The same theme is explored by Perica Vucinic (through the AIM agency)in the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni of June 21, 1996.

The President of the War Crimes Tribunal Anonio Cassesse returned from a recent visit to Belgrade with a half finished job. He agreed with the official Belgrade the opening of the office of the Tribunal, but he remained without an answer to two important questions. The first one is: why hasn't the procedure for the inauguration of the law on cooperation with the Tribunal been started ? Second: will the three officers of the Yugoslav Army (YA) implicated to have committed war crimes be given to the this international court.

It turns out that the Serbian president is still not clear weather there are war criminals in Serbia. He, first of all, has to establish if there are any, and then, if there are any ... he'll do something with them, but far away from the international legal instruments and the eyes of the international public.

But, as the things stand, the war criminals will not be searched among these three high officers of the Yugoslav army, who are accurse by the Hague tribunal of crimes committed in Croatia. If there are any , they will be collected, among the still nameless mass, which, with mind dimmed by low desires and brandy, rushed to drown itself in the myth of Serbian protectors , which was ruthlessly and shamelessly built by Serbian propaganda.

There are few reasons for such development. among the first is that, with an investigation among the personnel of the Yugoslav Army, what is left of the former JNA, Milosevic would only deepen the cleavage between the regime he represents and the army. Members of the YA are dissatisfied with the results of the war; many are dissatisfied with the goals of the war too - whether they think that they should have stood immediately on the Serbian borders , or those of SFRY, and almost all of the professional personnel is dissatisfied with the material and status position they currently have. The officers of the YA currently work as cheap and quality painters, plumbers, their wives are selling trinkets in flea markets...

The three officers- Sljivancanin, Radic, even general Mrksic, no matter how much they are men of confidence of the Army and in direct connection with its highest command, are still witnesses from a certain level of command which is far away from Milosevic which could be connected to him only in an indirect manner, if some legal instance decides to untangle the whole matter completely. Even then, the Serbian president would find himself quite protected, since his competencies,m, formally., were lower than those held by former member of the Presidency Borisav Jovic, general Veljko Kadijevic, and a few other tragi-comic and very dangerous figures. Only them would, in a process till the end become dangerous witnesses for themselves and Milosevic, since they would have to prove, That, even from a higher instance of rule, they obeyed orders from a lower instance. But, nobody has threatened them with the Court.

So, the most unpleasant witnesses for Milosevic, that would unmistakably pave his way towards the Hague, remain president of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadzic and general Ratko Mladic. But, the world has accepted Milosevic as a factor of peace and stability. If Milosevic would give the first three, and particularly the second two to the international legal instances, the world would remain without this factor in the Balkans.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , June 21, 1996

SITUATION IN MACEDONIA

VREME: You strongly oppose the idea of pushing Macedonia into some kind of a new Balkan basket'' and your motto is ``Europeanization yes, regionalization no.'' But the European Union seems to be advocating regionalization.

GLIGOROV: We believed this issue to have been overcome. Simply because we are for any kind of regional cooperation. This is not disputable. But when a clause on regional connecting appeared in the draft of our agreement with the European Union, we asked for an explanation. This had not been a problem in any of the previous agreements with the E.U. Why now? Regional cooperation as a general idea is not disputable. We immediately offered all our neighbors open borders and free communication of people, goods, capital and we have no reserves in this respect. We want as much cooperation as possible with all our neighbors. Which regional association we shall join must remain an independent decision of every country. I do not agree with the ideas that Europe should keep the Balkans in some kind of a ghetto, then civilize it and then decide what to do with it. This could cost Europe dearly, as was the case with Bosnia. Sixty thousand troops have to keep peace there now.

VREME: Macedonia has recently joined Partnership for Peace.'' How much self confidence does your country get from the presence of the American troops?

GLIGOROV: Their presence, regarding the numbers, is really symbolic. It cannot be a military warranty for the country's safety. But their presence does have a certain importance. U.N. peace-keepers were verysuccessful in some incidents on the borders with Serbia and Albania. They went right to the General Staff in Belgrade and said things could not go on that way. They took the maps issued by the General Staff and explained it was the territory which belonged to Macedonia. All right, the border is not regularly marked, so no one could swear whether it was a meter to the left or right. However, the incidents caused anxiety. They met with General Perisic in Belgrade and explained what further conflicts in the south would mean, with Kosovo so close. After this, there were no more conflicts at the border. Macedonia has firmly decided to enter the European Union when possible and to become a member of NATO.

VREME: Is the dispute between Greece and Macedonia anywhere close to a compromise solution and how far is Macedonia ready to go in the compromise?

GLIGOROV: The Greeks have the theory that Macedonia is, in fact, Greek while the Albanians have pretentions concerning the western part of Macedonia although the census conducted according to all European standards shows that ethnic Albanians are not a majority in Macedonia, as some people claim. Due to this situation, we simply must take care of our identity, language and history. This is something we must not neglect, because these are the bases of the independence of our state. The change of name would cause a big psychological and ethical problem among the population people would wonder what it is, who they are. We had a referendum a few years ago in which the people said they wanted an independent state. The prevailing opinion in Greece used to be that an independent Macedonia was a threat for Greece. They probably believed that Macedonia would have some pretentions concerning northern Greece and that a newBalkan dispute would arise. We proclaimed a totally different principle-- Macedonia as an independent state is possible only within the existing borders. Everything else would be an illusion and would When we were adopting the Constitution, we had to struggle against the nationalists in Macedonia's political public, who lost the elections andcould not implement their policies.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 15, 1996

Iso Rusi writes in the June 21, 1996 issue of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni about the current position of the Macedonian president Gligorov.

After the recent participation of the Macedonian president Gligorov at the annual conference of teachers, unbelievable stories started to circulate in public about his unorthodox behavior during his speech to the teachers. The Skopje weekly Delo wrote in one of the recent issues a short note, stating that instead of a brief speech, the teachers were treated to a monologue, or better said, mono drama, lasting two hours . The paper states that through tears, and short breaks due to Gligorov's crying, he opened his soul to the present public , that with tears in his eyes he was yearning for Yugoslavia and his deep fear for the destiny of our small Macedonia . According to the same source, Gligorov cried when he spoke about the assassination attempt on him, insisting that it originated from people within Macedonia.

This story of Delo is only one in a series of them, which insisted that Gligorov had similar outbreaks during the celebration of the Skopje drama theater (his happy behavior in the theater buffet) and during his visit to Croatia (during the laying of the reef at the grave site of the World War II victims), and even some others. The mentioned note remained without a comment, so some were inclined to attribute it to vivid imagination of people in a magazine which is not inclined to Gligorov.

But, ten days later, the daily Dnevnik published a letter by Lidija Ivanovska, the editor of the Macedonian programs on the Swedish radio.In it, she describes the meeting of Gligorov with the Macedonians during his recent visit to Sweden. the president gave the impression of tiredness, which is not strange due to his years and recent assassination attempt. The larger part of those present reacted with understanding to the emotional outbreak of Gligorov... . It seems though that Gligorov's tears in front of the expatriate Macedonians in Sweden were not the cause of her letter, but the reaction of a close associate of the president who requested that Ivanovska erases from her tape from the meeting, the part where the President is crying.

The crown of all these (un) confirmed reports is the story that recently Gligorov had a similar outburst at the meeting with the agricultural producers. He supposedly used this occasion to make public what he spoke with Slobodan Milosevic, and what with Ibrahim Rugova (it is unclear whether with this he confirmed the information that he has accepted the role of mediator between the two).And this is not all. Supposedly, they were not able to remove Gligorov from the microphone, so the hall was emptied, leaving him to speak to himself !

All this could also be put under the category of speculation. Since a lot of stories were circulating about Gligorov while he was recuperating. In the end, it came about that miracles are possible. Surviving an explosion of 25 kilograms of dynamite placed in a car a meter or two away from his unprotected vehicle is truly a miracle ! This even more so, taking into consideration that with his first appearances after the three and a half months of absence he denounced the rumors about his non-functioning .

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , June 21, 1996

The Pristina Albanian language weekly Koha brought in it's issue of June 19, 1996 two articles concerning the situation in Macedonia, by its editorial team and Iso Rusi from Skopje.

The beginning of June marked the continuance of the talks on the differences in regard to the name of Macedonia that turned unexpectedly into a series of events promising the smallest country of the Balkans the strong back in the field of security and defense. A week after signing of the agreement on the status of forces between Macedonia and the NATO member states, the Macedonian foreign minister participated in the ceremony following the agreement on the individual program, within the framework of Partnership for Peace.

Thus, Macedonia has practically gained the status of the privileged partnership with NATO, with the right to realize exclusive meetings with all of the 16 NATO member states, according to the model 16+1 . This step was evaluated by the Macedonian foreign minister Frckovski as the beginning of the second stage in relations with NATO. Frckovski stated that taking into account the geo-strategic position and the developments in the southeast parts of Europe, we believe that Macedonia and Albania can and must become priority members .

Thus, the Macedonian diplomacy promoted publicly the idea on the compatibility of interests of the two neighboring countries, however with the firm advantage of Albania. The advantage in relation to the NATO is Macedonia's main motive for the promotion of such regional approach (although the term regional arises unpleasant emotions in the Macedonian opinion relating this term to the problems with the EU). Besides this, it appears clear that Macedonia has understood the game that is being imposed because of the geographic facts of two countries, the form and the size of which, if analyzed separately, offers no possibility for (mass) manoeuvering of NATO forces, so it tends to utilize this for its own interests, to gain simultaneously the western sympathies which tends to encourage the cooperation between the mini-countries in the southern part of Europe. This goes particularly for Macedonia and Albania, which in almost every aspect has the advantage in regard to the integration in the European and North Atlantic courses.

As for Macedonia and its efforts for joining the NATO, an important event is the visit of the US Defense Secretary, William Perry, on June 12.This was Perry's third visit to Macedonia.The chairman of the Parliament convened a special meeting in which the US secretary of state addressed the representatives of the Macedonian electorate. This happened exactly in the period when Macedonia is hastily seeking for the military hug of NATO, as the best guarantee for the preservation of peace and stability, of what it is so proud of. This rush was undoubtedly motivated by the attitude of Russia towards the UN peacekeeping forces, the UNPREDEP.

The abstention of the Russian representative at the UN Security Council in regard to the extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP in Macedonia is a clear signal that Macedonia needs to hurry and find other forms for ensuring the western military presence on its territory, while it is militarily unable to confront any of its neighbors. Russia, in the context of the refusal of the idea for the NATO expansion, opposes the inclusion of Macedonia although it is clear that Russian arguments in regard to Macedonia (and Albania, in particular) are not that firm to determine the final result.

What appears interesting is the question what will happen if one day UNPREDEP is required to leave the country? This will surely happen one day. If for nothing else, then simply because of the fact that the deployment of this mission is costing the UN some USD 26 millions. Although something similar was to be expected, William Perry did not mention the fate of the peacekeepers whose mandate expires on November 30 , of this year. According to some rumors, UNPREDEP's fate will depend on the epilogue related to IFOR's mission in Bosnia. Although he gave no open promises, the US Secretary of Defense offered positive signals in regard to the US viewpoints towards Macedonia. Among others Perry stated to the Macedonian Parliament that I have came to Shkupi because the United States share a great wish to see your country a part of Marshall's Europe . As the best way of ensuring this, Perry recommended the Partnership for Peace and, if it can be judged by the first reactions in the opinion, it is almost sure that Macedonia will follow this message.

Source: Pristina weekly Koha , June 19, 1996

The event of the week in Macedonia is surely the visit of the US Secretary of Defense William Perry, his speech at the Macedonian Parliament and the meetings he had during his tour.

However, this is not as close to what is going on at the Macedonian diplomatic field. Undoubtedly, these visits got enormous coverage in all media and they were the motive for slightly euphoric announcements that
Macedonia is more or less at the doors of the European Union and that it is a matter of days when it will become a full member of NATO, through the realization of the idea on the southern wing . However, the main question that arises here is: Is it really so?

The individual program of Macedonia regarding the cooperation with NATO was announced instantly after the signing of the agreement on Partnership for Peace, on November 15, 1995. This document will be valid until 1998. During this interval, Macedonia is obliged in the military aspect, it is enabled the possibility for contacts and cooperation with any of the 16 members of the Alliance separately is accessible, there are activities planned through which Macedonia should adapt to the inter-operativity and the standardization demands of NATO.

Skopje weekly Puls states that the heaviest part of this job has already been concluded, emphasizing that there are mobile troops formed and ready to be instantly deployed all over the Macedonian territory; that its team work is completely ensured, because the standards demand a permanent formation that will regard the 80 per cent of the minimum. Its transporting means are already ensured, the land units are completely under arms. The complete lifting of arms embargo is also expected. According to the evaluations of the government, the completion of the technical military preconditions, is also a fulfilment of minimal standards. The inclusion of Macedonia in NATO as a member with full rights, however, remains the issue to be referred in the first decades of the next millennium. Not because of the geo-strategic and geo- political difficulties or the economic and democratic criteria of the Alliance - but also because of the inter operativity and the compatibility, frequently stressed by the other side. One cannot avoid noticing a simple example: the Macedonian soldier should at least understand English, in order to be able to understand the orders, or to compile documents according to NATO standards.

Perry's visit and Frckovski's and Handzinski's trip, together with the recent diplomatic activity of Macedonia, could be interpreted differently. The actual regime in Macedonia distributed for quite a time the information according to which the association of the Macedonia within the European Union and NATO is a matter of days and the formal agreement. The status of the EU member and the complete NATO membership were considered the deserved award to the new state that peacefully achieved to ensure its own independence, that during these five-six years succeeded to remain stable despite the raging war in the neighborhood, the blockade of borders and the sanctions from the south and west, followed by enormous difficulties and inter- ethnic tensions.

Intentionally or not, it is a picture that is being projected and saying that Europe is behind that door we should open and live happily ever after with the rest of our neighbors as a big family (Zoran Andonovski in Nova Makedonija ). After the May talks in Paris, the head of the Macedonian delegation, the ruling coalition MP, Nano Ruzin, stated very clearly that the wish of Macedonia could be realized at its best during the first decades of the next millennium. Thus, he denied a statement made by minister Frckovski, who, a few months ago, after the meeting of the twelve European ministers with the NATO representatives in Prague, announced with euphoria that the western military Alliance will realize the idea on the southern wing with the inclusion of Albania and Macedonia.

However, this does not prevent minister Frckovski to state to the journalists, after his meeting with Solana, that having in mind the geo-strategic position and the development of the southeastern parts of Europe, we believe that Macedonia and Albania should become priority candidates for expanding the NATO in order to enforce peace and stability in this fragile region. The diplomatic activity of the Macedonian ruling staff during the past six months is quite impressive. Simply, there is not a single day that could pass without someone from the Crvenkovski cabinet leaving for some official visit somewhere. Even the diplomatic activity of president Gligorov is very vivid, particularly after his return to the daily duties. In any of these, there was a wish of the regime stressed for presenting these activities as the acceptance of the Macedonian state and his good behavior that itself, parallel with the accentuation of the danger that if we do not enter Europe and NATO, Macedonia could become the center of the Balkans turmoil , serves to open the doors of the West for its association. There is an impression that the actual regime insists on this by capitalizing its foreign merits . It is not to be contested that from the complete blockade - the international refusal of the recognition and its present international status - Macedonia progressed a long way. However, the use of the foreign policy can today be interpreted as drawing of the population's attention from the internal problems in the country.

Source: Pristina weekly Koha , June 19, 1996

MEDIA -
THE FERAL TRIBUNE TRIAL

This trial, initiated only ten days after the mini-reform of the penal code concerning the media came into effect, showed in its beginning that the regime overplayed its hand by persecuting Feral people. After the first round of the case, based on the prosecution claim that the paper offended and slandered the President of the Republic, judge Mrcela diplomatically suspended the proceedings, due to taking of witness statements , adjourning the case until September 25.Until then, two things will happen: Zagreb elections will be held, and as those informed say, promotion of judge Mrcela to a county court post.
Until, then, possibly, the dust will settle. Since, the first time after the regime put its paws at rare independent media, the public had enough - proof is the protest meeting in support of Feral , held in Zagreb on June 13. Also , the next day, the courtroom was full .

If for nothing else, the courtroom scene was worth seeing for the surprise on the faces of the district attorney and her deputy, when the editor of Feral Viktor Ivancic asked: I don't understand, my lawyers told me that defamation is putting forward untruthful claims. What is not truthful here? . Ivancic was addressing the claims of the prosecution that he proclaimed president Tudjman declared follower of former Spanish dictator Franco and follower of fascist-communist regime . Than he proceeded to cite quotes from Tudjman's public addresses and writings in which he directly lauds Franco, his regime and policies, particularly concerning his concepts of reconciliation, which Tudjman is attempting to apply towards the victims of world War II, particularly the ones of the largest concentration camp in Croatia - Jasenovac. Ivancic concluded by asking: Why doesn't the district attorney rise an indictment against citizen Franjo Tudjman, since he, with his acts is damaging the institution of the president of the Republic of Croatia?

Journalist Marinko Culic had a similar line of explanations, pointing to the public acts of both president Tudjman, his state and party officials sand party policy, which all publicly have supported the ideas of Ustashi's (Croatian WW II I fascists), like the official fascist greeting (raised straight right hand) used by the defense minister Gojko Susak at the annual Alka contest.

After their statements, the court decided to hear statements form another editor of Feral , Boris Dezulovic, as well as two graphic editors, but did not decide upon the requests of the defense to hear the statements of the damaged party president Tudjman, a number of other witnesses, including foreign and defense ministers Mate Granic and Gojko Susak, as well as a number of other legal and procedural matters.

In brief - the trial could be described as a political seminar, which is the only possible answer to a political indictment and the newly composed article 133. of the Penal code. Or, as one learned observer said, the trial is parallel to the festival Days of Satire , where the real satire is not in the theater but in the courtroom.

And, the result of the trial will be an exact indicator about the direction in which Croatia is going - back in the twilight zone of fear and verbal delict, or there where it verbally already is !

Source: Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin , June 21, 1996

CROATIA

Franjo Tudjman, entering the negotiations with the Croatian social-liberals, new exactly what he wants and what price he is ready to pay,. According to the leader of the Liberals, Vlado Gotovac, immediately at the beginning of their first of the three meetings, Tudjman told him that he needs the coalition with the Liberals because of the international reputation this party has, so that he would be able to pierce the international blockade that would open the door for Croatia of the Council of Europe and other international institutions. To buy this reputation, Tudjman was obviously ready to let the Liberals have part of executive power - a few of the important posts in the government, a few less in the ministries, diplomacy and state companies. The impression of Gotovac was that all the time Tudjman remained completely convinced that the policy he is creating and which he is leading is completely correct and that it is not the cause of the blockade and international pressure.

The Liberals themselves put country-loving reasons up front: they would be ready to accept the coalition so that they would pull Croatia from its current international position which is pushing it into oblivion and at the same time attempt to change and democratize from within the character of Tudjman and HDZ rule. But, in direct contacts, neither Vlado Gotovac told Tudjman in the eye that one of the basic conditions for the formation of the coalition would have to be the turn in the current Croatian state politics, and this because, he says, he knew that Tudjman would immediately give up on further negotiations.

If they themselves did not dare tell Tudjman that at least in some segments he has to change his policies, then it was even more puzzling, even irritating and tragicomic to look at the surprise and shock the leadership of HSLS suffered when they heard and saw the reactions and strong criticism from the part of the opposition and public that is critical towards HDZ, but within the ranks of the party itself. The culmination of everything that has happened to the Liberals occurred at the session of the Great council of the HSLS.

In a very tense atmosphere, there were obvious conflicts concerning taking a decision whether the negotiations with the HDZ will continue. Gotovac stated that the accusations coming his way were motivated ny moral reasons, and not political or other.
During the discussion, the statements of the opponents of the negotiations that since Gotovac took over the leadership of the party, it has been building an image as the strongest critic and most democratic alternative to the ruling HDZ and that sudden departure from an oppositionary coalition and entering of the negotiations with the HDZ is in essence immoral.

After the supporters of the negotiations and coalition with HDZ, lead by former party president Drazen Budisa, remained a minority at this session, loosing their party positions, rumors became abound that Budisa and his supporters will probably leave HSLS and join HDZ, or acting for some time a strong faction within the party, leave it at one point and form a new one. Gotovac thinks that they will not move into HDZ, but that time will tell.

It seems that the orientation of Budisa to set full sails towards cooperation with HDZ, influenced to a good measure the weakening of his party positions, and loss of the presidency of the party. The decision that Vlado Gotovac will be the presidential candidate at next elections, also indicated that there were other things rolling inside the party.

Budisa has obviously, so far, lost the battle, and it is highly improbable that he will recover soon politically from this defeat.But, Gotovac has lost somewhat too. The definitive break with the Budisa group uncovered a division within the party, which will inevitably reflect on the electoral body. Gotovac found himself in the supporting role, ready to turn his back to his oppositionary partners, without whose support he cannot win against Tudjman in the presidential race, which will inevitably have the influence on their future relationship towards him.

On the surface, Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ did not win or lose anything. The fact though that they were ready to enter the coalition with the Liberals uncovers that they are conscious themselves that they have entered a blind alley which they cannot leave without help from the outside. At least not without changing considerably their current policies.

The Presidential quarters will have to decide for the changes that will satisfy the international demands and pressures, and in that manner exit the blockade in which they find themselves in, or the will, except smaller or greater bunch of ministerial and other chairs, and considerable political concessions, endear another of influential oppositionary parties to finally accept coalition with them.

Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune , June 17, 1996

SERBIA

The joint meeting of the top of the Socialist party of Serbia and Joint Yugoslav Left caused considerable interest of the public. Even though it was publicly states that the discussion covered (and a conclusion reached) about possible cooperation of the two similar parties, the political circles mostly speculated whether the decision on their (pre) electoral coalition was reached. The only concrete and visible result of the discussion was the reconstruction of the Serbian government that ensued, which more than anything showed the real relation of forces on the so called Serbian political left.

The essence of the changes in the cabinet of the prime minister Marjanovic was not in making his cabinet more efficient, since it has, according to its key political sponsor, Slobodan Milosevic , won best epithets, even though the situation in Serbia has radically worsened. With the semblance of change of some ministers, like that of Djonovic (agriculture) and Radic (social policy) an attempt is being made to dampen the sense of incapability of this government and party in power to solve any remotely serious problem.The reconstruction of the cabinet was a public theater, from which only JUL party profited. The party (or the movement) which does not have a single member of parliament, nor any form of success in the elections, has practically taken over the government in its hands, since the greater part of it are active members or those with so called dual membership, or open nonparty sympathizers (minister of information). Whether this is fall of the SPS under the influence of JUL, or a family agreement within the presidential residence, is in essence less important, as is the fact that the process of restructuring of the Serbian political scene which has no connection with proclaimed multi parti parliamentarism and true democracy is continuing at a speedier rate.

Two facts are currently undisputable: the socialists are, after a series of dramatic and unsuccessful years of rule, in their probably toughest crisis. At the same time, at one point minor communists, gathered around the Army party SK-PJ, have been waiting for years to grab a chance, and it seems it has come. The switch to peacemaking politics has only deepened the conflict within the SPS, os the people that said that without Milosevic the socialist party would tumble like a house of cards are quite correct. What has kept it in power is the powerful state, judicial, repressive and propaganda organism which was and remains in the hands of one person.

Inauguration of dr. Mira Markovic as the ideologue of the JUL at the time when Milosevic was switching to the peace track, and renewed gathering of the disgruntled communists that have brought him to power, has marked the beginning of a different strategy, the JUL sucking in of the SPS and key state functions. All that will happen at the top of the SPS was first announced within the ranks of JUL. The party without formal power was becoming more and more powerful. Infiltrating within state and financial centers, JUL has been gaining space for stronger and stronger influence. Distancing itself from the nationalist policy of the SPS at the time, it made the socialists conflict within themselves, so that at some point in time, all those that Mira Markovic thought were and obstacle to the JUL strategy of forcing political and social demagoguery were removed.

Today, SPS and JUL are typical protagonists of egalitarianism, meaning collectivism and social demagoguery, which has as a goal to the conservation of old relations and guarding of full control over the property and financial flow, as the basic foundation of power. At the same time, Milosevic need JUL as a political cover for the new course, since his socialists are becoming ever weaker base. To his wife the socialists are necessary since they hold the other levers of power.All this together, in a synchronized and harmonized connection, is a guarantee enough to eliminate any kind of danger from the breakthrough of some other, democratic civic options. With the tactics of satanization and marginalization of the opposition as incorrigible android right and propagandistic brainwashing of the population by creating virtual image about the state in Serbia, an impression is being created in public that this state, actually, has no alternative except the option of enlightened socialism., ruled uncontestedly by one or few families.Both SPS and JUL are parties without true ideological identity, but also political centers ruled by the arguments of power, influence and money.

Source: Belgrade daily Nasa Borba , May 31, 1996
(through its daily e-mail service)

THE FRY CITIZENSHIP LAW

The draft of the new law on citizenship which is at the end of the long waiting list and revision, envisages a new category of acceptance into citizenship for the refugees. At the first glance, it would seem that the conditions for acceptance have bee relatively eased. But, in the Draft there is a political catch which reflects the essence of the relation towards the solution of the refugee question.All is according to the need. The institution which takes the decision, in this case the ministry of internal affairs, can refuse the acceptance if it is the question of interests of public order and security of the country. So, there are no additional conditions, but there is a broad provision which can be interpreted in a lot of ways. Even if this does not have to be the case in practice, it is an unimaginable situation that the responsible official can tell the refugee that he does not fulfill the conditions for acceptance in citizenship, since this is not in accordance with the security of the country.

About the possible misuses of the category of interest of the country it is illustrative to mention the categories of refugees which are considered to have the right to be accepted into the citizenship due to national and state interests , as it is written in the Explanation of the draft, the refugees from Republika Srpska and REpublika Srpska Krajina should return to the places where they previously lived, and they do not fulfill the conditions for acceptance into the citizenship. Since this was put in the explanation, a lot of things have changed, so it will be quite interesting to see what will end up to be state and national interests.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor , May 31, 1996

Chief commentator of the Belgrade weekly Vreme , Stojan Cerovic analyzes the relations between Belgrade and Pale in the June 1, 1996, issue of that magazine.

The operation to remove Radovan Karadzic is underway. He was quiet after Dayton and was perhaps on the way to being forgotten or at least until the very end. Then he suddenly ran towards his fate. He drew attention to himself by dismissing Prime Minister Kasagic who had gotten too close to Carl Bildt threatening to meet some of Milosevic's promises and bring the international community to the point of demanding Karadzic's disappearance. Since the problem is considered too delicate for US and NATO troops, everyone turned to Milosevic who is hesitating, but no one believes that the issue is delicate for him also. He has proved many times that the more complex and sensitive the problem the more he is prone to use force. Also, the international community is inept and not conversant with local technology and keeps telling Milosevic that he is the best person to get rid of Karadzic since he put him where he is now. They keep reminding him that he promised to do that in Dayton.

The fact that Karadzic, as soon as he ousted Kasagic, said he was withdrawing doesn't seem to be enough. Everyone saw him and rumors that he is still firmly in control is spreading far and wide. It seemed, before everything happened, that he might remain RS president formally up to the elections and now everyone is demanding he step down.
Bildt is complaining that Karadzic is spoiling his operations aimed at bringing Bosnia back to a civilian state and organizing the elections, but more importantly Karadzic is a thorn in Clinton's side prior to the US presidential elections. Milosevic is expected to contribute to Clinton's election victory by creating even a semblance of stabilization in Bosnia.

The word semblance is important at this point. The fact that Belgrade and Pale are offering and promising that no one will ever hear of Karadzic again shows that everyone understands the rules of the game. Will Karadzic be forced to resign or not isn't clear right now and it's not important. He will certainly seem to disappear and what he'll get out of that situation is known to anyone who heard anything about Biljana Plavsic. It seems the whole problem is Bildt's fault because he's the only one dealing with something real and running up against obstacles. If he hadn't persistently tried to get the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate through Kasagic, Karadzic would not have been forced to show up and spoil the semblance of a good situation. So now Belgrade, Pale and Washington have to set up a new semblance and someone might tell Bildt that he shouldn't take his job so seriously.

Some people say this is a time of virtual reality and he should adopt that view of Bosnia. The problem is that in virtual reality, in a world of semblance, the same rules apply as in the old, real world. Symbolic success is achieved in the same way and with the same difficulty as in the real world and failure takes the same toll. So new diplomatic efforts are needed because Milosevic will now ask for a semblance of support from the world to get rid of Karadzic.

The whole operation, whose outcome will become known soon, is not easy or painless for both Karadzic and Milosevic. No one knows better than they do how wrong it is for the world to think they are so different; viewing one as a war criminal and the other as a factor of peace and stability. Their dialogue, direct or through intermediaries, has to be devoid of anything human under the influence of that fake difference made in the outside world. Because of that Milosevic will have to pretend he has the right to demand Karadzic's withdrawal and Karadzic has to obey.

Luckily, they know each other well and they've had ample opportunity to find out what they can expect from each other. The fact that they are in a humiliating situation is natural to them and deserved many times over, but in this case Bosnia and the Dayton agreement, the great powers, America and Europe seem silly and defeated.

I'm beginning to understand some of the reasons why some cautiousWestern strategists opposed interference in the war from the start. This isn't about us, nor the fact that we deserve no foreign intervention and arbitration. On the contrary. The problem is that the West has gone too far in one direction to be able to deal with this case.

They had and still have huge difficulty in understanding what's happening, creating a feeling for the situation and accepting this war as real. To achieve that, to really be able to believe reports from Bosnia, they would have to disassemble their entire portrayal of the world and themselves. They haven't gone far enough in that despite TV, the pressand all possible evidence that this outburst of violence can be solved realistically. This case remains slightly impossible for them, illogical and unpredictable in the narrow, fictitious repertoire of human behavior they live within peaceful well-ordered countries. Because of that, reactions by diplomats and politicians were inappropriate and slow from the start. Even when they sent troops in it was because they secured a cease-fire on condition that all violence should stop. It's important to show an image of force and more important not to use it, i.e. not to let it spill over into reality. The West has to persistently try to act indirectly and symbolically through pressure, sanctions, promises which had some effect but some things had to be done for real.

If war criminals can't be expected to run to the Hague, if NATO can't be expected to arrest Karadzic and Mladic, then there's no other solution than to ask Milosevic to deal with the problem. In return, he will inevitably become the only, irreplaceable partner on the Serb side just as Tudjman did for the Croats. So to solve the war crisis they created, to restore an order that does not offend Western tastes, democratic countries will help keep their Families in power in Belgrade and Zagreb. In other words: democratic countries are asking tyrants to produce a democratic result.

Moreover, at least in the case of Karadzic, this is a man who would most probably win the Bosnian Serb elections and democratic countries are forced to limit the democratic choice to secure a democratic result.

That paradox is true for all of Bosnia. Truly democratic forces can't win power democratically and the freer the elections the less hope for peace in Bosnia. If there is no readiness to postpone the elections until the people get their breath back, the best thing would be for IFOR troops to count the ballots with a nicely planned outcome just like after the previous war.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , June 1, 1996

The editor of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , Mile Isakov, looks at the position taken towards war crimes in former Yugoslavia by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the May 31, 1996, issue of that magazine.

Isakov reminds the readers about the statement of the assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which insisted that the trials in the Hague are in essence trials against whole nation . Being aware of the high level of education of the church high officials, it is quite clear that such wise thinking cannot be a chance product of stupidity, but that it is a matter of serious illness, which, like chicken blindness spreads from the Holy Sinod throughout the trop of the Serbian Orthodox Church. There is not a single word of condemnation for the crimes and the perpetrators, on the contrary, the whole nation is identified with them. Not a word of forgiveness for the sins of others and confession of one's own. Not a word of condemnation of murder, rape, pillaging of all that have done it, including your own, which have breached god's laws with it. Instead of all this, only shockingly inept attempt to cover up crimes committed by individual Serbs under unspoken and even publicly stated blessing of the Church leadership, through the guise of unquestionable innocence of the nation, which, not only in our case, is always understood and there is no need to particularly prove it.So, in the desire to cover this up, they actually uncover their complicity in the preparation and execution of the crime. So that there is no confusion, it is the matter of the Church leadership, since accusing the Church as the whole would be equally dishonorable, as is covering of the nationalistic blindness of the Church leadership with the purity of the majority of the Orthodox believers and Church members and priests, for whom this Balkan butchery is only an unfortunate war and trial of Serb criminals in that war planetary injustice and shame.

In that manner, the Holy Sinod and SOC bishops are again calling for the disrespect of earthly laws, from which obviously stems the choice of heavenly kingdom, and it is known where that leads to. Part of the people, which accepted the Sinod statements and Academy memorandums word for word and started really believing that we are really closer and dearer to God than other nations and religions, has been in that manner pushed to war, and all of us have paid jointly the misconceptions about the heavenly nation.

Of course, personally i do not support Milosevic's soulless and inhuman kingdom, but even as it is, it seems more realistic for daily life. The second part of the Church statement, again politics,this time internal, but still only vulgar politics. Again, blindness, because the Church leaders are only bothered by the fact that communists enriched themselves, and are still getting rich on the people's suffering, but not because the same is happening for those that went to war to pillage, steal and what not, crossing themselves with their hands and feet, calling upon God, king and the country.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , May 31, 1996

Belgrade university professor and the leader of the National Peasant Party, Dragan Veselinov comments through the AIM agency in the May 31, 1996 issue of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni on the current stage of the politics of Serbian president Milosevic.

Up until recently a good analyst could even predict individual steps of Milosevic's destructive politics. Now it will become much harder, since with chaotic times the political logic disappears, even if it is negative.Until now, the presidents fall in the pit was under the rules of the populistic retaining of power and war nationalism. At the end of that road is the dictatorship of a manic leader, where decisions are taken capriciously, as a result of his current feelings. The court becomes a madhouse. All appearances are de-masked, and it is not known anymore who will get hit. systematic destruction of national property and neurotization of families, has pushed the president to construct enormous police force, believing that it is his secure praetorian guard. If he believed in the social development and the reform of society, he would be glorified today. But not only him, the nationalists too, thought that after the war of sacrifice progress will come. They said - first of all greater Serbia, then progress. The greater the sacrifice, the greater the step. Milosevic became the proof of their blunder, while they still think that they have been technically treasoned and that their idea did not fall apart because it is anti-democratic, anti-economic and uncultural.

The opposition is tricking itself with supposed innocence. It still thinks that Milosevic is a traitor, and does not see its own character. The president and his entourage are entering the heaviest for of rule for any power holder and primitive oligarchy: they are entering dictatorship without ideology, money or international support. Milosevic is entering into direct and uncovered opposition of wishes of the majority of the population, at the price of civil war and terror. His unmasked rule has already begun. With the military defeat of the Serbian nationalism, the regime lost the ideology with which it excused the lack of reform. Nationalism is not the key ideology in Serbia anymore. Its temperature is falling. The Serbs are openly confronted with large unemployment, they even think about a large interest rate - and are already openly mocking their territorial conquests. They are becoming contemporary people, at least in some respects. Open space now stands in front of the regime and the population, and the regime without any ideology and progressive developmental goal has to descend to the level of police rule. It becomes like a red leach on the arteria of the nation. Nothing is to come in the form of international financial support. The regime itself does not want it. The domestic hard currency has been unlawfully placed on private accounts abroad.The Milosevic group is afraid of development, it got used living on crime. It cannot change, it can only be replaced. The resistance to reforms by this group is not tactical diplomatic prolongation that will last until the Americans grant us the gift of political continuity with the former SFRY state, but is the negation of progress caused by the natural urge of the criminal gang to survive.

Serbia is not cooperating with the Hague court, internally it is proclaiming retroactive and destructive laws, externally it is wishing for the support of degenerative regimes in North Korea, China, Iraq, and hopes that Stalinist Zyganov will win in Russia, Nobody in Europe and America believes the Belgrade regime. So, the regime has nowhere to go. Outside, isolation, inside, poverty and mistrust, fear on the court - all conditions for assassinations and personal and state terror have accumulated. There is no illusion it will not come to this. There could easily come about individual eliminations of the dangerous oppositionaries, internal conflicts among the power holders and revenge terrorism of the opposition.

With the terror and conflicts president Milosevic can count upon only a few months of advantage. The Army will disown him immediately, it hates and distrusts him. The police of hundred thousand people is uncertain. The only force that will sincerely step on his side is the not so numerous hard core in the special police forces. And the secret police. Nobody in Serbia has any more nerves for another hyperinflation. Even if it does not come to it, the regime has already dug its grave. Individual fates will only interest biographers.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , May 31, 1996

Belgrade professor and regular commentator of the Podgorica weekly Monitor , Slobodan Inic, comments in the June 21, 1996 issue of the magazine on the recent changes in the Federal electoral law in FRY.

The doubts, expressed recently , and spread quite extensively, that Slobodan Milosevic and his socialists will not relinquish power if they lose the forthcoming elections, no matter how much they stem from good knowledge of the demonic nature of the postcommunist regime in Serbia and power - holding ambitions of its first man, could only add to the creation of wide apathy, disillusionment and throwing of the spear in thorns , in the larger part of the opposition, which, of course, is not good for it, or for the whole electoral body.

It is certain that there are many proofs that Milosevic and his socialists are ready to reach for this, the last resource in protection of their power, or, better said, themselves personally. Whoever left the power in Serbia, even though these departures were rare and illegal, left with all of their, even personal shame, and even if this was not always the case, his successors made sure it was.

The phenomenon that all the Serbs are members of one party if somebody is to be brought down from power, even though up until that moment they were his biggest followers, is being replaced by an even more curious one that they are against the one which they have crowned and glorified until recently as their new and undivided idol.

The manner in which Milosevic has been winning the elections so far is only confirming the impression that he will not give up the reigns of power if he looses the elections. It does not mean that the Serbian opposition has been loosing the elections so far only because Milosevic has been preventing it to fight with two hands. Lets be fair: if anybody brought itself into a downgraded position, then it was the opposition itself, believing that it can win the elections against Milosevic in his manner.

The imperfection of the multi-party system in Serbia has its origin in the consciousness of a group of political personalities, headed by Milosevic that in democratic elections they have to ensure in advance that they will win them, even more so if they lose them.

Insurance that the elections will not be lost, as well as if they by chance are lost the power is not given away, decisively characterizes Milosevic's period of rule. Still. the fact remains that he has to thank less to this for winning all the elections so far, than to the mood of the electoral body which in his name saw the freedom for itself and its political and national strivings.

The opposition has added much to this. It has consciously or unconsciously supported all his nationalistic goals and actions. So, even when voting against Milosevic, the oppositionary voters, followed him.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor , June 21, 1996

One of the regular commentators of the Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin , Bozo Matic, comments on the current political events in Croatia in the June 7, 1996 issue of the magazine.

While poor pensioners watched as thousand of kuna's(Croatian currency) are flying up in smoke, Tudjman was celebrating his state day , with his people, in his palace, in the manner of Arab sheiks. All in all, everything looked happy, smiling and idyllic. It had to, since we live in a country where there are no poor, hungry, unemployed, or deprived.

Who does not believe me, could get confirmation on the TV. Across the screen went the images of the happy people of the Croatian capital, whose only dilemma was whether they will have dinner for the Statehood day , or will they skip it, due to the gaping hole in their wallet. They had enough of games, now they would like some bread. The TV journalist though, had a stinging comment against the former regime, which for fifty years took away from Zagreb, without giving anything in return.

But, the ambitious TV being did not, of course, answer how many apartments were allocated to workers in the last six years, how many were built or similar. The answer is, of course, none. The apartments are not built anymore for those that live from their work or their salary. She did not state either how to get a loan for an affordable apartment. That is because there are no loans for those that do not have a bank deposit of few thousand DEM. She did not say either that from month to month the number of unemployed in the capital is rising. This, of course, would be due to the transition process, and not because of skimming, robbery and other financial manipulations. She did not mention either how many young schooled people left, since this is hard to establish . This and other similar data does not rise optimism. Nor did she mention that many of the key buildings and centers in Zagreb were built during the previous regime, and that the current one is showing no intention of concluding the unfinished ones, like the Zagreb university hospital. She did not mention the destroyed production capacities, disfunctioning agriculture, transformation of factories into storages and similar. This is mentioned only by those who hate Croatia.

That this is not mentioned by an aspiring journalist could be partly understood, but that one of the heads of the oppositionary Social democrats, dr Zdravko Tomac, did not mention it, marking the Statehood day in the Zagreb city hall is not understandable and is unacceptable. As if a future president, he did not want to criticize current regime too much. In this manner, the opposition has lost another chance to speak openly to the public, which, stubbornly, still expects it to do this. The opposition got so frightened, that even the radical minister of defense Gojko Susak said that he expected it to be in a much more polemic mood . During the visit of the oppositionary leaders to president Tudjman, there was no polemics because Tudjman does not know how to do that, and the opposition does not dare. If the regional Istrian IDS party did not exist, somebody might come to the conclusion that everything is one great HDZ party.

The stubborn ignoring of the mood of the public by the opposition indicates the essence of the problem. The opposition does not care about the public, but only about itself. Their fear that Tudjman might prohibit them is even stronger than their will for power.

Source: Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin , June 7, 1996

The same theme is explored by Zagreb professor Slavko Goldstein in his commentary in the June 3, 1996, issue of the Split weekly Feral Tribune .

At the two-day session of the Presidential Council held on May 25 and 26, 1996, the Croatian political opposition has thoroughly shown its face. President Tudjman and his ten aides have consistently tricked the Presidential council and the general public that some unnamed European powers are plotting against Croatia, that they are preventing its entrance into the Council of Europe, and that they are - instead into European - pushing Croatia by force into some euroslav, neo-Yugoslav or neo-Balkan integrations. None of the ten present oppositionary politicians did not in a real manner denounce such misplaced insinuations, which are compromising Crotian politics, antagonize it with Europe and put it further away from it. Nobody stated the very simple truth that the Croatian acceptance was blocked for only one reason: because president Tudjman broke some of the key obligations , he undertook along with the president of the Parliament Pavletic during their last visit to the Council in the form of 21 points.

To cover up the personal responsibility of the president Tudjman for a heavy foreign policy defeat of Croatia, the Presidential council in the enlarged form was called. In all opening statements the truth was thoroughly evaded, and the European institutions and leading European states were accused of falsely putting blame on Croatia, and that for the refusal of Croatia they have some dark, background reasons, which they are hiding like snake hides its feet. They are constantly preparing some conspiracies against Croatia, so they are pushing as away from Europe, somewhere back into Yugoslavia, anywhere towards the East, far away from itself and the West.

The oppositionary politicians have listened for two days off this rubbish, they did not even attempt to dispute it, but have attempted to distance themselves in mild metaphors. As a protest this was obviously not enough, sot that with its passive stance the Croatian opposition helped president Tudjman and his aides to at least lessen the responsibility, transferring it to the whole Croatian political scene.

There is no state policy today, nor a serious political power in the world which would aim to reconstruct the former Yugoslav state union in any form. Even those that are still yearning for Yugoslavia, have already, by the end of 1991, after Vukovar and Dubrovnik, realistically understood that there is no more Yugoslavia, and that it is not possible anymore, so they have collectively recognized Croatia. Why would they now be against its Europeization, or its existence, which they have helped come about ?

The smoke screen about some pushing of Croatia outside of Europe, into the Balkans and into some Yugoslavia, is only essential to the current Croatian political leadership, for at least two reasons: first, to cover up their own mistakes, and second, to suggest to its public that some new dangers are appearing for Croatia, for which it still needs a firm hand of the great leader and his authoritarian power, and not some political pluralism and democracy.

The dangers for Croatia really still exist, but they mostly come from its political top. If he did have some advantages as the war head of state, president Tudjman is showing himself as totally incapable to lead the state in its peaceful development of democracy, legal order and market economy. Encouraged by supposed one mindedness of the enlarged Presidential council, he immediately announced that he will not sign anymore any obligations . He showed even greater arrogance a few days later, when he gave an unmeasured negative response to some ten European and American ambassadors, which with good intentions wanted to suggest him how to formulate a more balanced law on amnesty which would facilitate peaceful reintegration of Croatian Danube region (Eastern Slavonia). Into what kind of stubborn rebellion against Europe and the whole democratic world is president Tudjman leading us ? Into what kind of adventuristic self isolation of Croatia ?

None of the oppositionary politicians did not stand up to say that all European states signed exactly the same obligations and that this did not damage their dignity. Spain brought around 300 new or revised laws and in that manner signed 300 obligations, so that it would be accepted into the European Union as the highest level of European integration, And with it did not loose anything of its dignity, but it did advance is democracy, its economy and stability.

Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune , June 3, 1996

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