Tagirov's "home" paper, Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", brought a
commentary by a group of its authors under the name Intellectual
Cooperative "Bastard" , attempting to answer the question "why is
Croatia turning its head awy from the other Serbia", in the December
20, 1996 issue of the magazine.
The curious lack of interest for "Belgrade events" in Croatia is
emphasized in the regular column of Mirjana Kasapovic in the weekly
"Globus". Warning that such an attitude is not a good stance, since
from the outcome of those events depend some important strategic
interests of Croatia, the column gives a synoptic-comparative
overview of the former and current turmoils in Belgrade, and in such
a manner gives a main tone and content of all meager in number
reports which have ensued about the subject: the continuity of
persons, the pragmatic political turnaround forced by the pressure
from outside, but not a turnover in content of the greater serbian
ideology.
Such a joint, and a more or less explicit moment of Croatian
thinking about this theme is a thesis of a political, and above all
moral falseness of people and proclamations seen in Belgrade
demonstrations.
But still, that general populistic tone which is shared not only
by the "populus" but by the "caste" of columnists, analysts and other
officials of the Croatian media seems to be damaged by some strange
auto - blockade which prevents Croatia from answer even with the most
ordinary carnival happiness over the events in Serbia ! Croatia
answers the run down of its Bastille with quiet, disinterest,
ignorance and turning away of the head.
It is clear that what is happening in Belgrade is actually all of
what has not, and is not happening in Zagreb, and only the
consciousness of this non - event is the factor of Croatian
disinterest for Belgrade demonstrations.
As far as the Croatian envy for the attention the Belgrade
demonstrations have in the world media and the question of their
world history or just real - political value proportionality to the
spectacular media presentation, was overshadowed by one, in
comparison to the movement of the masses unseamly news flash of
DEcember 16: that is, that the municipal court in Smederevska Palanka
decided to re - examine the results of its local elections. With
this, Smederevska Palanka did not only become a "term" in the heads
of information consumers from Iowa, through Zapresic andas far as
Kigali, but surpassed in "world importance" the political reality art
performance in Belgrade.
The report on Smederevska Palanka - whatever its status: truth,
lie or both, has marked that moment when the movement of the masses
in Belgrade cannot remain "a walk 'till forever", or performance
theater of political and moral bathing of the elite of Serbian
nationalism. chauvinism and "chetniks - beginners".
The case of Smederevska Palanka gives those artistically designed,
"happy" demonstrations in Belgrade that realistic dimension which is
opened only in situations whe a certain expectation, such as the
oppositionary fantasy of power is becoming a reality with all the
disbeleif of its own actors.
That is why Smederevska Palanka is a lying invention of Milosevic,
his aid to become, in the eyes of all, if not the biggest democrat,
than surely the biggest guarantor of that legality which serves as
the precondition of democracy - the respect of law and honesty !
Serbia obviously finds itself in front of an impossible political
choice, in which it has to take a wrong move: either life with a
"democratised" dictator, with the prolongation of the introduction of
democracy for an indefinite period or a step back from a presidential
system, with the perspective of the restauration of monarchy, whith
which the opposition still obviously speculates, as to be able to run
away from the political reality.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin",
December 20, 1996
Zagreb university professor and a regular commentator of the Split
weekly "Feral Tribune",Slavko Goldstein gives his view on the
situation in Serbia in the December 30, 1996 issue of that magazine.
The leaders of the "Zajedno" coalition - Vesna Pesic, Vuk
Draskovic and Zoran Djindjic - in their daily speeches in the
meetings, stress only the civil protest against the current regime
and its dictatorial methods. They carfully evade the themes which
could lead to questions like "Why did we go to war at all?", or "Why
did we need this at all?". As if they want to suggest: lets forget
what happened, let's turn the page, let's move forward. But some
lonely Serbian heads with whom I spoke recently, very wise heads,
maybe most wise, are quite worried: can all that has happened, all
this catastrophe which Serbia has brought on itself, can all this
just simply be sweapt under the carpet ?
To most of the students, that freshest part of the protests, it is
not hard to say - let's turn the page, let's go forward - because
they do not have anything to do with those previous pages. When war
mongering was on, when the war started, they were only in high
school, and if they have received a recruitment call, 85 percent of
them evaded the mobilization. They are simply not interested that
today Biljana Plavsic is trying to please them with her support
telegram from Pale.
In the meetings and protest lines there is a great number of those
who are against Milosevic because he took them to war, but there is
probably no lesser number of those which bear a grudge against him
because the war did not lead to victory. Their only consensus is that
they have had enough of Slobodan Milosevic, his dictatorial regime,
his demaugogic lies and lying TV, electoral fraud, shamless
enrichment of war profiteering oligarchy and less and less bearable
poverty of the greater majority of the city population. Confronted
with such stubbornly tight consesus, Slobodan Milosevic is, for the
first time, visibly baffled.
In one of his most empty speeches, in
front of some fifty to hundred thousand barely gathered counter
-meeting participants from all over Serbia, he did not know to say
anything more than that some kind of wide world conspiracy against
Serbia is again in action, supported by the "fifth column" in the
country, and that this is the reason why Serbia has to be unified
again, gathered around its current leadership and leader. The ages
old refrain of all authoritarian regimes when they start feeling that
they are losing ground under their feet.
Slobodan Milosevic is finally sliding downhill, but what can
Serbia expect after him ? What canbe expected by Serbia's neighbors ?
The healthiest part of the protest groups, the students, will not
become the authorities for another ten to fifteen years. Much longer
ahead of them the current oppositonary parties will be in power,
which have skillfully put themselves at the leadership helm of the
protests, papering over some of their specifics in the name of the
consenuss against the current regime. But these "specifics", with
unresolved questions - who is guilty ? what is the cause of all this
? and why ?, will inevitably come to the fore and lead to new
tensions with unforseeable outcome. It is not possible to fully sweep
the most recent past under the carpet. With the confrontation with
the truth they can be resolved, and only then shelved into historical
archives, after which it is possible to turn more peacefully the page
and continue further.
Of course, it is possible that the oppositionary parties are
unreliable and posssibly shallow, comments one of my most sober
interlocutors . But, they are breaking the monolith and that is why
they have to be supported. Once they come to power, we will fight
them ! Untill the current student generation does not ripen and
brings back health to Serbia.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune",
December 30, 1996
The prominent commentator of the split weekly "Feral Tribune",
Marinko Culic, examines in the magazine's issue of Demver 9, 1996,
the parallels between the Serbian and Croatian oppositions in the
light of the current events in Serbia.
Can recent Zagreb and Belgrade demonstrations be compared at all ?
Even when they orderly register that Belgrade demonstrators have
swarmed the streets of the city because of the electoral theft,
something that is not unknown to their readers, the reporters and
analysts of the croatian state press run away from the comparison,
like it is plague infested.
Completely logical consequence is that in Belgrade, for weeks now,
an answer to the question how to depose, or at least bring to its
senses bad government, while here, in not so different circumstances,
it is not known even who will do this. Some essential details put
into relative terms the strength of the Serbian opposition. First of
all, it is its knee deep involvement in nationalism, only untill
recently, which went as far that it was not necessary for Milosevic
to make up the last battle cry or slogan under which Serbian
expansion was directed towards the West or the South.
Now this
overheated exstasy is cooling rapidly under the influence of
pro-Western demonstrators ( first of all the students), while
Draskovic, Djindjic and Kostunica owe their thanks to Seselj for
drawing to his side a good part of their most inflamed supporters.
Still , this trio remains the greatest unknown in the recent events
and undoubtedly the weakest link in the great street transition that
is roaring through Serbia.
Further weakness of the opposition there is that in front of it it
has the task which would be a great challenge even for those who are
much better and more honorable. and could possibly answered by the
demonstrators themselves. It is obvious that the question posed in
Serbia is not only of the change of the regime, but of the system
itself, which has stuck itself in the futile attempt, according to
some guidline known only to Milosevic, to restore communism in that
part of the Balkans.
In comparison to this, the task of the Croatian opposition seems
at the first glance a more simple and reachable one, since the system
is not brought into question here, even those most fervent in the
Jelacic square and elswhere did not scream against capitalist
economy, even not against the national state, although its rigid
constraints are becoming an obstacle to desirable development.
But, when more than hundred thousand people gather in the central
Zagreb square, it is not necessary to explain that brought into
question is the functioning of the system, and particularly those who
are leading it in top positions. At some point, this can create
equally unbearable situation, which has happened, when it was shown
that "post - communists" can equally "well" steal the elections or
turn off the radio station as the communists, in our case even better
and faster than them. In that respect, it is hard to see any
essential difference between the Belgrade and Zagreb demonstrations,
nor the demands posed on them, so that some of the explanations of
the oppositionary leaders in Croatia could be understood only as
positioning of ther inability in some future demonstrations, as much
as in those that have ocurred.
It seems that the opposition has concentrated to come up with a
joint proposal for the reduction of constitutional prerogatives of
the president of the Republic. How much chance that proposal has is
completely uncertain, but it is certain that this will depend on the
estimate of Tudjman himself, that is, whether his vanity will allow
him that his successor will have exactly the same caesaristic
prerogatives as he does.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune",
December 9, 1996
In the December 7, 1996 issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
Aleksandar Ciric takes a look at the situation within the state media
created by the demonstrations.
``Public transport and traffic in general collapsed for a few
hours in downtown Belgrade yesterday, as a result of a dwindling
protest rally organized by the opposition coalition Zajedno,'' the
Serbian state television said in one of its prime time news
broadcasts.
Many other state-controlled and regime-owned media made it their
business in the past couple of weeks to count protestors marching
under their headquarters on a daily basis. Statements like ``there
are not so many of them today'' and ``the number is decreasing
daily'' sound almost grotesque even to the employees of Studio B
television, whose recent takeover by the state effectively ended the
existence of independent media in Serbia. Camera crews have been told
to dismantle their sophisticated devices from the capital's tallest
building and find something else to do.
One of the editors in the daily Politika said the atmosphere among
the staff was bleak and depressing, to the extent that hardly anyone
is still at work after three o'clock in the afternoon.
When a group of Politika reporters lodged a protest against
unprofessional and biased behavior of their editors last week, they
were told that they are a disgrace to the credibility and reputation
of the oldest newspaper in the Balkans. One of the signatories of the
petition replied by opening the windows so that the deafening roar
calling Politika's management ``red bandits'' and thieves could be
heard even more clearly. ``Who is responsible for this and who is a
disgrace now,''she asked.
It is hard to gather the thoughts of a silent majority which comes
to work every morning but can't wait to leave the building whose
shattered windows are covered with nylon and cardboard paper. Even
more humiliating is the ghastly sight of the Serbian television
building, the prime target of daily egg-raids which often ended with
demonstrators throwing stones and red paint at its walls and windows
when eggs were nolonger available in nearby shops.
Those working in the two pillars of the Milosevic regime have to
go through the additional trouble of walking past nervous police
units, and often right through them, apart from short spells when
representatives of law and order are busy playing cards in the
canteen of the nearby Belgrade radio.
Apart from the Politika petition and support voiced by one of the
Serbian television editors, who was nevertheless jeered when he tried
to address the demonstrators, the only other sign of resistance came
from an anonymous group of Radio Belgrade reporters, who appealed to
the protestors to spare their building from egg-raids and thus make
their own misery slightly more bearable. When told that the Yugoslav
news agency could be the next target of angry demonstrators and their
fierce weapon which costs one dinar a piece, the editor in chief of
TANJUG said ``I don't give a flying f...
A thorough reconstruction of the media, which began in 1986
as preparation for the famous Eighth plenum of the Serbian communist
party, brought about as one of the final products a new breed of
professional reporters whose mission is to stop information from
reaching the public. In practice, a 15-second statement on a traffic
collapse in Belgrade is followed by 20 minutes of statements
condemning ``blatant manipulation of children for the purposes of
pro-fascist demonstrations,'' broadcast by the very same television
which reduced its audience to tears only a year or two ago with
stories about 14-year olds defending their homes from ``Ustashi
fascists.''
It is therefore no surprise that a regular Serbian parliament
session was postponed indefinitely the other day. The explanation
offered on television rested on sanitary reasons, or bug-cleaning to
be more exact.
Studio B bears the honor of being the last institution to fall
into the hands of the regime, while its editor-in-chief Mira Djurovic
has already selected the good guys from the bad ones in her backyard.
Three editors had their press IDs taken away and told not to come to
work anymore with no explanation at all, which is hardly surprising
bearing in mind that Mrs. Djurovic has an associate whose nickname is
``dog catcher.'' His name is Branislav Ivkovic, he came from the
daily Politika Ekspres and his official rank in Studio B is
information assistant.'' While the nickname speaks of his duties the
rank is definitely some kind of an honor, for Mrs. Djurovic's faith
in her own staff is so deep that nothing goes on air before she sees
it personally.
Dissatisfied individuals in Studio B are kept at bay with mobile
telephones---a method the authorities previously applied inside the
``big television'' with some success. No one with a mobile phone will
be sacked or allowed to quit, the donors said. One of the most
interesting issues is the morale and ethics of those who lost the
local elections before and even after the fraud of nullifying the
results, namely candidates of the Yugoslav left wing alliance now in
the service of state television and its efforts to keep the entire
nation in the dark. Nothing has been said about what the Yugoslav
foreign minister was told in Brussels, what is going on in Belgrade
and why wasn't the Yugoslav president invited to attend the CSCE
conference in Lisbon.
All news are triple-checked and censored before broadcasting,
while unfortunate reporters who have to leave out politically
unacceptable parts face crossfire questioning if the name Slobodan
Milosevic is left out for one reason or the other.
The situation is such that many Serbian television editors are
said to be on the verge of insanity. At least one case of an editor
``going bananas'' just before the elections could turn out to be the
taste of what's coming.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme". December 7, 1996
AIM correspondent from Pristina Shkelzen Maliqi, writes in the
December 7, 1996 issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" on the
reflection of the current events in Serbia on the situation in
Kosovo.
Kosovo's ethnic Albanians are continuing to feign an obvious lack
of interest for events in Serbia. Earlier they boycotted the federal
and local elections in the FRY and Serbia and now they're watching
the crisis caused by the flagrant stealing of the opposition local
election victory with a ``disinterestedly.'' All Kosovo Albanian
politicians argued that the elections ``are their thing, the Serbians
which we Albanians have nothing to do with because we have our own
elections.''
They have the same stand on the mass protests in Belgrade although
they haven't voiced it yet: ``Their demonstrations are no concern of
ours, we have our own demonstrations.''
That refusal to have anything to do with political life in Serbia
is a demonstration of the ethnic Albanian's will not to belong and
they want confirmation that they are not a part of Serbia.
The fact that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia and that Serbian
elections are still being held there is just proof to the Kosovo
Albanians that there is a state of annexation and occupation which
they blame on both the Serbian regime and the opposition which does
not have the solution they want in their programs. They feel that the
Serbian regime sometimes advocates more radical stands than the
regime. The regime publicly took on obligations imposed by the great
powers to work towards a compromise solution on Kosovo. On the other
hand, the Serbian opposition sharply criticized the regime's
readiness to compromise and hasn't voiced a single positive vision
for a solution to the problem.
Despite the demonstrative facade of rejection represented by the
Bujku Albanian-language newspaper and some radical isolationist
circles who see any link with Belgrade as treason, Kosovo's Albanian
population has some elite and middle political circles who regularly
read the independent and opposition press from Belgrade and who have
a different stand on the crisis in Serbia, a stand that inclines not
towards a lack of interest but towards concern and a deep interest in
the outcome of that crisis. Those ethnic Albanians are not in favor
of the opposition. They have an equal mistrust of the regime and the
opposition but they believe that showing a lack of interest in the
outcome of the crisis is irresponsible and dangerous to ethnic
Albanian interests.
Whether they want it or not, Kosovo is part of
the area covered by the crisis and the Kosovo Albanians can't not
care whether the fire spreads or is put out before it bursts into a
civil war in Serbia itself including Kosovo. There are real fears
that the regime will, if things start turning bad, look for salvation
in provoking a Serbian-ethnic Albanian war just as it avoided reforms
of the system and society in 1991 and 1992 by fanning the flames of
war in Croatia and Bosnia.
Many feel they should sound the call for danger and perhaps even
mobilization. At the very least, they say they should stay alert and
prepare an adequate response to possible Serbian provocation.
Surprisingly, ethnic Albanian political circles don't seem to take
those warnings seriously. In public, there is virtually no sign of
concern among ethnic Albanians political circles. Is that because
their senses have dulled after years of passive resistance and
waiting or are they so sure of foreign guarantees, especially
American that no war will be allowed in Kosovo. Are the United States
as reliable as Kosovo Albanian politicians think they are?
Ibrahim Rugova and the leadership of his Kosovo Democratic
Alliance (LDK) are not showing any sign of concern over the crisis
and they've spread that feeling among their subordinates. They're
waiting for the outcome and don't seem to care what it is. If there
is a civil war in Serbia they are almost certain that it will be
``their, Serbian war'' and that it won't spread to Kosovo. They don't
even give serious consideration to threats from Serbian radical
circles or local militant groups that they will organize ``an armed
defense'' of Kosovo if Belgrade Betrays them or some foreign power
intervenes in favor of the ethnic Albanians.
Rugova's policy of staying out and watching from the sides also
favors Milosevic because that leaves Kosovo at the disposal of the
regime in the internal power struggle. To Rugova and his elite that
means choosing the lesser of two evils: Milosevic's regime has at
least some compromise solution to the Kosovo problem while the
opposition ``has no clear vision.''
In his weekly column in the Zeri
Albanian language magazine, LDK deputy leader Fehmi Agani said the
Serbian opposition ``knows what it does not want but doesn't know
what it wants.'' Agani drew that conclusion from part of Zoran
Djindjic's statement that the ethnic Albanians have become one of the
regime's pillars through their passive policies. Djindjic and other
opposition leaders offer nothing but a change of the regime. Their
vision of a democratic Serbia includes a gray area---the Kosovo
problem. Agani concluded that ``the attitude towards Kosovo is one of
their greatest weaknesses.'' Vojislav Kostunica said in his
pre-election speeches that a Serbian-ethnic Albanian war would break
out in 1998 as a reaction to Milosevic's betrayal of Kosovo.
So just as the democratic world lent support to Milosevic openly
during the latest elections, the Kosovo Albanians are not hoping for
a democratic solution which seems to them to be an illusion but on an
authoritarian solution for the Kosovo problem. They feel that it's
better to opt for a weakening of the authoritarian Milosevic than on
the cacophonic nationalist opposition. Agani made the clearest
formulation of the pragmaticisim of current ethnic Albanian policies.
He said: ``At first glance, the crisis in Serbia seems to be slowing
sown and delaying the process of finding a solution to Kosovo. But,
by weakening Milosevic's position the process can't but increase his
obedience to foreign factors and the need to seek a solution to open
problems.''
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
Devember 7, 1996
Goran Milicevic, a professor of Urban Economy at the School of
Economics, University of Belgrade, and a member of the Initiative
Board for the Defense of Democracy of the University, wrote his
analyses of the events in the December 30, 1996 issue of the Belgrade
weekly "Vreme".
1) The Roots: Professional disorder makes me search for the causes
of the existing few-years-long crisis of the uncompleted transition
from a traditional society to a modern one. More precisely, I see the
causes in the fact that the traditional, agrarian, patriarchal, rural
system of values still stubbornly resists the modern, urban system of
values. Even a hasty look at some developmental features supports
this thesis. The participation of the literate became greater over
the participation of the illiterate in 1931 for the first time. The
participation of the non-agrarian inhabitants became greater than the
rural only at the beginning of the 60s.
The participation of the
employed with elementary school education was over 50% only in the
middle of the 80s, and, finally, the participation of the urban
inhabitants, due to the tempestuous migrations from the rural areas
to the urban areas, became greater than the participation of the
rural only at the end of the 80s. Thus, it could be said that the
basic preconditions for democratic development and ascendancy of the
modern system of values were satisfied only at the end of 80s, and
only after a few decades of accelerated industrialization and
urbanization.
Regretfully, the quality of these two processes (measured by the
achieved income per capita) is fairly modest. And not only due to the
short time in which the changes, which in the developed countries
took centuries to model, happened, but also due to the ideological
obstacles to the normal development of the processes. Which is why
here we could say that we had quasi-industrialization and
quasi-urbanization. And that means that the majority of the workers
has low education and training, that a considerable portion lives in
the village and works in the city, so their fear of a transition from
such a system into a market economy based on competency is not
something to wonder about.
2) The Turnover: Along with the struggle of the two different
systems of values unfolds the struggle for liberation from the
centuries-long fear of those in power. After 500 years in the course
of which local, and then foreign feudal lords oppressed, and two
dynasties choked freedoms, followed by fifty years of communism which
in its final phase turned into an utterly open dictatorship, the
threshold of suffering hasfinally been exceeded. The arrogance of the
current regime, expressed through such a degrading mockery of the
freely expressed will of the people, has gone too far and caused a
new phenomenon---an awakening of civil consciousness. The former
fierce, and for that reason short-lasting peasant rebellions,
remembered by their leaders, have been replaced for the first time by
the peaceful, persistent manifestation of civil disobedience. And in
them, as opposed to the ``happening of the people'' from the end of
the 80s, the request is not for a new leader, but for the protection
of the basic principles of a civil society.
3) The Outcome: The general belief is that there are only two
possible outcomes---a bloody one, like in Bucharest, and a peaceful
one like in Prague. Used to the violent nature of this regime, most
of the casual observers and a good part of the participants in the
events believe that the first one is more probable. Unfortunately,
they could be right. But it also seems that the second outcome is not
less probable, but also is more likely to occur. Namely, the
situation resembles a chess game in which seemingly the opponent with
all the ``heavy'' figures on the chessboard has an advantage, but in
fact he has no worthy move open to him, because all of his powerful
figures are captured by his opponent's pawns.
It could even be said that the current president has already
announced civil war to his own people by his moves during the latest
local elections.
However, since slavery is the only alternative to the protest,
each day brings less probability that this large mass of people will
bend and become silent, because it is clear to everyone that after
that only a several-decades-long silence would ensue. His attempts to
weaken the strength of the protest by threatening the demonstrators,
first verbally, then by arrests and police torture, have, to his
astonishment, created a counter effect. Obsolete tutorials from the
area of putting the fear of God into the masses will not be of help
any more, because he faces something which is not described in those
books and for which there is no good police answer. That's why the
measures undertaken by the regime just increase the masses in the
streets, resolute to protect their essential rights.
Therefore, the counterpart of the increasing resistance to the
obstinacy of the regime and the insistence that at least once the
switch of power occurs peacefully, is only his unquenched craving for
power and his fear that descending from the throne would lead
directly to The Hague. As for his craving for power, it could weaken
when after many months of demonstrations he becomes assured that his
power exists only on paper. Therefore the only option is to provide
him with a descend from power which would not lead to The Hague. A
satisfactory solution should be found, having in mind that the
alternative is a bloody solution.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
December 30, 1996
Stojan Cerovic chief commentator of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme"
continuously looked at the current situation in Serbia. Here are his
key comments.
Now even Slobodan Milosevic knows that the election fraud and
theft of the votes was a mistake, although committed with the best
intentions to completely finish off and liquidate the tiresome
opposition. It isn't all that important to him anymore whether the
error sprung out of negligence, arrogance or bad assessment. Maybe he
only thinks it is stupid that such a huge problem originated out of a
mere trifle, since he knows perfectly well what scrapes he has
managed to come out of unpunished until now. Theft at the local
elections appears here just like that sloppy tax return which landed
Al Capone in jail.
There is no doubt that the mistake, that is theft, was committed
by Milosevic himself, and if anyone else was behind it, that mistake,
that is theft, would have been admitted sooner and easier. It
wouldn't have been allowed for the misfortunes of the regime to
accumulate and multiply from day to day. However, it is not in the
nature of the beasts nor the beastly regime to make rational
maneuvers and diminish the damage, but rather to steal, snatch what
does not belong to it and openly display force, and it retreats only
when it has to, meaning when misfortune dangerously escalates and a
serious resistance threatens.
It seems as though this time the headquarters in the wolves lair
have, lightly and incautiously, believed the news that Serbia has
completely lost it's capability for self-defense and a will to react
to anything. They could not resist the challenge to commit a highly
obvious theft, and if that had been accepted peacefully, it would
have been easier and sweeter to them than to have truly won the
elections. People would not only have understood who the authority
really is but also that that authority does not depend on the
elections and voters will one iota. Therefore, that was an attempt at
establishing a stable and long lasting facade of democracy, in which
people agree to vote even though the outcome is known in advance and
is unchangeable. Milosevic, according to his will, was nowhere to be
seen nor heard, yet he has never been so visible and clear to such a
large number of people.
All of a sudden, he found himself in conflict
with the complete communities of Belgrade and Serbia, which he had
believed had either scattered, been scared to death, or vanished. The
protests sprouted with speed and strength which obviously highly
exceeded their initial cause. A hundred thousand people gather in
Terazije each day primarily and mostly because of Slobodan Milosevic.
Djindjic, Draskovic and Vesna Pesic can say what they like, can be
more or less effective, can generate applause and chants, but
Belgrade citizens seem to be only waiting for one of them to mention
Milosevic's name before they start booing, swearing, hollering,
blowing their whistles and sirens, for at least fifteen minutes,
interrupting each speech. They come not to listen but rather to
express their opinion, and that only with regards to him, and not
only on account of this election theft but on everything.
Ruined lives, abolished hopes, general humiliation and disgrace
are hurling a scream of accusation.
Four years ago, Belgrade was protesting in mass numbers as well,
but then more out of fear of what was obviously to come. This time,
with more stamina, more directly and utterly personally, Belgrade and
many other cities are telling Milosevic that they don't want him, do
not recognize him, that they refuse to see or hear him anymore. He
knew that himself , which is why he hasn't put in an appearance
anywhere, yet eggs are flying at the buildings of the state-owned
tevision and Politika daily because the citizens know that he is
speaking from there and are launching direct hits.
Never again shall Milosevic hatch from these eggs with any
dignity. He himself is the greatest slave and the least free man in
Belgrade, so that even his own name (Slobodan = free) is ridiculing
him now. These eggs have forever stained both him and all those who
agree to remain in his service, and they will be recognizable to the
whole city by them wherever they dare to appear. Waiting for the
protest to simmer down and die out on it's own, Milosevic has
approached a dangerous ledge where even the judges of the Supreme
Court are publicly disassociating themselves from the judicial theft.
It would definitely soon become apparent that there are less and less
Tomics and Dacics in his midst, prepared to shoulder his disgrace,
and more and more of those who are packing their bags, selling off
their real estate and transferring cash.
Once that starts, it spreads like wild-fire and is unstoppable,
and there is no doubt that many of his men have prepared and planned
all details for a quick getaway a long time ago.
Attempts at totally censuring the protest, ignoring it and then
intimidating it did not pay off. I believe that Milosevic is now
urgently looking for the cheapest way to relent and admit an
opposition victory in Belgrade, Nis and Kraljevo, however not a
single way exists without admitting attempted theft, without shame
and defeat. However, the most important issue for him now is to
remove the people from the streets and to make the cameras of world
television stations back off. After that, he would find ways to deal
with the opposition in a different way.
The outcome of this affair, however, depends in a large degree on
the stands of international factors, which have a stronger hold over
Milosevic today than ever before. It is also definitely true that
they still perceive him as an important figure and as capable of
partially controlling the Bosnian Serbs. Yet, it is also certain that
they will not back him regardless of the price, and especially not if
it becomes apparent that he is not capable of controlling even
Belgrade and Serbia without terror. And terror is not only ugly, but
also verified as an unstable and unreliable model of ruling.
Therefore, what Milosevic risks is that the West could turn it's
back on him, as his own nation has turned it's back on him at this
very moment. His authority is now based on the support of the West in
a large degree, since he has nothing to offer Serbia, and what he
could offer, he refuses to. His people backed him more sincerely
while he was at war, and many of them undoubtedly fear his wife, her
political and psychological profile, her ambitions and
unscrupulousness by which her JUL party is clutching power and money.
I am disposed towards believing that the success of these protests
throughout Serbia has been brought about with the help of part of the
regime figures who are resisting Serbia's transformation from a bad
to an even worse, utterly incoherent JUL model, and that despite the
catastrophic election results of this party.
At this moment Milosevic cannot keep his regime tightly bound
together with only JUL's help, and that is the reason why he needs
support from the West which is quickly crumbling. Yet, to totally
abandon him, the most powerful world factors would have to know who
they could turn to, and the opposition coalition, apparently, still
fails to generate enough confidence. Naturally, we know their
imperfections, as we know that they are always far lesser than
Milosevic's, however they should put one last effort into
consolidating and presenting themselves as serious partners.
Beside that, the opposition leaders are not quite sure whether
this protest is only one phase in the process of eliminating
Milosevic, or a decisive moment when they should play for all or
nothing. It is not easy to answer such a dilemma, yet the mass on the
streets is getting bigger and there is a possibility that Milosevic
is now too late for any kinds of concessions. Gathering on the
streets in all weather is becoming such an irresistibly pleasant
habit, and the mood is so contagiously triumphant that it could
possibly cease only on account of the loveliest and most pleasurable
sight---of the tyrant who is departing.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
December 7, 1996
If we were to judge by the fact that he has officially wished us a
Happy New Year, Slobodan Milosevic is still head of this state.
However, that theory has been seriously brought to question by
numerous recent arguments, amongst which that ceremonious speech
stands as well. It could be deduced from it that the speaker possibly
is head of something, but that something could in no way be Serbia,
of which he knows nothing, or at least not what we all know, the only
thing both we and the rest of the world are talking about. He acted
as though he did not notice that he was up to his neck in water, as
though by that very stand it would retreat and as though the whole
secret of ruling is to be blind and deaf.
I still had the impression that he was unusually slow and unsure,
with a higher pitched and almost gentle voice, as though even he no
longer knows whether he truly is head of a state. That short
pre-recorded speech could have been repeated to the camera several
times, and we probably saw the best version he was capable of at the
moment. What I want to say is that he sounded almost human, which is
a sure sign of weakness and defeat. Yet, that is but an impression of
a viewer who could be accused by everyone of being too partial
towards Milosevic.
However, what is certain is that he has missed this opportunity to
announce a decision regarding whether he will congratulate the
opposition on its victory which he has tried to steal from them,
which is what the outside world, Montenegro and probably a large
number of his desperate supporters are demanding of him, or whether
he shall settle accounts with the ``fifth column,'' i.e. that same
opposition, as he himself had promised at the rally a week earlier. I
believe that his wife is talking him into the latter, as well as the
Devil himself whose advice he had usually greatly esteemed.
I see that some deem the fact that Milosevic has said that this is
to be a year of reforms as an important step forward. Then we would
also have to be happy that he had wished all of us a Happy New Year,
without excluding the walkers, students, Montenegrins, demonstrators,
whistlers, conspirators, ``fifth column'' and all who are in a truly
good mood these days. I would rather not dwell on interpretations of
the mentioned reforms, since if Milosevic is in no hurry to be more
precise and specific, we should give him time. This time everyone
else has even less reason to be impatient.
Let the man contemplate in peace on the depths of the reforms and
let him dispose of the remainder of his time by himself.
Finally, it
is no small task to give up your primary idea by which this year had
to have been a year of happily combining a civil war with a state of
emergency, during which the ``fifth column'' would have been
liquidated along with all anti-Chinese forces. Milosevic is
hesitating and is waiting for a good enough motive, yet has still not
seen one which is why he is talking of reforms in such a dejected
way. He did not clarify things further, since that reform would
definitely have to start by surrendering Belgrade and most of the
other cities to the ``fifth column.''
Finally, reform is a magic word
which the tyrants always remember towards the very end, when they run
out of ammunition, when they lose their strength and when it is too
late for their good intentions.
Whoever had stepped out on New Year's Eve into the streets of
Belgrade, Nis or Novi Sad, did not have to watch Milosevic on
television prior to that to understand how grieved he is. It was
enough to feel that unrepeatable explosion of enthusiasm, since that
was the true measure of his grief. Underneath the monument to Prince
Mihajlo I saw a man who, at the very peak of elation, while the
entire square was lit up by fireworks, love and happiness, was
looking at the sky and thanking Slobodan Milosevic. He himself had to
have equally deeply suffered, raged and cursed his bad luck.
That New Year's Eve celebration turned out to be so realistic and
complete because Milosevic had in the last ten years used up and
totally drained all the reserves of negative emotions. He gathered
only enemies and called the nation to feel fear, anger and hate which
had attained cosmic proportions. On top of that, that perverse
pleasure wasn't free of charge. The people had to tighten their belts
in order to have the right to feel fear and hate. They then noticed
how those manufacturers of hate and collectors of enemies most
definitely did not share their poverty. Then Milosevic announced how
there were no more foreign enemies, and the people understood that
his poverty was futile and absurd, and Milosevic all of a sudden
acquired plenty of internal enemies.
The current situation is something which is rarely seen. The head
of state in principle still holds all instruments of power and, in
the technical sense, is ruling the country. In principle, the
question still revolves only around the local elections and local
government. In principle, he can still recognize the results of
November 17. Moreover, he is not threatened by any physical force and
no one is demanding anything illegal of him, while he himself has
been caught in the act of demolishing legality. Finally, in
principle, he still could find some culprits in the lower echelons
who could, with modest compensations,agree to keep quiet and take
shelter elsewhere.
Yet, what would it all mean? Milosevic would then admit that he
really does not have the power he has, that is that he does not lay
claims on it, at least not in the way he has used to and how it only
interests him to. As if it was demanded of an absolute monarch to
abdicate, and become president of the republic. First of all, he
would be obliged to explain how the ``fifth column'' had all of a
sudden turned into a legal opposition and even local authority in the
cities. He would find it difficult to avoid opening up an
investigation against those plainclothes policemen who had, out of
the blue, beaten up the citizens with baseball bats, and it is a
well-known fact where that investigation would lead us to.
He would also have to, which is of the utmost delicacy, explain
to Mrs. Markovic why he isn't in a position to introduce Chinese
socialism in Serbia. He would probably be forced to agree that
television would in future broadcast at least twenty percent of the
truth, which would totally degrade him, since his people, as can be
seen, have rebelled even without that. That would also be an
admittance that the counter-rallies were not successful, i.e. that
the people do not want him, i.e. that he rules only because his term
of office still hasn't expired, i.e. that he is more dead than alive.
Those are the reasons why Milosevic hesitates to accept the
recommendations of the OSCE delegation which he had so gullibly
invited, not knowing that Felipe Gonzales is not Mile Ilic. Which is
why the institutions of the system have become such a favorite
syntagm of all official speakers, which somehow sounds amazingly
advantageous to them. Therefore, the findings and recommendation of
OSCE shall return to the very institutions of the very same system
which had stolen the elections and because of which help has been
called from outside. No uninvited and especially invited foreigners
shall force their will upon us.
However, the main charm of this entire joke boils down to the
fact that we all know that no institutions nor systems exist here. We
were told how what should have been institutions had operated by
those few brave judges of the Supreme Court. I am no longer able to
keep track of the news from Nis concerning the official
correspondence between their local court and election committee, nor
do I feel obliged to understand more than the fact that word is of a
simple government collapse.
Therefore, of institutions and systems here, all we have is the
ruling Family, their services and the people, or citizens, or however
the rest of us wish to call ourselves. Which means that power is one
and indivisible which is where the drama over the local authorities
springs from, since they know if someone takes away just a piece, he
takes all. The regime in Serbia is a tower of cards from which not a
single one can be taken out, and the easiest thing would be to take
out the one from the very pinnacle. In that way the lowest could
somehow maintain their position. Which is why it is good for the
future of this country that the crisis has been opened up from the
very bottom, over local authorities, since that promises and opens up
possibilities of constructing something a little more solid.
Therefore, if the unavoidable change could be accomplished in the
best possible way, Milosevic would be the last one to leave his
sinking ship. Yet he shall choose his destiny on his own and, judging
by all facts, no one can be of help to him there. The citizens of
Belgrade and Serbia have already done all that they could, the
students have been dead creative, and even the opposition leaders
failed to make a single mistake. Intimidation and threats of violence
have been removed with unexplainable calm, patience and discipline.
It all turned out as though God's mercy has spilled over this country
and now all of us can utterly calmly await all that our unfortunate
tyrant opts for.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme",
January 4, 1997
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