BALKAN_MEDIA_&_POLICY_MONITOR

Issue34/35 Vol. 2 May 31, 1996


IN THIS ISSUE:

Current events in Bosnia:
  • Svijet on the elections in Bosnia, Vreme (three articles)
    on the situation among Bosnian Serbs

    Sacking of the Yugoslav govern or of the Central bank:

  • articles by Nezavisni and Monitor

    The situation in Kosovo:

  • analyses by Vreme and Feral Tribune

    The relations between Serbia and Montenegro:

  • discussed in two articles by Monitor

    The cases in front of the War Crimes Tribunal:

  • information by Nesavisni and AIM

    Internal political events:

  • Arkzin and Feral Tribune on Croatia, Vreme and Monitor on Serbia and FRY and Nezavisni (AIM) on Slovenia

    Comments and analyses:

  • by Feral Tribune, Arkzin, Vreme, Nezavisni, Republika and Svijet

    Presures on the media:

  • Croatian situation discussed by AIM and Arkzin

  • Current events in Bosnia

    In its issue of May 2, 1996, Sarajevo weekly Svijet brought a report of Zlatan Karovic concerning the election rules in Bosnia, decided upon by the electoral commission.

    The choice between bad and worse could hardly be called a free choice. In that manner, it is clearer in which situation does Bosnia and Herzegovina find itself, which is constantly in this kind of dilemmas. To make the paradox greater, the choice is not even give by the elections. At least that is the impression that crops up after the announcement of the election rules, directed by the Temporary Electoral Commission, lead by the veteran american diplomat Robert Frowick.The announcement of the rules started an avalanche of reactions, particularly from the opposition parties.

    But, all political forces on the territory controlled by the BiH Army agree in one thing. They estimate that the election rules legalize the war politics of ethnic cleansing,, by which the design of the bosnian ethnic carpet have been drastically changed.. The article in question, of course, is the one which enables the refugees (inside Bosnia) to vote in their new places, for the authorities in those. Simply put, the elections have to legitimize their temporary residences as permanent. Frowick commission explains this rule with very convincing arguments: the people have to be allowed to vote somewhere and for somebody, and to decide themselves where they want to live. Essentially, everything is controversial: by this rule the re integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina is destimulated, and at that, in its key part - the return of refugees to their original residences.

    Frowick's decision perpetuates ad infinitum the key question: Is the international community really working at the re-integration or on the final ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina ? Not only the rule on the refugee vote, but also the rule by which the Serbs n the Federation, and the Bosniaks and Croats in the Republika Srpska practically have limited voting rights,show that the international community is formalizing the reality arrived at through crime, genocide and expulsion. Talking about the past, it directly influences the future. Since, even with the said shortcomings, the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina should bear the epithet of democratic.

    The finger is pointed at the international community, since, through the Frowick's commission, it took the right upon itself, but also the obligation, to decide instead of us what should the democratic elections look like. That is why there is the strengthened conviction that the world powers, under the guise of democratic, are at work on legalizing the ethnic cleansing and definitive three-part division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    This pre-election direction deals directly with the voters, but even more so with the political parties which have to enter these elections. It should not be doubted that the nationalistic parties will know how to capitalize Frowick's gift and earn on the refugee misery the majority of political mandates. This includes not only the Serbian SDS and Croat HDZ, but also the Muslim SDA party.

    It is really hard to assess whether it is good for Bosnia and Herzegovina that the elections be held at any cost. A good reason for holding the elections are found in the fact that they would lead to a change in power in the Serb entity, finally removing Karadzic from the helm there. In the best instance, the criminal policy will be somewhat softened, but essentially not changed. The Pale-Banja Luka republic is dominated by the opponents of the Bosnian- Herzegovinian statehood and proponents of unification with Serbia and Montenegro. Secondly, even after the elections, Karadzic could keep the essence of power in his hands, as the head of the SDS party. He will surely not move from that position. The only chance of the political elimination and removal of the Bosnian butcher is in his arrest and taking in front of the Hague Tribunal.

    The postponement of the elections or its boycott are important also for the fate of the internal political processes in the Bih Federation, more precisely said - in the territory under the control of the BiH Army, which is the only place where the multi-party system is taking hold.. But even there it is not taken to the essential democratic level.Even there, some party advantages for the SDA are drawn from the so called reality. The most important part of that reality is the monopoly of this party over the key electronic media. SDA has a hundred percent political control over the biH TV and the republican radio waves. It does not show any readiness to give up on this monopoly.

    Frowick cannot help there . Even with proclaimed rule that all parties have equal access to the media, it is known that this will not happen. All the parties will formally get proportionally equal time, but the SDA, as it was so far, will be installed in all programs .It is clear that SDA will enter the electoral race with a few meters of advantage. That is why there is ample reasoning why the suspense over the participation of the majority of the parliamentarian parties from the territory under the legal rule of the B/H authorities should continue. The reasons for the boycott are clear, but on the other side, so are the shortcomings that come along with it. In that manner, all the power would concentrate into the hands of the nationalistic parties.

    Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet, May 2, 1996

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    Main Bosnia analyst of the Belgrade weekly Vreme, Filip Svarm, discusses in the May 18, 1996, issue of that magazine the events behind sacking of the Bosnian Serb prime minister Rajko Kasagic.

    Rajko Kasagic is no longer prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). He was ousted on May 15 by Radovan Karadzic. The reason listed in a statement was ``protection of constitutional order and implementation of agreed policies'' and removing the blockade of the authorities. Karadzic said Kasagic failed to adapt to the situation and that could bring unforeseeable consequences to the state and people.

    Karadzic's decision was not surprising. First he accused ``some Serb politicians'' of pushing the Serbs into a common state with the Moslems and Croats through their irresponsible statements. Then he went a step further and said he would run in the coming elections in Bosnia. He added that ``the international community is wasting its time looking for Serbs with moderate stands.

    Both those statements referred to Kasagic. He's the man who said the peace process will speed up once Bosnian Serb representatives join the newly-established bodies of the Bosnian union. Also, the international community is counting on Kasagic as a moderate to bypass Pale and Karadzic. Confirmation of that lies in the fact that more diplomats and international community representatives came to see Kasagic in the last month than came to Pale over the past few years.

    But, Kasagic responded to Karadzic. At a meeting with 33 Bosnian Krajina MPs he said ``it's shameful for any nation to harbor war criminals'' and indicated he would cooperate with the Hague tribunal. He added that he would reconstruct his government and dismiss ministers ``who oppose the peace process.'' Well informed sources believe that was aimed at hard liners in Pale---Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, Defence Minister Zivomir Ninkovic and others.

    Kasagic intended to raise the government reconstruction issue at a May 15 cabinet meeting in Pale. That meeting never took place and he was ousted.

    Sources close to the EU feel that the Bosnian Serbs lost their only acceptable negotiator when Kasagic was ousted.
    The RS parliament is due to meet soon in Banja Luka. Informed sources there said Kasagic could refuse to leave if he gets support from Belgrade. The precedent for that was set when Karadzic tried and failed to oust army commander General Ratko Mladic. One of the ways out is seen in the form of a government of experts who would run the RS to the elections.

    Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, May 18, 1996

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    Belgrade weekly Vreme May 25, 1996, devoted special attention to the current developments in Bosnia, particularly among the Bosnian Serbs and the position of Radovan Karadzic. The situation there is analyzed in three separate articles by Ljiljana Smajlovic, Filip Svarm and Perica Vucininc.

    United States Information Agency (USIA) has not yet published the results of its public opinion poll conducted in the Bosnian Serb Republic in April, but the processing of the data has been completed. The poll covered three thousand citizens of the Bosnian Serb Republic who, among other things, said what they thought about leading Serbian politicians. Vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic Biljana Plavsic, to whom Radovan Karadzic transferred part of his authority last weekend, was not on the list of the persons whose popularity the Americans were interested in (unlike Ratko Mladic, Nikola Koljevic, Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic and Momcilo Krajisnik). Nikola Koljevic,the vice-president of the Bosnian Serb Republic to whom Radovan Karadzic had transferred no authority, ranks high on the list. VREME has learned that he has the support of as many as 80 percent of the interviewed citizens (39 percent have a ``very favorable'' opinion of him while 41 percent consider him ``favorable to an extent''). The credibility of Karadzic himself is some ten percent lower (31 percent ``very favorable'' and 37 percent ``favorable to an extent'') while Momcilo Krajisnik's position is even worse---only half of the interviewees had a positive opinion of him (20 percent in the superlative and 29 ``to an extent'').

    If we are to trust the Americans, however, only the popularity of Ratko Mladic in the Bosnian Serb Republic exceeds that of Slobodan Milosevic (66 percent think all the best to him, as compared to Milosevic's 52 percent, while on the whole Milosevic is supported by 81 and Mladic by 93 percent of the people). The latest developments in the Bosnian Serb Republic, however, show that it is wiser to take the American results``cum grano salis:'' Karl Bildt's encouragement seems to have led to Rajko Kasagic's dismissal. Bildt had quoted American analyses, according to which Karadzic was losing popularity in the state and in the party while Kasagic was becoming more popular. The same poll shows that Silajdzic would simply ``erase'' Izetbegovic in elections and in the polls carried out six years ago similar interviewees said they would vote for Markovic's reformists and reformed Communists.

    Pale does not take these parameters into consideration when making political steps, but one should wonder why not Nikola Koljevic instead of Biljana Plavsic? If they were looking for someone who could speak with Karl Bildt and John Kornblum, was Koljevic not the right man? He had been in Dayton and he had not been in Bijeljina and he was not embracing Arkan: according to the criteria of clean hands, which are in effect in the Bosnian Serb Republic, he perfectly fits in the image of clean hand personnel, whom the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) requires in order to regain reputation ahead of elections. Throughout the war he was on the spot, he made major decisions and there are no rumors about him being a war-profiteer.

    The latest political solution has proved that Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic has no power in Pale. If Slobodan Milosevic had been asked, Nikola Koljevic would have been the ``acting president.'' Not because Koljevic is ``Milosevic's man,'' since he is not. Three years of Milosevic's efforts to remove Karadzic in Pale, or to find him a credible alternative in Banja Luka, have yielded no results. There are many people across the Drina who would, if they found it personally profitable, betray Karadzic and follow Milosevic, but there is no other fairly relevant ``Milosevic's man'' in the Bosnian Serb leadership. The difference between Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic is not in the faithfulness to Serbia's leader or his ``peaceful policy.'' From Milosevic's point of view, Koljevic would simply be the ``lesser of two evils,'' a fabric which might, in due course, be made into a better and more permanent Rajko Kasagic. But the president was not offered to choose between the ``two evils.''

    This, of course, does not mean that Bosnian Serb leadership will have to obey Belgrade. Karadzic's and Krajisnik's choice is similar to Milosevic's. They, too, have to choose between ``two evils,'' between Sarajevo and Belgrade, between re integration and allegiance. After all, they can choose only between a slow and a fast political death. Bosnian Serb leadership became a hostage of Milosevic's politics and its turns six years ago, when they joined in Milosevic's dance. Having broken off with Milosevic, Bosnian Serbs could not divorce the fateful consequences of his politics. This led them to Dayton, and now they have to live with Dayton. It is in Milosevic's nature to produce an illusion that he has his men across the Drina, who are faithful to him and who will, at a required moment, implement his will.

    At this point, however, Milosevic still cannot remove Karadzic. What beats Serbia's president is that his powerlessness is not a result of Karadzic's power, but vice versa. Something lively and tough has remained of Karadzic's charisma; he still arouses some strong emotions among the Serbs across the Drina, even if these are the kind of emotions one feels at funerals. Karadzic and Mladic still arouse pathos, tragedy of defeat, unfairness of history. Before the war, Milosevic's charismatic personality reigned in Serbia and he communicated with his brothers across the Drina by telepathy. He produced Bosnian Serb leaders by single moves or blessings. He had created Karadzic by giving him two looks of approval: now, it requires more than lying press, NATO army and support of the world community to replace him. The secret is not in Radovan Karadzic's alleged political prestige, nor in the nationalist madness of Bosnian Serbs, but in Slobodan Milosevic and the nature of his reign in Serbia and over the Serbs. He is now relying on the ruling apparatus and repression levers: these methods are not an inspiration for new followers and cannot generate new political energy. It is no longer a matter of a political idea or a political product. That is why Belgrade has no other political follower to offer but Dragutin Ilic, the president of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian Serb Republic, who on Tuesday explained on channel one of Radio Television Serbia that Karadzic was politically dead when the not-so-well-informed media throughout the world were telling the viewers that the Sunday news on Karadzic's political death had been somewhat hasty.

    Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, May 25, 1996 ( Ljiljana Smajlovic)

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    The fate of the Bosnian Serbs depends on one man---Radovan Karadzic. With him the future is hunger, isolation, refugees. Without him everything they spilled their blood for topples. Karadzic's fate will be decided by Slobodan Milosevic who is being threatened with sanctions again. Without Milosevic there would be no dilemma RS vice-presidents Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on May 21. The meeting was cordial, the smiles big and the handshakes were pronounced. Some people recalled that Plavsic refused to shake Milosevic's hand with contempt once and demanded that he renounce Communism. They added that Milosevic declared her a mental case who should be in an institution, and his wife Mira Markovic said she was like Mengele experimenting with her own people.

    A statement to Tanjug said Plavsic is the ``acting RS president'' in charge of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. That coincides with another Tanjug report that Karadzic transferred his powers to Plavsic although both said it was just for contacts with the international community. I don't believe anyone in that game, said the international community's high representative Carl Bildt after meeting Milosevic on May 20.

    When he signed the decree ousting Kasagic, Karadzic also signed a request for his own dismissal. As long as he is in power, international community spokesmen said, the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement can't be implemented.

    Karadzic couldn't oust his prime minister without the silent approval of Belgrade. There are two theories on how everything happened. One says Milosevic gave Kasagic 24 hours after his dismissal to accuse Karadzic of conducting a coup d'etat and, if need be, break off all links between the Banja Luka area and the rest of the RS. Kasagic didn't have the guts for something like that and Milosevic gave him to the Pale leaders. The second says that the flexible and cooperative prime minister (at least with the international community) did not suit Milosevic. Kasagic was growing stronger by the day as the chief negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs. Pale was being pushed out but so was Milosevic. In other words he was a threat to the Serbian president and could have brought him into a position where he would have had to meet all demands on Bosnia without concessions. The support of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments came amid the confusion of reactions from the rest of the world which, both theories agree, Pale and Belgrade did not foresee.

    Now that Karadzic's survival means the sanctions against the FRY could be re imposed efforts are being made to play a trump card---Biljana Plavsic.

    Plavsic has been Karadzic's close associate from the start and she is know for her statements that ``six million Serbs can die so the other six million can live in freedom'' and that ethnic cleansing is ``a natural thing.'' She made all those statements in her calm nasal voice. Her new powers to negotiate with the international community are the best guarantee that Karadzic and Mladic won't be handed over to the war crimes tribunal if they back off. She's also a guarantee that not much will change in the RS.

    Plavsic also suits Milosevic. He has met his obligation of ousting Karadzic from the political scene.
    But, it seems international community envoys aren't about to swallow that story and now they want Karadzic and Mladic extradited as well. Plavsic could be the tool used to buy time: before the sanctions against him are re-imposed he could re-impose sanctions against the RS.

    Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, May 25, 1996 (Filip Svarm)

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    ``The only thing any normal person sees is that Karadzic's rating has dropped dramatically over the past year-he was close to zero, and now he is the absolute favorite. No one can oust him today and that is because of the policies of the international community,''VREME was told by Predrag Lazarevic, a leading member of the Banja Luka intellectual forum and a subtle analyst of conditions in the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). Lazarevic would not say whether the international community consciously raised Karadzic's ratings or made a political error.

    Miodrag Zivanovic, leader of the Banja Luka Social Liberal Party said the RS president made a great deal with the international community; he removed himself from his post and became stronger than ever before. ``Karadzic is in a comfortable position now: he has less duties, a wall of people around him and he still orders a lot of things but isn't responsible for anything,'' Zivanovic said.

    The one thing that does bother the RS opposition leaders is the ease with which the Pale leaders managed to dampen their clash with Kasagic. The opposition (strong only in Banja Luka) stood by the ousted prime minister who it never liked because it had no opportunity of presenting its political stand on the state media and used the clash to say what it does and does not want. Rajko Kasagic was never liked as chairman of the Banja Luka executive board. He was seen as the extended arm of Pale. When he complained that the RS state TV was keeping him off the air many people smiled knowingly and recalled how he didn't allow Mayor Predrag Radic on Banja Luka TV once. In the last days of his premiership, Kasagic got Radic's support and people said he had advanced. Kasagic began insisting on Banja Luka's particularities and advocated it as the capital of the RS, condemned the approach of the media towards the opposition and tried to secure normal conditions for the election campaign.

    The RS opposition, at least its more prominent members, lent their support to Kasagic's policy of openness and condemned the closed policy that led to his ouster. Kasagic was a man who was fascinated by the world and with his contacts with international mediators and often repeated that the Serbs have to understand that the world has no ill intentions.At age 54 he wanted to hear a song by Croatian singer Arsen Dedic on the radio and assumed correctly that the station record library had been cleansed.

    Now that Karadzic has decided to hide behind Biljana Plavsic he could decided to move the government to Banja Luka. That was indicated by the new Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic who said that ``in the future all ministers will be in one place, the seat of the government which the RS parliament will choose soon.'' Bosnian Krajina MPs from Karadzic's SDS party said the president promised Banja Luka will be the center of the RS if they help topple Kasagic. They said Banja Luka as the capital is a solution to be considered in light of the coming arbitration over Brcko. If Brcko is lost, the RS would be cut in two giving the Banja Luka area as the capital much more weight.

    Official Belgrade didn't really get excited by events in Bosnia which is unusual since Belgrade always reacted fiercely when the Bosnian Serb leaders endangered the interests of Serbia. The Belgrade regime press cried foul when the RS authorities obstructed the election campaigning by the RS Socialist party.

    The reconciliation between Plavsic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is a sign that the Serbian leadership supports Karadzic's decision and Karadzic is testing the Dayton agreement by removing the prime minister and reorganizing his authorities.

    Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, May 25, 1996; ( Perica Vucinic)

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    The editor in chief of the Podgorica weekly Monitor comments on the same issue in the May 24, 1996 issue of that magazine.

    The latest reactions of Karadzic show that he doesn't care much for threats and newest powers of Ifor in the sense of possible arrests of those accused of war crimes. The reason he is still not in the Hague, he can thank to the fact that he found himself in the package with the officers of the Yugoslav army, accused of the same thing, and not to the generosity or national feelings of Belgrade.The Yugoslav Army shows no readiness to give its officers accused of war crimes, among them general Ratko Mladic, who is considered a member of the chiefs of staff to the Hague tribunal.Bosnian Serb generals Mladic, Gvero, infamous colonel Sljivancanin and other officers from abroad participated in the funeral of general Djukic in Belgrade. Even though he was a member of the Karadzic army, his funeral was conducted with Yugoslav army honors. This was a daring provocation of the international community.The generals are not only provocating the international factors responsible for the consolidation of the remnants of former Yugoslavia, but are also pushing Slobodan Milosevic into the cracks, so that he is not able to carry out what he took as a statesman's obligation in Dayton.

    International mediators do not show much understanding for his troubles; Milosevic has more than earned them. In the Hague the proof of guilt for Mladic and Karadzic is prepared in absentia. If the Yugo generals do not change their relation towards international institutions, this country will find itself in isolation and under sanctions again.

    Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, May 24, 1996

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    FRY -
    Sacking of the Governor of the Central Bank

    One of the key independent economic commentators, Dimitrije Boarov, writes in the May 17, 1996, issue of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni on the sacking of the governor of the Central bank of FRY, Dragoslav Avramovic.

    Even though everybody who was present at the session of the Yugoslav parliament on May 13 and 14 could foresee that the regime will coldly get rid of the governor, Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, since he dared think with his own head and independently do his job, nobody expected that, against all odds, the popular grand daddy will show so much combat spirit in this grand political conflict. The manner in which dr. Avramovic opened his cards and showed how the superstructure in power lies, falsifies, steals, squanders, supplants and suffocates in luxury, and how much the power is in the hands of ignorants, turncoats, lazyboys and squealers - will remain remembered in the Yugoslav parliament. ff for nothing else, than for the fact that so much human sincere openness and farsighted responsibility so far never happened within its walls.

    The cause of the conflict is well known. Dr. Avramovic wanted to negotiate with world financial circles and colleagues from the states which appeared on the ruins of former Yugoslavia, but the regime did not want to permit that, since this regime actually stays in power based on isolation from world currents and enriching machinations conducted by the political top in the role of the untouchable mediator between this state and that world. Dr. Avramovic showed what money was stashed in Cyprus, what commissions does this top gives to itself and its partners, how much interest it has to infinitely tangle and quarrel with everybody in the world - so that in the last instance it would hold the unscreenable blanket over the trails of its far reaching mistakes, its unbearable mishaps and unscrupulous treachery and lies.

    During those two days in which the Parliament carried out a dirty political deed of the popular governor, daddy Avram paced through the Parliaments as if he was in a trance, sometimes showing infantile belief in the power of his argument, almost naively surprised that his until then supporters from Montenegro so easily leave to hang, that he is treasoned by the New Democracy party, which supported him with a double face, that the opposition is defending him with half voice, counting that he will serve it better as the victim of the regime, than as a victor of a specialized political discussion.

    The economic consequences of dr. Avramovic's fall will not be felt immediately on the value of money, since the regime has to keep the stability of the currency for some time, abiding by the recipe of restrictive monetary policy of dr. Avramovic, so that it could say, after a month, that it can do as well without the monetary saint . Then there will be a rush to the money printing office in Topcider,. Because that is why the uncontrollable governor was sent away.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni, May 17, 1996

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    Drasko Djuranovic of the AIM agency expands in the May 24, 1996 issue of the same magazine on this theme, particularly from the aspect of the fight for the inheritance of the former Yugoslav state.

    Except for the fact that Avramovic did not want to print money whenever somebody orders him to, Avramovic's greatest sin was in his consequential stance that FRY should not insist on the continuity with former SFRY. You cannot feed yourself on continuity , the former governor said, stressing that the stubborn insistence of the FRY to be the sole inheritor of former Yugoslavia could definitely close the doors of international financial institutions to it.

    The supporters and promoters of the ideo of continuity are swamped in bad news again. Any insistence on the continuity as far as the membership of the successor states, including FRY, is not acceptable to IMF, was the message to Belgrade. This being only an additional statement to the EU ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, at the beginning of April, which came with an almost identical opinion.

    The sacking of the governor Avramovic is only the confirmation of the fact that the theory of continuity will not be abandoned at any price. There are many motives for this, of economic, but also mainly political character. The insistence of the Federal government on continuity and prolongation of the talks with IMF could be equalled with the re-introduction of sanctions towards FRY, but now an internal wall is being raised. Educated on the old example of Albania, but also with modern experience of Iraq, the current regime in FRY has opted for temporary, self-willing isolation, until better times come . Entrance into IMF and other financial institutions would understand a different economic policy: privatization and disappearance of state ownership as a form of rule over the economy; liberalization and lowering of customs barriers; financial control of internal and inter-state flow of money and goods... With the entrance of foreign capital and rule of market economy Milodsevic looses an important lever of staying in power - the control over an army of servile CEO's and economy bureaucrats which remain in their positions only as unquestioning executors of orders from the top. The absolute power and free market simply cannot be combined, that is why Milosevic and Montenegrin DPS party, along with him, opted for a closed system.

    On the plane of daily political goals, the insistence on continuity is, actually, an excuse for all the use of force in the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia, for the destruction of Mostar, shooting on Dubrovnik, destruction of Sarajevo... If milosevic would suddenly give up on the theory of continuity, he would have to return to the period of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, to the place of his initial crime. This would mean an unpleasant settling of accounts of a policy whose results are painfully visible. Under the guise of a fight for guarding of Yugoslavia, Milosevic strongly took care of thousands and thousands of Serbs who believed him. How can he admit now that everything was a fight for domination of others in former Yugoslavia ?

    The question of continuity can be finally looked at as personal problem of Milosevic. It is a question of remaining in power of the Serbian leader.If Milosevic accepts that FRY is a new state, he would at the same time admit the thing many already now - that he is actually the main destructor of the former country. Admitting to this would spell a quick political crash.

    Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni, May 24, 1996

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    The same author, this time in the Podgorica weekly Monitor of May 24, 1994 looks at the possible reasons the Montenegrin regime decided to back the Serbian leaders in deposing of governor Avramovic.

    The session of the federal Parliament showed in a clear manner the fearful attitude the leaders of the ruling Montenegrin DPS party have towards the Serbian leader: for the deposing of the super grand daddy all members of the DPS are ready to raise their hands, including the party secretary Svetozar Marovic, who appeared in the Parliament only during the vote. Almost all oppositionary leaders the decision of the Montenegrin regime to back Milosevic saw as the behind the scenes on the relation SPS-DPS.

    According to one version, DPS was able to get important personnel solutions in the Federal administration. To that effect, it is said that the days of the customs chief Mihalj Kertes, with whom Montenegrins were in direct conflict, are over, and that the Montenegrin authorities will get the chance to name the next governor from their personnel list. But, the story about personnel combinations is quite unconvincing. The departure of Kertes has been announced for a while, and seen as his successor is the current director of the Belgrade jail Mihailo Radoman, of whom Montenegrins will not have much use. Also, even if the next governor of the Central bank will be to the liking of the DPS party, it would not profit much. The practice has shown so far that so called montenegrin personnel start serving the interests of the Serbian president as soon as they take a federal post.

    The interesting version is that in deposing of governor Avramovic, DPS demanded economic independence of Montenegro, actually of opening an off shore zone in the Republic. There are indications that negotiations in Belgrade were actually held on this subject. On the first day , at the session of the Federal government, the DPS amendments were simply shrugged off. Only after consultations behind closed doors, the amendments were accepted and the governor deposed.

    The most interesting is the supposed deal about the project Montenegro as free economic zone , which understands the opening of offshore companies and banks, free industrial zone, as the registration of foreign maritime companies. The initiative of the Montenegrin government, at least so far, did not gather positive reactions in Belgrade. Supposedly, the OK has now been given. To make all this more interesting, the Montenegrin government has announced that it will put in front of the Montenegrin parliament a package of related laws already in June.

    The manner in which the idea of individual creation of economic relations in Montenegro is a big question. If Milosevic would allow that Montenegro becomes the center of offshore business in the region, he would soon encounter grave political problems. It would de facto mean the existence of two different economic systems in the FRY, which would inevitably lead to flow of capital from Serbia to Montenegro and registration of a number of strong Serbian companies in Montenegro.In that respect, the economic independence is only a step away from political one. Such a concession, Belgrade will never give willingly. If Milosevic really did promise economic independence to the Montenegrin leadership, he will soon renege on his promise.

    Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, May 24, 1996

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    In the same issue of Monitor (May 24, 1996) the regular commentator of that magazine and a president of the national Peasant Party, Dragan Veselinov also looked at the sacking of governor Avramovic.

    During this year, 1996, the ideology of the national sacrifice on the account of progress has disappeared. With the war defeat of Serbia and enriching of the criminal regime, the people came to their senses.But, it is still afraid to hit back, it does not even have able oppositionary organizations to lead them into attack, and it does not believe the old, pre-war parties. So they are stumbling in the dark . They will hit the light switch sooner or later, but definitely quick enough if Zebic (the current finance minister) and Gazivoda (the Central bank official) and others from the financial chefs of staff turn on the money printing office.

    Our analysts who say that Avramovic fell because Milosevic and Bulatovic do not want to go with the world are mistaken. They do want that, they have to,but they do not want to lose power at that, and they do not want to let it seem that they were forced to do that by a pensioned old man and then beat them in a duel. Oh, they will kneel in front of the Americans and IMF, but they want to present this as theirs, and not old man's victory. Avramovic fell so that he would not be circled with glory. Besides, he challenged them too much publicly, even blackmailed them, so that they would let him look at them from a higher plane with an ironic smile on his face. He also fell because he believed that the quick opening of Serbonegro towards the world would be beneficial to everybody. This is where he made a mistake, he did not pay attention to Milosevic's fear. An express opening would drastically lower the manoeuvreing space to get an immunity from the Hague by the West. If privatization in Serbia started and the US credit for the developmental aid to the currency arrived, Serbian president would already loose one foot for his getaway, without getting anything in return.

    Avramovic only wanted to be a quantitative expert, as if he did not have to understand immediately that economic decisions always influence social equilibrium, whatever it is.Quantitative economists often become naively helpless whenever they throw away the truth that their small research subject is a large reduction of the social situation and that their decisions cannot be generalized. When he concluded that the question of the American credit is a political one - as the question of distribution of power and influence - it was too late, no workers saved him.

    The Belgrade socialists are not even scared of the unknowns of privatization. The state capital has already been placed under the control of party oligarchy. It is not afraid to formalize private ownership, even though than it would legally bear economic responsibility for failure. They are still a bit afraid of a possible inter party conflict concerning who is going to get what company and raise somewhat above his comrade . Milosevic is not preventing privatization because the people would throw him away with it, but because he would personally loose direct control over big directors and strategic economic capacities. In the case of the reform of the economic system, he would definitely be glorified and would win the next elections, but his power would diminish. If he wasn't there, the SPS party would be a content oligarchy with internally balanced division of power among its strongest members, and would conduct the privatization.

    The SPS directors would definitely be gone if the SPS looses power before privatization. The opposition would quickly remove the comrades from their positions.

    Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor, May 24, 1996


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