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DOSSIER:

IFOR'S BOSNIA

Sarajevo weekly of April 4, 1996, took as its main theme the influence of the presence of IFOR troops on the political situation in Bosnia. Here are presented the main accents from the relevant articles of Djuro Kozar and Vlastimir Mijovic.

Kozar begins his examination with the complaint of Avdo Hebib to the international mediator Christian Schwartz-Schilling, that the IFOR troops are forcefully entering objects controlled by the Federal police, as well as that IFOR, on a number of occasions has disarmed the policemen in the area of Bihac. Similar complaints were given by the chief of staff of the Bosnian army general Rasim Delic, that IFOR entered one of the main military installations in Sarajevo, practically kicking out of it the Bosnian army.

This does not seem to bother general Leyton Smith much, nor his local IFOR commander.From December 20 of the last year, when they took over the mandate from UNPROFOR, the NATO troops have proclaimed their mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the top treatment without any restrictions or Bosnian control.

Some domestic commentators already assess that Bosnia and Herzegovina is an occupied country, even though nobody of the officials has openly stated that. In that manner, for the last three months, this is the confirmation of the thesis that the state on whose territory step foreign troops looses its sovereignty.

The deployment of IFOR forces in Bosnia is the largest concentration of a single military force in Europe after the Second World war. The large force is not only moving freely around Bosnia, but is also practically demonstrating its deadly force. It seems that the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina will become a big training ground.

By manifesting its force in Bosnia, NATO achieves two goals in Bosnia: first, practical test of firepower and manoeuvreing capabilities of the multinational forces, and second, serves notice to the three armies in Bosnia with whom they are dealing with.

But, with IFOR there is no differentiating - it is dealing equally with the aggressor and with the victim of aggression. Recently, they have actually been more bold with the victim, engaging on the territory of the Federation anti terrorist units. This has to bee seen in the context of the wish of the Americans, and not only them, to clear the Federation territory from mujahedin .

This situation was created by some officials in Sarajevo which wanted to use a number of remaining lovers of Bosnia to the last DEM as police instructors, where their instruction would not only be tactical but also ideological. They scored an own goal to their state ! Now they have IFOR on their neck, looking under every carpet for a foreign soldier in civilian clothes.

NATO implementation force attempt to be objective and use one measuring stick for all. The Bosnians will believe in that only when they see cuffs on the hands of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

Maybe it is the time, concludes the author, now that the peace came and that arming of the Federation army is probable, that Sarajevo should initiate corrections in the IFOR mandate, including some lowering of his troops and armaments.

Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet , April 4, 1996

In his article Mijovic says that those that did not know how to make peace in their own house had to accept foreign tutelage. The impression is that they have actually accepted more than they have wished in the beginning. Of course, the leadership in Sarajevo did not think that it could be put in the same basket as the puppet regimes in Pale and Grude. But, this has happened anyway. The Sarajevo leadership is also among the group which is practically denied the right to exercise sovereign governing of its country, or the part of the territory it controlled up until the agreement.

The key political decision of the internal order and life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are stated and created by Christopher, Kinkrl, Chirac, Agnelli, Primakov...The people are used to hear more about concrete economic and financial activities from Carl Bildt, than from Muratovic or Kapetanovic. The money is in Bildt's safe. This will be felt the most when concrete projects start. The world will help and finance in Bosnia what it considers necessary and not what is preferred by domestic leaderships.

Foreign governance is bosnian reality. Nothing can be done there, and maybe we should not be sorry for that. The times to assess whether this is good or bad for Bosnia are yet to come. The world is dealing with Bosnia in a pragmatic and not strategic manner. Pragmatism brings half solutions, and laf baked relations and statuses. We have seen that before.The constitutional concept of Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is the best example.

Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet , April 4, 1996

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CURRENTTHEME:

Under the constitution, the government has certain powers it has to adhere to and we are adhering to them. The preface to the federal constitution says the FRY is continuing the international and legal subjectivity of the former Yugoslavia and that means we will take on all the debts of the former Yugoslavia.'' (Tomica Raicevic, federal minister).

It's mainly depends on us whether we'll get funds from abroad or not. That is perhaps the biggest disagreement between the government and myself. I hope we will solve all these problems before the parliament session. If they're not solved, especially if they decide to freeze our relations with the world, which I think is the consequence of the government's stand, we'll go to parliament.'' (Dragoslav Avramovic, Yugoslav National Bank (NBJ) governor).

Why is recognition of the FRY's continuity so important that membership in the IMF would be rejected and the money that comes with it?

Continuity, which the FRY authorities raised to biblical levels since the FRY was formed in April 1992, includes keeping the status and place of the previous state in the international community and its effect boils down to securing historic and legal links between the new states and the precursor state.

The Yugoslav authorities believe the international community is obliged to recognize that continuity since four republics broke away which is an illegal act in terms of both the constitution and international law. They repeat that at every occasion in a way that no state whose continuity was threatened ever did. So what are the unimaginable advantages, what vital national interests does continuity secure?

For example, it brings a certain political prestige, especially retaining the status of UN founder and indirectly confirming that the other republics are evil secessionists and the only ones to blame for the breakup of former Yugoslavia. They're counting on possibly avoiding special conditions in regard to solving the crisis for the FRY's acceptance in the UN. There's also a belief by some international law experts that if continuity is recognized, the armed conflicts could be considered a civil war not FRY aggression. There are also expectations that the position of the inheritor state would be much more favorable in the succession process. Lawyers who defend the stand of the authorities said preserving continuity is a condition for the self-determination of the Serbs outside the FRY (Milan Bulajic), and there's talk of danger for Kosovo, the Sandzak and Vojvodina if continuity isn't recognized (Vojislav Seselj). Budimir Kosutic feels that securing the borders through continuity is important ``because there are states that claim some territories were given to the former Yugoslavia, which no longer exists, and not Serbia and raise the question of getting them back.''

In explaining the FRY's right to continuity various arguments are used. One is that the FRY included that continuity in its constitution, i.e. the ``uninterrupted subjectivity of Yugoslavia,'' and that Yugoslavia's membership in the UN was never in doubt legally. Some have also invoked continuity with the Kingdom of Serbia.But thing's aren't as they might seem.

For a start, no one has to recognize the FRY's continuity. There are no international legal norms which would guarantee continuity for any state. So there's no legal basis for the FRY to demand recognition. Achieving continuity depends primarily on the situation which resulted from changes in the state. The key question is whether the FRY is the same as the former Yugoslavia? The difference is in size, geographic position, national make-up, constitutional and socio-economic order even insignia. And perhaps more importantly, the FRY, its statesmen and public, are renouncing the identity of the former Yugoslavia. The entire legal system is changing, tradition is being rejected---therefore continuity is being rejected---expecting in ultimatum demands for others to recognize it.

Others will decide whether to recognize continuity based on their own free political will. The authorities here are hiding the fact that the understanding of continuity is created outside the state which aspires to it, often devoid of its wishes.

Invoking our constitution puts an obligation on us, not the international community least of all the IMF. It's even less credible that the IMF will be impressed by the patriotic pride of Mihailo MIlojevic, president of the Yugoslav Economic Chamber, who swore he will resign if the talks with the IMF do not provide the result the authorities want.

UN Security Council resolution 777 of September 1992, should be borne in mind when considering theories by lawyers close to the authorities who said Yugoslavia's UN membership was never in legal doubt. That resolution says the state formerly known as the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and added that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically continue the membership of the former Yugoslavia and that the Security Council recommends that the General Assembly should take a decision for the FRY to submit a request for UN membership and will not take part in the General Assembly.

The invoking of the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro is especially interesting because it leads to the conclusion that Serbia and Montenegro are the state nucleus of Yugoslavia. The political agreement between the two republics, sanctioned in the 1992 constitution, is explained as the expression of the will of the two peoples to continue living in one state, Yugoslavia, which has been reduced in size. That argument seems to lose track of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (of which only Serbia remains in Yugoslavia) and makes no mention of the fact that just two of the federal units that made up the former Yugoslavia are in the FRY.

It's also worth mentioning that soon after Yugoslavia was created in 1918, a debate was started on whether the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is a new or old state, or a state that continues the continuity of the Kingdom of Serbia.

Confusion came when the problem of succession was placed in the context of recognizing continuity. Although those two things are being solved parallel in practice, they are essentially different. Continuity is political and succession is a legal category which includes, above all, the transfer of rights and obligations, active and passive, property and debts, i.e. the change of owner.

The criteria for succession are different: size of territory, number of inhabitants, contributions to the state budget and joint property, investments in parts of the country, a division of expenses and the foreign debt in the common state; in simple terms, who brought what into the common state and not who is to blame for its break-up. The FRY would not have any right to take the entire property of the former Yugoslavia even if continuity is recognized and the other republics are declared secessionists, nor would it allow any privileges. Contrary to what the authorities believe, secession is not banned under any international law. Normal countries solve inheritance issues by agreement. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia's continuity was recognized but the debts were divided among the former Soviet republics just as was done in the case of the Czech and Slovak republics, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

When you take everything into account, the conclusion is that recognition of continuity would have no practical effect on this country or its citizens. That recognition is needed only by Slobodan Milosevic as a way to get legitimacy, primarily for use at home, to show he is completely innocent of wrongdoing, that he did not break-up Yugoslavia but stayed faithful to it in every way, that he's not an aggressor, that he didn't wage war, that the blame is entirely on the other side.

As Borisav Jovic said, he won't beg for recognition, he wants the world to admit he was right. On behalf of the fixation, he won't take money from the IMF to revive the economy and improve living standards. Life on this earth obviously isn't one of the political priorities of these authorities.

Source; Belgrade weekly Vreme , April 13, 1996

COMMENTSAND ANALYSES

If the NATO in the span of the current year - according to the opinion of many, too short a period for the establishment of positive peace which would mean the reconciliation of the warring sides - is able to achieve some form of stability and open the door for a true end to hostilities, than NATO would really substitute the ineffective UN and OESCE in the quest for peace . This would end the period created by the fall of the Berlin wall, in which NATO wondered around the world in search of itself.

What is the role of NATO in the new world order created on the ruins of the Cold war ?

After its identity crisis immediately after the end of the Cold war, a chance for revitalization came upon the horizon : it was the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, which gave a new chance to NATO for the return into the center of events. The failure of the EU, and after it the UN paved the way for the entrance of NATO onto the scene. The first military action of NATO was not undertaken against the rusty Soviet military hardware, still respectable for its destruction power, but against a handful of inferior examples of the aging Yugoslav air force tools from the early sixties over the Bosnian skies. This action signalled a change in the development of a global self-consciousness - instead of a respectable adversary in global confrontation NATO had to satisfy itself with an inferior, but no less dangerous enemy which understood NATO's crisis of identity well and attempted to use it, not believing until the end that NATO would accept even that minor role of involving itself in local conflicts.

The basic sense of the NATO military operation was not to really involve itself and solve the military conflict in the Balkans, but,to, first of all, defend the western world from the spread of such conflicts to the other parts of Europe, and particularly to that part of Europe which finds itself in transition , and to which the Balkan war could spill over immediately. In that manner, this operation has actually continued the logic of protecting the western world of the new paupers of Eastern Europe, which are drowning in ethnic conflicts, local wars, genocides and horrors which can raise empathies only if the CNN cameras are present.

This is evidenced by the short-term goals of the NATO operation: every, even the most superficial observer is clear with the fact that the positive peace could be built in these regions only if a true catharsis occurs and the causes of war are removed- from the punishment of all war criminals to establishment of status quo ante - return of all exiled and refugees to their homes and creation of international guarantees that something like this will not happen again - which means the removal of all consequences of ethnic cleansing, but also the policies that have created it, meaning its protagonists.

The Bosnian operation represents, by 'force majeure', the model of NATO's future peace operations in the process of stabilizing and pacification of Eastern Europe: but the way it is conceived testifies more to the intentions that by such stabilization the Western Europe protects itself from the chaos of local conflicts, which could encroach upon it. The wars are like virii: if they are not suppressed and localized, they show the tendency of spreading. The reflexes of the Balkan war have shown that neither the Western Europe, the showcase of civilization and democracy is not immune to the virus of nationalism and racism: that is why the European union has called a state of emergency and as the biggest enemies of the united Europe proclaimed nationalism, racism and xenophobia - as the consequences of the local wars which are shaking the Balkan peninsula and former Soviet republics.

In its search for a new identity, NATO developed its military component of containment of local conflicts, through military engagement in humanitarian operations, but under its own command; the second component, the political one, found its embodiment in the program of Partnership for Peace .

The launching of this initiative came almost a mont before a decision has been taken of entering the Balkan conflict, striving to strengthen its political component. If it does not have an enemy in one piece, as the Soviet Union was, now cropping up as potential enemies are local conflict flare ups and general instability and destabilization of Eastern Europe: and with it the possibility of establishment of authoritarian regimes, enemies of democracy, either in the form of neo-communist regimes, or populistic dictatorships of neo-fascistic inspiration. To counter this, it is necessary to undertake preventive action, so that the situation which enabled Hitler to strengthen his power and led to Second World War would not repeat itself.

That is why new NATO orientation was found in the globalization , including former enemies in than not only military, but now also a political association with global pretensions . But, the largest obstacle to the globalization of NATO are made by those who dearly wish to become full members of NATO and in that manner enjoy the benefits of collective security and defense.

Source: Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin , March 29, 1996

Throughout this whole period - as a deeper background of division of power and interests - an old plan has survived and outlived all others, the plan on the division of Bosnia end Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. Its longevity and resistance to numerous changes in the balance of power and war luck, could serve as a specific proof that annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or its division represent that deeper motive of continued political and operative meddling of both interested sides.

Big national programs of Serbia and Croatia, have always understood disappearance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a three ethnic state. What was not spoken publicly by Milosevic and Tudjman, was shouted out by Seselj and Seks, and secretly desired by Churches and Academies, and unfortunately, by many more moderate than them.

Have these projects finally been abandoned ? Is the Dayton agreement the end of that story if it is of the war ?

In its tendency to achieve peace now , the Dayton agreement recognized the existence of two separate entities and three monoethnic units, of which the Serbian and Croat one have thoroughly cleansed the Muslims. The insistence on the ethnic division of Mostar, ion keeping of Serbian Sarajevo , then unwilling, and possibly still not final abolition of the Croatian Herzeg Bosnia, and looseness of the Bosnian-Croat federation, feverish grabbing of the Posavina corridor, and similar, show that the tendency of keeping the divisions is much more vital than the tendency towards integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic, multiconfessional and multicultural state unit, which Serbia and Croatia unwillingly accepted in Dayton.

If it shown that such divisions can be kept and even strengthened, and the principle of unity compromised, Bosnia out of two or three parts , sooner or later, could be put in the process of division between serbia and Croatia, with very unpredictable chances of the Muslim entity to survive.Everything could start as the already legalized strengthening of special ties , worry for the development and protection of co-nationals, and end up in annexation and always possible Serb-Croat conflict, even war.The World, Europe and the Balkans would then find themselves confronted with a problem which would be much harder to solve than the one they are dealing with now, and the encouraged ethnocentrism could open many new - nearer or further fronts than the current one.

The Dayton agreement - even due to its preciseness - still does not close all the doors for a three-state separatism, which as such does not exclude all perspectives to imaginative combinatorics of enlargement of Serbia and Croatia on the account of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why it could decidedly be said: If the ethnic monolithic entities remain for long as they are now, the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia will be only a matter of time and favorable moment, which could - due to general circumstances - be patiently waited for, or impatiently speeded up.

Serbia and Croatia have done nothing so far to decrease the level of their political, personal and party presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reliance of the Contact group and NATO on the key role of Milosevic and Tudjman in conducting the plans and actions of the Bosnian national leaders suits this development of events. This, actually, asks these two to do exactly the thing they do not want to give up, because it strengthens their weakened positions in front of their domestic, nationalistically still warmed up public.

Mononational units in the current Bosnia and Herzegovina were not created by living necessity, but by war violence and national-chauvinistic theory on the impossibility of joint life as its ideological basis. If Bosnia was ethnically divisible, it would long be non-existent.Even if a significant part of over two million refugees return to their homes, it will not be possible again to have single national rule in any of Bosnia's parts.

Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika , March 1-31, 1996

After Dobrica Cosic and Milan Panic, Dragoslav Avramovic is becoming the third personnel mistake in the Milosevic kitchen of smoked and cooked hams.

Avramovic differs from the previous two 'smokes' since he knew perfectly well that by his taking of the position of the Governor of the Central bank he is protecting Milosevic and his entourage. Hi is guilty of thousand deeds: he did not close down criminal banks, particularly Dafiment and Jugoskandik ; he did not force into bankruptcy any bank due to its total dinar and hard currency unliquidity; he did not forbid that bankers notes be used as a parallel currency; he should not have promised the peasants the golden coins in exchange for wheat that they never got; he proclaimed Mira Markovic (Milosevic's wife) as a fiscal expert and enlisted her in his experts' groups on taxes; he did not forbid that pensioners are given energy payment coupons instead of regular payments as a direct diversion of the monetary policy; he spent the whole of 1994. And 1995, in ideological blasphemy of privatization; he demanded trust of citizens in his banking policy, but has never transferred his personal saving accounts here.

His achievements definitely include the reduction of inflation in 1994, but this was done only after the Milosevic regime, through unseen monetary piracy stole and pumped out from the people all the monetary capabilities. Avramovic never accused the regime that it stole from 10 million citizens of Yugoslavia, and has accepted the governorship continuity as if that has not happened, and as if the Central bank has no responsibility to answer where that money is.

Avramovic spread the illusion that with restrictive monetary policy you can restart the ruined economy without changing the rotten socialist system.along with the ruling SPS party, he kept on talking that production and employment are growing, even though he knew that this is asking of the death throes of a living corpse.

But, since he started to save his face and expertise, Avramovic is raising the public opinion in his favor. To be alone against the regime is the most favorable position for truthloving rider. And he does not have to lose ! Cosic and Panic had to fall in 1992, and 1993, since they wanted to take over power and Serbian glory, this one doesn't. He is harmless.He is risky only so much that he is pushing Milosevic to get rid too soon of the criminal and servile personnel structure in favor of a new one, ready to speak in English.

Milosevic is still not sure whether the change of the system would keep him in power. He is still not sure whether with this change he gains immunity at the Hague Tribunal.It is also not clear whether his wife can stand the old governor, despite his faith breaking concerning privatization and conviction of the communist fiscal skinning of the population and private enterprises.

If Avramovic wins, this would signify the last great defeat of the Milosevic conquering policy since 1988. He failed in war, he failed economically, he failed internationally, he traded the Greeks too- he only did not give up to proclaim Srbogora as the only political successor of the Versailles Yugoslavia. But this dream is burned up, since Washington, Brussels and Moscow will never recognize the exclusive right of Belgrade to inherit the yugoslavia of 1918. Through fate of his key opponent, Kosta Mihajlovic, we will know the fate of governor Avramovic.

If Avramovic is sent to his domestic pension, the period of mindlessness could be prolonged for at least another year, with the threat of fascination of the country and further control of the press. But there are no economic benefits of Avtramovic exile.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor , April 19, 1996

In the last five years there were frequent announcements of violent springs, summers, autumns and winters of workers discontent. It was thought that tumbling fall of standard of living, followed with hyperinflational robbery and reduction of the large mass of the employed in the state and social sector to a more and more ridiculous level of poverty, will cause a defensive reaction and push them into collective action for the protection of their vital - minimal - interests: right to work, wage and normal life.

The rebellion and action are missing, first of all at the workers expense.There is no more talk about hot workers' seasons. The threats of strikes are not taken seriously by the regime. Why is there no significant social rebellion even though the situation is so bad ? Posarac calls upon a research project Socio--economic position of the families with children in Serbia conducted by a group of researchers from her Institute in 1995.

It shows that the deep economic and social crisis which since 1991. Becomes acute, caused the fall in the level of individual and social standard, rise in poverty, return to civilizationally lower level of satisfying the needs of the population (production for own needs), very pronounced economic insecurity, suspense and lack of perspective. A great part of the population became equal in poverty and strongly dependent on the state.The highest coefficient of poverty was recorded in 1994 - it was 23,5 percent, of which 30,3 of the urban population.The results showed that prolonging of the crisis pushes practically all urban population into poverty, since they are brought into a situation to fight to survive.

Possible answers why there is no social rebellion caused by this are numerous. Posarac names seven key causes:

>-The lack of tradition and practice of organizing of workers in protection of their own vital interests and undertaking of industrial collective action
- Non-existence of a true union organization
- Weak comprehension of own rights and power
- Skillful manipulation with the bad socio-economic position of the workers
- Institutional vacuum in the legal protection of the rights of workers on the basis of employment contracts
- Inability to differentiate between personal, general and collective interest
-General erosion of the morals and bringing down of general value system.

Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika , March 1-31,1996

We are aware that it will take time, but the step by step approach will be the best for the solution of the Kosova question . Any Kosovan activist has had the opportunity to hear these words from foreigners and last time I heard them was from a Western diplomat in Paris last week, during an international conference.

The problem, of course, is not that things have to be solved step by step, there is not a sword that could cut Kosova's knot and disentangle once and forever the disarray created in Albanian and Serb relations, that can be the commotion to regional security in the Balkans, too. The problem is in the steps, their dimension, will the left foot follow the right one, or will it all look as a stumbling of drunkards. Experience so far has not shown any important engagement (or any engagement at all) of the West in the question of Kosova, and we can justifiably complain about the lack of attention.

Apart from the letter by president Bush, repeated by president Clinton, the Serbian administration has, so far, not had any serious feeling that it should deal with the matter of Kosova. None could have seriously taken the CSCE mission and it's human rights violations record-keeping mandate. And, in the meantime, Milosevic managed and knew how to use the lack of unity of the West on many foreign policy issues. Now the West, among other preoccupations on approaching Belgrade, faces the problem of how to formulate a unified policy regarding Kosova. Although there are almost priestly repetitions of the need of an autonomy for Kosova, some new elements come into the surface.

For example, the idea drifting in some European circles and which will be confirmed also by the American Administration in a few days, about a form of autonomy which because of lack of democratic tradition in Serbia should be under international supervision or guarantees. In fact, if it might be assessed so, a process of more frequent reflection and originating ideas about Kosova has begun. And, the first outcome, no matter how modest, appeared. The exit visas for Albania, for example, were abolished thanks to the American pressure exerted few months ago. Next, diplomatic sources say, could be other concessions like measures to promote reciprocal confidence . Is it too late for such approaches? In fact, good connoisseurs of the question of Kosova would say yes. Even the ordinary reader of geo-political movements in the Former Yugoslavia will see that stability in the region is being created with new ethnic states, at the expense of, e.g., Bosnia & Herzegovina, whose chances to survive are diminishing on daily basis. In this context, the solution of Kosova's question, which would bring stability to region, should only be independence, but for this too, they said, a process is needed, hoping in Albanian non-violent response to Serbian violence. And, hoping that the model of integration rather than of division is applied in Macedonia.

The politics regarding Kosova has been developing in several railways. One of them is dissolution of former Yugoslavia with all consequences it has brought, up to the foundation of new ethnic states. The other one carries the Western train which is collecting ideas on how to solve other crises in different regions, learning in the meantime how to settle the relations among themselves, either between countries of European Union or between EU and the USA. Kosova stands on the third railway, looking at the train departure time-table.

Source: Pristina weekly Koha , April 3, 1996

COOPERATIONWITH THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL

A while ago, Ivica Rajic was a dear guest of the most Croatian radio of Western Mostar, and in the live program insisted that he definitively will not appear in front of the Hague court, as was done by his HVO colleague Tihomir Blaskic. The journalist Smiljko Sagolj completely agreed wuith his guest, and has show nervous misunderstanding for the Croatian authorities, on this and the other side of the Dinara mountain, who are, in such a vassal manner, letting down the stream their best knights and sons.

Sagolj, who is scared that at one moment he himself might give such an interview, is finally right in one point. The double face of the official Croatian politics, which not only knew about the crimes of its knights , but has also stimulated and organized them ( the Herzegovina camps have, for example, been discussed in full detail at the state top), will probably bash solely, but definitely first of all, the heads of these abandoned sons .The fathers have already run into their mouse holes, about which a clear trail is left in the minutes of the Parliamentary session at which a constitutional law on cooperation with the Hague tribunal was passed.

It was also necessary for two top officials (Vladimir Seks and Franjo Greguric) to stress that Croatian authorities did not know about the war crimes on this side, least of all that it stimulated them, but nobody remembered to amnesty the Croatians in general. In such a manner, the thesis of the innocence of the nation-victim has been discreetly withdrawn if not abandoned completely, particularly that extradition of any Croats to the Tribunal in the Hague would equal a seasonal sale of Croatian sovereignty. Instead of that, a new meal has been cooked in the handy HDZ kitchen and placed in front of the MP's, in which the hard question of sovereignty has suddenly been prepared in such a light manner as it was a question of a light summer salad.

Vladimir Seks stated that the passing of the Constitutional Law only confirms the sovereignty of Croatian Republic , since, it decided with its own free will to do this. It is a question, actually, of 'salon ecstasy' of the most equal of the Parliamentary vice presidents, since only a moment before that, foreign minister Mate Granic openly said that The Hague is at this moment main obligation of Croatia, and then dryly listed the list of punishments that could be inflicted if this obligation is not kept.

There was only one group of HDZ MP that were not aware of the prepared game. Those were diaspora Herzegovinians. After all, they are only six months in the Parliament and do not know all the games that were seen by its walls. That is why Jozo Maric stated, so directly that the indictments against Croats are only sent from the Hague, but that they are actually written in Croatia. This is an openly thrown glove to Tudjman that his are only the knights , while criminals belong to the Hague.

There are indications that Zagreb has been put under double magnifying glass particularly at the time that the Parliament was discussing cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and at the same time the membership of Croatia has been scaled down on the agenda list of the Council of Europe.

That is why there was no other choice than pressure their own europrimitives and pass the Constitutional law on international punishment of crimes, something that the conducted polls is supported by three fourths of the citizens.

Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune , April 22, 1996

Serbia

On April 3, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague ended its hearing on three officers of the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) charged with the killing of 261 people, POWs and patients at the Vukovar hospital, at the Ovcara farm near Vukovar. The outcome of the public hearing which included testimony from a number of witnesses (including some who escaped the firing squad) was an international warrant for Mile Mrksic, Veselin Sljivancanin and Miroslav Radic. All three are know to be in the FRY: Mrksic was retired as a general last year and lives quietly in Belgrade; Captain Radic was demobilized at his own request in 1993 and runs a business; the whereabouts of Veselin Sljivancanin are well known---he's a colonel in the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and teaches at the military school center in Belgrade.

The whole issue would not have caused any fuss in Belgrade if Sljivancanin had left active service or got lost somewhere in Bosnia between November 21, 1991 (when the alleged crime was committed) and this April: most of the 47 Serbs charged by the tribunal are citizens of other states (Bosnian Serb Republic or Republic of Serb Krajina) or, as in the case of Mrksic and Radic their residence is unknown. But the authorities in Belgrade can't use any of those excuses for Sljivancanin, and they face a huge dilemma: hand him over and suffer political damage or openly disregard the tribunal demand and risk coming under total international isolation again. The day the warrants for Mrksic, Sljivancanin and Radic were issued, tribunal prosecutor Richard Goldstone officially declared Yugoslavia a criminal state since it hadn't extradited the men the tribunal had charged six months ago. Under UN Security Council resolution 827, the tribunal will inform the UN, and the Council can reimpose the sanctions without a possible veto from Russia or China.

Before trying to predict a possible outcome, let's look at how Croatia, whose authorities behaved similarly towards the tribunal, solved a similar problem. General Tihomir Blaskic, a former commander of the Bosnian Croat Defence Council (HVO) and chief inspector of the Croatian army was charged with the massacre of Moslem civilians in central Bosnia in April 1993. Those charges met with fierce criticism in Zagreb. When President Franjo Tudjman decided to promote Blaskic and appoint him chief inspector, the public thought Croatia had decided to resist the tribunal at any cost. Then, suddenly, reports late last month said Blaskic had decided to turn himself over to the tribunal.

Blaskic did appear at The Hague voluntarily on April 1. But, judging by his and his family's expressions, some force was used to bring him there.

There had also been pressure on Belgrade, and that is shown by the fact that all of Belgrade's steps towards cooperation with the tribunal came after high ranking US officials met Milosevic. First, in January Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck forced Milosevic to accept a visit by tribunal president Antonio Cassese to Belgrade and got agreement in principle for the tribunal to open offices in the city.

Then came Warren Christopher's visit in February. He was followed by Richard Kornblum, Holbrooke's successor, in March and two new steps towards The Hague. First, a way was found to overcome the persistent refusal by the Yugoslav authorities to hand over the evidence they collected on crimes against Serbs by Croats and Moslems. That refusal was the main reason for the lopsided ethnic structure of the people charged by the tribunal (47 Serbs, five Croats and one Moslem), tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said.

The second example of cooperation is much more specific: Milosevic immediately agreed to send Drazen Erdemovic and Radoslav Kremenovic to The Hague to testify about their involvement in the alleged massacre of Moslems in Srebrenica last autumn. They were arrested near Novi Sad on March 2, after Erdemovic, who said he was part of a firing squad, told ABC and Figaro reporters of the alleged massacre. They were arrested by state security officers in what was initially assessed as Belgrade's attempt to prevent Erdemovic's planned departure for The Hague as a repentant witness in exchange for immunity and money. The information ministry issued a statement leaving the impression that the two men were only on loan to The Hague and will be returned after questioning. The tribunal statement that denied the claim was not reported by any of the regime media.

All that is not enough. The warrant for Sljivancanin ends the possibility of continuing the push-pull game which replaced Milosevic's firm No after Dayton and forces the Serbian president to choose an option. The extradition of an active officer who was promoted twice since the start of the war in former Yugoslavia will be painful for the army and the civilian authorities who are preparing for elections in October. The political damage in terms of national pride would be much lower than the damage inflicted by the reimposition of the sanctions and Milosevic knows that. The model Tudjman used for Blaskic (promote and extradite) could work for Sljivancanin, especially if followed by a media campaign.

Two events that point to a possible further development happened last Wednesday. The first was a visit by John Kornblum to Belgrade, which he said was used for an intensive discussion on cooperation with The Hague tribunal. The other is Sljivancanin's interview to ``Intervju'' weekly in which he denied involvement in the Ovcara killings and the indisputable fact that 261 people were killed there. He added that none of his superiors told him what to do. The interview portrays a frightened man.

Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme April 6, 1996

MEDIACONTROL

On the basis of anonymous telephone calls , the Croatian secret police has just recently started the practice to stop the journalists, even on the street, and without presenting a warrant, started taking them to the informative conversations search team, and take away documents from them.It is true though, that`t once in a while, the minister of police has to say something about this in the Parliament, But, there's no problem. The president of the Parliament, or his aides, acting as police stooges, like in the recent case of the journalist of the weekly magazine Nacional , Zeljka Godec, who was taken to the Zagreb head office of the secret police, will forewarn him that a question about such a case will be posed to him in the Parliament, so that he can prepare and cellophane wrap his answer. So what it ends up with is a promise by minister Jarnjak to the Parliamentarians that he won't prosecute all of them .

And what will Jarnjak, the police, and the complete current regime do with the journalists ? We will deepen the action - answered Vladimir Seks, even a month ago when asked by a Feral journalist whether through the newest changes in the penal code they want to put additional pressure on the media and journalists so as to discipline them as it suits them. And before the publication of the state secret became a criminal act, the members of the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order, deepened the action against the journalists.

In the concrete case, against the journalist of the Nacional magazine. This was done due to an article in which, on the basis of documents which came to her from the Federal police, she wrote about eavesdropping on journalists, union leaders and oppositionaries, done in the framework of operative actions ( ( Sheperd 900 , Renault , Goran ), by that Ministry. Even though these operative actions were undertaken to secure the visit of Pope John Paul II, and prevention of a possible assassination attempt on president Tudjman, on the list of those that were bugged were journalists Fran Visnar, Denis Kuljis, Jasna Babic, Tanja Torbarina, some journalists of former magazine ST, offices of the magazines Panorama , Danas , Novi List , and Feral Tribune , union officials Dragutin Lesar, Vesna Kanizaj, Vilim Ribic, Nenad Mrgan, oppositionaries Josip Bebic and Nikola Stedul.

The magazine verified the authenticity of the documents, informed the Ministry beforehand about the publishing of the article, and also did not fully disclose their contents. When another journalist of that magazine Zeljka Godec, attempted to hold a follow up conversation with one of those that were listened to, journalist Fran Visnar, she and her photographer were stopped in front of Visnar's office and taken to the police station. They were released after four hours of questioning.

The next day the editor of the magazine Smiljan Reljic was officially informed he will be called in for questioning too. The explanation given stated that his magazine committed a criminal act of spreading false news. But, in his reply to the parliament minister Jarnjak stated that there is an ongoing investigation within the ministry concerning the eavesdropping documents.

As it obviously turns out, the questioning of Nacional journalists are a simple demonstration of force under the guise of legal procedure against all those that might probe police or regime irregularities.

Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune , April 1, 1996

It is not by accident that the official daily Pobjeda sharpened its attacks on the opposition parties a while ago, reminding of not so far times of war for peace .A really good reason was needed for such a come back, since this spearhead of the Montenegrin war rethoric has been fairly quiet in the last few months. The elections are nearing, and the intention is to put the media in the service of the ruling politics, so that they would explain once more to the national masses who is the best, most beautiful and smartest.

The fact that the oppositionary parties are represented in the Parliamentary working group for the preparation of elections, is not a guarantee enough that after the summer holidays we will witness a fair electoral match. Or more precisely, even if the rules are set according to the democratic practice of western countries, hardly would anyone believe that the state media will really abide by them.

Some freshest examples are enough to show how the regime is feverishly gripping to the Montenegrin media space, leaving space to no one else. First, the draft law by which the public media would be bound not to censor the statements of the Parliamentary opposition parties fell through. Then, another of the attempts to put on the Parliament's agenda the question of the program policy of the state media also fell through. In the meantime, measures were undertaken to put under control all the media that strived towards democratic, open society and media freedom: from small things like the removal of independent media stalls, to attempts to put these media sources under control.

Not by accident, on the eve of the elections, the Montenegrin government decided on the measures to regulate the method and conditions of the usage of radio and TV frequencies. By introducing the method of direct deal, the regime will be able to easily prevent those that do not suit it, but also to enable their favorites to get the frequencies easily.

Finally, the Parliamentary committee for political system turned down to put on the agenda the proposal of the Liberal party of the Law on public information.

Source: Podgorica weekly Monitor , March 29, 1996

After two days of anxious wait, the readers of the Albanian language weekly were able to get the issue which was surrounded by numerous speculations. The disturbance begun when the premises of the private printing factory Feniks in Pristina were raided by six policemen, without any documents or formal explanation, ordering the owner to stop the printing of the controversial Koha issue.

The police took the owner Zilivoda to the station and he was kept there for a few hours.He insists that he was strictly forbidden to print Koha , unless he presents the manuscript ts in advance to the police, and until the permission is given when can and what can't be printed . Editor of the paper Veton Surroi informed the wider public of the incident , stating that he will not carry out the order of the police. According to him, the editorial staff of Koha received no written or oral decision of the police.

A day later, Koha found out through the statement of the official news agency tanjug that the Pristina public prosecutor has ordered to the local police authorities to find out all the facts concerning the publication of some photographs in the last issue of 'Koha', since according to the prosecutor, they gravely offend the reputation of the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic .

Actually, the problem was the photo montage of Slobodan Milosevic sitting next to a young fascist, and another one in which the army in nazi uniforms march in front of the building of the suspended Parliament of Kosovo. Koha , in that respect, received no formal decision of the prosecutor's office either.

Even after sharp reactions from the domestic public and from abroad, the marketing director of the magazine Ahmet Kurtoli was questioned by the police for more than three hours. Their questioning concentrated on a comic strip from a previous issue of Koha , as well as the printing procedure of the new issue.

The editorial staff of Koha is of the opinion that the fact that the controversial issue of Koha appeared on the stands does not mean that the pressures on the magazine are over, particularly since most of the journalists of the magazine passed through the questioning procedure since the beginning of this year.

Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni , April 19, 1996

Balkan Media & Policy Monitor

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