The subject of mockery
represents his motives as a matter of free choice, not as a matter of
the spirit of province.
It is exactly in the aberration from the norms of elementary
civil norms , lets not even speak about political correctness, that
101 confirms its immersion in the primitive mentality of Zagreb
provinciality.
At one point almost revolutionary eccentricities of Radio 101
is today only the expression of cultural, moral and political
conformism of this media and provincial spirit which it represents.
Just as the silence (with mockery) about the Belgrade democratic
revolution is a measure of provincial media backwardness and
historical blindness in general.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", January 17, 1997
SITUATION IN THE MEDIA
Bozo Nikolic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" explores in the
January 10, 1997 issue of this magazine the current situation in the
media created by the recent political upheavals in Serbia.
When President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, confronted with a
great anti - government demonstrations, attempted to silence the last
of those among the independent media, he unintentionally initiate a
technological rebellion which he regretted very quickly. Numerous
students, professors, experts and journalists have immediately turned
their computers to the Internet. The independent radio station which
the government stifled for two days, B 92, used them to begin
digital program dispersion in Serbo - Croatian and English through
the Internet Audio capabilities. In that manner, it was The Web that
informed about the protests.
This experience has indicated to the demonstrators in Serbia
the great capabilities available to them through their fingers, so
the independent journalists, with a breakneck speed, rushed to
circumvent the government transmitters, news agencies and studios and
use the Internet to transmit their messages throughout Serbia and
the World.
This opens up possibilities for the local radio stations to
transmit their programs through the Internet, and if they would be
forbidden to transmit newspaper reports the people could gather
around a computer and listen to the news through the Internet, which
many have done when B92 was disabled during those two days.
The government officials have ordered the college deans of the
Belgrade university to disable the students the usage of university
computers to send the messages and receive information through the
Internet. But, since many professors support the student protest,
the order was ignored. Such university computer centers remain
crowded with students. "We have taken over all the computers at the
Philology college and are using them for the student movement", one
student says. To their Internet sites and e-mail addresses thousands
of messages from around the world arrive daily.
The users of the Serbian Web pages have already developed
plans in case the government attempts to cut off the Internet lines.
Thousands of egg messages sent through the Internet will flood the
government fax machines.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 10, 1997;
Balkan Media & Policy Monitor
and its regular supplement is a by-monthly publication.
Editor: Ruzica Zivkovic.
This publication is supported and sponsored by:
the Netherlands Ministry of Culture,
hCa - Prague,
IKV - The Hague,
Pax Christi (Nederland) - Utrecht, and
Press Now - Amsterdam
Contact address:
Celebesstraat 60 , The Hague
tel. 31 (0)70 350 7100,
e-mail:ikv@antena.NL (for the Monitor )
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