Thematic Issue - Kosovo Vol. 3, November 15, 1996
THEMATIC ISSUE:
Thematic Issue - Kosovo Vol. 3, November 15, 1996
Belgrade weekly Vreme brought
in its issue of September 7, a detailed report on the Milosevic - Rugova
agreement, written by Roksanda Nincic.
To everybody's surprise, Slobodan
Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova signed, on Sunday September 1, directly prior
to the beginning of the school year, an agreement by which the Albanian
pupils are to return to the regular schools. However, neither elementary
school pupils, nor high school ones, nor students have yet entered the institutions
which they had left six years ago, while the assessment of the motives and
political range of the signed agreement differ in a large measure. The actual
text of the agreement as well as the manner in which the Serbian authorities
chose to inform the public of it speak to the political nature of such a
decision to stop the parallel educational system in Kosovo.
Firstly, the
public was informed of the event in an unusually pompous manner---by a press
conference of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Mirko Marjanovic, and two of
his Ministers---Dragoslav Mladenovic (education) and Aleksandar Tijanic
(information), of which none participated in the negotiations with which
the government, at least officially, had nothing to do.
The following point
of interest is that the document is officially termed a consent,''
since that probably sounds less harsh than ``agreement.''
An agreement,
as we are all aware, is signed by two at least similarly equal parties.
As the stand of official Belgrade always maintained that no negotiations
can be entered into with the Albanians from Kosovo, since negotiations are
not entered into with citizens of one's own country, and that only talks
can be commenced with them, it is utterly principled that the result of
the talks should be a consent.
To be honest, there really weren't any talks---Milosevic
signed the consent'' in Belgrade, and Rugova in Pristina, but others
talked. Further, it is interesting to note how the difficulty of a formally
protocol yet actually political issue was solved concerning the titling
the signatories. On one side, the signatory is Slobodan Milosevic, President
of the Republic of Serbia; on the other side the signatory is Dr. Ibrahim
Rugova, with no function.
It is true that that seems quite ridiculous, but
at least that bypassed the necessity to put down in print that the mighty
President of Serbia was signing consents with the president of a party which
his country does not recognize, or, even worse, with the President of the
self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.'' (The announcement of the Information
Center of Kosovo however states that a consent has been signed between
President of the Republic of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova and the President of
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.'')
Finally, it is completely obvious that both
parties goal was to deprive the text of the consent'' of all political
context. They had gone so far in this that the return of the Albanians to
the schools was transferred into humanitarian spheres. Regardless of the
terminology, the consent was approved in all relevant places and---what
is encouraging---without provocatively stressing that it is an issue of
political victory of either one side or the other. The agreement was approved
even by the President of Albania, Sali Berisa, who stated that ``through
dialogue other even more important measures can be achieved.'' Positive
reactions came from Washington, from the EU and foreign media. The Pristina
daily Bujku estimates that the agreement should be respected without euphoria,
since a return to our schools was a step which had to be made, just like
the Albanians shouldn't have been expelled from the schools.''
Of course,
it would have been even better if the Albanians had really entered the schools
which they had left more than half a decade ago, but those who are acquainted
with the situation in Kosovo say that it was unrealistic to expect that
to happen on the day the agreement was signed.
By talking to Vreme
some of the influential Albanians, only halfway joking, say that the police,
apparently, still haven't received instructions to permit the teachers and
pupils of Albanian nationalities into the school buildings. Professors,
whom nobody had asked anything from the beginning, found themselves utterly
dazed. The principals of the Albanian parallel schools had in their first
reactions expressed disbelief in such a thing,'' while Serbian principals,
not in a small number, were both bitter and scared, asking themselves how
such quarrels can be forgotten overnight, how to agree upon actual space,
separate entrances into schools... Taking into account that the agreement
is only in principle, since the actual solutions are left to the mixed committee
which still needs to be formed, the indecisions are constantly multiplying.
As announced in Nasa Borba, in the Secretariat of Education Science and
Culture of the Province, they know nothing of the conditions under which
the Albanians shall return to the schools and that they have no official
information from Belgrade. Radio B92 broadcasted that the police prevented
high school pupils to enter the buildings of the elementary schools in Mitrovica
and Vucitrn.
Dnevni Telegraf announced the claim of Agim Hisenija, the president
of the Union of Education Science and Culture of Kosovo that classes shall
in future have the same plans and programs which were used in the parallel
schools---plans which Serbia had refused to acknowledge up till now. The
state Borba has, however, on September 3---not naming any sources---announced
that signing a consent with the president of Serbia in itself understands
the acceptance of educational plans and programs and methods in accordance
with the laws of Serbia.''
In the meantime, classes in Albanian continue
to be held, just like all these years, in private houses. Schools and the
educational system in Kosovo are the battlefield of the political conflict
of the Serbs and the Albanians for the last fifteen years or so. A reminder:
the so-called Kosovo issue in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
was introduced by the demonstrations of the Albanian students in Pristina
in the spring of 1981 and for a whole decade following that event, the officially
valid explanation of the Belgrade authorities was that the Albanian youth
were indocrinated in irredentism, and an ideological and political classification
was demanded of the professors.
During 1990 and 1991, the authorities in
Serbia adopted a number of decisions ``on the rationalization of the educational
network and on establishing an unique educational system in the Republic
of Serbia,'' which, understandably, was one aspect of the reaction to the
proclamation of the Constitutional Declaration of (independant) Kosovo on
July 2, 1990 by 114 delegates of the Provincial Parliament of Albanian nationality.
Already on July 5 of the same year, by the decision of the Serbian Parliament,
the Parliament and Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija were dissolved
and special measures'' were announced. Among other things, a certain
number of elementary and high schools in Kosovo were closed, as well as
a number of departments and schools of the university. The Serbian Parliament
had, on June 1, 1991, limited the number of pupils to be enrolled in the
Albanian language high schools. The Educational Institute of Kosovo, the
Book Issuing Bureau and accompanying institutions were suspended.
Due to
the non-acceptance of the unique textbook,'' more than 18 thousand
professors were fired in Albanian language schools and university. Around
250 thousand pupils in the Albanian language schools have completed the
1990/1991 school year using programs of the suspended Education Institute
of Kosovo.
When the authorities in Serbia conditioned the enrollment into
the next grade by the passing of additional subjects in accordance with
the program of the Education Institute of Serbia, Albanian schools in private
houses, cellars, mosques, coffee shops... were opened, which pupils attend
even today. Milosevic's reasons for signing the agreement with Rugova are
clear: one of the conditions set by Washington and their close political
partner for lifting the outer wall of Yugoslavia's sanctions is to resolve
the situation in Kosovo, and the first concrete demands are normalization
in the field of education and freeing political prisoners.
By this consent''
he loses nothing, and if the outer wall of the sanctions could be lifted
until the elections, he would gain a lot. The motives of Ibrahim Rugova
are also relatively obvious---although there is a possibility that his political
position could be disbalanced. Despite the furious diplomatic activity of
many years, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians didn't receive support for
secession (the EU has, even on the occasion of this agreement reminded that
it regards Kosovo as an internal Serbian and Yugoslavian issue), the strongbox
of the Republic of Kosovo'' is relatively empty, and parallel education
isn't cheap.
There are estimations that Rugova has reasons to fear radicalization
in the ranks of his own party which could jeopardize even his power. The
influential Adem Demaci, president of the Committee for the Protection of
Human Rights, made a statement for Nasa Borba that the agreement is an important
point for Milosevic,'' and that the real loser'' was Rugova, since
the debate on the status of Kosovo is finalized and the whole issue has
entered the narrow track of an autonomy as part of Serbia.''
He estimated not only that the situation in Kosovo would not calm down,
but rather that the disturbance will emerge'' now because the
Serbian nationalists will not calm down . Of course, there is also the question
of how the Albanian extremists, already irritated by the fact that the Kosovo
issue was ignored in Dayton, will react to the fact that Rugova has signed
the agreement in Cyrillic.'' All in all, for Kosovo, even after this
agreement, the recent estimate of Mirko Tepavac still holds: The world refuses
to allow Kosovo to secede, and to allow Serbia to carry on their torture.
The apparent peace in Kosovo is upheld by NATO and America, rather than
by the numerous Serbian police force. It is completely clear that not a
single solution can go below the stipulations of the Constitution from 1974.
''A cold apartheid'' has been established in Kosovo which with each
passing day threatens to escalate into a hot conflict.''
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , September 7, 1996
In the October 12, 1996, of
the same magazine, Pristina analyst Shekelzen Maliqi makes a commentary
on the recent developments concerning Kosovo.
If all goes according to plan,
events in Kosovo should bring about a process exactly opposite to the one
which took place in Bosnia It seems that the war in the former Yugoslavia
is finally history now that the elections in Bosnia have ended and the sanctions
imposed against Serbia and Montenegro have been lifted. Politicians and
analysts are now focusing on two vital issues: will the fragile Dayton accord
hold and actually become a long-term guarantee of peace, and can the implementation
of the treaty ensure lasting stability in a region with more powder kegs,
such as Kosovo and Macedonia, potentially the venues of future conflicts.
To make any safe predictions about the latter issue is an ungrateful task.
It is apparent that the situation in Kosovo, the hallmark of the Yugoslav
crisis back in the eighties, has not culminated to a point of no return
and therefore an armed conflict. In other words, Kosovo remains a crisis
area and a possible war zone.
Armed clashes have so far been averted thanks
to a wise decision by ethnic Albanian politicians to refrain from military
methods in the attempts to resolve a conflict of interests in controlling
Kosovo. War and large-scale disaster evaded Kosovo even after Serbia had
demonstrated readiness to use all means available and appointed a military
governing body in the province in 1989.
A situation of neither war nor peace
has prevailed in Kosovo over the past six years, a kind of status quo resting
on delicately balanced fear present both among the Serbs and the ethnic
Albanians. However, it is quite clear that the status quo cannot and will
not hold much longer. The ethnic Albanians, who have formed some kind of
a parallel government, made it clear that they are not prepared to tolerate
Serbia's hard-line policy indefinitely. The parallel system, formed as a
resistance factor which has served its purpose more or les successfully,
does not satisfy their ambitions.
Although it has played a crucial role
in their cause, in the long run it will become counterproductive and exhaustive
of their resources because ethnic Albanians are actually paying two sets
of taxes: one to those who have occupied'' them, and another to those
who are supposed to liberate'' them.
In addition to this problem,
their ranks include a number of influent radicals accusing the present leadership,
headed by Ibrahim Rugova, of incompetence and collaboration. Worrying signs
that things could change for the worse appeared a few months back with a
series of terrorist attacks on Serbian police and civilians, which haven't
ceased to this day.
An illegal foreign-based ethnic Albanian organization,
previously unknown, allegedly claimed responsibility for the attacks. However,
there are theories according to which other factors are involved. One
of them is that the entire affair is a set up by Serbian police which could
give them a perfect excuse for repressive measures against ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo.
All factors involved in the Balkan crisis are well aware that
the key to securing lasting stability in the region lies in finding the
most adequate solution to the Kosovo problem.
A recent and dramatic decline
in Serbia's tight grip on Kosovo showed both the efficiency and the purpose
of keeping Serbia I isolated with extended economic sanctions, not included
in those lifted after the end of the Bosnian conflict. The measure, which
forced Serbia to reconsider its position, came as result of U.S. pressure
and brought an agreement between Milosevic and Rugova last month on the
restoration of the ethnic Albanian education system. In addition to that,
a prominent Serbian academician, Jovan Despic, promised back in June he
would address the nation with his vision of a new approach to the Kosovo
problem, based on a proposition for territorial demarcation'' with the ethnic
Albanians.
Rumors in Kosovo's capital, Pristina, have it that secret Serb-Albanian
talks, held in Rome last summer under the auspices of a Catholic goodwill
mission, resulted not only in agreement about the education matter, but
also agreement in principle on the gradual resolving of specific political
and other issues. The agreement indicates that politicians in both Belgrade
and Pristina, although Tirana officials should be counted as an interested
party, realize that the conflict in Kosovo must not be allowed to get out
of hand because neither side will benefit from armed clashes.
In other words,
they are aware that they must compromise and accept as the most appropriate
solution, a form of autonomy for Kosovo similar to the model provided by
the 1974 constitution, with outlets needed in case additional or other solutions
are required.
Although other options have been mentioned, most of them with
a disastrous scenario of full-scale war as the end product, the most realistic
solution seems to be the one envisaging a political solution through the
gradual introduction of a model called autonomy plus'' and subsequent
federalization of the ethnic Albanian issue. If all goes according to plan,
events in Kosovo should bring about a process exactly opposite to the one
which took place in Bosnia.
The Bosnian Serbs were forced to give up their
military dominance and become a federal unit in the newly formed Bosnian
state, while the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo should gradually gain a similar
status within Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, only
time will tell whether that will result in the recognition of a future Republic
of Kosovo as an integral part of Yugoslavia, or perhaps some other outcome.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme , October 12, 1996
Ylber Hysaof the Prishtina Albanian language weekly Koha looks at the
political implications of the education issue in the October 30, 1996 issue
of that weekly.
The appointment of the Albanian trio that should negotiate
with the Serbian side about the implementation of the agreement on education
in Kosova, reactivated the bit forgotten issue of the first
step in the Albanian-Serb dialogue. The agreement reached on Sept. 1, has
caused enthusiasm among Kosova Albanians, and many international political
structures greeted it.
However, the gesture of good will has not been achieved
yet. And not only this, but there has been no preliminary meeting between
Belgrade and Prishtina. There was a series of reasons for that.
First, the
elections in Serbia slow down the process. First of all because the local
Serbs complained about the agreement, trying to present this gesture of
the Serbian president as a series of concessions that harm the Serbian national
question. It's Kosova's turn, say the members of the Serbian Resistance
Movement (SRM), thus trying to get as many followers as possible.
However,and having also in mind the action of the arrest of some of the Albanian
terrorists in Drenica, are the aces in the hands of the ruling
party, that despite all problems, will win the elections in Kosova too.
Although it will not be easy... But, this seems to be only one of the problems
that slows down the realization of the agreement. After all, the postponement
of the realization of the agreement can be justified with the technical
aspect of the elections. But after the elections are over, there will be
no more space for such explanations. Then, the problem will be reduced to
more concrete things.
One of them will probably be the issue of the intermediation
of a third party. In fact, according to our direct sources, this issue was
brought up by the parties themselves. And, while the Albanian side considers
the issue of mediation more than a symbolical matter, the Serbian party
considers that such symbolism proves its old posture that Kosova remains
it's internal matter .
In fact, such a wording about Kosova's
problem can be used for domestic purposes, despite the fact that Kosova
since long is not a Serbian internal problem, neither is it an international
problem as Albanians wish. Moreover, because the presence of Monsignor Paglia,
the representative of Sant' Egidio, and not a state or an institution -
doesn't place the Serbian party in a directly uncomfortable situation. If
it is so, then here we have another technical problem that would disable
the meetings of the two sides. And whilst the fact that the Albanian side
didn't nominate it's trio was used as an excuse of the Serbian side to evade
the meetings, now the dilemma is - with or without the intermediator?
At
the LDK they tell us that this shouldn't represent a problem to the Serbian
side, for this is the representative of an organization. These sources even
say that when the agreement was reached, this element was mentioned expressively,
and that the Serbian side had no objection to it.
Anyhow, at the LDK think
that Milosevic, in fact, with his stalling, is trying to increase the value
of his concession. And he does this knowing that both the Americans and
Europeans are interested in the implementation of the agreement.
But, it
is ironic to ask and gain from something unjustifiable as is the expulsion
of Albanian students from their schools buildings, say at the LDK. On the
other hand, our attempt to find someone from the Serbian party failed. Percevic
was always busy, and we couldn't get any information from the Ministry of
Information.
It is easy to understand why the Serbian side is not interested
in making any statements. On the other hand, it is said that the Americans
insisted many times, in the many visits effectuated, that the members of
the Albanian delegation be appointed and the names be published. Anyhow,
it is early to expect the meetings of the groups to take place soon. December
is scheduled for the Albanian-Serb round table, and until then, there is
enough time for manoeuvres. On the other hand, as weere told unofficially,
the appointment of the Albanian trio caused quite some sparkles in the LDK.
There were even suggestions that the appointment should be done by the Government
of Kosova! This can also be one of the elements that Milosevic could use
- the lack of unity among Albanians. The same way in which the Albanians
can accuse the Serbs for trying to avoid the realization of the agreement.
To Rugova, the realization of the agreement is something more than education.
To Milosevic, who anyways has no way to evade letting go on education, the
issue is a matter of political profit. Therefore, although there are many
elements that could justify the non celebration of the meetings,
it is hard to find justifications for its final non-realization.
Therefore,
the future terrain of political manoeuvre about Kosova, even after the elections
will be - education!
Source: Pristina weekly Koha , October 30,1996
KOSOVO
Recent political development
in the Serbian province of Kosovo, particularly the Rugova-Milosevic agreement
on education, the question of Albanian asylum seekers in Germany and other
political questions are examined by presented here by the following authors
of Belgrade weekly Vreme and Pristina weekly Koha: