Issue32/33 Vol. 3 April 30, 1996

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IN THIS ISSUE:

Current Developmets:

Vreme on recent violence in Kosovo

Political Events:

Feral Tribune,Slobodna Bosna, Nezavisni, and Svijet on Bosnia

Globus on regional plan and secret services in Croatia

Monitor on strikes in Montenegro

Nezavisni and Vreme , on relations between Serbia and Montenegro

Vreme on political situation in Serbia

Vreme(AIM) on the Serbia-Kosovo- Albania triangle

Dossier:

Svijet on IFOR's Bosnia

Current Themes:

Vremeon the succession of former Yugoslav state

Comments and analyses by:

Arkzin,Republika,Monitor,Republika(again), andKoha

Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal:

discussed by Feral Tribune andVreme

Situation in the Media:

analyses by Feral Tribune,Monitor andNezavisni

CURRENTDEVELOPMENTS:

On Monday, April 22, just after 9:30 p.m., a masked man with an automatic rifle burst into the Cakor restaurant in Decani and sprayed bullets at the people inside. Owner Danilo Stesevic said his restaurant is a gathering place for Serbs in that Kosovo town. He added that there were about 10 people there that night and three of them were killed. All three were refugees: Stana Radusinovic (48) moved to Decani from Albania, Blagoje Okuka (53) and Djordje Dragic (56) fled the Krajina. Branko Babic (57) another Krajina refugee was wounded. Stevisic dropped to the floor when the attack began. He told reporters that the masked man emptied his AK-47 clip (30 rounds), pulled up his mask to see the damage and fled.

Just half an hour later and 20 kilometers down the road, policemen Zoran Dasic and Safet Kocan stopped a small group of men to check their identification near the police station in Pec. Instead of ID cards the men drew automatic weapons. Luckily the two policemen were only wounded. Another policeman, Milenko Bucic died of gunshot wounds at around 9:10 that night in Stimlje near Pristina. The fourth attack came about 20 minutes after the third on the Kosovska Mitrovica-Pec road when an unidentified attacker ambushed a patrol car wounding policeman Slobodan Dudic and killing prisoner Dragana Nesic (19). Her death was the last that night. The final balance was five dead and four wounded in four attacks all within one hour.

No one claimed responsibility for the attacks, and there were no fresh attacks by Wednesday night.

The Kosovo Democratic Alliance (LDK), the largest ethnic Albanian political party, issued a statement stressing ``the resolve of the Albanian people to fight for their goals peacefully'' and calling the population to refrain from any activity that could lead to violence. The police got back the body armor they only recently stopped wearing and stepped up security measures.'' For now that means intensive patrols and frequent routine checks'' of people and vehicles. There have been no reports of repression. The restraint of the Serbs and Albanians is obvious in their approach to the attacks.

Serbia's state radio and TV reported the attacks in the 31st minute of the main evening news on January 23 through a short statement that only said some incidents'' had occurred in Kosovo in which a certain number of people'' had been killed and added that the executive committee of the Kosovo SPS committee sharply condemns'' the incidents. The regime print media also tried to calm things down: ``Politika'' printed a statement carried by Tanjug on page 13, while Novosti'' published their report on page 11. In both reports, the killings were blamed on Albanian secessionists but with no details of the investigation.

The reaction on the Albanian side is cautious: for now all channels, official and semi-official, are shut tight. A well informed Albanian politician said, the situation is so delicate we can't say anything right now.'' Similar answers came from most other people. To the Serbs in Kosovo the silence is harder to bear than occasional shots in the night.

How can I know what's happening if the RTS just shows Koreans, Chinese and folk singers,'' said Milenko Karan, a Pristina psychologist, ... Five people were killed here and they say nothing.''

Unofficially, there are three interpretations of the attacks and none of them can be taken for granted just yet. The first was voiced by LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, who told Belgian daily Le Soir'' that the killings are a provocation by Serb extremists'' while Bujar Bukosi, the ethnic Albanian prime minister in exile, told the BBC that just because the victims are Serbs, the blame cannot automatically be Albanian.'' Under the second interpretation in the Belgrade tabloid press, the attacks could have been in retaliation for the killing of Albanian student Armand Daci (20) who died a day earlier in Pristina. Daci was allegedly shot from the apartment of a Serb refugee family because they thought he was trying to steal their car. Kosovo Albanians are bitter because the police seemed to show no interest in the case and they brought some 10,000 Albanian women to protest in Pristina. Those were the first mass demonstrations in Kosovo in the past two years. One of the women said the police were restrained and there were no incidents.

Advocates of the third interpretation say it's hard to believe the Albanians (who have the motive for bitterness) could organize vengeance killings just 24 hours in attacks that would make even the IRA proud.

The calmness of the killers, choice of target and the fact that all the attackers used automatic weapons in a short period of time and escaped show that the attacks and attackers were carefully prepared. If this really is an organized terrorist group then the Albanian movement in Kosovo has gotten its military wing and there will be more killing. In that case, the Milosevic authorities, with all its police, has little chance of suppressing them with repressive measures. There are a lot of places in Kosovo where the police station is the only non-Albanian building in town. In all of Kosovo now, there are fewer Serbs than there were in Serb Sarajevo and there are close to two million Albanians. That balance of forces makes it impossible to provide public safety without the consent of the local population. That consent might no longer be there.

Milosevic had to know this before Monday night and be aware of the fact that mass activities in searching for hidden weapons'' are not prevention enough against terrorism. During his climb to power and first years of his rule even harmless and sometimes construed incidents in Kosovo were termed acts of mindless terrorism.'' Now when real terrorism is rearing its ugly head, the regime is confused and acts as if it would prefer to keep quiet about it.

Regardless of who's behind the attacks, their political message is clear: the time to take steps towards a political agreement between Serbs and Albanians is almost over and it's high time to start talking. If they allow the moment to pass there will be more messages of this kind and retaliation and innocent people will die.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , April 27, 1996

INTERNALPOLITICAL EVENTS

After the recent conflict and heavy personal accusations, Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic have unsuspectedly renewed their alliance. Along with some small fry represented in the form of some parties and unions, these two have embarked onto possibly the last attempt to save the whole and multiethnic Bosnia. The salvage operation has the name of the Declaration on the Integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina . The document was signed by some twenty political parties and social organizations - from the ruling SDA party to Women's Union.

The HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina denied its signature, something that was expected, as well as five opposition parties, among whom are also former communists and reformists - which was received with some surprise in Sarajevo.

This document is, in the first place, geared towards the international factors, while its domestic use is curtailed only to one half of the federal entity.Everything that is asked for - is contained within the Dayton agreement. Still, the alarm has already been activated. This was done for two reasons: first, since the Bosnian Serbs were practically left with the freedom of the choice between Belgrade and Sarajevo, and second, since the civil clauses of the Dayton agreement are being implemented shoddily. For now, IFOR successfully keeps watch between the three armies, and that is about it. Bosnia somehow survived the war, but it is hard to foresee that in these conditions it will survive the peace.

The unsuspected rapproachment between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic somewhat pushed aside the Declaration itself, becoming a subject of various speculations. Everybody asks themselves what lies behind it.There is no question that it is being forced upon them. It is only a question whether it is a fruit of their analyses of the situation in Bosnia, or, as many think, it is a question of American pressure. For a long time, Washington has not been inclined towards Izetbegovic, due to the nature of his ties with Iran. The American press ties him with tendencies of installing Muslim fundamentalism in Bosnia, something he has publicly denied a few times. The elections are coming this autumn, and the US, supposedly, wants to see Silajdzic as the Bosnian leader instead of Izetbegovic.

This can sound quite convincing, but, it still does not provide the answer is America in its policy towards Bosnia motivated by unacceptance of formation of an Islamic mini-state or the resoluteness to safeguard unified and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Positioning of this theme in the context of fight for power also has its supporters. According to their opinion, the separation of Izetbegovic and Silajdzic was only a big manoeuvre through which small political differences have been elevated to the level of uncompromising options. For now,there is no arguments that can confirm this thesis.
Izetbegovic, for whom this is a first attempt to save Bosnia looking for support in the opposition, stated that he was angry at the representatives of political parties and unions which did not sign the Declaration, naming them as political calculants.

Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune April 8, 1996

Mostar is divided as before. Croats still wish that this city becomes the capital of a Croatian mini-state, and the Muslims still want that they be governed by Sarajevo. But now, there is a great difference. While the sovereignty of the government in Sarajevo is recognized in the whole world, even the Croatian president Tudjman does not openly recognize the Croatian mini state of Herzeg-Bosnia .And while the Muslims in great number agree what was proposed in Dayton for their city, the Croats want that everything is postponed until tomorrow, hoping that tomorrow will never come.

One of the largest open questions represents the one concerning the freedom of movement between the eastern and western bank. Three dates designated for the opening of all crossings in the city have passed, and the Croatian resistance in all three cases has prevented this from happening. The insist that the opening of the city would mean that people are crossing delineation lines so that they could settle accounts, and that this would lead to the renewal of conflict.

In their answer to this, the Muslims say that even now it would not be hard to cross the separation line if somebody really wishes to, and that if anybody wanted to settle any accounts with Croats on the western bank, they would have already done so. They will be settled by the Hague tribunal , is a common answer.

The Mostar Muslims have suffered so much, and still it seems that they came out of the war much happier and content than their neighbors on the western side, which are in a much better economic position. What the Mostar Croats simply cannot understand is why does everybody support the government in Sarajevo, when these are all Muslims .Even though it takes you five seconds on the eastern bank to realize you are not in a state controlled by Muslim fundamentalists, on the other bank things might look different. This particularly when you watch the TV program coming form eastern Mostar, and see that a program in Arabic is being transmitted all day long, even though no more than 10 percent of the people on the eastern bank speak that language.

The Mostar Croats are currently the most dissatisfied people in Bosnia - even more than the Serbs from Sarajevo, which at worst have decided to leave. There is no doubt that many Croats will leave Mostar. The ones that will remain will be from the hardcore , well armed, but not so well educated, and poor. Criminals. In short, all those that see their salvation, after Zagreb has abandoned them, in the resumption of war.

If the Croat-muslim federation breaks down somewhere, it will be in Mostar. If that happens, the side that feels it is loosing, will secure that the Serbs be drawn into conflict again by firing a few grenades at them. And then we will all get what we asked for.

Source: Sarajevo weekly Slobodna Bosna , April 5, 1996

Radovan Karadzic was able to squeeze out of his Parliament the prerogative by which he is the only one who has the right to name the people who will negotiate with the international community. The Parliament also formed a special State committee for the cooperation with the international community, which should, as was stated, secure the independence and sovereignty of Republika Srpska achieved by the Dayton agreements .

In the background of these parliamentary decisions lies the conflict of Radovan Karadzic and the political top of the Bosnian Serbs with their prime minister Rajko Kasagic. At the parliamentary session, Karadzic openly criticized the government, saying that it too easily accepts the measures that lead to the weakening of the Serbian entity at the expense of the central Bosnian authorities. After the session he said that negotiators sometimes... Awaken in the opponents the hope that Bosnia could be integrated . The opponents in this case are the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community.

Those in the know of the situation among the Bosnian Serbs insist that Karadzic and his aides have prepared a frontal attack on Kasagic, which would include a demand for vote of confidence. But, they abandoned that idea when it was seen that Kasagic has thick backing in Belgrade, and that he has unreserved backing of the Banja Luka region.

Kasagic is a pragmatist that supports wide economic cooperation with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also with all former Yugoslav republics. He does not shy away from talking about establishment of a joint payment system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other joint functions envisaged by the Dayton agreement. Karadzic and his aides want to cull out of that agreement only what pertains to the statehood of the Serbian entity.

Kasagic is also the first official of the Bosnian Serbs that came into inflict with Karadzic, requested help from Belgrade and - remained on his feet, I.e. Kept his office and influence. The political observers think that this is also due to the fact that he has a strong internal base in the Banja Luka region and strong backing of Belgrade. The representatives of the international community and international negotiators are also inclined towards him, and the journalists have also noticed that with his sleek looks he jumps out of the background he moves within.

Belgrade observers agree that strengthening of the pragmatic Kasagic is so far the strongest threat to the influence of Karadzic and central authorities of Bosnian Serbs. It is particularly stressed that the prime minister, in difference to the previous Milosevic choice, vice president Nikola Koljevic, is an influential man on the internal scene.

The decision of the Bosnian Serb parliament can burden the intentions of Milosevic and Kasagic, but cannot fully threaten them. The Serbian leadership from Pale could hardly sustain the game with Belgrade and the world, even if it would be fully united and backed by the population. It could hardly do that now at the time that regional divisions have grown, and people openly criticize Karadzic for the loss of great number of lives and significant territories.

It is expected that the prime minister will answer back although that might not be immediately. The observers think that Milosevic has secured, in Banja Luka and cities in the north, and partly in the east of Bosnia, decisive influence in political, economic and military affairs. If he wants to keep that influence, he will use the chance offered by the strengthening of the role of Kasagic to make a decisive attack on Karadzic.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , April 12, 1996

The last weekend of March saw the meeting in Tuzla of persons from parties, associations and NGO's from the areas of almost whole state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for a long time known under the name of Democratic alternative. This meant the members of both social democratic parties - SDP and UBSD, then people from the opposition in the Serb entity, representatives of the associations like Krug 99 from sarajevo and Citizens Forum from Tuzla.

Condensing what has been achieved so far, the head of the Tuzla Citizens Forum , Vehid Sehic, states that the people from the Democratic alternative are for a long time clear with the fact that Dayton agreement did not bring secure peace, but just the cessation of hostilities. For this, the ruling oligarchies have to be thanked for , since they have accepted the painful and hard compromise only under pressure, practically loosing the legitimacy of builders of peace.

A joint stance of the Democratic alternative was prepared, and was put in a final statement of the Tuzla session, repeating the demand to the international community to exert pressure on the ruling structures, so that they would deal more with the operation of the Dayton agreement, endless with personal mistrust, with which they should deal through the institutions of the system, and not through secret dinners of party officials and conspirative meetings.

Sejfudin Tokic already blamed the national oligarchies for the possible breakout of hostilities after the departure of IFOR troops, which, did not ask their populations for anything, nor have done anything against federal mafia , which is only growing stronger. The head of the Liberal party of Banja Luka Miodrag Zivanovic went further, asking whether the decisive influence and open meddling of the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman and police-party regime of Slobodan Milosevic, which support political and ethnic breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina ?

Another Serb oppositionary, Miodrag Dodik said that the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be offered the Tuzla model.

These words currently might seem like an insistent, but slow walk towards the windmills. The Tuzla meeting received sharp criticisms from all supporters of national oligarchies, particularly to hold the next session of the Democratic alternative in Banja Luka.

Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet April 11, 1996

Arlovic says that the recent changes in the legal status of the city of Zagreb and Zagreb county, have come about when the political balance in Zagreb tilted in the direction of the opposition.Since the ruling party, even with all the means it used was not able to regain control in the county, it decided to change the law.

It was important to create a new legal background for the elections and regaining of power.All the cards were thrown at the city of Zagreb and its inhabitants.But, the citizens have recognized the sacam and willing the protection of their interests and democracy, they voted for the oppositionary coalition.

Then, the problems started for the ruling party. HDZ could not concede to fact that it has an oppositionary situation in the capital, and power on the state level.

The attempt to place current proposal for a change within a democratic framework is done again through legal means, partly due to attempt to act democracy in our circumstances, and even more in front of the world, first of all Council of Europe.

The absurd of Croatian democracy in that manner has been brought as far as it goes. From the introduction of the local self-governing system, up until today, there were hundreds of initiatives and demands for its change,. From the territorial system as far as the change of the contents. With it, actually, nobody was completely satisfied: the citizens, the bodies of the local self-rule, the opposition, but also the larger part of the representatives of the ruling party. It seems that only the top closed circle of the HDZ . Now that this pleasure has been ruined by an oppositionary situation a change is being prepared of the local self-rule in Zagreb.

The working draft on local self-rule is already circulating and professional circles, as well as the law on new territorial system of counties and cities. Obviously, a new electoral geometry and rules are being created which would ensure a victory for the HDZ in possible oncoming elections, even if the voters unreasonably or incorrectly vote for the opposition.

If the present relations concerning financing, prerogatives, even the property and overseeing are kept, a question could be posed what is left to the self-rule.

Different modalities of choosing city mayors are envisaged. In the big cities the mayors would be voted into the office directly, and in all others, as well as the counties, that would fall upon the representative bodies. Again, there is opening of the possibility that the city of Zagreb would be separated from the region of Zagreb, which would now encompass the former city ring, with the name of Prigorska-Samoborska region and with the seat in the bordering city of Samobor.

What is to be said about the percentage system which is being offered for the election of representative bodies of the self-ruling units?

Particularly, if one has in mind the fact that within the cities, or counties, there is possibility of inclusion of suburbs, as well as other dwelling and etc ! Is it possible, after such elections, to expect a possible situation that some places would not be even represented in the parliament of certain bodies ? We are in front of elections. When ? This will be decided by the ruling party, attempting to target the time when, according to its estimates, it will have the best chance to keep the power with the largest possible margin.

Arlovic expresses the hope that after the new election a new anathema will not be thrown the opposition's way, even reaching the levels that it is proclaimed as internal enemy , only because the voters will vote for the opposition parties.

Source: Zagreb weekly Globus , April 19, 1996

The editor of the Zagreb weekly Globus Davor Butkovic looks into the political background of a big purge within SIS - Military secret service of Croatia, in the April 26 issue of that magazine.

At the end of February of this year a general mobilization was proclaimed within the ranks of the SIS - Security Informative Service of the ministry of Defence of Croatia. The reason behind this was a document, prepared by then former officials of the SIS and given to the members of Parliament, and then, since the MP's, including some very serious members of the opposition, did not want to read it, the general public, finally passing it on to journalists.

The matter concerns a Report by two ranking officers and one colonel of the SIS, which contains a number of compromising documents marked state secret and which make heavy accusations some, now degraded officials of Croatian security services for crime, shoddy work, and eavesdropping of leading Croatian politicians, oppositionaries and journalists, including Josip Manolic and Josip Boljkovac, who at the time they were bugged, held the posts of Prime minister and Minister of police.

It is of particular interest that these former officials of SIS insist that president Tudjman personally ordered them to prepare that document about the scandals within the ministry of Defense.
It was thought for a while in Zagreb political, military and police circles, after the publication of this Report that this dossier was intentionally publicized by SIS, so to compromise the competitive agency - SZUP - the police Service for the protection of constitutional order, since the published documents obviously point to the fact that SZUP was the one that conducted the large number of unauthorized eavesdropping, and that some of the mentioned agents are police officers.

But, two sources of the editor, a high official of the SIS, and another source close to the Croatian intelligence community insist that in the first two months of this year a complete chaos ensued in the ranks of SIS, and that the military counterintelligence service was completely incapable to stop the publishing of the report.

Due to this supposedly chaotic situation in the SIS, the head of all Croat intelligence services, dr. Miroslav Tudjman, decide to make thorough changes.
First of all, he thought about closing SIS completely and opening up a new, much more effective service. But, that idea was abandoned quickly. Then the decision on its reorganization was arrived at. The job was given to colonel Ante Gugic, who was partly responsible for the suppression of crime within the HVO units in Herzegovina. Even though Gugic is formally answering to the service head, Markica Rebic, also a close friend of president Tudjman, he has been given an almost free hand.

The purge that is ensuing is taking place at both high and low levels. This means that most of the old servicemen of the SIS will be fired and replaced by those that Miroslav Tudjman and minister of defense Gojko Susak consider worthy of trust. Supposedly in those two months more than two hundred new people were hired in the SIS, mainly from Herzegovina. The choice was made during the recovery of minister Susak in Siroki Brijeg in Herzegovina, where he was joined for a few days by dr. Miroslav Tudjman.

The main change taking place in the Croatian intelligence-security system is substantial loss of influence of the SZUP Service, compromised by the accusations in the mentioned report. But in this service they adamantly denied the reports from the high circles in the Ministry of defense that the head of SZUP, Smiljan Reljic, who holds that position for four years, is to be replaced soon.

It is a fact that politicians close to the ministry of defense have been attempting for a while now to overtake important positions in the ministry of Interior. The departure of Reljic would signify the disposal of the last rival of Gojko Susak and his close political partner Vice Vukojevic from the Croatian security system.If Reljic goes, police minister Ivan Jarnjak would be left with only a handful of loyal aides and would be much more politically vulnerable. It is a big question whether Jarnjak will be able to sustain further attacks from the right wing of the HDZ party and the attempts of Susak and Vukojevic people to depose him.

SZUP itself has prepared a counter document that will be presented to the closed session of the Parliament, end which, as this service insists, contains the true facts about the eavesdropping affair. Still, the sources of the globus editors insist that the political structure of the Croatian security services are changing, and that this whole system is coming under full political control of the strongest Croatian minister, Gojko Susak.

Source: Zagreb weekly Globus April 26, 1996

It began with the Bjelasica in Bijelo Polje, continued with Obod in Cetinje, Bauxite mines in Niksic and came to Cetvrti novembar plant in Mojkovac. The wave of strikes and disposal of CEO's has begun. When and how it will end is still an open question.Since the suspension of sanctions, at least ten company directors have been forced to resign or was replaced under the pressure from workers.

Is every workers protest so far a story in itself, or can some joint characteristics be drawn ? Every rebellion so far for now was reduced to the dissatisfaction with the situation within the company itself.

Since the suspension of sanctions more than six months have passed and many have felt this period as the time of unfulfilled hopes. The suspension of sanctions has left no trace on the regularity of salary payments, even less on their level - the measuring sticks used by the workers for the quality of economic recovery. The data of the Union show that more that 26 thousand employed receive their salaries two months late (the average being around 120 DEM). A few thousand workers has not received their salaries for more than a year.

Why did the directors come first under the attack of the workers discontent ? It seems they were the first ones to fail the examination since they were not able to revive the production, or more precisely, they did not find the way to return the workers to their jobs and to secure them more orderly and higher salaries.

There is no question though of movement of the dissatisfaction from factory circles to the streets and opening of more serious questions of the weaknesses of the economic policy and system.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor , April 5, 1996

The mutual recognition between FRY and Republic of Macedonia on April 8, 1996, has put an end to a long and unreasonable prolongation by the Serbian regime to do the thing that was clear from the beginning it will not be able to evade without an unbearably high damage to itself.

The agreement between Skopje and Belgrade could symbolize the final end of the war in the Balkans and signalize mutual normalization of relations between all newly formed states in the region of former Yugoslavia.

The importance of the normalization of the Yugoslav Macedonian relations is not lessened in any manner by the fact that the Belgrade agreement was signed only when the regime in Belgrade could not evade it in any manner anymore. Those who, despite all, have not lost the faith that they will live to see the establishment of democracy in Serbia, are particularly encouraged by the fact that this time Milosevic loosened up not only under the pressure of the mighty internationals , but also these domestic. Probably even more so due to these latter.

Montenegrin prime minister Milo Djukanovic in an interview to Serbian oppositionary (SPO) magazine Srpska Rec denied the right to Milosevic to further conduct internal and foreign policy of FRY. This job, should be undertaken, with no remnants, by the Federal government, which is constitutionally designated to do that. It is interesting that this is the first interview Djukanovic gave to an oppositionary paper.

Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic, almost at the same time given interview to Radio Yugoslavia , repeating in a more diplomatic manner what Djukanovic openly stated. Bulatovic said that Yugoslavia has a future, but on a new basis and connected with Europe and the world.

The political message of Podgorica to Belgrade is clear. It says: we are for Yugoslavia, but not at any price. Along with that message goes another one, which warns that in that sense there is a consensus between the regime and opposition in Montenegro.

This message from Podgorica dangerously brings into question Milosevic's position of undisputable leader of all Serbs and main guarantor of peace in the Balkans . So, if Milo Djukanovic does not withdrawn what he said, or if milosevic does not remove him from the political scene, this would practically mean that there is no undisputable leader of all Serbs and that from now on the guarantor of the peace in the Balkans will less and less be one man and more and more constitutionally based internal and foreign policy of Belgrade.

The attempt to curtail Milosevic's absolutism comes literally at five to midnight . Vital interests of this state are at stake. If something is not done urgently and all obligations undertaken in Dayton are fulfilled, including the cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the UN could put into motion the procedure for the return of sanctions against Yugoslavia. And, if we find ourselves in the quarantine again, this would surely politically and economically finish us.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , April 12, 1996

The public support for National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic is fading after the latest attacks against him and now he just alludes to that support and tell reporters to ask them.'' It's hard to expect anything to leak to the public before a public statement,'' a source close to the Podgorica authorities told Vreme.

The silence continues after pressure from the Montenegrin opposition to make that support public given the new circumstances. Whether that will happen soon depends on the outcome of the arguments between Belgrade and Podgorica far from the public eye, the source said.

The greatest doubt stems from the question: if Montenegro supports Avramovic, does it also support federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic. Why doesn't it start the mechanism to replace him the more so since the federal government is a favorite topic with Montenegro Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and the fact that many decisions by the federal government endanger Montenegro's equality in the federation.

In any case, the general assessment is that the difference of views on the talks with the IMF and World Bank are causing cracks in the coalition between the Socialists in Belgrade and Podgorica. The federal government is a coalition of the two ruling parties and if the Montenegrin DPS persists in supporting Avramovic the coalition will break-up and the government will fall, said Dragan Soc, National Party parliament group chief. He added that would happen if the DPS really does support Avramovic, which would be the only logical and possible thing---but everything that is happening points to the conclusion that this is feint within a feint.

The Montenegrin opposition all agree that the bad outcome of the Paris talks is not in the republic's interest and that the ruling party should be careful. Kontic's dismissal would change nothing but some people are wondering what would happen if Kontic took a guarded position like Avramovic which he can do under the constitution. If Avramovic can be defended in parliament, Kontic can do the same since assessments are that the necessary majority would be secured to keep them in place if the DPS really supports Avramovic. But, in an interview to Poland's Zecpospolita daily, Kontic insisted on everything Avramovic opposes.

What would happen if the DPS starts proceedings to oust Kontic? Recall that Kontic is a Montenegrin parliament deputy along with his deputy Uros Klikovac. The opposition pointed out in vain Article 100 of the Constitution which says ``a member of the federal government cannot hold another public or professional post.'' Instead of taking their parliament seats away, the Montenegrin government would delay parliament session for hours waiting for Kontic and Klikovac to arrive from Belgrade to vote.

The DPS can call for a government confidence vote which could oust the prime minister and perhaps exert decisive pressure on the main power center in Belgrade. There are assessments that Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic would get strong parliament support for that which could cause a big crisis and decisive moves on the political scene which would endanger Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Is that possible and is it true that only Bulatovic answered Avramovic's letter asking for support from him, Lilic and Milosevic? That report was not confirmed by the Bulatovic cabinet nor was the report that he talked to Avramovic afterwards.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , April 20, 1996

Amid the overall mood of defeat, the authorities emitted several nervous signals showing fear of possible disturbances. That probably stems from the ruling party's assessment that it does not rank too high with the population.

A state of nervous indecision is ruling Serbia this spring. The regime is waging a cold war with the democratic opposition which has announced it will: unite in parliament and out of it to oppose the regime, ask where all the money went and who stole last year's wheat crop, and demand the return of Serbia to Europe, speedy privatization, a civil society and the rule of law (Belgrade, March 9, Nis, March 30).

The chameleons in the regime are waging occasional anti European campaigns (against Vuk Draskovic and the independent media), upsetting Milosevic's deals with the West at times and seem to be forcing him to make a mess of what he deleted, and wait for the elections in Russia to see if Zyuganov will bring something they prefer.

The democratic opposition is forced to submit the bill of guilt for the war in which two centuries of Serb history and honor disappeared. That gives it the excuse to, as Draskovic does, ironically hit back and say we planned the war, we worked with criminals, we chased the Serbs out of Sarajevo, we went to war with the whole world, we tricked the people out of their money.

When the new propaganda produces an adverse effect in the world which Serbia is headed for (and it must all seem anachronous, backward and despotic to the world) then they start lying about the highest, excessive, even dangerous level of media freedom, parties, individuals.

The regime could have, but didn't want to, use the mood and pressure from political parties willing to turn the page in the interest of consolidating Serbia and bringing it closer to Europe, postpone the debates on guilt and defeat and took several steps (stopped live TV coverage of parliament, took over Studio B) which frustrated democratic forces, pushed them away, forced them to use anti-Communist arguments and continued preventing the consolidation of the political scene as it did during the war.

The Socialists and Communists are now attacking only those parties which had a chance of winning European legitimacy or, failing that, exerting pressure for a rapprochement with Europe, before them. Just like they attacked federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic before the war who was seen as the American man.'' One of a series of comments against Draskovic even said that they are the ones who enjoy international trust not Draskovic.

They know Seselj is still fairly strong but they're leaving him alone maybe because they need a conflict to eliminate the competition and give themselves legitimacy as the only factor of stability and the Radicals have been presented as a scarecrow, an export, like Zhirinovsky was to Yeltsin. Seselj seems to be thinking that the latest series of attacks is useful to regime opponents and is saying he's sorry his party hasn't been attacked.

Draskovic is teasing Milosevic now by telling officers and generals to think what they should do. The army is unhappy about the ruin and abandon'' technique but hasn't shown any visible sign of being disloyal, but state employees have. Teachers and metal workers have been protesting and now civil servants are saying they'll strike.

What does Milosevic do in that situation? Changes in the party, promotions in the police, monopolies over the main print and electronic media, an anesthetic in the form of 48 political and non-political, state or private, local or national TV channels in the form of light entertainment and humble loyalty. The opposition is banned from meeting in squares, it's being obstructed with bizarre details at rallies. After the rally in Nis, the opposition is saying the authorities are even faking the weather forecast because of their gatherings (they predicted snow on a sunny day). A large number of policemen are on alert every time the opposition meets but neither the police or demonstrators are showing any visible tendency to clash.

The SPS Congress showed that the party is becoming a collection of the leader's courtiers, and party protgs are being eliminated so they won't resist anything and that spreads insecurity. After Dayton and before it, he opted for optimistic propaganda to make up for the visible results.In his address to the SPS Congress Milosevic said the priority is economic development (and economic and cultural development), and added that contemporary economic and technical experience would be used. Political experience in the free democratic world was not mentioned when he spoke of the formula to unite experts, workers, farmers, intellectuals and young people.

Todor Kuljic said in his eloquent historic study Forms of Personal Power that the leader usually needs a high ranking figure to take the responsibility for failures and unpopular measures; the sultan had the grand vizier, Western monarchies had governments, socialism has police chiefs (who loses his head over the need to hide crimes. Stalin executed several police chiefs who protected his charisma). A lot has been written to prove President Milosevic is pushing the police but that story is complicated because of Kosovo.

Milosevic made several public gestures in an effort to show that he's looking to technocracy, i.e. the Serbian government made up of company directors who are supposed to get production and investments moving and keep the economy somewhere between East and West by preserving the system.

Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic was hugged by the president at the congress and received him during a session of the republican parliament.

The government, headed by the experience of socialist directors, has some advantages over the Zelenovic and Bozovic war time governments and Sainovic's hyper-inflation cabinet, but it faces a possible loss of credibility over the so-called conflict of interest when cabinet ministers are company directors and their companies are working with the government as in the case of last year's wheat harvest which Djindjic is pressing. The authorities tried to cover up the scandal by refusing to start a debate in parliament and by filing a law suit which got a political dimension once Djindjic became a witness. The game is going both ways- - Milosevic's spies are hammering the opposition but documents are being leaked to the opposition.

The government will be restructured soon but that probably won't change it too much.

Milosevic's main political capital is the fact that foreigners rely on him because of the promises he made (in English and psychologists say it's harder for him to lie in English) but that support ties his hands because it's conditioned on constructive activities in the region, democratic behavior at home and normalization of relations with the Albanians. He doesn't even like the d'' in democracy and there probably won't be a dialogue with the Albanians soon, judging from the recent round table on inter-ethnic relations.

Despite all the boasting, there hasn't been any money from the West yet and everything is standing. Milosevic might have judged he can allow some capitalism (as much capitalism as there is capital) and some state control. He also destroyed pro-European political rivals and woke nostalgia for Communism. JUL was promoted by the media as planned and a large part of the nomenclature, civil service and organized journalists were allowed to join it and the president's wife. The opposition pointed out that a large number of the new capitalists with links to the state are there as well.

Besides family reasons, no one can list any reason why the Socialist authorities are turning one body into two. If this continues, they could wonder one day whether the authorities are controlled by the Socialists or Communists who brag of having 100,000 members.

The opposition isn't focusing as much anger on Milosevic as it used to, as much as it's using humor to destroy his charisma and show he's tied with apron strings.

Unlike the time he was climbing to power when he demonstrated decisiveness, Milosevic is hesitating now. There was a lot of calculation in his determination in earlier years but it was wrong, based on the false assumption of a coup in Moscow, the power of force in politics and everything else. His hesitation now is certainly conditioned by the political and theoretic ambitions of his wife, hopes of the return of Communism in the East, the interests of many lackeys and the needs of the poor for social security of any kind. The strongest pressure to resist changes might be coming from the techno-managers in the economy who are still clinging to state subsidies.

The killing of politics by suppressing parliament, silencing the opposition, weakening the independent media and barring political content form state media has strengthened the dull resignation and hopelessness that came with the defeat in war, lack of a catharsis at the end of the war and four months of no visible economic improvement. Emotional, political, material and psychological reserves are way down. Institutions that lost their autonomy are showing no sign of fighting to win it back.

Sociologist Silvano Bolcic defined the situation as a destroyed society.''

The president's environment recalls the Autumn of the Patriarch by Marques. His power is huge but he has few trustworthy associates and he's giving them several jobs at once.

A more detailed analysis would show signs of crisis in every field outside the leader's direct control, a confusion characteristic of declining totalitarian regimes. That could be dangerous: sustaining controlled chaos to extend rule.

Source; Belgrade weekly Vreme , April 6, 1996

Maintaining the physical border with Albania in the present-day circumstances is like insisting on some kind of an ideological Magino line which can have no rational purpose. In the Serbian-Albanian relationships which were frozen and very stiff for years, a step has finally been made, which gives hope that the problem will move from the deadlock.

Belgrade has revoked exit visas for travelling to Albania which were introduced in 1981 in order to control and prevent contacts between Kosovo and Albania. The revocation of exit visas which is to take effect in late April may be considered as the first sign of the good will of Belgrade, which is aware that serious negotiations with Albania are about to begin. The revocation of exit visas is not a great and painful concession for Belgrade. Visas were introduced in order to prevent close contacts and connections between Tirana and Pristina which were established in the seventies when Kosovo was fairly autonomous. In the meantime, the system of exit visas has become an inefficient and anachronic measure because the Kosovo Albanians found alternative ways to travel to Albania (via Macedonia, or even via Europe). However, the Serbian police applied the exit visa regulations. Passport control was very strict on ethnic Albanians and the Serbian police took their passports if they had stamps from Macedonian-Albanian border crossings, or any other kind of indirect proof that their owners had visited Albania. The suspicion that one had been in Albania was a strong enough reason for harassment, informative talks with the police and even persecution. The first ones to be persecuted were those who erased stamps in their passports in order to conceal that they had visited Albania. The constant strict passport control did complicate communication between Kosovo and Albania but did not prevent it.

Maintaining the physical border with Albania in the present-day circumstances is like insisting on some kind of an ideological Magino line which can have no rational purpose. The classical police control and border regime can no longer limit the flow of people, goods and especially ideas. In the situation when Albania and Kosovo are part of the world telephone and electronic communication networks, when we have satellite television, the police methods of seizing Albanian books and magazines at the border become nonsense. Information, articles and books are exchanged via modems and the old-fashioned police logic is completely powerless and outdated for these forms of communication.

Another fact concerning the Serbian-Albanian border also shows that this police logic is being overcome---Kosovo tourist companies are planning to start operating air traffic between Pristina and Tirana soon. In addition to the revocation of exit visas, this will be a new satisfaction for the Albanians who wish to go to Albania on business, to visit their relatives or to go there as tourists.

However, one should not hastily assess the easing of the Serbian-Albanian relations. The fact that the Serbian police no longer require exit visas does not mean they will automatically facilitate other forms of the border regime toward Albania. One should not have illusions that revocation of exit visas will overcome the gap of political and strategic interests which separate Belgrade from Pristina and Tirana. Major problems remain where they were, with no real signs of yielding, only Belgrade now seems more willing to start a dialogue with Pristina and especially with Tirana. Albanian President Sali Berisha last winter made several compromise statements about Kosovo, which even included the resolution under the Yugoslav sovereignty. Berisha, in exchange, asked that Belgrade should show its good will by revoking exit visas for people travelling to Albania. If Belgrade's latest decision is a reply to Berisha's request, this might mean that Belgrade is praising Tirana's moderate policy, i.e. that when it comes to the essential status of Kosovo, Belgrade and Tirana understand each other better than Belgrade and Pristina.

Pristina sees the revocation of visas as a good sign but not as a fulfilled condition for the beginning of serious talks. Pristina demands cancellation of the repressive police regime installed fifteen years ago. More precisely, Pristina would like Belgrade to make real and not only symbolic steps. Freeing of political prisoners, elimination of police repression, giving people back their jobs, liberation of Albanian-language media-- radio and TV above all---normalization of the work of schools and university in Albanian, might be some of the gestures of good will. Belgrade and the installed local Serbian authorities do not even want to hear of such steps. Some of the ethnic Albanians who had been dismissed are now returning to their jobs and even getting compensation for the damage that had been inflicted upon them during 1990-92 when ethnic Albanians were being illegally dismissed. Some of those who had lodged appeals are now being called to court and even getting positive answers.

However, this action of the Serbian courts, which is probably coordinated with tactic plans of Milosevic's team concerning Kosovo, is still a limited one and most of the ethnic Albanians do not trust the purpose of the selective return to work. They believe that it is aimed at making a split among the Albanians, or at making some of them dependent on the existing system. Such expectations may easily be recognized in the Serbian regime propaganda over the past few months, such as the claims that part of the Kosovo Albanians are gaining self-awareness'' and are abandoning the secessionist leadership.'' This, of course, is more of a wish than a reality. Albanians know that selective offers cannot essentially change the installed anti-Albanian system, but can only change it superficially. The Serbian regime is trying to partly improve the dark image of mass violation of human rights in Kosovo, which has been mentioned in numerous reports of various influential international organizations (UN, OECS, European Parliament, etc.).

However, although Belgrade cannot hope to have a fairly influential pro Yugoslav generation of Albanians in Kosovo, the ethnic Albanian political circles are afraid of the consequences which manipulation with the unemployed might have. These people have no alternative solutions for their difficult situations.

On the other hand, a general approach to the return to work has many concrete tensions and dissatisfactions. The ethnic Albanians who received their cases for the sustained damage (which the courts in some cases estimated to as much as 100,000 dinars-- or approximately 30,000 German Marks) are not satisfied with the collective approach to the problem because they must immediately decide whether to return to work and force the companies to pay the compensation. By yielding to the pressure of the community, they personally would lose and the reward for the concrete sacrifice seems to be virtual with uncertain answers to when and how it would take place. The distinction between the rationality and irrationality of practical decision-making of human beings becomes more than obvious in these cases.

The easing of the border regime, which was at first received with joy, even with euphoria called the beginning of the fall of the so-called Albanian Berlin wall,'' later proved as a diabolic act. Revocation of exit visas is a good sign, but it can also be understood as an act which re-confirms the existing borders. The only thing that is being canceled is the system of exit visas, while entry visas remain in effect, as well as the control of all border crossings. Traffic across the border will be made easier for the Albanians, but Kosovo remains part of Serbia and Yugoslavia. From this aspect, the concession Belgrade is making has its consequences. At the critical moment, when the international community reiterated the principle that borders cannot be changed, and when Kosovo was said to be remaining in Serbia, Belgrade took only a preventive step in order to neutralize the strongest proof of the Kosovo Albanians---their right to maintain free political, cultural and economic communication with Albania as their mother-country. Belgrade can now tell the world: this is where we have opened the door for free communication of the Albanians. After this, Belgrade can promise that the Albanians will be denied no other right except the right to secession!

It could be said that Belgrade is preparing and adjusting itself for a possible compromise in the resolution of the Kosovo issue. The adoption of the principle of unchanged borders must be compensated by wider political rights for the Albanians, which should essentially go---if not so far as full right to self determination---as far as that which is called internal self-determination.

In this case, because of direct implications concerning the stability in the region, the self determination of Kosovo Albanians must have certain foreign guarantees. This is why the world political centers consider the Kosovo issue internationalized. This means that the principle of unchanged borders should not be understood in the classical sense of the word. The borders are re-affirmed, but the tendency of their relativization prevails.

New Balkan borders, although formed forcibly and after terrible ethnic wars, are essentially undetermined and porous in the same way in which the newly formed states are not typical sovereign states, but something in between. Kosovo might soon find itself in this configuration of relative indetermination and floating.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , April 6, 1996