BALKAN_MEDIA_&_POLICY_MONITOR

Issue Number 48 Vol. 3 April 28, 1997


IN THIS ISSUE::

Bosnia:
  • "Dani", "Svijet" (two articles) and "Republika" on the possible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    Croatia:

  • "AIM"("Monitor"),"Arkzin", "Svijet" and "Feral Tribune" analyze the outcome of the Croatian elections:

    Montenegro:

  • "Vreme" , "Monitor", and AIM ("Nezvisna Svetlost") on the clash in the Montenegrin political top and consequences on Milosevic's policies;

    Kosovo:

  • "Vreme" on the current political events in that region;

    Serbia:

  • "Vreme" and "Nasa Borba" on the forthcoming elections in Serbia:

  • "Vreme" (two articles) on the recent police and intelligence scandals;


    THE DIVISION OF BOSNIA ?
    Sarajevo monthly ñDaniî considered as the main theme of its April 1997 issue the recurring discussions on the divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this time coming from the Muslim political circles in Sarajevo. This theme is discussed by three authors: Semad Pecanin, Ozren Kebo and Nerzuk Curan.

    The Bosnian political top is thinking more and more seriously about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts. With the blessing of Alija Izetbegovic, a few months ago a multidisciplinary team of trusted people has begun work a few months ago, with the task to analyze as many s possible conditions which would occur with the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    The projects goal is creation of a ethnic Bosniak state on the part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the internationally recognized borders. The goal of its creation is a prosperous survival and regeneration of the Bosniak nation.

    Assessed as the most important question is the size of the territory this state would encompass. Considered as an optimal solution in the given international circumstances is a state that would cover at least the double area of the territory which is now under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although it was not made public so far what is the area of the territory of the Federation under the control of the Bosniaks, it is known that it does not exceed 27 percent. In that context, the area up to 60 percent of the territory of the current Bosnia and Herzegovina as the territory of the new Bosniak state as the most favorable variant is considered as very satisfactory.

    As far s the quality of territories is considered ( a term first used by Radovan Karadzic in 1991), the Bosniak authority starts from the position of the importance for the future territory of Bihac, Mostar and Neum.

    Bihac is least contentious, not only because it is under Bosniak control. The potential of the militarily strongest corps of the Bosniak army and political monolithism of the largest part of the Krajina people are the decisive argument for Bihac as one of the essential points of the new state.

    Through territorial exchange with the Serbian and Croat side, that is through charging a price for the territorial dowry which the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are taking to Serbia and Croatia, Bihac would, through Mrkonjic Grad and Jajce, but also Banja Luka and Skender Vakuf, have a strong and wide territorial connection with Sarajevo.

    The most contestable point of the whole project is Mostar. Even the best prognosticator, would play all three signs under Bijeli Brijeg, and here is why.

    Mostar is of key importance for TudjmanÍs policy strategy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and it is in no way coincidental that Croatian president, even with all the pressure and problems created for him by the international community is persisting on this city. The practical image of the current imperial Croatian state policy is the project of the modern highway.

    In the line: ñBihac, Mostar, Neumî, the only exit of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the sea does not represent the last city by its importance, but is definitely in the last place in realistic possibilities to find itself within the structure of the new state. It is there as a method of pressure in compromises in the negotiations with Croats that will be compulsory.

    Serbian side is entering into the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the weakest starting point. It will pay a much higher price for the annexation of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In short, the reasons lie in the economic and military exhaustion, which pushes it to much quicker, and than lesser and worse solutions, as well as in the international isolation, created by Milosevic regime itself. So, Serbian side loses all the areas in Bosnian Krajina and Posavina which it got through Dayton agreement. The exception is Brcko, which remains under Serbian control, with international obligations for free access to the port for the Bosnian and Croatian state. The only qualitative positive point in relation to Dayton maps, Serbian side gets in Gorazde. With this, it brings into Serbia compact territories in Eastern Herzegovina, Semberia and Posavina.

    For the part of Mostar that he does not control now, Tudjman is ready to offer to Bosnians Banja Luka, which he does not control now ! In the case of deadlocked negotiation positions, the Croatian side will, through the arguments of military advantage and better relations, threaten the Serbs with the takeover of Banja Luka and the whole region surrounding it.

    The irresistible attraction of the division for its supporters among Bosniaks lies in the fact that after it the Bosniaks would control t least double of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina than it does today, when the country is formally integral. In relation to Dayton, the only certain loss would be Gorazde.

    But, it would be compensated in Krajina, which would, along with the rest of the Bosniak Dayton territory, form a compact whole. But here too, the key is in Mostar. If the southern border of the Bosniak state will be in Jablanica, that is, if the loss of Mostar is accepted and the tactical negotiation pressure on Neum, there is a possibility of a deal where the northern border with Croatia would be river Sava. So, Mostar, and conditionally Neum, for Bosanski Brod, Modrica, Odzak and Bosanski Samac.

    On the internal political scene Izetbegovic needs the most support of Haris Silajdzic. According to reliable information, Silajdzic has returned under full wing of Izetbegovic after the unsuccessful oppositional flight.

    Those in the know insist that a scenario has already been made according to which the Bosniak will be given the tragic news that the things have finally boiled over, that is, that the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina has fallen into the state of clinical death.

    According to that scenario, dead serious Alija Izetbegovic would address the Bosniak folk through the TV, explaining that, with a heavy heart, the suffering Bosniak people has decided to cut the dilemma. The decision is the heaviest one, and that is, the one about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Explaining in an argumentative manner that Bosniaks cannot guard the unity of the state by themselves, when it is quite obvious that the Serbs and Croats do not want that, and the international community is not sanctioning their actions. Izetbegovic very precisely recounts all the sacrifices of the Bosniak people suffered in the defence of the unity of the state. After that, he explains what he did personally fighting for the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    In the end, s one of the key arguments, Izetbegovic pulls out Silajdzic, who is standing besides him, showing to the folk that Haris too has comprehended the futility of further efforts, and that full understanding has been reached between them about the hardest decision. In the end, he democratically offers their places to other Bosniaks, if there are those among them who think that they can keep all that Alija and Haris couldnÍt.

    According to some, remaining today in the Bosnian executive structures only two such persons remain. The name of the second is Fadil Banjanovic Bracika, and that of the first is Safet Orucevic Safa. Both are rushing on the windmills. If the division would ensue, both of them would remain without the things they defended so hard during the recent years. Just a while ago, BanjanovicÍs Bureau for the return of the exiled has been closed. Mostar is OrucevicÍs life work, and it would be hardest for him to give up on himself because of a political turn in the Bosniak top.

    The goal of IzetbegovicÍs trip too Saudi Arabia and the US was to clear up the stance of Saudi Arabia as one of the most important, and the US as the most important allies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to establish what kind, and how big support can Izetbegovic count upon. But, the meetings on the highest levels only muddled the picture further, and Izetbegovic returned empty-handed from Riadh and Washington.

    First he found himself in a tricky situation when in Riadh he was offered a meeting with IranÍs foreign minister Velayati, who, by accident, stayed at the same royal palace. Two different diplomatic sources of ñDaniî offered us two different informations: according to one, Izetbegovic met with Velayati, but according to the other, he refused to meet with him. Attempting to get more information from Riadh, we found out that Izetbegovic then still did not know whether he will be received by president Clinton, which was most important to him. That is why the second alternative is more probable.

    Careful analysis of press reports concerning IzetbegovicÍs visit to the States, but also his interviews given to the state TV and BiH press, it can be concluded that he did not receive any more guarantees from the American administration, than he had before he went on this journey. His conclusions are full of contradictions and bad assessments.

    If the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina occurs, nobody will be able to accuse Izetbegovic that he did not announce that during his visit to the United States. It is fully clear that the chances that his four preconditions for the survival of Bosnia to be fulfilled are barely better than zero. After all, in the mentioned interview after his return from America, he said that there is no room for optimism as far as the acceptance of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ñPartnership for Peaceî is concerned, something that will be waited on for a long time.

    On the other hand, in the mentioned interview after his return from the US, Izetbegovic stated that it is quite realistic that there will be no extension of the mandate of the international forces after the period of 18 months. This is worth analyzing.

    The announcement of certain departure of foreign troops is the best stimulus to all who plan the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly if it comes from its president and right after his return from the US.

    Izetbegovic believes in the withdrawal of NATO at the time when not a single serious Western analyst does. Is it possible that Izetbegovic does not know that already for three months a program of the new engagement of the international troops after the withdrawal of SFOR is being prepared ? The name of the forces, after ñImplementation Forceî (IFOR), and current ñStabilization Forceî (SFOR), has already been decided on, and will be ñNormalization Forceî (NFOR). If the president knows this, why is he tricking the public, and why ? If he doesnÍt, and ñDaniî had this information for two months now,, what is our expensive diplomacy doing ?

    The most sensitive segment of the whole job was feeling the pulse of the Bosnian, first of all, Bosniak public. ñDnevni Avazî is to the SD what ñBorbaî was to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: quick, dependable, with small circulation, but secured subscriptions in all most sensitive and most important segments of the society: police, military, and party organizations.

    On March 17, the leading page of ñAvazî, as an introduction to what is to follow in coming days, a big headline appeared: ñThe Burial of Dayton ?î The preparation of the terrain was approached carefully. First, the folk have to be explained what hardships are encountered by Bosnia, and those that are leading us into brighter future.

    The sentence ñIs it time that the Bosniaks contemplate how to proceed from now on ?î was the initial sentence, after which a detailed propaganda system followed. What was thought up by the political top, in the following days will be put in the mouths of the people through the pages of ñAvazî.

    The story about the division of Bosnia is as old as this regime. It was current in 1991 and 1992 and 1993 and 1996. What makes this experiment different from the rest is the seriousness with which it is approached by the Bosniak side. For the first time, the Bosniak political top publicly contemplates this possibility, for the first time initiates the discussions on this subject and for the first time it is working on media preparation of the people.

    Source: Sarajevo monthly ñDaniî, April 1997

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    The same theme is discussed by Gojko Beric of the Sarajevo weekly ñSvijetî in the editorial commentary and the accompanying text by Vlastimir Mijovic in the April 17, 1997 issue of the same magazine.

    Beric writes that the new ideas about the traditional division are supposed to create the impression s if there is some work to be done there. But, isnÍt Bosnia and Herzegovina already ethnically divided ? The numbers are a non negotiable indictor here. They show that today, in Republika Srpska, there is no more than four or five percent of non Serbian population.

    There is approximately the similar percentage of Bosniaks and Serbs in the so called Herceg - Bosna, while on the territory where the SDA party has the power the Bosniaks comprise around 85 percent of the population.

    Even under the condition that a part of the refugees return to their homes, the three ethnically homogenized and territorially separated nations will remain s a long term, and maybe s a permanent demographic picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resembled leopardÍs skin before the war. The ñleopardî has not been killed of, but his skin cannot be recognized anymore.

    What kind of state re we talking about, if it was not even able to hang out its flag , line up its army and play its national anthem in honor of an historic event, as was the visit of the Pope ?

    To be blind when confronted with this and a series of other even more defeating facts is equal to participation in the divisions themselves. Each of the three nations has today totalitarian political rule, its army and police, border controls and customs officials, their school programs and linguistic rules. The richness of differences, which lasted for centuries due to civil and religious tolerance have been turned into divisions by the war, and life is being constituted on upon these divisions. I do not understand those that state that there is nothing wrong in that, and that this is, supposedly, the condition for the reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    This is big and dangerous trap for this state. Secessionism is the goal of both Bosnian Serbs and Herzegovina Croats. Milosevic currently has problems at home, but he has not forgotten about Bosnia, while even in a recent interview to an American paper Tudjman repeated that in these regions, the only solution is Scaninavization of the Balkans. And under this term Tudjman implies resettlement of the population and formation of single nation states.

    In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a lot of people with stature believe that it will survive. Confronted with reality, that is more than patriotism. But, what does each person understand under this term ? If survive means hold on through all of our stupidities, Balkan primitivism, hatred, historic drunkenness, civilisational backwardness of whole nations and dilettante politics of the ruling elites - I am afraid that this will last through decades. In that combination, for current generations Bosnia and Herzegovina represents the past.

    Source: Sarajevo weekly ñSvijetî, April 17, 1997

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    In his article, Vlastimir Mijovic poses the question: What is it actually that the international community wants to achieve in Bosnia ?

    This question gain became current due to two important decisions of international representatives responsible to oversee and implement the peace process. BildtÍs office took care of the first spark. The stale mate position created in the BiH Ministerial Council, where the Serb and Croat ministers lined up on one side, and the Bosniak on the other - BildÍt office broke with the opinion according to which the Dayton BH constitution gives the right to the supporters of the solution according to which the customs revenues would go into the entity bank accounts. The Bosniaks felt hurt and cheated with this opinion.

    The other contentious decision created even greater furor. It concerns the order of the head of the OESCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina, American diplomat Robert Frowick, to prepare the September ballot boxes for Mostar too. At the same time, no such instruction has been passed for Brcko, so that still in force is the decision according to which there still won't be any municipal elections in that city.

    The Bosniak top reacted very quickly. Dr. Kasim Begic got the order to resign his membership in the Temporary Electoral Commission, which operates under the patronage of the OESCE. So, this commission, as specific headquarters for the implementation of the elections, was left without a Bosniak member. Dr. Begic actually was formally the member of this commission as a representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in essence he had the role of the representative of the Bosniak national political interests.

    In the case of the customs knot, BildÍt office came down with a truly pragmatic view of the Dayton constitution. Since the Constitution does not directly spell out that the customs are collected by the state, this opened up the possibility that BildtÍs arbiters support the demands of Serb and Croat ministers.

    Since the summer of last year, as soon as the results of the local elections in Mostar were made public, the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Union is leading the campaign for the renewed holding of elections in this town. What has changed so that by the beginning of April Frowick has decided differently ?

    No matter how much the American and his press officers insisted that by calling new Mostar elections they did not suit Western Mostar political clique, the consequences of that decision feed the estimate that the OESCE has rewarded HDZ. There are many reasons for political bitterness about this case, particularly since the international community has practically done nothing to sanction the Western MostarÍs undermining of all agreements signed to solve the crisis in this city.

    Even the Bairam crime in the Liska park was not sanctioned, while a new truckload of gasoline is being poured on the political relations in the city. So the Croatian top has all the reasons to gloat, and that a reward, when reprimand was expected, is being interpreted as the inclination of the international community towards its obstructive policy.

    The departure of professor Begic from the OESCE electoral commission is the smallest measure of an angry reaction. This is probably a first step in the moves that follow, and which could considerably worsen the relations between the international guarantors of the peace process and Bosniak political top.

    BegicÍs resignation can become the snowball which will reach the bottom of the mountain as in form of a big political avalanche. It could become an introduction for the political project of the SDA party under the code name: postponement of the elections. Actually, this year the SDA may attempt to correct the mistake, of which it seems to be conscious now, and which it made last summer. It then accepted the elections for which correct conditions have not been met.

    What is gone, can hardly be corrected now. But, a new mistake can be evaded. All truly democratic parties and political forces would support the idea of suspension of September local elections unless correct conditions are not created for them. For the moment, unfortunately, there is no sign that they could be created, particularly in the most important aspect: the return of the exiled voters into the places where they are registered in the polling lists.

    Both FrowickÍs electoral decision and BildtÍs customs arbitration, with all the trends that indicate that Bosniaks and integral Bosnia and Herzegovina are not international favorites, impose the need of serious re-examination of the strategy of the Bosniak and pro Bosniak front. The tendency of really loose interpretations of the Dayton peace jelly is really reaching serious proportions. Along with them come some very suspicious practical moves. One of them is MuratovicÍs statement that currently going on in Washington re direct talks between the World bank and Republika Srpska about credit projects worth 17 million dollars.

    Concerning the latest tension in relations between the Bosniak political top and international peace coordinators, which is in great part provoked by the manner in which the Dayton Peace Accord is being interpreted, a serious need of the objective document is becoming necessary. Both Izetbegovic and Silajdzic who then, in Ohio, decisively participated in its formulation, have to interpret more soberly, and even admit some bad consequences for Bosnia - which stem from that famous paper. The need is even greater when it can be seen that the international arbiters tend to read exactly what is written there, and not to interpret in the manner which would be good for the supporters of unified Bosnia.

    This could actually be the first homework for the newly formed political council of Izetbegovic, comprised of people who have so far, in an operative, ideological and programmatic manner, tailored the Bosniak political and national fate.

    Source: Sarajevo weekly ñSvijetî, April 17, 1997;

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    Nebojsa Spajic of the Belgrade by-weekly ñRepublikaî takes a look in the April 1-15, 1997 issue at the political interests of Serbian president Milosevic in signing the close relations agreement with Republika Srpska.

    The express establishment of the ñSpecial, parallel, etc.î, relations between FRY and RS, with all the propagandistic pomp in the state media and a hefty ignorance of those others, with the joy of those taking part, and silence of the opposition, covers the essence of the agreement.

    The structures of the regime insist on the ñjoint wish of the same nation on the both sides of the Drina riverî, the Democratic opposition leaves the agreement in the back row, but neither of them uncover the true reasons of their actions. The regime hopes that the most important political intention included in the agreement will remain mostly covered up, out of tactical reasons, while the opposition does not even want to see the intention, unable to confront it and to admit the political points which the regime will gain with the fulfillment of that intention.

    The question is that the agreement, at the same time opens the door to the formation of Greater Serbia and opening of the formal possibilities for Slobodan Milosevic to become the sovereign ruler of somewhat expanded FRY.

    This, since the agreement envisages not only the establishment of the closest possible relations between FRY and RS in all state, political, economic and security fields, but also the creation of a body which can become some form of supreme political and military head of state of the two ñsidesî.

    To confirm the closeness, the agreement further states that close parliamentary cooperation will be established, the cooperation of regional and local organs and institutions, cooperation of unions, youth organizations, sports societies, joint approach to third markets, free flow of people, goods and capital across the border...

    And all this does not mean anything else but that a political framework is being made so that the function of the president of FRY would become the key political position, and this not only for FRY but also for RS, and this - without the change in the Federal constitution.

    In other words - Milosevic, who does not have constitutional possibilities to run for president of Serbia - can, with this, secure himself a new ruling position. If the governments of FRY and RS are ñobligedî to take into consideration within 15 days everything that the Council proposes, if those governments and this council re controlled by Milosevic - then he does not need any change in the constitution, but only to sit in LilicÍs chair.

    Along with this, agreement brings through the small door, something that actually is in accordance with the Dayton agreement (on which this Agreement calls itself upon, that is, that disintegrational part of Dayton), the institutionalization of another step in the process of creation of Greater Serbia and disintegration of BiH. At the first glance, the limiting factor is the last article, according to which this agreement has to be ratified by the BiH Parliament, as well as the FRY Parliament.

    It is hard to believe that the BiH Parliament will ratify such an agreement, but if it refuses, there are other possibilities that it is imposed. It was envisaged in Dayton that if the members of one entity in the central parliament refuse something, this decision is brought back to the parliament of the entity, and if it accepts it with a two third majority, it becomes obligatory for the central authority too. Also, certain prerogatives on these questions belong to the international community, but it is quite possible that it would, in full accordance with disintegrational elements of Dayton, accept this agreement.

    The reaction of Western representatives, although it would not seem that way at first, confirms that it is quite probable that the world will at least be indifferent to the division of Bosnia, if it does not support it directly.

    Verbal condemnations which came from Carl Bildt, from Paris, Bonn, Washington - are nothing else but - verbal condemnations, without any indications of concrete political moves. The most indicative reaction is of course the one that is most important - the one from Washington - which says that the agreement is ñprematureî - so, not unacceptable, damaging, dangerous or something similar.

    Only ñprematureî, In other words, Bosnia should not be finally divided now, but maybe a little bit later. BildtÍs reaction too, after the FRY Parliament ratified the agreement is also indicative - he did condemn that, and he did say that by this FRY breaches the Dayton agreement, but, he did not list a single measure which he would undertake against this, and in accordance with his prerogatives.

    Coming from Pale was the expected, but disunited opposition. In the backstage political fight for power, by signing the agreement Biljana Plavsic knew nothing about, Momcilo Krajisnik placed himself as MilosevicÍs partner among Bosnian Serbs. Knowing that nobody rules there, unless Milosevic rules him, Biljana Plavsic had nothing left but to rebel - and loose the political battle. She is still left with some possibilities to grapple and attempt to salvage herself, but it is clear that Momcilo Krajisnik became the one who has the decisive word among Bosnian Serbs.

    The reactions of the Serbian democratic opposition are unusually mild - the representatives of all parties more or less say that the agreement is completely irrelevant and that its goal is to ñdetract attentionî from internal problems.

    The oppositional minimizing of the agreement, on the other hand, has as the goal to cover up the fact that this is a step towards Greater Serbia, since the opposition, due to daily political points, and probably due to a nationalistic element in its own policy,wants to cover this up, since from their perspective - this is a success which should not be assigned to the opponent. That is why none of them noticed what are the prerogatives of the Council, as well as the fact that with this Milosevic showed that he still controls Pale, and not only Banjaluka.

    The responsibility for the destruction of BiH and enabling of Milosevic to rule, undisturbed, Serbia, current Yugoslavia, as well as Republika Srpska, in the coming period, then partly falls on the back of the opposition.

    While the ñdemocratic oppositionî closes its eyes in front of a dual political danger in the special agreement - the danger of the formation of an institutional framework without the change of the constitution for the maximal self - rule of Milosevic on the federal level, and the danger of the division of Bosnia, which cannot bring permanent well being to anybody in these regions - the non - democratic opposition has understood the message. Tomislav Nikolic, head of the Radicals in the Serbian parliament, did not, as was announced, block the work of the Parliament. The parliamentary debate was conducted about the fact who is a bigger Serb, who enabled the Serbdom on the other side of the Drina ñthe fulfillment of the century old dreamî - manning: the dream of all Serbs in one state, that is, the dream of ñGreater Serbiaî.

    This was not hidden either by the Radicals, the Socialists, or the guests from across the Drina, so that Dragutin Ilic, the head of the MPÍs of MilosevicÍs satellite party in RS - openly stated - ñI am quite convinced that this agreement paves the way for FRY and RS to unite into one state. I hope that we will not wait long for thisî.

    The political events that are occurring after the signing and the ratification of the agreement confirm these theses. Milosevic has transferred the focus of the political activity away from Serbia, to a level of a ñgrowing Serbiaî. He left the wrangling over panel discussions, draft laws, political combinations about Serbian elections, the ambitions of Karic, Panic, Covic, curtailing of BK TV, radio Bum 93, to his appartchiks.

    In essence, Milosevic is not personally not interested in that part of the story - he can allow himself even the luxury that at the next Serbian presidential elections the winner is either his party candidate - whomever he is, or his neighborly candidate, Bogoljub Karic, and even an oppositional candidate, which is least probable, if he creates the conditions for the control of the situation from another level.

    The formal ones are created with the ratification of the agreement - while the political ones he is creating with the purge in Montenegro and in Pale.

    Source: Belgrade by-weekly ñRepublikaî, April 1-15, 1997

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