ELECTIONS - CROATIA
Igor Vukic of the AIM news pool, comments from Zagreb for the Podgorica weekly ñMonitorî, in the magazineÍs issue of April 18, 1997, on the results of the Croatian elections.
ñI am not disappointed by our result. But I am particularly disappointed by the result achieved by the HDZ!î Vlado Gotovac, to whom this statement belongs to, has listened with a sour face the first results of the electoral commission: not only did HDZ retain the previous support of the electorate, but it even bettered the result. Obviously, for the moment stable electoral body, which, depending on the region spans 35 to 40 percent, along with the electoral system and divided opposition ensured this party a good result.
In the ñZupanijaî house of the Parliament HDZ achieved almost two thirds majority - from previous 37, it went up to 41 seats of the 63 available in the Upper house of the Parliament. In Zagreb, where for 18 months the HDZ prevented the majority in the city parliament to take over the executive government, the outcome is very tight - HDZ has 24 council seats, other parties 26.
In that manner, the ñZagreb crisisî could continue, but also be resolved quickly - in favor of the HDZ.
The HDZ lists for the Upper house received the relative majority in 19 of 21 counties. Most in Lika - 62 percent, and all three MPÍs in the Parliament. In 14 counties they got two, and so on.
The biggest losers in these parliamentary elections were the Liberals (HSLS). They came out in a coalition with HSS (the Peasant party), refusing that the SDP (Social democrats) join them. In the end, HSLS fell from previous 16 to 7 MOÍs in the Upper house. Their partner, HSS, rose a bit, from 5 to nine MPÍs. SDP achieved a relative success, who previously held only one seat. In the new House it will have four members, thanks, first of all, to the good result in Rijeka, where it had successful seven year city government. This itself brought them two seats.
he big HDZ majority in the Upper house will probably be even greater when president Tudjman uses his constitutional prerogative and names another five members of this House. HDZ regained the lost self - confidence in Zagreb, where it became a minority in 1995.
It again won the same percentage of votes as in previous elections (35 percent), but, with the changed electoral system and the help of the opposition, which kept competing with each other (HSLS and SDP were able to retain the electoral coalition, but the HSS did not accept the SDP, so it left the coalition there), it came close to victory. Of the 50 seats in the city parliament, HDZ now has 24 seats. The SDP-HSLS won 23 mandates (SDP 14, HSLS nine), and the HSS can decide to again complicate the Zagreb crisis with the three seats it won. HDZ counts upon the problems between HSS and other two opposition parties (particularly the SDP), and it has already officially stated that it will offer it coalition partnership so that it would achieve a majority in the city parliament.
In a way, even though without a formal agreement, HSS already helped the HDZ in the elections - in the 12 electoral units in which the third of the city parliament was being elected, HSS took away votes to the HSLS-SDP coalition, helping HDZ win in six electoral units.
The consolation to the oppositional parties could be a relative success in a number of cities - other big centers as Osijek, Split, Rijeka, Varazdin, Pula, Dubrovnik... HDZ remained in minority and their governing bodies will be filled, in different combinations with the members of the oppositional parties.
The oppositional majority was achieved in number of county parliaments - traditionally in Istria, or Rijeka. The electoral units won the oppositional HSLS-HSS coalition the majority in the Osijek county - where the HDZ was well leading the polls.
The first post - elector comments indicate a clearing up of the political scene: along with HDZ, through the electoral crowd in which 38 parties competed, passing through were SDP, HSLS and HSS. In some regions, regional parties will have the influence, particularly IDS and PGS in Istria, and the analysts also give a survival chance to HNS (Mesic) and HSP on the right side of the political spectrum.
The rise of the SDP, mostly in the urban areas, did not go unnoticed with the HDZ, so it attacked it ferociously in the last days of the campaign. SDP was being accused that it wants to restore communism and Yugoslavia. With the TV ads through which it attacked them HDZ crossed the line of good taste on a number of occasions.
Overzealous attacks on the SDP garnered that party some new sympathizers, because these attacks turned the SDP into an important adversary of which HDZ is afraid of. SDP rethoric, geared towards social questions, forced HDZ to offer some amenities ahead of the elections.
Source: AIM news pool, through Podgorica weekly ñMonitorî, April 18, 1997
The comment on the results of the Croatian elections is presented by Goran Ivnovic in the April 25, 1997 issue of the Zagreb by-weekly ñArkzinî.
The Croats finally got everything, and Serbs barely the crumbs. This is the impression after the first unofficial results of three day long local and Parliamentary elections in the Croatian Middle East, where the (pre) electoral games without borders overshadowed the results of the voting in the remaining 95,5 percent of the Croatian internationally recognized state territory.
Despite stressed party fragmentation, the elections in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, have passed in a clear national bipolarity, and under the watchful eye of the international community, which is, in the end, the most satisfied party in these elections.
The voting was on the edge of regularity, which according to the noted irregularities gives a foundation for the dissatisfaction of the Croats, which won the majority ñonlyî of the three fifths of the bodies of local governments, that is, two cities and 15 municipalities, but also for the Serbs, who ñretainedî one city and 10 municipalities. The practice of democracy in Podunavlje was watched by more than 400 foreign observers, including the diplomatic corps stationed in Croatia, while the voting material was taken and kept by the UNTAES soldiers.
With the proclamation of the official results, the constituting of the local bodies will commence, with which begins the administrative re- integration of this area in the constitutional/legal corps of the Croatian Republic. This looks simple on paper, although a whole series of problems which will influence the conduct of the process remain.
The non - historic experience says that as far as the presidential palace is concerned, the most important thing is to see the Croatian coat of arms on the main buildings in Vukovar, and than throughout the banks of Danube, just as this happened when the independent and sovereign Republic of Croatia was formed. Maybe a few other thousands of Serbs will leave the region ñmad at the chess field flagî, but it is quite sure that the flags and symbols will not be the things that will bring the Croats back.
What remains for the politicians is further demilitarization of the Podunavlje region, particularly of the left, Vojvodina bank, then the introduction of the ñsoftî border regime and creation of dual citizenship. The Serbs also want the security guarantees of the international community after the set term in 1998, that is, after the end of the mandate of the Klein administration of the region. TudjmanÍs pre - electoral announcement of the post - electoral pilgrimage on Vukovar has been taken seriously by the Serbs, so quite a number of them are packing their bags. This is just another sign that the presidential, parliamentarian and local elections do not solve any crucial matters anyway, no matter how much the international community keeps quiet about that.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly ñArkzinî April 25, 1997
Kresimir Meler of the Sarajevo weekly ñSvijetî, examines in the May 8, 1997, issue of that magazine the results of the local elections in Croatia from the aspect of the situation in Podunavlje (Eastern Slavonia).
Many others are dissatisfied by the results of these elections, particularly the Serbs which came to Vukovar from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, or have been exiled there after the ñLightningî and ñStormî actions.
They have asked Vukovar mayor Stanimirovic, who is also a negotiator with the Croats, that as condition of the return of secure return, and return as such of the Croats, demand that the Serbs return into the areas they have come from.
It should be said that this is mainly impossible. That is, after the ñStormî, ñunknown personsî have burned down a number of villages, among others Kistanje, which is now being rebuilt so that - Croats from Janjevo in Kosovo could resettle there. Into other areas, like Knin and back hills of Zadar, the Croats are resettling Bosnian Croats which do not want to return to the mother state, even though they have a place to return to.
Very soon, there could be problems, for both the people that moved into somebody elseÍs houses and for Croatia, since it is almost certain that the European Court for Human Rights will annul the Law on temporary takeover of property, passed by the Croatian Parliament, according to which Serbian houses were moved into. As an answer to such a turn of events, Croatia founded the Agency for sale and exchange of property.
Actually, what is in question is ethnic cleansing wrapped into a legal cellophane.
Also, dissatisfied with the situation after the elections was Goran Hadzic, who insisted on voting in the elections, even though he did not ask for, and in that respect did not get Croatian documents. Actually, the only ones that have promised help to the Serbs there, at the price of a new war with the Croats were Vojislav Seselj and Arkan. Hadzic even mentioned the possibility that ñdissatisfied Serbian people deposes Stanimirovic, s was done with the political top in Vojvodina, and put into place those that would really represent the interests of the Serbian peopleî.
What is placed as a particular ñburdenî on StanimirovicÍs back is his supposed statement that he will enter a coalition with HDZ in the Vukovar city council, as well as his leniency during the negotiations about the re - integration of Podunavlje.
On the other hand, Stanimirovic says that it is ñnormal to co - operate with any party, even HDZ, if it t respects and fulfill the undertaken obligations. Finally, such a cooperation is better that the blockade of the operation or the imposition of the solution that would be acceptable to allî.
Source: Sarajevo weekly ñSvijetî, May 8, 1997
In his analysis of the Croatian elections, Marinko Culic of the Split weekly ñFeral Tribuneî asks in the April 21, 1997 issue of the magazine the question whether the Croatian opposition will learn on the lessons of their defeat.
In the HDZ party headquarters they really like to wave in the air the evidence on how many elections were held at which this party overwhelmingly won. But now, another evidence is coming into being, which gives a completely different picture.
By circumstance, HDZ went twice to the elections called and controlled by the international community. On one of those (last year in Mostar) HDZ lost, while in the other (recent ones in Podunavlje) it was concluded that the Croatian authorities used illegal engineering of the electoral ballots (due to which the elections had to be prolonged, and most probably the international control in Podunavlje counties too).
Would have the situation been different in the five elections that TudjmanÍs party won easily if the real control of the elections was allowed - foreign or domestic, no matter - and not only the useless contemplative show wisely named ñoverseeingî ? It is already becoming a tradition that ParagaÍs ñsniffersî find filled but discarded, or empty but added ballots.
Particular curiosity is that this time for his mission Paraga was able to secure particular cooperation, no more no less than Tudjman himself. The leader was, during the night of the count, zoomed at least for an hour by the cameras of the state TV, holding the detailed results of the elections, for which, s he was not hiding in any manner, he knew the results well before all voters of this country.
That this bullying show in front of the cameras is a true proof that the elections were stolen is too hard to say. But it did open the door to serious indications that there was a serious game going on concerning these results.
But the basic point of these elections does not lie in the electoral thefts, but in some of the following facts.
Firstly, the opposition suffered a heavy defeat on the state level, and the childish attempt to negate this (Gotovac, Cacic, somewhat Tomac and Jakovcic) is not only the refusal of the leaders of the opposition to confront the facts, but also the refusal to confront the essential reasons of the defeat. Second, the opposition will have to forget all that it has done and said so far, and pose itself again the question what king of a regime it is dealing with.
This is not a matter of an academic discussion, on the contrary, the reason is very pragmatic. Because if it turns out that it is a question of a classic dictatorship, than it should be known that dictatorships do not loose elections. But, if it comes out that it is ñonlyî a matter of a very autocratic system, with elements of fascistoid rigidity, then the elections still might have a role, but still not as the only lever of social change.
Thirdly, HDZ is not a classic parliamentarian party, but a revolutionary movement which remained in power through the use of the state apparatus. That is why it cannot be beaten in a classic manner at the polls. The change in power is only possible through organizing a similar, but short term and focused counter movement (like in Spain).
Without this global coalition, which would not only include oppositional parties, but also the wider public, the elections re only an expensive folk festival.
All in all, the opposition is moving towards the important, maybe fateful crossroads, which it could enter after it receives another blow, one that is even greater than the one t these elections. Very soon the presidential elections might be called, since it is quite sure that Tudjman will want to ride the wave which brought his party the victory. If the opposition does not find counter candidates who would at least force Tudjman into the second round, than he could reward his party in a manner in which the oppositional leaders do not even want to imagine. That is that the HDZ continues to dominate over the shaken opposition even after Tudjman is gone.
Source: Split weekly ñFeral Tribuneî, April 21, 1997
FRY -
DIVISIONS IN THE MONTENEGRIN TOP AND MILOSEVICÍS
POLITICAL MANEUVERS
Velizar Brajovic, Podgorica correspondent of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", writes on the current conflict in the Montenegrin political top in the April 12, 1997, issue of that magazine.
Following Svetozar MarovicÍs and Milo DjukanovicÍs public statements, President of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic is probably in a dilemma„whether to resign or endeavor to do his utmost, employing all means, to oust Djukanovic. Namely, by his own admission, he had already threatened his resignation at the famous session of DPSÍs main board: ``I even offered my own resignation, in case my option does not win.ÍÍ In the Serbian state media that option was called ``Defense of Yugoslavia,ÍÍ although it still hasnÍt been clarified what the members of the main board of MontenegroÍs ruling party had voted on.
For now it is certain that the main board shall once again hold a discussion on the ``disobedient prime ministerÍÍ on Friday, April 11, which is when Bulatovic, as a ``serious politician,ÍÍ as he had portrayed himself to the journalists, could turn another leaf...
However, he is left with a third option as well„to publicly announce that he does not hold anything against his closest associate Milo Djukanovic, however MilosevicÍs commands must be observed and fourth, to quietly, without any fuss, join Milosevic in the federal bodies.
In the course of his visit to Bratislava, Prime Minister Djukanovic was clear: ``Do I seem to be a person who is ready to retreat?ÍÍ Prior to that, he even sent a letter to Momir Bulatovic, the DPS president (which is the form of address he adopted in it, authorÍs note), in which he informed him that ``with regards to the conclusions of DPSÍs main board on the necessary changes in the government of Montenegro, the government, observing its constitutional norms, has not adopted any stands.ÍÍ
It was also estimated that in the given political context, some statements issued by its members could have caused certain political damage. He also confirmed that ``one part of the government members have expressed their readiness to, with the Prime MinisterÍs consent and in the interest of calming political tensions in the republic, endure all political consequences.ÍÍ
``Naturally, according to the constitution, it is exclusively the right of the prime minister of the government to suggest changes in the government structure to the parliament of Montenegro,ÍÍ wrote Djukanovic. He adding that on that question, he had expressed his opinion in detail at the session of DPSÍs main board and that he deems that the consequences which emerged on account of certain government membersÍ statements are not such as to implicitly suggest a necessity to have its structure changed.
It is obvious that Djukanovic is intending to pull the entire case away from closed party sessions. He was supported in this by the parliament speakerÍs Svetozar MarovicÍs statement that issues ``cannot be resolved in a manner which has already been seen, as suggested by certain individuals.ÍÍ Marovic signs his announcement as a DPS vice-president as well, by which he lets it be known that he has not bid this function farewell.
This statement was given following his discharge from the hospital, where he was in all likelihood admitted due to extremely grueling persuasions, primarily aimed at BulatovicÍs camp, to lower the temperature and preserve party unity. VREMEÍs sources close to Marovic claim that Marovic is persistent in salvaging what can be salvaged, and is dreading the DPSÍs collapse and a division of Montenegro to the north (Serbia-oriented) and the south (Independent Montenegro-oriented).
Marovic was a lot fiercer at the main board than Djukanovic, as our sources claim, and it is in his nature to call for rationality and wisdom in resolving the conflict which, according to MarovicÍs estimate, does not even exist.
Marovic had rather precisely located the epicenter of the actual shakedown. He says he was convinced that no differences exist between Bulatovic and Djukanovic which cannot be surmounted, and that therefore not a single reason exists for a division and conflict within the DPS.
This is especially true regarding the questions which initially figured as the basis of those non-surmountable differences between Bulatovic and Djukanovic. These differences occurred primarily over Yugoslavia, since an allegiance for a joint state with Serbia has been, according to Marovic, unanimously demonstrated. However, the state which is desired would be governed by strong democratic regulations and not by any individualÍs strong fist, in which laws would be observed instead of informal groups and family workshops.
Seeking a culprit for having allegedly abandoned the DPS program is also unacceptable for Marovic. He reminds that DPSÍs main board had greeted DjukanovicÍs acceptance of another mandate with applause, quoting President Momir BulatovicÍs words on Djukanovic ``who had prominently contributed to the realization of DPSÍs program, and is often left to wonder how such a young man has such strength.ÍÍ Marovic publicly states that such a government needs to be supported and not destabilized, that it needs to be aided with both support and criticism even at times when against both the government and the prime minister, a harsh and insulting campaign is conducted.
No one is irreplaceable however, according to Marovic, assessments on the needs for changes should be arrived at via an argumentative discussion and not by certain individualsÍ ultimatums. The executive board did not discuss MarovicÍs stands, however it did touch upon DjukanovicÍs letter and estimated that the prime minister did not comply with party orders, so that a step backwards has been made compared to the announcement from the session of the main board, which shall after everything, adopt a final decision on Friday.
Until then, talks shall be conducted in the headquarters„that is, in Niksic, Podgorica and Bijelo Polje. Talks shall be held with DPS activists or representatives, supposedly upon their request, as the executive board of the main board has announced, behind closed doors.
Djukanovic insisted that those discussions be public to no avail. It is not known whose supporters are initiating those talks, nor what influence they can have on the main boardÍs final decision.
It is ungrateful to predict such a decision in advance, since it is not known which new issue Bulatovic shall present for a vote. As he had categorically stated to the journalists, as party president he has the right to formulate a proposal for a decision, however at this moment it is unclear how the media racket„especially Belgrade state media„has influenced the members of the main board.
The events between the two sessions of the main board have laid bare that the goal of BulatovicÍs operation was nothing other than to overthrow Djukanovic. For this purpose, the already tested tool of the anti-bureaucratic revolution was activated, along with the same reporters of SerbiaÍs state media. Djukanovic was imputed with anti-Yugoslav sentiments, and following the session of the main board some reporters were already celebrating DjukanovicÍs collapse. They were not alone in this. Certain dignitaries from BulatovicÍs camp joined the festivities. The imputed anti-Yugoslav sentiments did not supply sufficient reason for the Montenegrin citizens to rebel.
This is why the scenario was refreshed with a story on criminal activities in Montenegro. The verbal offense and disrespect for party orders have been cast aside. Features and commentaries about Djukanovic the ``criminalÍÍ could be seen by Montenegrin citizens on channel two of MontenegroÍs television which RTS broadcasts as well. This was not enough for Emil Labudovic, the editor of Montenegrin RTVÍs news desk and his order-issuing authorities.
Therefore, following ``viewersÍ requests,ÍÍ they re-ran it again the next day on channel one. The attempt to suggest to the public how Momir is launching a battle against criminal activities, as personified by Milo Djukanovic, is obvious. The Secretary for Information harshly reacted the next day. Their reactions were once again announced by Labudovic, without the usual comment. News leaked out from Montenegrin Television that the story was broadcasted following an order made by the editor in-chief Vladimir Asanin, who jumped into that position following his previous one as Svetozar MarovicÍs chief of cabinet. The story goes on, as the same sources claim, to say that Asanin received orders from Predrag Bulatovic, the president of the TV board of directors and DPS MP chief, otherwise one of the most consistent Bulatovics in the clash with Djukanovic. Predrag Bulatovic is also the main informant of Belgrade state media reporters.
However, the question remains open as to how effective that campaign really is. Not a single graffiti for BulatovicÍs support has been registered, while services in charge of wiping them off have their hands full with those which support Djukanovic and ridicule Bulatovic.
The Democratic Movement for Montenegro has still not been constituted so its leader is not known. However, this so-far phantom organization, as rumor has it, is preparing a large protest rally in Podgorica on Friday at the time when DPSÍs main board is to decide on subsequent measures for overthrowing Djukanovic and Marovic. The message ``Slobo, Montenegro is not in your backyardÍÍ is appearing on facades throughout Montenegrin cities, while independent media is counting BulatovicÍs all the more frequent flights to Belgrade.
Even the Montenegrin University has raised its voice. A Student Forum already exists, while the University Democratic Forum is being constituted which has announced a manifestation of the UniversityÍs employees. The manifestation of the University Forum advocates redefining the relations between Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. establishing those which shall enable each republic to attain its vital state interests without any hindrances.
The events at the University should not be underestimated by Bulatovic along with DjukanovicÍs concrete actions during the last few days. He attended a meeting where the agreement on establishing a Slovakian-Montenegrin company was signed in Bratislava, which shall transfer around 100 million dollars credit into Montenegro for the construction of coastal waterworks. That is the modes for generating capital in Montenegro and our sources are announcing a number of similar arrangements however, as they say, they shouldnÍt be made public now so as not to incite Slobodan MilosevicÍs wrath. It is not insignificant that the Montenegrin union has announced that it shall not make its opinion public yet it shall support those who stand for an openness towards the world.
While postponing the final outcome, BulatovicÍs arguments seem to be melting. The one about defending Yugoslavia has become transparent after DjukanovicÍs and MarovicÍs statements, and he himself has re-valorized it at the beginning by stating that no conflicts on that issue exist.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", April 12, 1997
The subject is further discussed by Darko Sukovic of the Podgorica weekly ñMonitorî, who takes a look at the prerogatives of the Montenegrin president Momir Bultovic in the April 18, 1997 issue of the magazine.
Based on the seven year experience, there is small number of people who could have illusions about Momir Bultovic as the president, as it is often said, of all citizens of Montenegro. His position in Montenegrin society was as non - partisan s was Montenegro a civil society, and not a (one) party state. Still, until the conflict with his two closest collaborators, Bulatovic based his political power in essence on the concentration of party might, retaining at the same time the appearance of its being grounded in the respectability of the post of the president of the Republic.
The breakup at the top of the ruling party, finally made public after the session of the Executive Board of 24 and 25 March, has amply shown how much Montenegro is a standstill party state. The highest body of the DPS, inspired by its instructed, vain and combative president, has meddled with a party directive into the work of the most important state institution. The ultimative demand for the reconstruction of the Government, with a specific list of unwanted ministers, has certified that within DPS the state institutions re considered s simple services of the party.
But, in the highest legal document of the Montenegrin state, its Constitution, there is not a single letter from which president Bulatovic could draw the right to order anything to the prime minister.
Except the right to offer the governmental mandate and to call a referendum, presidential prerogatives are mainly of procedural and representative nature. The question of the governmental confidence can be posed in the Parliament by at least ten MPÍs. So, translated into the language of practice, if the DPS is not satisfied with the work of Milo Djukanovic, its Parliamentary Club has four times higher potential than necessary to initiate the discussion bout this. Does it need mention that only with the votes of the MPÍs of the ruling party the government and its prime minister can be thrown into dust ? Why then such stomping disregard of the procedure which was established by his party, and he got the task to protect it ?
No constitutional grounds exist either for the Bulatovic letter to Svetozar Marovic ñwith a suggestionî to call a session of the Montenegrin parliament through the extraordinary procedure. Neither is the ñsuggestionî a constitutional term, nor does the President, while the regular session is in progress, has the right to call the session of the Parliament through extraordinary procedure.
There is no doubt that by acting according to MilosevicÍs directives, and initiating the dirty war against Djukanovic and Marovic, Momir Bulatovic publicly degraded the post of the President of the Republic.
In politically enlightened societies, such a sin could not remain without a political punishment. In Montenegro, where the folk are still not used to even think about the possibility to punish the rulers, the things have to be ñuntangledî by somebody who, by the nature of his position, would have to be conscious enough, and obliged, to initiate that other responsibility of theirs.
The Constitutional court of Montenegro, for example.
Source: Podgorica weekly ñMonitorî, April 18, 1997
Radivoj Cvijeticanin of the AIM news pool looks at the Montenegrin situation from the aspect of wider political moves of the Serbian president Milosevic in the April 6-12, 1997 issue of the Kragujevac by-weekly ñNezavisna Svetlostî.
Montenegrin political clashes are echoing in Belgrade, as much as they do in Podgorica. In any other situation this echo would definitely be intensive, but the reflexes of the current conflict between Montenegrin president Bulatovic and prime minister Djukanovic is of a much higher intensity than usual, since, according to all indications, Slobodan Milosevic is entangled in it. Entangled ?
Actually, Milosevic is the key actor in the conflict. The matter is not essentially changed in any manner by the fact that he stands behind the scene and moves the strings from the dark. Moreover, this somewhat mysterious position only enlarges the curiosity and attention. And since things are like that, it is relatively easy to explain the furor with which Belgrade involves itself in this event. After the first winning phase of Bulatovic, Milosevic again appears s a political giant, who is being reborn and can cause havoc again.
Milosevic did not appear angered only because of the opposition raised against him by the Montenegrin prime minister. We know that post - electoral rebellion in Serbia brought him to the edge of oblivion. The collapse in which his rule found itself would make many other politicians say: let everything go to hell ! But, Milosevic did not give up.
It still cannot be said that through the Montenegrin game Milosevic has found a leeway, but it could be spoken about the consolidation of his might. He got breathing space after the suspension of street protests in Serbia, and signing with Krajisnik the agreement on parallel special relations between Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska. Those interpretations which said that he signed this agreement so that he could bring order into his ranks were right.
This was a first goal he scored in his favor, after a series he shot into his own net.
As far as we are using soccer terms, lets say that he always favored a game in the opponents field. At home, everything was entangled, and it seemed hardly an escape,From Bosnia he went over to Montenegro, and if in our dictionary this could mean leaving Serbia, in his it could easily be the encirclement of the same.
It would be quite superficial not to see that his strategy of consolidation of bare power is not limited to foreign terrain. He is undertaking some steps on the internal field too, maybe currently not so visible, but in no way less important. In the post - electoral furor, he made personnel changes in his party, throwing out those that he saw as unstable. The main motivation was to remove those that have doubts. This might be useful for his Socialist party, but in the wider scope it could hardly be spoken of an encouraging sign.
Actually, contrary is probably the case. It seems that this orientation in party consolidation announces a preparation for a battle, and not political work.
Milosevic has a big problem with a deficit of combative personnel. That is why he is probably turning towards former people, whom he gave up on already, which was never his habit before. The story about the combinations with the former TV head Milorad Vucelic are not gossip, but realistic combinations. The same goes for Zeljko Simic.
But, the most complicated project concerns the consolidation of relations on the left, which, according to the current thinking in the top of the party, should be concluded with the unification of the Socialist party and JUL. This is without a doubt a spectacular thought.
One of the motives for such an endeavor is of a very practical, if not base nature. The situation in the terrain, first of all in mid-Serbia, is actually in many cities, such that relations between SPS and JUL re on the edge of being bearable. Due to the existing tensions, the party central offices are almost daily sending out teams to quiet down the quarrels. What is the problem ? Constant clashes concerning the division of power, which some Socialists readily describe as a result of insatiable JUL.
As a possible reason for the integration, some circles state the intention to put JUL under control, even the head of JUL itself. With the practical flow into the Socialists, who are a stronger side anyway, the architects of this idea wish to remove in an elegant manner not only an irritating group of people, but a provocative person in the image of Dr. Mira Markovic. There is a feeling that the left would remain in power more if two spouses would not directly grab for power, that is, if only one of them did it.
It is symptomatic that prof. Markovic has not appeared in public for quite a while, and she also stopped publishing her infamous diary in the magazine ñDugaî. There is obviously an attempt going on, but with n uncertain end result.
Construction of bare power was always MilosevicÍs stronger side, and he has obviously returned to his initial trade. All this could, hopefully, sober up all those who have written him off too easily.
Source: AIM news pool, through Kragujevac by-weekly ñNezavisna Svetlostî April 6-12, 1997
CURRENT SITUATION IN KOSOVO
In its April 5, 1997, issue, Belgrade weekly "Vreme" brought an analysis of the current Kosovo situation by its regular contributor Dejan Anastasijevic.
The pictures of people in Albanian cities in revolt are among the main reasons for the fear that the Kosovo ``powder kegÍÍ could be detonated by events in the neighboring country.
The possibility that several hundred thousand ``long barrels,ÍÍ appropriated from ammunition storages of military barracks and police stations across Albania, could surface in the region are setting ablaze some already dusty hypotheses about a potential regional conflict which would begin in Kosovo, would then spread to Macedonia and Greece, and immediately afterwards to Turkey, Bulgaria and God knows where else. Such a ``Doomsday scenarioÍÍ has been a cause of fear for some time in foreign affairs departments throughout foreign capitals, and it is small surprise that the world community has already begun fire prevention measures.
However, in Kosovo itself a convincing majority of people interviewed disdainfully brush away any questions about whether there are weapons in Albania. ``Why would they need such stuff„they are already armed to the teeth,ÍÍ says one of the residents of Gracanica who refuses to give his name. ``Recently an Albanian man was enquiring with the military if he could purchase a tank; when asked what he would use it for, he answered„`for spare partsÍ.ÍÍ
For their part, Albanians respond to the same question by pointing to the proclaimed principle of the nonviolent fight for independence which is sworn to by a great majority of Albanian political forces, despite the recent actions of the mysterious ``Army for the Liberation of Kosovo.ÍÍ
``It is not us that are armed, but the Serbs,ÍÍ claim the residents of the village of Mramor on the Pristina border (its population is 100% Albanian). Every few months the police cordons off the village and conducts thorough house-to-house searches; as for smaller portions of the same treatment, dealt out to selected families, their count has been lost some time ago.
``Weapons have not arrived yet for two reasons,ÍÍ a well informed (Serbian) source says, which also insists on anonymity (in general, it is next to impossible to find anyone in Kosovo, Serbian or Albanian, who is willing to give statements in their name, especially if those statements conflict with well known, official opinion).
``The first reason is that these days mountain peaks are snowed over, so the established smugglersÍ routs are inaccessible. The second reason is that the army and the military have practically closed off the border.ÍÍ Still, our source admits that not even the weather conditions, nor the police-military factors can continue to hold back the flow of weapons: summer is on its way, and a military blockade cannot hold up forever.
``Guns wont flood Kosovo, but will slowly trickle, more from Macedonia than from Albania,ÍÍ our source forecasts. ``That, however, is a long-range problem, and we do not deal with long-range problems here.ÍÍ
The political effect of the fermenting in Albania is for now more concrete, and can be seen in the sudden loss of influence of Adem Demaqi, the leader of the newly formed Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, who in past months has been openly expressing the desire to replace the until recently unchallenged Ibrahim Rugova, the head of the Albanian movement for independence. DemaqiÍs combination of hard-core nationalism (because of which he served a 20 year sentence) and political suppleness (which Rugova lacks) have by all accounts left a good impression of Sali Berisha, which was indicated in the programs of Tirana Television which has been ``pumping upÍÍ Demaqi in the same way RTS had been ``pumping upÍÍ JUL in the wake of the November elections.
At the moment the Albanian president has more important business, and Tirana Television is showing footage of a different sort. Having allied himself too closely with Tirana and having offered unqualified support to Berisa during the beginnings of the unrest, Deveci, for his part, had sealed his political fate. It is with difficulty that relief at DemaqiÍs loss of influence is concealed within DLK (Democratic League of Kosovo) ranks. ``What is happening in Albania is not good, but discord among the Kosovo Albanians is even worse,ÍÍ a high official of this party told ``Vreme,ÍÍ having asked, of course, that his name not be revealed. ``Demaqi is not a serous politician; he changes his opinions constantly, and the majority of Albanians see that clearly now.ÍÍ
What a majority of Kosovo Albanians still do not see is that the independence that Rugova promises is not nearly as near as they would like to think, ``VremeÍÍ ascertained from a Western diplomat who frequently resides in Kosovo, ``surveying the situation.ÍÍ
``When someone in Brussels or Washington states that the Kosovo Albanians should be granted the right to self determination, but that it should under no circumstances include secession, the first part of such a statement immediately finds its way to the front page of `BujkuÍ (the daily sympathetic to Rugova), while the second part is glossed over. I have the impression that they persistently disinform their people about the West supporting their secession.ÍÍ
Diplomatic sources tell that DLK officials do not stop addressing the Chief of the American Information Center in the middle of Pristina as ``American Ambassador,ÍÍ which presents a constant source of frustration to this diplomat, who according to title only has the status of First Secretary (three ranks below Ambassador).
We had the opportunity to find out how the so-called common people of Kosovo view the events in Albania in the mentioned village of Mramor.
The rebellion is perceived there as the result of joint actions by the secret agencies of Serbia, Greece and Macedonia, while CNN and BBC footage from Albania is dismissed as ill spirited, constructed, tendentious reporting. However, beneath that anger what can be seen is something resembling shame. ``The whole world watches and says: you see how they are those Albanians,ÍÍ a local teacher says in despair.
``It cannot be true. We are not like that; we are a civilized people who respect all the values of European culture.ÍÍ Serbs, for their part, view Albanians precisely in that light: ``They are a savage people,ÍÍ it is said in Gracanica, 5 km distant from Mramor. Still, fears from what the future promises outweigh for most ``the contentment at seeing the Albanian neighborÍs cow go dead.ÍÍ
That sense of uncertainty, enforced by growing mistrust of Belgrade are what is prevalent among the local Serbs. ``We saw how Milosevic betrayed the Serbs from Krajina and Bosnia, and we saw how Belgrade welcomed the refugees from those regions,ÍÍ states a regional government official who was born in Kosovo. When asked whether he had already reserved an apartment in Belgrade, he answered: ``It is out of the question. I wouldnÍt be seen dead there. I got together with a few friends, and weÍre starting a company in Thessaloniki.ÍÍ
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", April 5, 1997
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