Montenegro

The probing of the inclination of the voters towards individual parties, but also towards possible coalitions is a job feverishly undertaken these days by all parties in Montenegro. This is something that is not bothering only the ruling DPS, which will, instead of coalition partners at the next elections , will have the help of an array of satellite parties, trained to bite and damage a piece of the oppositionary pie. The regime, in that manner has the complete scenario of the preelection campaign, while the opposition is still weighting its options.

It seems that the leadership of the National party (NS) will have the most problems to persuade its members and sympathizers of the need to enter coalitions with the parties it looked across the aim. From the reliable sources in the strongest oppositionary party in Montenegro, it is already fairly clear that the reactions to the possible coalition with the Liberals and Social democrats are different from region to region. The least opposition to that idea lies in the capital of Podgorica, the largest in Niksic, which is not good for the NS leadership, since 26 MP are chosen in those two electoral units. The party,s base in the North of the republic does not look well at the deal with separatists.

Additional complications to the NS will be made with a bunch of party that have a Serbian connotation, of which two: the SRS(Radicals) of Visnjic and the recently formed SSS of Mitar Cvorovic and Momir Vojvodic could make problems for Novak Kilibarda in the cities of Pljevlja, Berane, Herceg-Novi, Niksic, even Bijelo Polje.

It seems that the leadership of the Liberal party will have much less problems to explain to its base the need for a coalition. The obvious animosity of the part of its membership towards the compromising past of the NS will cost the Liberals some votes, but not as much to bring into question the validity of a joint electoral stance. The advantage of the LSCG is a relatively clear position in the larger part of the electoral units. In Plav, Rozaj, Ulcinj and Cetinje the coalition with NS cannot be of much use to the Liberals, but it can cause a lot of damage. There, as well as in Bar, the coalition with SDP is more logical. A joint list of these two parties in those four electoral units could expect even 8 to 14 seats. On the other hand, on Pljevlja, Berane and some other places, the Liberals could hardly expect any seats, but their votes might be indispensable to NS for victory. Only in the electoral unit 3 (Bijelo Polje) and number 12 (Budva,Kotor) the three parties have an equal interest for a joint list.

In the largest two electoral units Podgorica and Niksic (With Pluzine), due to the large number of mandates, the changes in the Electoral law will not threaten the proportional character. The leading parties could count there on gaining seats, even if they enter the elections by themselves. If they do enter the elections together, the regime could hardly expect to gain 16 planned seats in these two units.

It can be said that the leadership of the Social democrats(SDP) has least problems.The vice president of this party, Dr.Burzan, even says that he is for an even larger coalition, that would include the parties f the Muslims (SDA) and the Albanians (DSA), which could guarantee the defeat of the regime. This though, at this moment, does not seem feasible even for the party leaderships, let alone their heterogeneous voter bases.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, July 12, 1996

Serbia

Last December Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic, accused of having insulted the Serbian Prime Minister, believed that the Socialists would schedule elections right after Dayton and started saying that 1996 would be the year of decision. He focused his campaign on proving that Mirko Marjanovic's government of directors was stuck in the so called conflict of interests which began when ministers-directors reigned in such a way as to protect their (socially or privately owned) companies.

Djindjic's Democrats were, therefore, innovators, when they insisted on the affair of wheat export through the company whose director is the Serbian prime minister. The topic is a politically important one because it touches:

(1) the issues of the so-called social minimum, nutrition of the population, and the socialists declare themselves as ``Leftists,'' i.e. as a group that takes care of the poor, and we are speaking about bread here

(2) the position of farmers, to which the socialists must be very sensitive because the farmers are potential voters for the socialists and there are always problems with paying for the crop

(3) the zone of ``gray business'' widespread during international sanctions; (4) there is a tension within the regime as to who is going to accuse whom of not having brought back to the country the 800 million dollars.

Djindjic should have known that he would be attacked by all the weapons. The Democratic Party (DS) MP group on 21 February requested that the Serbian Parliament form an inquiry committee which would investigate the deals of public companies and the Reserves Bureau with the companies headed by Serbian ministers. In spite of the fact that inquiry committees did not prove to be an efficient means in our parliaments (a proof of this is the Dafiment affair), the socialists who had had no opposition in the parliamentary debates for seven months feared for their rating and arrogantly rejected the request. Someone decided that the government should take Djindjic to court because of the DS advertisement in the Belgrade weekly ``Telegraf.''

The advertisement consisted of Zoran Djindjic's open letter to Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic in which Djindjic claimed that Marjanovic had profited from the wheat export via ``Progres'' company. Djindjic gave up his MP immunity and decided to go in for a court showdown with the government. He said the Democratic Party would continue publishing and distributing throughout the country leaflets with ``proof about underhand dealings of Serbian ministers.''

The moment investigation began (4 April), Djindjic started turning the case into the one in which someone would win the elections and someone else would lose freedom: ``The essence of this government is a monopoly and abuse, and that is what they want to cover up by this process.''

Djindjic said that he would propose that one of the witnesses be National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Dragoslav Avramovic who ``will have something to say about the business of the Reserves Bureau.'' When Djindjic's trial began, Avramovic was no longer the governor, despite the opposition's attempt to defend him in the Parliament. Opposition parties were solidary with Djindjic, which was easier to do than to unify them.

The Socialists, obviously aware of the fact that opposition coalitions are difficult to form and when they eventually do, they disintegrate after a short time, twice this year (January and June) launched rumors that elections would be held soon. They certainly have information on the public opinion---they know that the opposition does not rate very high (major parties 6-8 per cent, public opinion is against Kostunica who is disappearing, like most minor opposition parties), that their propaganda has raised JUL up to about 5 per cent of the electorate. They may worry because of possible high abstinence but are still arranging the scene so as to ``fence the policy'' and believe that, being the ruling party, they would most successfully swim across the ``dead sea.'' They know that the voters are tired of listening to how the opposition would unite and are quietly waiting for December.

In the campaign, the length of which will be difficult to bear, Djindjic did not give up national voters; he had on his agenda the Bosnian Serb Republic, the Democrats kept repeating that the situation there was disastrous, that people in the Banja Luka region slept under improvised tents.

The Democratic Party assessed that the letter by the three presidents from F.R. Yugoslavia in which they had demanded that the Bosnian Serb Parliament name the acting president was ``the washing of hands in front of the international public and continuation of the old practice of blackmails, without real support to the people of the Bosnian Serb Republic.'' But Djindjic again said that ``this is a decisive moment in which something must be sacrificed in order to form conditions for a normal future life of the citizens of the Bosnian Serb Republic,'' i.e. that ``the Bosnian Serb Republic should sacrifice part of its autonomy'' and ``ask President Radovan Karadzic to withdraw from public political life.'' He, however, must know that the Bosnian story is no longer so decisive for the Serbian voters.

Trying to stand with one foot on the other side of the Drina, Djindjic this year started applying for the European visa. At home he kept saying that the ``change of government is a condition for Serbia and Montenegro's return to the international community and for the state's recovery.'' These may not be bad moves for one who wants to create the atmosphere which would bring the country closer to Europe.

The so-called election campaign and the activities of coalition ``Together'' were marked by 9 March. A week before 9 March, DS, SPO and GSS leaders confirmed that they were forming a coalition which advocated radical social changes and democratization of Serbia.

Although Seselj kept saying that ``Draskovic and Djindjic will soon have a fight'' and that ``possibilities for radicals' cooperation with two democratic parties will open up,'' coalition ``Together'' held rallies in Nis, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kraljevo, Uzice and Leskovac.

In Uzice, on 18 May, Djindjic said that two roads were ahead of Serbia---``one that leads to isolation, chaos and poverty and the other that leads to Europe.'' Adapting himself to coalition ``Together,'' Djindjic introduced pro-European elements in his policy, kept crumbs of his national policy, made coalitions, lost part of his party, made various turns, took, left, swindled. The only topic he never dropped was the wheat affair. As we have seen, this affair sheds light on the character of the regime, the way of its functioning, the opposition's ways of controlling the government, independence of the judiciary... Is it too early to say that due to all these circumstances an important round of future elections is currently taking place in a Belgrade courtroom. It would have been better if the round took place in the Parliament, but this is Serbia and in Serbia the courtroom is an important institution.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, July 6, 1996

The same subject is explored by Jovan Dulovic in the July 13, 1996 issue of the same magazine.

Surprise and then revolt ensued after the court council of the Belgrade District Court partially accepted the defense's suggestions and scheduled the trial of Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic and Telegraf editor Dragoljub Belic, charged with ``damaging of Serbia's reputation,'' to resume on September 16-17.

As Serbia is currently legally personified by the figure of wheat merchant, Progres Director, co-owner of the highly-profitable monopolistic firm Progresgas trading, i.e. Mirko Marjanovic, the Serbian Prime Minister, the Belgrade District Prosecutor, who in such trials makes no decisions without prior consultation with higher courts, was officially obliged to raise charges against Djindjic and Belic, thus completing his part of the job. Despite the orchestrated campaign of the state media (RTS, Vecernje novosti, Politika, Politika ekspres) and pressures from the Ministry of justice and republican prosecutor's office to end the trial as soon as possible and reach a verdict as ``it is clear as day both are guilty,'' the court council, however, decided to call to the witness stand the dismissed Serbian Agriculture Minister Ivko Djonovic in September.

It was a real shock for everyone who had expected the court council to act under summary procedure: to request of Djindjic to present the court with indisputable evidence that Marjanovic ``abused his official post and made a fortune for himself or someone else,'' i.e. ``took for himself $200 million'' as the incriminated Democratic Party ad published in Telegraf read, and to pass a verdict as the defendant has no such evidence. As this did not happen, the regime media launched an unprecedented campaign against the legislature, the Belgrade district Court Justice Goran Cavlina, chairman of the court council. Where does so much bile come from, whose hopes were dashed by the court decision?

According to a not so outlandish version, Marjanovic had a very hard time getting President Slobodan Milosevic's approval to prosecute Djindjic, but only under the condition that the trial end by mid-July at the latest, when Milosevic is going on holiday. Also, a marathon trial of the Democratic Party leader could be counterproductive to the ruling party ahead of the upcoming elections. Seems like Marjanovic promised the President this, expecting Serbian Justice Minister Arandjel Markicevic to do the job for him. The feasibility of this version is corroborated by the fact that the Prime Minister called the court three time on the last day of the trial, July 3, insisting that it end. No-one doubts that such an instruction came directly from Marjanovic's cabinet, which is standard practice when the Prime Minister, acting either as a firm's director or the PM, is interested in a trial and its outcome.

Prime Minister Marjanovic has obviously found himself in unexpected trouble during his litigation with Djindjic, as the force with which the papers supporting him criticized the judge and legislature shows. Resorting to the old practice of discrete and clear deterrence, Politika carried an article on July 3 entitled ``Djindjic Slanders Marjanovic without Proof.'' Beneath the report on the trial, the daily carried an article headlined ``Investigation of Rekovac Judge and Mayor.'' Just to show what can happen to judges, too.

It is symptomatic that no-one in the ruling party stood up to defend the PM; this should not be understood as their belief that everyone is innocent until proven guilty, even Djindjic. Some political analysts prone to conspiracy theories say Marjanovic is counting his last days as PM and that a strong political clique is working on his toppling, that the trial adjournment is merely a minor detail of the plan. It is difficult to believe, however, that justice Goran Cavlina is working under someone's orders. He apparently wants to end the trial with a clear conscience, convinced his decision is just. The above analysts mention that the document from the PM's cabinet scheduling a meeting was not made public by mere accident and that a ``mole'' in the Government leaked it to the press.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, July 13, 1996

Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni of July 19. 1996, brought a comment of its regular contributor Teofil Pancic on the Serbian oppositionary coalition Zajedno (Together).

For some hundred days of their friendship, Vuk Draskovic, Zoran Djindjic and Vesna Pesic crisscrossed Serbia, held relatively well attended and successful political meetings in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Loznica, Uzice, Nis, Kragujevac, Leskovac, Kraljevo and Arilje. Even though it is quite evident that there is no overt closeness of opinions between them on some key questions - first of all towards the regime in Pale, the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina and national question in general - they have surprisingly succeeded to guard themselves from in-fighting and bad mouthing. That is why they have succeeded in something else too: to draw onto themselves the rage of the regime and oppositionary opponents.

In his known style, Vojislav Seselj called them the treasonous coalition, which, of course, operates in the service of foreign intelligence services and has announced that he will not play with them at any cost. The other one, Vojislav Kostunica, is at pains: it is hard to align his tough national politics with renegade ideas of Vuk Draskovic, and anational Vesna Pesic, and it would be impossible to keep the democratic image of his party if he enters a separate coalition with Seselj's Radicals. Individual entering of the elections, though, brings a real danger that his Democratic party of Serbia stays outside of the Parliament or that it gets a symbolic number of MP's and in that manner further lessens its already tarnished political esteem and influence.

Nobody denies Kostunica's party high level of consistency in its fight against the regime, but the problem arises immediately when somebody asks themselves: in what name does one have to fight against the regime ? To fight for All Serbian Lands Everywhere? That story is an airless balloon, and nobody wins the elections in Serbia in the year 1996. The remaining national hotheads will push themselves under Seselj's skirt anyway. That is why for Kostunica's national democrats the saving grace would be the widest coalition of all parliamentary opposition parties, but that will definitely materialize. Zajedno people know that Seselj could ruin their chances, since he would refuse all democratically oriented Serbs and all national minorities,let alone the destruction of the democratic image of the opposition outside of the country.It would be natural that, in the end, the DSS party, after some hard bargaining, will join the triumvirate. Due to the situation in his party, the final decision is not probable before the beginning of the electoral campaign itself.

While Kostunica is basting in the sauce of his own political ingredients, the coalition is preparing the tactics for the hot pre - electoral Autumn. The next big challenge will be the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: measuring of forces in this state under international protectorate will have considerable influence on the Serbian internal political scene and its international position, and in the coalition there is no agreement who to root for.

There is enough time until the federal elections for the ambitiously conceived union for the change of the regime to fall apart, but also to further strengthen and gain a clearer profile.Draskovic and Pesic will definitely not move to the right, but there is also hope that the Democrats will move from flirting with politics this country has no use for

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni, July 19, 1996

V. Didanovic of the Belgrade daily Nasa Borba looks in the July 20-21 issue of this newspaper at the results of an extensive political opinion poll conducted in Serbia.

During the first post-Dayton spring the number of disillusioned Yugoslavs who do not have the confidence in any of their politicians has grown, but, to the joy of the oppositionary oriented population, a certain reorientation of trust from the president of Serbia to other politicians has taken place. This is shown by the newest research of the public opinion conducted by the Belgrade Mark-plan agency, which, in the period of June 24 and July 3, of this year queried 2,448 people from 31 counties in FRY, excluding Kosovo.

The results have shown that as much as 28,7 percent of the polled citizens does not trust any politician, and that the position of the until recently undisputed Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic (took this time 23,7 percent of the confidence votes) after the percentage rise at the time of the signing of the Dayton agreement, has almost reached the minimum, registered in September 1995 (after the fall of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia). In the reshuffling of confidence , it turned out that the largest profit was made by Vojislav Kostunica, the leader of the Democratic party of Serbia (9,2 percent of the votes), who is quoted as the main politician of confidence by twice the larger number of those polled, than in March of this year. He is followed by Zoran Djindjic, the leader of the Democratic party and Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian radical party ( with 6,7 percent each), and in the fifth place is Vuk Draskovic, with 5,4 percent.

Somewhat different order is established when most honest politicians were in question, where all leading politicians except Kostunica have registered less points than on the confidence list. To that effect, 36,5 percent of the polled thinks that none of the politicians deserve the attribute honest,19,4 percent consider Slobodan Milosevic honest, 9,4 have that opinion about Kostunica, 5,5 about Seselj and 4,3 about Draskovic and Djindjic each.

The largest number of Serbians, according to this poll, would vote for the SPS- Socialist party of Serbia at the next elections - 25,6 percent, while 15,7 percent would decide not to go to the poll, and 10 percent are still undecided.

As far as the oppositionary parties are concerned, the results of the poll give the largest chance to the Democratic party of Serbia (11,6 percent), then Democratic and Radical party (8,5 percent each), and Serbian Renewal Movement (6,6 percent). The Yugoslav left JUL, would get 4,5 percent.
As much as 43,7 percent of the Serbians stated that they would definitely not vote for the SPS, 16,9 for the SPO, 12,6 for the Radicals, and 9,7 for the JUL.

The poll also showed that the largest part of the population of Serbia does not believe in the oppositionary coalition (60,9 percent), one fifth that it hopes this will happen (21 percent), while others do not have an opinion to that effect.

Source: Belgrade daily Nasa Borba, July 20-21, 1996

Comments and Analyses

Radovan Karadzic is politically dead. That has been known for a long time, but the manner in which Milosevic is selling his skin already looks like indefinite warming up of a many times cashed in political corpse.

Milosevic's store in which he is dealing with his Pale executioner with this episode is not yet closed. The story will definitely get new chapters, except if Karadzic would personally take nails into his hands and punches so many holes into his skin, already punched up so many times, that nobody would be able to sell it anymore. But this is impossible to believe in.Radovan is conscious that he is galling unstoppable, but he would rather have Milosevic's insecure parachute than fall immediately.

Those standing at the other side of Milosevic's counter, the Americans, are also stubborn, systematic, good at bargaining, at least as good as the trader from Dedinje. They have an answer to every move of Milosevic. Push into the corner is taking a long time, even too long, but the space is being narrowed all the time. Karadzic will be stuck to a Hague wall soon, where his place is. But, with his, end, the real story only begins, again with Milosevic in the main role. But this time not with Milosevic as the negotiator, but as a catch.

Hiding behind Karadzic's back for years was something that boss for Dedinje needed as a personal shield. Sometimes the Americans pretended to be naive, that they do not really understand what is going on, that they believe Milosevic when he says that he does not have enough influence on Karadzic and Pale leadership. Milosevic though, amply showed that he deals with Pale as with puppets on a string, that he can do what is at his will, and that he does not do that only from yesterday but from the moment tens years ago when he unleashed the fascisthoid Serb machinery. It was always operated from Milosevic's cabinet.

The most important part of the job is the removal of the live shield in front of the Dedinje command post, in which Karadzic was the strongest figure. At the same time, another mechanism was put into operation, heating up of the atmosphere in which Milosevic could receive the same indictement as Radovan. The third stone is the question of the Responsibility of Belgrade for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, began by recent decision of the International Court of Justice.

The net for Milosevic has been set.Like the spent force Karadzic is now, he wall fall into it slowly. But it seems that the hunters are geared to that possibility.

Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet, July 25, 1996

The editor of the Banjaluka monthly Novi Prelom and the president of the oppositionary Liberal Party, Miodrag Zivanovic, comments in the latest issue of the magazine (June 1996) on the process of return of refugees.

The return of refugees is one of the key points of the Peace Agreement. National oligarchies have began, completely rationally and in a planned manner, immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreement, with the obstruction of the return of refugees. Firs, inside Bosnia and Herzegovina great resettlement of the population was conducted, so that, for example, Serbs were settled in those places where Muslims and Croats should return, and vice versa. Secondly, border incidents occurred, also in an organized manner, which were supposed to create fear, mistrust and hatred.Thirdly, with a continuous media propaganda, the local nations were persuaded that they do not have and cannot live together, even one along each other.

There are three concepts in the solution of the refugee crisis. The first one is that of Krajisnik and Karadzic, according to which the refugees actually should not return to the places they originate from. The second one is that of Alija Izetbegovic, by which Muslims and Croats should return to the territory of the Bosnian Federation, and Serbs to Republika Srpska.Conducting this idea in practice, the Sarajevo government is even conduction a trade with people. Sarajevo offered to the German government, for example to accept around 100 thousand refugees (mainly Muslims) and settle them in the Sana-Una region, with the condition that the German government pays it 20 thousand DEM per refugee, meaning in essence 2 billion DEM for the whole deal. Izetbegovic, as is the case with the leaders of the other two nations is not interested for his people. Power and money are above the national interest.

Our people abroad see this, I talked to them recently, and are against this kind of trade. They want to return where they came from. Spread around the world, around Bosnia, of destroyed fates and lives, they now serve only as an instrument for the creation of three ethnically pure entities and like a faceless mass which has to give its votes in the forthcoming elections to those that are the main perpetrators of this tragedy.

In such circumstances it is hardly probably to conduct the third and real concept of solving the refugee problem. That is their return to their homes and cities. This seems impossible. Maybe it is possible in a step by step process, where conditions would be created for those that are returning for economic,p percsonal and other security, conditions for achievement of human rights, equality and other. These are long term activities and cannot be replaced with short term, pragmatic moves as are physical movements of the populations or trade with people.

Source: Banjaluka monthly Novi Prelom, June 1996

Serbia

Along with the Hague tribunal came, finally, the moment of truth in the literal and symbolic sense of that word. For the moment, this truth is shaking the world. For the moment, in Serbia, nobody wants to know about it. It is being made available by only one daily, marked as anti-Serbian due to its resistance to war.

But, is it only the question of absence of insight into bare facts and is the main obstacle to reach them the media blockade by the regime which projected and lead the war ? It would be consoling if the answers to these question were positive. Unfortunately, the matter is much more complicated.

The current regime in Serbia grew on the large support of the mass, which was demonstrated in massive demonstrations of the anti - bureaucratic revolution. Along with it came, without much skepticism, the support of the scientific, military and political elite. It has left numerous written statements of its solidarity with the rising leader. The goal on which the unconditional alliance was made was: all Serbs in one state, Serbianized Yugoslavia, or ethnically pure national state.

A certain deeply archaic policy was proclaimed as a national program, which was openly conducted. Nobody can say that they did not know about Vukovar and three- year siege of Sarajevo, about the camps and columns of people forcefully expelled from their natural and emotional world, about the savage destruction of material and cultural assets. Nobody could also say that the names and faces of the key, but also less important protagonists of the war is unknown to them. So what is that new thing uncovered to us by the Hague Tribunal ? What is new to us is the mark it has put on all of this what we have done and said ourselves. It is radically different from the way that the essence of the object of interest of the Hague tribunal has been marked.

It is of course important that those that symbolize and embody the crime stand in front of the Tribunal in the Hague. This possibility does not seem to be far away. It is much harder, though, to give up on a wrong goal and see the essential defeat of the policy, if it can be named as such, which considered crime as allowed.

The truth that the Hague tribunal is confronting us with has a layered meaning. This international institution, which has gathered the world legal authorities, for us is, still, only the newest chapter of the permanent and encompassing conspiracy against the Serbian nation. This tragic illusion is a result of our cocoon and self-sufficiency, our mental conflict with the Western civilization. The confession and condemnation of the crimes, particularly under outside pressure are not enough to end that drama. Along with that, a great and multi-layered effort is necessary to understand and explain its essential motives. By definition, the largest responsibility in this arduous endeavor belong to the Serbian elite. But, it in itself is a participant and a victim of the mentioned civilizational clash.

Through its not so long and not so rich history, the Serbian elite, conceived in a rural and poor society, has been stretching between East and West,, between patriarchal society and modernity. But, all the movements it has inspired suffer of an intimate desire for collectivism. Using Western terminology, the Serbian elite has been, consciously and unconsciously, tricking itself that our, Serbian democracy is democracy in the Western sense of the term.

The idea of a national state based on heritage law, contrary to a state based on the rule of legal norms, is a great chapter in the history of Serbian political and social thought. Only the gravitational point has been changing. From a social point, it has been shifting towards a national one, but has always had the nation as a collective body. In essence, the state and society coincided.

Without economic modernization, without democratic institutions and style of governing, the Serbian rural and patriarchal society feared change and swung between anarchy and autocracy. From its collective mentality stems the inclination towards the Leader, who is always a potential dictator. The present is not understandable without taking into consideration this tradition. How else could it be explained that the Serbian elite, was the one which, when one utopia has ended, proposed an archaic project: future as a restored past.. From the world of rekindled myths and dangerous fictions, we have clashed with criteria, values and semantics of the real world, with unavoidable historic processes.This had cost to others, but also to us.

But everything that lead us to reason and put us back on firm ground did not come as a result of internal maturing process, even less as a result of catharsis. This is where evasion of Dayton and ignoring of the Hague come form.What we don't want to know about, does not exist ! That is why it is hard to believe in a soon to come true condemnation of the crimes, which are, in their last instance, nothing else than most degenerated consequences of a wrong historical choice: for the war, territories, instead for development. Without full conscience, first of all of those who are considered the salt of the nation, that it was exactly them that have made the strategic mistake, there is no real change in the nation itself.

Nobody is talking about collective guilt of the Serbian nation. But, the Hague tribunal is putting to test our collective political maturity. The fact here, as well as elsewhere, crimes were committed before, and that they were committed also by others in this war , does not exonerate the crimes committed by Serbs. Everybody must confront the truth about themselves. In the readiness to condemn the crimes in our own nation is the first sign of coming to senses, birth of hope in the possibility of an alternative which would have reasonable goals and uses them with reasonable means.

History does not forget anything. In the preparations of this war, in fanning of fear and mistrust, the important role was played by the suppressed truth about the genocide against the Serbs in the World War II. That is why Serbs, before all, must know that the truth about the crimes cannot be ignored. It has to be accepted or rejected, with all current and long term consequences. This fateful choice confronts today every member of the Serbian nation.

Those accused of the war crimes, after all that has happened, trying to save their skin, identify themselves with the nation. In a complete historical crash of the nation, they see the last chance of their personal redemption. The Hague tribunal is attempting to deprive them of the possibility to along with themselves, drag along the whole nation into an abyss. It presents the satisfaction to the victims and defends the universal principle of the human justice. For this already the Hague tribunal is not and cannot be contrary to our narrower national interest.

Source: Belgrade daily Nasa Borba, July 20-21, 1996

Media situation

As soon as Aleksandar Tijanic met the personnel in the Ministry, and promised that there will be no pressures either on the state or oppositionary media, the independent team of Radio Smederevo was deposed. The county of Smederevo, meaning the local branch of the ruling SPS party, put their people in the vacated offices. Tijanic insisted in vain that he had nothing to do with the Radio Smederevo takeover, that everything happened three days before he took the post. Although he came out with the statement which condemned the methods used by the Smederevo state, he explained everything by the already known recipe for the stifling of the independent media, reexamination of the property transformation.

Then, on June 6, the State market inspector denied work condition permit to the magazine Novi Pancevac. The offices were sealed, since the magazine does not have the proper operating license, a new form used as pressure on those media that cannot fall in the transformation category.

Already on June 12, it became public that the Executive Board of the big Belgrade publishing house BIGZ, decided not to print anymore the SPO party weekly Srpska Rec. Even though the magazine paid the printing paper in advance for at least two to three issues, the cooperation was canceled due to economic reasons. The real reason, according the the paper's editor, Danica Draskovic, is a text on the illegal building of the house for the presidents son, Marko Milosevic, on somebody else's ground in the city of Pozarevac, and the title page - a photograph (actually a montage) on which Marko is leading a drunken steer. Due to another photograph, taken at the opening of Marko's club, and published on the cover of the weekly Vreme, the local photographer was beaten up.

Danica Draskovic asked to be seen by the new minister, who accepted. She complained at BIGZ, but also at the distributors, and held a press conference a day after. He told me - I personally wish that Srpska Rec disappears. 'Srpska Rec' is simply s..., and it would be good for Serbian journalism that this paper does not exist, she stated.

The oppositionary coalition Zajedno(Together - SPO,Democratic party, Citizen's Alliance) sees in Tijanic the key man of the Socialists' preelection campaign. That the temperature is high, even though the election date has not even been set, is proven by the discovery or discovery of the SPO that Slobodan Milosevic held a secret meeting outside of Belgrade with the heads of the information and police sectors. During this session, as the spokesman of the SPO party said, Tijanic was given the task to prepare special pre election TV and radio programs and magazine articles against the leaders of the coalition Together, as well as overseeing the media that have to be closed to them.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisn June 28, 1996