BALKAN MEDIA & POLICY MONITOR

NEWS AND ANALYSIS DIGEST
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ISSUE 11 VOL 2 MAY 1, 1995.


IN THIS ISSUE:

  • Comments and analyses:

    Monitor and Republika - what is the background of Milosevic insistence on lifting the sanctions ?

    Oslobodjenje - what is the achievment of Milosevic's pressure on Karadzic?

    Republika - The wider aspects of the Yugoslav crisis

    Arkzin - The lessons of the puppet NDH state of WWII for Croatia

    Vreme - The possible Balkan confederal proposals and their effects on Macedonia


  • Internal political events:

    Vreme: Bosnia - can the internal opposition to Radovan Karadzic be successful?

    Globus: Croatia - possibility and prospects of an oppositionary alliance

    Koha: Macedonia - Comment on the Albanian university in Tetovo

    Vreme: Serbia - The goals of the new leftist coalition - JUL


  • Situation in the Media:

    Republika: - The report on the "Nasa Borba" case

  • Dossier:

    Monitor: - The facts and background of the paramilitary units on the territory of former Yugoslavia

    Note: The " Balkan Media & Policy Monitor" has published a special number on the situation in Kosovo, which accompanies this issue


    COMMENTS AND ANALYSES

    Slobodan Inic discusses in the april 14 issue of the Montenegrin weekly Monitor the stance of the Serbian authorities towards the war in Bosnia, in relation to the question of sanctions.

    Often quoted statement of the Serbian leaders that the continued retaining of sanctions against FRY only strengthens the warmongering circles in Serbia is problematic in a number of its dimensions, says the author. The warmongering chauvinistic elements in Serbia were warmongering even before the sanctions were introduced, and they remain as such today. Their warmongering is almost completely independent from sanctions, since those circles in Serbia and Montenegro advise us to sustain everything, and at any cost., since we Are "only steps away from the unification of Serbian lands and embodiment of Greater Serbia". It could be said that the most extreme elements in Serbia would wage the war no matter whether the sanctions were there or not.

    Finally, if the fear from these forces is in question, why would the international community worry about that more than Slobodan Milosevic himself, who was the instigator of the crisis in Yugoslavia on the ultra - nationalistic basis. Is Milosevic socializing his fear, telling the international community what is the situation in his house, or is something else in question, asks Inic.

    It is more probable, he continues, that this is a policy which would like to lift the sanctions and keep the Serbian quasi - state situations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since, objectively speaking, the current peaceful policy of Milosevic, even though it might look completely contrary to the previous war policy, is not considered completely sincere in the official circle of the international community - Milosevic opted for peacemaking at the moment when he concluded territorial conquests in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    For that reason, thinks Inic, Serbia would have to recognize former republics as the proof that it has sincerely changed its policy of war. But this recognition should not be preceded by any "final solution", as talked about by Milosevic's functionaries in Serbia, as Radmilo Bogdanovic, actually the "eminence grise" of the Serbian internal politics, since this was the reason for which the war was started, but it should be the other way around: only the recognition of former republics is the condition for a final solution and the lifting of sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro. Further contesting of the former internal borders in previous yugoslavia ("AVNOJ borders") will further prolong that final solution. Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", April 14, 1995.


    Milenko Markovic in the April 15-30 issue of Belgrade fortnightly Republika also tackles the question of the background of new Serbian policy.

    The author states that for this moment it is most important how different regional factors are relating towards the newest proposals of the "Contact group" for Bosnia. But it is not unimportant how different factors within Serbia and elsewhere relate towards the plan of "Greater Serbia", which is one of the greatest causes of the current war. The Serbs in diaspora are completely clear in that respect: they want Greater Serbia, and they want it now, even at the price of continuing the war. There, Milosevic's position is ambivalent. On one side, he allows the possibility that he could gradually, under certain conditions, abandon the plan of Greater Serbia, but on the other, through his idelogue Mihajlo Markovic, he only postpones the realization of that plan for better times. It should not be doubted that Milosevic's break with the leadership in Pale is completely serious on the politically tactic and ideological plane.But this does not have to be the indisputable proof that the break also occurred concerning the goals of the nationalist policy. While this proof is lacking, there is a basis for a statement that Milosevic in essence wants the same thing as Karadzic, Martic, and part of the opposition in Serbia - Greater serbia, but without the symbols of monarchy, Chetnik movement and in a more realistic manner ( "first the peace, and then we will see how to proceed" ).

    In any case, says the author, the most serious test of Milosevic's intentions will be reflected through the question whether he will, and under what conditions, recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina in the so called "AVNOJ borders". Until now, the official Serbian politics was able to skillfully use two mutually functional statements: that it has no territorial pretensions towards republics of former yugoslavia, but that the Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia has the right to self - determination, which includes territorial secession and ceding to mother state.

    Milosevic finds himself in front of an almost impossible task: to legalize what has been achieved so far for the Serbian national corpus as a whole, and that his would not be received as the disrespect and breach of rights of other nations or treason of Serb expectations, particularly those in the diaspora.

    The dilemma is of Hamlet proportions, or as the folk saying goes: he'll regret whatever he does. If he recognizes Bosnia and Croatia in within their "AVNOJ borders" he is threatened by the nationalists, former war allies , from this and the other side of river Drina.And, if he decides against this move, or drags it through, he could be confronted with social rebellion within the country.

    There are those political analysts which advise that the recognition should not be rushed, since this would supposedly encourage nationalistic forces in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro. The author is of the opinion though, that the agresiveness on one side, breeds co- agresiveness on the other, and that peaceful moves on one side weaken the forces of war in all areas. He also thinks that that the advice by which the process of normalization should begin first, and that the recognition should come as the concluding act, also does not stand. It should be had in mind, says Markovic, that other have their trump cards too, but also the fact that Milosevic, no matter how much he really is "a key figure", is not the only card dealer in the game, and that the one that uses overplay can be overplayed himself.

    The only precondition from which Milosevic would not have a moral right to give up is a high level of autonomy of Serb Krajina and international guarantees that this autonomy of Serb Krajina will be respected in Croatia. This is a debt and obligation of the mother country, and a personal debt of Milosevic, since he bears the brunt of responsibility for the suffering that these people passed through in this tragic war. The Bosnian case is different, thinks the author. But, if the Serb - Croat agreement anulls the Tudjman - Milosevic agreement from Karadjordjevo ( March 1991. ) about the division of bosnia and if it would be accompanied by a joint statement about the respect of territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this would alleviate the process of finding peace on the territory of that republic too.
    Source: Belgrade fortnightly "Republika", April 15 - 30 1995.


    The weekly international edition of the main Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje, carried in its April 6 issue a commentary by Gojko Beric about the achievements of Milosevic's pressure on Radovan Karadzic to accept the "Contact group" plan.

    Beric says that the time of the fragile truce is running out (at the time of writing) and the results of Milosevic's attempts to remove warmonger Karadzic are becoming thinner and thinner. This is becoming a surprise even for those who do not believe in any kind of good intentions of the Serbian strongman. In this "remote control duel" he has so far used mainly political trump cards, but they did not prove to be too effective. The reason for this is in a simple fact that if the Bosnian Serbs accept the peace plan, Milosevic would save at least some face in the eyes of the international community, while Karadzic would become a multiple looser. It should not be excluded as a possibility that he would be "swallowed by the dark" of the state in whose name he committed so many crimes. Milosevic has now decided to compromise his former satellite in the sphere of mass emotions, opening up the theme of death. As usual, he has left the first punch to the media inclined to him. Lamenting on the fate of the Serbs, for which it only circumvently accuses themselves, the commentator of the Belgrade NIN states that they are, by what is offered to them, getting a better deal than "AVNOJ " was, but that the price is too high.

    NIN, under the burden of frightening reality in Serbia itself, is dealing with fallen Serbian heads, says Beric. It does not dare tell their number, and particularly who is responsible for their death, because it would be too much for it. The price of the aggression is appearing to the Serbs as a biological boomerang : there is less and less earthly, and more and more "heavenly" Serbs.

    The dark forces of Orthodoxy, in cahoots with Chetnik movement, became a governing ideology in Karadzic's "state". From this monstrous concoction almost half of Serbs ran away. Karadzic is not asking for the price of defeat. He is relying on the strengthening of the whole national block, lead by Vojislav Seselj's Radical Party and his own SDS. According to that scenario, Milan Martic (current president of the Krajina Serbs), who seems to be written off by Milosevic, has been designated the role of Karadzic's satellite in Knin. It remains to be seen which move will Milosevic undertake in relation to Knin and Pale. He is still not ready to confront the defeat. Milosevic has been most precisely been defined by the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who recently said : " there is no water in that well ".

    Source: Sarajevo daily's "Oslobodjenje" weekly international review, April 6, 1995.


    The president of the European Movement in Serbia, Mirko Tepavac (a former minister of foreign affairs of SFRY in the early Seventies), discusses in the March 15 - 31 issue of the Belgrade fortnightly Republika the European aspects of the Yugoslav crisis.

    A lot of time was necessary for Europe and the world to realize that the Yugoslav crisis is not local, folkloric Balkan outrage, but a reflection of wider open processes which burden current world situation, including the multinational, multicultural multiconfessional Europe. It took even more time to realize that crises of this kind are not only a post - communist phenomenon, invoked by the discords of autocracy and lack of freedom that characterized it. As if it was thought that every act of destruction of communism brings freedom, prosperity and democracy, which is a specific type of Western dogmatism.

    That is why every nationalism and separatism easily appeared to the West as the outbreak of democracy, only if it would ornament itself with anti - communist decorations. At the same time, in the domestic public, every defense of the state socialism was able to justify itself by the necessity to close ranks around big national projects. In all known cases, in ours in particular, says Tepavac, it was easy to push forward the slogan: "national state first, democracy later".

    Caught unaware by this relatively new process, tangled by their own worries, and insufficiently knowledgeable by the depth and the essence of the problem, the world unfortunately, and Europe and EU itself - showed the tendency to quickly accept and force upon easy and "simple" solutions, often contradictory to each other. easily switching among them, unfortunately, seldom for the better.

    In short, the wise Europe and the rich world were not able, or did not like to see that this process is not, after all, of a local, but universal character, that the sickness is not exclusively somebody elses, but potentially one's own, and that it is actually highly contagious. Such baffled and helpless world was practically helped, or ,morally eased by those of our "heavenly politicians" who have easily explained all with "conspiracy against the Serbian people", finding all the causes of our problems in the "evil intentions of the selfish world" and "mysterious new world order". Today, the world is beginning to see its share of the blame, but it knows well that it does not bear the responsibility for everything it is accused of. It is, Actually, much easier to bear the unfounded accusations then accept the founded ones. The Yugoslav crisis, unfortunately, will not be over soon, even if there occurs a ceasefire that lasts for a while.

    Realism talks in favor of every compromise formula which helps that the killing is transformed into negotiations and that reason contains the madness. But, then it will come the turn to find and build the real and lasting solutions. To turn the break in war into a lasting peace, and the confrontation in the beginning of reconstruction and development, it will be necessary to accept the offers and that, through time, the high standards of organized society and state on which the peaceful and civilized part of the world is founded today start taking root through time.

    Good will be only the solution which will enable that the states of former Yugoslavia do not remain closed societies - autarchic and ethnocentric - , that they do not hinder the communications and free flow of people, including, above all, the right to return of all those who were expelled or who became refugees, and that the guilty of war crimes are not amnestied. No matter how noble the goal, the peace is not the end of the story. Peace is only the last act of the confrontation, only the necessary precondition that we become open to real and lasting solutions. That is why peace itself, no matter how precious it is - should not be patched up so that it will burden or hinder the removal of the deepest sources of the conflict. violence and backwardness. It has to be thought about the peace of change, of a secure and lasting one.
    Source: Belgrade fortnightly "Republika", March 15 - 31, 1995.


    Alen Anic of the Zagreb independent fortnightly Arkzin , in its April 7 issue wrote on the lessons of the 10.th of April, the anniversary of the formation of the so called "Independent State of Croatia" during the Second World war.

    From today's vantage point, says Anic, some historical figures and events are harder to understand and define their place in history, than others. Ante Pavelic (the Ustashi leader of the puppet nazi state in Croatia during WW II), from the standpoint of the historical science is not a controversial figure. Everything is practically known about him. Everything is known about his state, its racist laws and concentration camps for genocidal destruction of people.

    Still, there are polemics, more than ever, in Croatia today about his historical role. It is necessary to ask ourselves why this is occurring. Maybe because many people, no matter what their level of intelligence , education or social status is, have the need, in this general fear of war, to define themselves towards the facts of national history and to seek in them parts of themselves and their identity, no matter how much that part of national history swam in blood. Maybe because a small number of people still remember long past killing and butchery, or maybe, because nobody wants, in the current situation to remember that, because there is an alibi ("see what the Serbs are doing") and there is enough of today's butchery.

    The story of phenomenaeology of a sorry pseudo - state has its partial continuation in the politics of today.It is appearing today as a measure of its political correctness and purity, an aging state - forming light bearer and a time which reeks of blood and despair and whose touch, no matter how much time has passed, can be felt as something cold under the neck. The phenomenon of nazism, is not . of course, exclusively owned by us, says Anic. But the form and manner in which Croatian society of today regenerates its own historical frustration has no match in today's states which were once totalitarian.

    The Croats, though, are not offered national catharsis through remembrance and insight. They are offered forgetfulness. So the Ustashi/state-forming "festivity" in Split on April 10th is just one of the symbols of staged collective forgetfulness, intentionally bent picture of history, which liberal democratic states of today (Germany and Japan, for example) do not tolerate.

    If we were all mentally disabled and that we did not have former lives, we would really think that there is only God and Croats. But, we know that not one state, even Croatia, is not a measure of everything, The primitive fantasy of hiding the truth is the proof that the truth really exists. It depends on us whether we want to take it.
    Source: Zagreb fortnightly "Arkzin", April 7, 1995.


    Belgrade weekly Vreme carried in its issue of April 17 the analysis of its regular contributor Nenad Lj. Stefanovic of the current "Balkan confederation" proposals, floating around the political circles in the region.

    If some quite unsuccessful attempted projects, like the Muslim/Croat federation are excluded, says the author, as well as all of the federal - confederal options in the areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, this type of " visionary " politics deals predominantly with the future of Macedonia. Only in the last few months, in an official or unofficial manner, at least four different ideas of Balkan confederal connections were promoted, in all of which Macedonia was put at the center seat of such unions.

    The frequent offers of joining different Balkan unions are met in Skopje with a good dose of odium. Recently, main Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija" in its article "Hunt for a Confederation", said that something is obviously not right when similar offers are made to Skopje by both Serbia and Albania, two neighbors quite antagonistic to each other and with completely different political and strategic interests between each other and towards Macedonia. According to this commentary, cited by Stefanovic, both offers have the prefix of "Great" - Serbia or Albania. Something similar was directly said by the Macedonian prime minister Branko Crvenkovski. Talking about the Belgrade offer, he stated that "the Serbian president is dreaming about the confederation between Serbia and Greece, in a manner that he would wipe the Macedonian state off the map".

    The Milosevic confederal offer to Athens is almost three years old, presented to then Greek prime minister Constantine Mitsotakis. In a much enlarged and detailed version the same idea was presented at the end of the last year to the leader of the Greek leftist coalition Nikos Constandopolous. Then, according to the Greek media, the inter - Balkan confederation would be comprised of FRY, Macedonia and Greece, while in the second phase this state union would be widened to Bulgaria and Romania. In that manner, the Athens magazine "Ethnos" stated that the capital of the new federation of Balkan countries would be in Athens, that the first president would be Greek, and the official language Greek. Another Athens paper "Apogevmatini" said that the draft of this "loose confederation" envisages a non - belligerent agreement between Belgrade, Skopje and Athens, as well as a formation of a joint military staff, which would be located in Thessaloniki. The confederal bank would be located in Belgrade (probably the weakest point of the project) and the Balkan university in Skopje. Some Greek media went even further, stating that this union could be named "small Russian support" , since this idea was supported by the Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. The whole idea does not diverge much from the similar projects of the "Byzantine club" in Serbia, which proposes a concept of joining the areas from Moscow to Nicosia. Former Greek foreign minister Samaras formed his "Spring party" on the basis of a similar project. At the beginning of this year, in a statement to the greek paper "Elefteros tipos", Radovan Karadzic joined in the so called "Republika Srpska " (Macedonia was understood) into this idea.

    In Belgrade, where this idea was conceived, there were not too many comments about the Balkan confederation. Some experts for the international law have said that from the diplomatic standpoint, the idea about the (con) federation is not particularly usual or understandable. With this proposal, the confederation is practically offered to a state (Macedonia) which FRY does not recognize, but with which it shares a border. Along with that, as a main partner os taken a state (Greece) with which FRY has diplomatic relations, but does not share a border. In Skopje, which logically should be asked about all this, a categorical stance was taken immediately against any pact and unification in the Balkans.

    One of the basis of the official Macedonian policy is the so called equidistance towards the neighbors, which starts from the point that Macedonia cannot be in too firm a connection with any of its neighbors. Contrary to this stance of the Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov , most of the oppositionary leaders proposes the idea about the necessity of Macedonian leaning on the "real friends in the neighborhood". Some of them at that mean Bulgaria, others Serbia. The third "Russia small", with Moscow patriarchy at the head. Some recent polls have showed though, that around two thirds of the polled do not wish any "special relations" with any of the neighbors.

    In October of last year, presidential candidate of the VMRO - DPMNE party, Ljubisa Georgijevski , condemned Gligorov's policy of equidistance towards the neighbors with the idea of a confederation of Skopje, Sofia and Belgrade. He outlined the proposal as a pact and " authentic protection against Islamic fundamentalism and aggressive appetites of Albania" in these areas.

    The youngest initiative about Balkan ties came in March from Tirana, in a form of a proposed union between Albania and Macedonia. The whole idea was begun by the Kosovo daily "Rilindja", which is published now in Tirana. According to the paper, the formation of the Albanian - Macedonian confederation, similar to the one between Croats and the Muslims, is actually proposed by Washington. Skopje, supposedly rejects all this with the stance that it is against any form of union in the region, but with the ambition that one day they get accepted in the EU. The official representative of the Macedonian government called all this speculations.

    The Macedonian media stated that the idea of ties between Albania and Macedonia came at the moment when the "Kosovo question" became practically closed and left to be solved as an internal Serbian matter, so it is becoming obvious that there are attempts, also through initiatives like these, to move it into Macedonian terrain.

    Most of these Balkan federations are connected by the fact that they are far from reality and that they are launched as to "feel the pulse", and not only of the Balkan states. Watched from the angle of Skopje, the fact that Macedonia finds itself at the epicenter of all current projects of Balkan unification is interpreted as a definite sign that this state is "seen" to serve at the end of the war as a bargaining chip in the Balkan end game. Contrary to this idea, says Stefanovic, there are those who think that the stories about the Balkan confederation are the re- escavation of an old "cominform" idea.

    But what all more or less agree, is that for the last three thousand years you travel through the Balkans by the Danube River, or by the route "via Ignatia", from Albanian coast to Aegean Sea, and mostly from Belgrade to Thessaloniki through the Vardar river valley, with disregard for the borders, quarantines and blockades, concludes the author.
    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme:, April 17, 1995.


    INTERNAL POLITICAL EVENTS

    Bosnia

    Belgrade weekly Vreme in its issue of April 10, carried two extensive articles on the internal political situation among the Bosnian Serbs, with the particular focus, on the formation of political opposition to president of the so called "Republika Srpska", Radovan Karadzic.

    In the first article, Uros Komlenovic states that Karadzic's SDS Party of All Serbian States (its formal title) is more and more confronted with the downfall of popularity and re - kindling of the opposition. This is not a surprise, when it is known that the citizens of his self - proclaimed state are living through strange times : the minimal salary is still 45 dinars (cca 20 DEM), and the highest allowed salary is three times higher, while the prices are higher than in Belgrade. The average pension is 30 dinars, if it reaches the recipients at all. At the same time, the public in Banja Luka is disgruntled about the hard currency accounts on the "freezing lake Geneva", so that it can be heard that for only one unsuccessful round the Bosnian Serb delegation has spent a considerable sum of money, sufficient to pay the salaries of all the workers in all the banks in Banja Luka, accounting service, and state financial institutions. A specific form of communism has been introduced in Pale - there they do whatever they wish, and they take as much as they please, a citizen of Banja Luka says, alluding to the "sweet life" of the state - party leadership in Pale. The travel expenses and similar could probably be defended - the Serbs across the Drina are obsessed by the formation of a state, and the state can be costly - but the affairs concerning the contraband of gasoline, automobiles from the "Volkswagen" factory in Vogosce, or the aluminum from Mostar, are making "the ordinary people" more and more nervous. A working group has been recently formed to research these affairs, but a lot of people there think that nothing will come out of this.

    Financial- marketing shenanigans, war profiteering and general corruption have created a reaction in the ruling party too. A series of statements by the up until recently important men in the party hierarchy of SDS have been noted - Andjelko Grahovac, Radoslav Brdjanin, Milorad Kuzmanovic, Vojislav Kupresanin and others - which with more or less ferociousness the current party policy is criticized.

    Along with this, the regime in Pale is somewhat shaken by the formation of the independent club in the Parliament, whose leader Milorad Dodik considers that the current regime should show more flexibility in the peace negotiations. Similar opinions are heard in the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska, whose rating seems to be rising. The Union of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia, has re - kindled its activity. This new reddish overtones cropping up in "republika Srpska", is being interpreted with tiredness with the war, and a reaction towards the unhidden connection of the regime and over rich "newly composed" businessmen of dubious virtues.

    It is quite natural that the most serious critiques towards the regime in Pale come from the left, since there is no greater right than they are, says professor at the Banja Luka university Mico Carevic, also a representative of the Union of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia. It is interesting that Carevic as the opposition towards SDS, along with his party and the Socialists mentions the Liberal party , whose name "the nationally conscious Serbs", speak out as a dirty word. Differing from the Socialists and Communists which remembered to cautiously whisper a word here and there against the nationalistic vandalism, only when all the mosques in the city have been destroyed and when the ethnic cleansing has practically been concluded, the Banja Luka Liberals have been against such policies from the beginning. The civic courage and the promotion of respect of human rights and inter - national tolerance, have their cost - the leader of the Liberals, dr. Miodrag Zivanovic, is the only party leader in the "Serbian republic" who has been sent to the front since 1991., with some short breaks in the service. This is also true of the small number of supporters of this party which dare to freely and loudly speak their political ideas. Along with military drafts, which are used as the most "legal" means the Liberals in Banja Luka, they have been accused as the "fifth column", but also threatened with liquidation, but they are still active in the city council of Banja Luka and are attempting to use the cracks in the media wall raised around them, trying to reach the public.

    While the local branch of the Serbian Radical Party supports Pale in its policies, the Serbian Democratic Union - The Fatherland front, as its leader Bozidar Bojanic says, sees itself as a party of democratic center.. The political polarization, which is in his opinion created by Belgrade, does not exist towards both sides, but between the leaderships and inner groups which dream about great successes in the war profiteering schemes. He says that his party thinks that no such peace plan has been formulated yet that would have a chance and which would address the burning questions.

    The author of the article says that the biggest attention on the political scene of the Bosnian Serbs was created by the "Radoslav Brdjanin case", whom many analysts consider as a member of the hard nationalistic core., and who has recently made tough statements against war profiteering and shady financial transactions, saying that after the war he will form a new SDS party, based on the "original principles". He resigned as a minister and government coordinator, and the central authorities in Pale revoked his parliamentary mandate.

    Brdjanin stated that he only resigned as a minister and government member, but did not leave the party, so that the mandate has been illegally revoked. But, talking about the peace plan, he still insists that the offered peace plan is unacceptable, and the maps cannot be forced, no matter what the world pressure amounts to.

    Komlenovic says that it is hard to estimate the strength of some political parties, but there are judgements that at the possible elections the favorites would be the ruling SDS and the Socialists. The regime is not mentioning the possibility of new elections, even though the mandates of Karadzic and the Parliament have ran out, as early as last autumn. Responding to louder and louder calls of the opposition for the elections, the regime is giving the usual arguments : the war is on, it is impossible to organize elections. War, of course, was no obstacle for the referendum which left nothing to coincidence and whose results are known in advance: 90, 95 or 99 percent of voters circles "yes". The others are considered traitors anyway.
    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", April 10, 1995.


    Croatia

    The key commentator of the Zagreb weekly Globus, Davor Butkovic, discussed in the magazine's April 21 issue the possibility and prospects of the oppositionary alliance at the next elections.

    Butkovic says that if the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), does not enter into a coalition with the ruling HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), will loose the next parliamentary elections.This as an outcome of a mechanical addition of votes, specifies the author. The discrepancy between the real strength of the HSS and the popularity of that party in the polling of the public opinion is an outcome of the specific rural structure of its potential voters.

    It is completely clear that HSLS (Croatian Social-Liberal Union ) and HSS, at this moment, can jointly get less than 40 percent of votes. To that could be added the usual 5- 6 percent for the Croatian Independent Democrats, and a few percent for the Croatian National Party.

    The four Croatian centrist parties, which have already reached an agreement about a great pre-election coalition, according to the reports on the research of the public opinion, would have to, to win at least half of all votes at the forthcoming elections, which would mean that in the coming 12 to 18 months there will be a change in power in Croatia. HDZ has not once in the last year, more serious polls got more than 40 percent of votes, and has usually ended with 30 percent.

    The position of the HDZ is burdened also with the dispersion of a certain number of votes on the parties of the left ( Social Democratic Action of Mika Tripalo, and Social Democratic Party of Ivica Racan ), and also on the regional parties.

    When the parties of the right are concerned, the elections would show if the estimates are correct that Ante Djapic and his extreme right Croatian Law Party (HSP) has for some time already been operating as a coalition party of the HDZ. In any case, it is almost certain that HDZ cannot remain by itself in power, and that the outcome of the forthcoming Croatian parliamentary elections depend on the strength of the oppositionary coalition blocks, or a possible success of the HDZ to win over one of the leading oppositionary parties to its side.

    Taking into consideration the long series of ferocious clashes and rivalry between HDZ and HSLS, the coalition of the largest parties is completely out of the question. In the final count, if Tudjman, in order to save the rule of HDZ would offer to Drazen Budisa two party coalition, a large part of the HDZ which sees in Liberals the embodiment of the international conspiracy against Croatia, would not accept such a coalition. That is why the HSS and HSP are the only two parties whose support can be seeked by HDZ at the following elections.

    Since the formal coalition with HSP is politically quite dangerous for Tudjman, since the president cannot allow himself to take a part in the election campaign under pro - Ustashi symbols, it is logical that HDZ, even with all possible changes in the election law, according to the mood of the electorate in the previous year, cannot remain in power.

    Butkovic says that his paper found out that the HSS under no circumstances wants to make a coalition with HDZ. That party's leadership supports the joint electoral approach of the leading oppositionary parties: HSLS, HSS, HND and HNS. It seems now that a consensus has already been reached about a joint approach of these four parties which need to win 50 percent of the votes.

    It seems that up until recently some leadership members of the HSS and HNS were against of the joining of Mesic, Manolic and Degoricija (HND) into the big coalition, but that these problems have been overcome now. The creators of the big coalition, mainly leaders of the HSLS and HND think that the coalition at the next elections should come forward with three coalition blocks . Along with centrist parties, a left-regionalistic and a right block should be formed.

    Supposedly, Ivica Racan, the president of the SDP does not agree with such a pre - election strategy, considering that his party should also join the centrist block, to which most of the other coalition partners do not agree, but the change of the agreement could come about with the expected changes in the electoral law.

    If the pure proportional system is introduced in Croatia, the oppositionary coalition would fall apart. The leadership of the HSLS and HSS rightfully think that they would individually pass through the prohibitionary clauses, and that any coalitions would not be necessary, since the HDZ would, with thirty or bit more percent remain the minority party in the Parliament.

    Butkovic considers this as a naive estimate, which only proves that the opposition, even though most of the current circumstances work in their favor, has not definitively decided whether it wants to come to power or not.

    If there is no formal binding coalition between the four centrist parties before the elections and despite the changes in the electoral law, it is hard to state that one of the currently oppositionary parties would not enter into a coalition with the HDZ.

    The key question that remains now is whether the formal rightist opposition, HSP, is oppositionary at all. Many oppositionary leaders think of Djapic's party as an HDZ branch. It is also thought that HDZ, during the election campaign, or after the elections, could form a formal coalition with HSP.

    The electoral chances of HSP , and particularly pre - election coalition of HDZ and HSP could be ruined by the HSP MP Ante Prkacin, one of the staunchest Croatian oppositionaries, who has a worse opinion about his party colleagues than about Drazen Budisa or Josip Manolic.

    Butkovic estimates that, for the first time, Croatian opposition parties are seriously preparing themselves for the elections. Most polls show that HDZ could loose if the opposition comes out jointly. In such a situation, HDZ has only two strong moves. First is prolongation of elections until there is a considerable progress in the re - integration of occupied territories, which could sway the public opinion. But the re - integration, except for Western Slavonia, is not possible in the coming year, so it cannot count much on this argument.

    The second strong move of the HDZ could be to try to divide the opposition, which has, for the first time in the last five years, reached a firm agreement in their approach.
    Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus" , April 21, 1995.


    Macedonia

    Independent Pristina weekly Koha in its issue of April 12, 1995. brought a commentary on the situation with the Albanian university in Tetovo. Apart from problems in relations with neighboring countries, Macedonia is increasingly being faced with problems caused by itself, the hardest one probably being the judiciary.Statements frequently repeated by Macedonian politicians some 4 - 5 years ago during the times of "democratic" euphoria, designed to correct mistakes made by the previous communist legal system, now resemble towers built in the sand, melting more and more under the waves of reality. It is obvious that daily political games, often determining the scope of the "contingent" of rights to be allowed, are playing quite an important role in defining the social life in Macedonia.

    The latest example for this are court proceedings against the pioneers of the Albanian-language university in Tetovo. The Public Prosecutor's Office in Tetovo initiated criminal charges against Dr. Fadil Suleimani, rector of the university in Tetovo, Milaim Feiziu, president of the Human Rights Forum in Gostivar, and Nevzat Halili, leader of PDP-Party for National Unity.Fadil Suleimani is charged with inciting to resistance, on grounds of article 206 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia. The indictment says Suleimani had been constantly repeating the criminal act he is accused of. As a result of his actions, the indictment goes on, a crowd of people gathered on 17 February in Mala Recica, intending to prevent the implementation of the Macedonian Government's decision concerning the initiative for a university in Tetovo.The other two, Feiziu and Halili, are accused of participation in crowds and preventing police officers from exercising their duty, on grounds of article 205 of the Criminal Law. The temporary imprisonment is extended for all three defendants.

    So far, no details about the proceedings have been announced, except the fact that only statements of eyewitnesses have been taken as evidence. (Let us remind the reader that Macedonia was neither in a war nor under a martial law on 17 February. Mahmut Yusufi, lawyer, says that article 206 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia, regarding "incitement to resistance toward decisions or measures brought by the administration agencies or prevention of officials from exercising their duties," is cited in combination with article 51 of the Constitution, which says every citizen is obliged to respect the law and Constitution. According to Yusufi, no constitutional category says that disrespect for government decisions or measures shall imply criminal charges.

    The final outcome of the initiated indictment will most probably affect the fate of the imprisoned ethnic Albanians. But, having in mind the previous experience in proceedings of similar nature (such as the hearings on the 10 ethnic Albanians convicted in the arms affair), it is difficult to believe that something can change the course of the proceedings. Reporters interviewed following the arrest of Suleimani have also been summoned to court in the role of witnesses for the prosecution. The reporters, sources say, have been asked to testify that Suleimani did state that "200,000 Albanians will rise to defend the university."

    These very statements were the grounds for bringing charges against Suleimani in the first place. The indictment on Feiziu seems to be based on similar grounds, as it says he had also stated "the university will be defended by all means possible."

    Nevertheless, the law is read and interpreted in different ways, depending on the need. A year ago, for instance, a certain Macedonian politician (having lost the elections in a large electoral unit in Skopje), stated that "Skopje will be a second Bucharest, as no one could possibly win elections in Macedonia with democratic means." But nothing happened, and this politician, unlike his ethnic Albanian "colleagues", was not even summoned to an informative questioning or asked to explain his threats toward the government and the state, let alone be taken into custody. The question arises by itself: What are the motives behind an act like this, which is no doubt far from being productive or contributing to the development of democracy or a just legal system?

    In this context, it seems worth mentioning that initiatives have already been brought to have the Constitutional Court re-examine the constitutionality of articles 205 and 206 of the Criminal Law. The initiator is the said lawyer, who points to the fact that article 205, which "sanctions participation in crowds to prevent state officials from exercising their duties" is in coalition with article 21 of the Constitution, which reads "citizens of the Republic of Macedonia have a right to peacefully gather and protest publicly, without previous notification and needing no special permission; this right can be limited only in a case of war or under a martial law."
    Source: Prishtina weekly "Koha" April 12 1995., through MILS e-mail service


    Serbia

    Vreme journalist Nenad Lj. Stefanovic examines in the weekly's issue of April 3, 1995. the background and effects of the new executive board of the leftist (pro- communist ) coalition JUL - United Yugoslav Left. Whether it was an accident or not, those that would like to place themselves in the political life of Serbia on the far right or far left have made their recent key public appearances by holding conventions in the Belgrade congressional center "Sava". The key event, though, seems to be the long - in - coming promotion of the new leadership of the "United Yugoslav Left" (JUL), which embraces 23 parties, and many non-partisan individuals, where that now infamous "we are coming" has been heard quite often.

    Approaching, as well as right after the promotion of the new JUL leadership, the main point spun around actual who is coming and going, and where, meaning mainly the possible "political transfers' between JUL and the ruling Socialists (SPS).

    To that effect, former director of the Belgrade TV, Dusan Mitevic, self - proclaimed "member of the SPS close to JUL" (and Serbian presidential couple) stated in the Novi Sad magazine "Svet" that the SPS as a party objectively and historically finds itself in front of a transformation process. Mitevic predicted that the leftist factions in the otherwise quite stratified SPS will "incline towards JUL and the left", while those that do not support the cooperation with the left will remain in the SPS. Ivica Dacic (SPS Spokesman) said that the left front is now widening now that some other parties are being formed, particularly "some that can play an important role on the political scene", and that his SPS party "would be very happy if there were other parties of the left in the parliament. An unnamed functionary of the SPS told the author that a number of political figures in Belgrade have already migrated from the SPS to JUL - he named the director of the "Metropol" hotel in Belgrade Slobodan Cerovic, as well as the director of the textile factory "Kluz" Dragan Ilic, who were both considered staunch member of the SPS were elected in the JUL executive board. Answering the question why the city council of the SPS look mildly on this, the official said that supposedly the directive to be favorable to this kid of a thing came directly from Slobodan Milosevic.

    A few days before the election of the new leadership, from the top level of JUL came the prediction that dr. Mirjana Markovic (wife of president Milosevic) will almost surely accept the top position in the Yugoslav left. Due to that, it came as quite a surprise that theatre director Ljubisa Ristic, became the party president.

    The inner leadership of the Yugoslav left, as a foreign correspondent told the author, looks quite similar to a "Rotary Club", due to the number of commercial directors it has gathered around. The fact that a movement which insists so much on equality and social elements in its inception is so strongly leaning on the CEO structures, speaks volumes about the true "hunt on the directors" that is being waged on the Serbian political scene, who can, later on, when there is a lack of party income, bring in the money, as a form of racketeering over the backs of their workers. Obviously, JUL has a good position in that manner. JUL leadership obviously expects that the workers "flood" the movement, which seems to have the ambition to essentially change the political landscape of FRY and prepare a terrain, on a long term basis for the politics "after the war".

    The answer to the question what can JUL really achieve is much harder that what JUL has. The elections so far in which it participated have shown that it has a larger membership than a number of voters. According to some opinions, the political party or a group that counts on a more serious status in the parliament has to have behind it at least 150 thousand voters. It seems that the people behind JUL have put in front of them exactly this type of a goal, with the intention of presenting themselves as a significant support and coalition partner to some "positive wing" of the ruling SPS (at the 1993. elections, as the United left, JUL won 32.346 votes). According to some information, Milosevic came to the conclusion that "faithbreaking" Vuk Draskovic and the current SPS coalition partner Nova Demokratija (New Democracy), which seems also to have success in hunting down big businessmen, cannot be sufficiently secure and strong partners to be able to defend his sudden political U-turn. That is why JUL has risen now, as to gain strength for the next elections.

    The appearance of JUL and covering of the complete political spectrum on the left, could, according to some analyses, prevent for a longer period of time, appearance of a serious social democratic party, something that SPS obviously dreads. Persuading at leas a hundred thousand new people to vote for JUL in the future, from the current perspective seems unattainable though.

    Most of those that are looking at the appearance of JUL with a doubtful perspective, think that this is only the game of the presidential couple Milosevic - Markovic. First he abolished the communists overnight. A bit after that, she helped organize the new communists, and in the end it could happen that she accepts him in the ranks of JUL. All in all, a game where both sides are throwing gentle lobs, so that a smatch could come in the end, concludes Stefanovic.
    Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", April 3, 1995.


    SITUATION IN THE MEDIA

    Serbia

    Belgrade fortnightly Republika published in its March 15 -31 1995. issue a special supplement concerning its findings in the government pressure on the independent daily "Nasa Borba".

    The fact that a sizeable collective of journalists has refused the regime's dictate and continued to publish its own newspaper, says "Republika", indicates that the power brokers are no longer omnipotent and able, as before, to destroy whatever they decide, with no resistance. There is resistance, but it is still not powerful enough to be more successful. The nationalist part of the political opposition that supports a continuation of the war is only giving the illusion of defending freedom of the press and electronic media. Civic parties are more resolute in this regard, but they have a very limited influence, which is even more true of the numerous non governmental organizations, trade unions and the non - regime Association of Journalists.

    Previously, financial assistance from abroad was negligible for the most part. Actually, it has become somewhat greater after the suffocation of "Borba", but is nowhere near enough to cover the newsprint that has been promised, the printing costs and auxiliary equipment that would enable the unhampered publishing of "Nasa Borba". While militant circles within the country and abroad are organized and efficient, the supporters of democracy are chaotic and inefficient and without even minimal coordination. The former provide arms for entire armies, while the latter cannot even succeed in acquiring a reliable printing office that costs less than a single tank. However, in spite of the high moral level and professional involvement, the difficult working conditions have place a new ordeal before the entire new staff. These difficulties are dramatically reflected in the following:

  • The editorial staff is situated in several different locations in Belgrade, so that individual parts are presently without links to each other. There is a real danger that this will reflect on the quality of "Nasa Borba" sooner or later. After being thrown out of its offices, the "Nasa Borba" editorial staff does not have a single typewriter , so journalists use private ones, there is a shortage of computers, printers, fax machines and telephones, and even basic office supplies.

  • Another call for concern is the fact that "Nasa Borba" is solely financed by the copies sold (the circulation is relatively small) which provide a rather modest and limited income. The amount barely covers the journalists' extremely low salaries. What is the solution ? Concentrated help, regardless of how precious, cannot be long - term solution. Among other things, thought should be given to new credit possibilities in order to create financially stable working conditions, for example a printing office whose services would be used by other independent media in addition to "Nasa Borba".

  • "Nasa Borba" is the only large privately owned daily newspaper. The ownership relationship between Dusan Mijic and the editorial staff is currently being regulated. An agreement has been reached to move from the present limited liability company to a joint stock company. At this moment, the editorial staff has one- third management rights, by mutual consent with the owner. The joint stock company would be 33% in the hands of the journalists, 33% would be held by Mijic and one third would be offered to other interested buyers. Until this process is carried out(the end of this year), the owner also consents to having all those donors wishing to help the "Nasa Borba" editorial staff and strengthen the current editorial concept, pay their donations through the Finninvest account, whereby the owner guarantees that this money will be forwarded to the editorial staff, exclusively for management. Should the owner withrow, the editorial board retains the right to 51% ownership. The persistence of "Nasa Borba" independent journalistic team is putting to the test not only colleagues from other media, the principled opposition, and those in alternative scenes, but also the entire citizenry. Either they join together and give their united support for the sake of public interest and the future of society and the state, or else continue tolerating an increasingly whimsical government.
    Source: Belgrade fortnightly "Republika" special report on "Nasa Borba", March 15-30, 1995.


    DOSSIER

    Paramilitary units

    Podgorica (Montenegro) weekly "Monitor" brought in its issue of April 14 1995. a detailed report by its journalist Vladimir Jovanovic on various paramilitary units engaged in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. On April 4, 1991., the first "voluntary" unit was formed in Serbia, under the name "Dusan Silni", by the extreme right party Srpska Narodna Obnova (SNO). This group would be termed as paramilitary, event though the events that followed would lead to a true confusion about the interpretation of this term. Already on the Catholic Easter of that year, a first armed action in which paramilitary (Serbian) formations took place at Lake Plitvice, everything else were only much bloodier copies.

    Paramilitary units were intended in the beginning mainly as the means of arming "your" nation, scaring of the enemy, waking of the "patriotic consciousness", while later their activities were mainly marked by war crimes and ethnic cleansing. In the narrow military context, such groups would become the embryos for the "special activity forces" of the armies formed on the ruins of former Yugoslavia.

    The best organized "non - state" military groups were those from Serbia. The leaders of all of these were, as a rule, criminals, which were sent abroad during Seventies and Eighties as the collaborators of the Belgrade police force or the Federal secret service (UDBA), particularly its section for the fight against political emigres.

    Some of them (Arkan), are suspected of murder, while most of them had the task to mistreat and beat political emigres. Dragan Vasiljkovic, known as Kapetan Dragan showed up in Knin at the beginning of June 1991., as a confidential man of the Serbian police and instructor. This former seargant in the Australian army, recommended to the Serbian leadership by the extreme nationalist Serb emigres, would take over the tactical preparation of the "voluntary" units streaming in from Serbia. also fighting at the time in the Krajina area, with a variable success, and with no support from the JNA and the Serbian police, the members of the "Serbian Guard of SPO" (Srpska Garda). Later liquidations of some of their members are being connected wit the official Serbian security services. In the Eastern Croatia a number of Serb paramilitary units took part in the war, along with "Dusan Silni" there were "Beli Orlovi", "Valjevo Unit" (also under the SNO control), and particularly "Srpska dobrovoljacka Garda" , of Zeljko Raznjatovic - Arkan. By the order of ten minister of defense, general Veljko Kadijevic, since October of 1991. - parallel with the battle of Vukovar - all of these groups would become the official and integral part of the so called "Armed forces of the SFRY".

    On the other side, the Croats accepted their volunteers in the ranks of the "Zbor Narodne Garde" (ZNG), or the ranks of the Ministry of Interior units, while HOS (Croatian Freedom Union ) of Dobrosav Paraga, enjoyed state support. Many political emigres joined their ranks, many of them from the ranks of professional Western armies, like the Foreign legion colonel Ante Roso.

    HOS is a story in itself: at the beginning it attracted radical Croatian nationalists, to whom Serbian aggression gave wings. Sometime after the fall of Vukovar, when Tudjman accused the commander of the city's defense, general Mile Dedakovic - Jastreb, for collaboration with the Yugoslav army intelligence service (KOS), the alliance among various groups and Croatian state fell apart. There were even firearm clashes between the police and HOS members on a number of locations in Zagreb.

    An unfavorable image connected to the past from the Second world war, the new Croatian regime attempted to correct by its activities against such groups and by removing from the ranks of its military some former members of terrorist organizations.

    Croatian problems with HOS continued with the beginning of the war in Bosnia, when this organization became the most numerous formation among the Croats in that area, even larger than HVO. But, with the mysterious and never fully uncovered liquidation of the HOS commander in Bosnia, general Blaz Kaljevic, this organization would break down, and the control over Western Herzegovina would be taken by certain Mladen Naletilic - Herzegovina "Wyatt Earp", a mafia type which musters a lot of respect in Zagreb circles, and whose cafe is frequented by Tudjman himself.

    In the initial phase of the war (mainly later too) Milosevic did not have too much trouble with paramilitary leaders. Vojislav Seselj, until the well known split, had the task of "raising the fighting morale" through his media activities; the volunteers which would come to the offices of his Radical party he would send in to the "4. July" garrison in the Belgrade county of Vozdovac, from where they were transported to the front. It is a question of tens of thousands of people. Dragan Vasiljkovic was engaged during October and November of 1991. with the important state task of forming Serbian state army (more details are included, as the author states, in the book of Dobrila Gacic - Glisic "Srpske Vojske" - Serbian Armies), the activities on which were suddenly stopped after the fall of Vukovar. Vasiljkovic then got the space in the top Belgrade high - rise "Beogradjanka", from where he is operating the "Fund for wounded" , which is believed to be involved in illegal financial transactions.

    Zeljko Raznatovic - Arkan along with his unit, became an operative part of the JNA while the fights around Vukovar went on. During the "freeing" of this city he commanded "the cleansing groups" and groups for "quiet liquidation" . In his so called instruction center in Erdut, in the cellars of the buildings, prisons and torture rooms were located, receiving captured Croatian guardsmen, but also civilians.

    Since with the fall of Vukovar, the Great Serbia expansion plans in Croatia were rounded off, for a short period of time, the paramilitary units got a role on the internal scene. They became the tools for pressure and violence guided towards broken remnants of the democratic opposition and independent media. Dragoslav Bokan and his "White Eagles" (Beli Orlovi) attacked the objects of "YUTEL" and the Reformist party (Now "Citizens Alliance"). Arkan from his side threatened the members of this party with "fifty spanks on the back", when he returns to Belgrade.

    All of this would only become an introduction into the Bosnian butcher shop. Paramilitary units from Serbia were dominantly oriented to the activities in the belt on the left side of the river Drina. Raznatovic first broke into Bijeljina, and then joined the "Yellow Wasps" groups in Zvornik, knifing individually or shooting civilians en masse, who were caught beforehand on the control ramps coming back from work. Serbian police had a hand into these break - ins, particularly of Arkan. This mainly concerns men from its top - Radovan Stojsic, Frenki Simatovic and Mihalj Kertes - Braca, who was responsible for the formation of the so called "red berrets", intended for ethnic cleansing or escorts of convoys with stolen goods from Semberija, Zvornik, Visegrad and Foca to Serbia.

    Seselj's followers received in the period of Spring 1992. - 93. guns, ammunition and equipment from the local JNA commanders, and then organized themselves into groups. The main aim was to kill as many people as possible, throwing into the gutter any remaining trust between local Serbs and Bosniaks.

    Then head of the KOS, general Aleksandar Vasiljevic, who was continuously present in Sarajevo and had a complete overview of the situation, told the "Monitor" journalist that arming of the SDA was in existence, but on a much smaller scale than on the Serbian side. As early as 1990., according to his statements, he had problems with armed Serbian groups distinguished by Chetnik insignia.

    Already during the war in Croatia, the storages and complete equipment of the Bosnian territorial defense units were put under the control of the Serbian officers of JNA, or local paramilitary formations; some were even evacuated from the non- Serbian surroundings. Alija Izetbegovic made a historical mistake, ordering that the citizens loyal to Bosnia and Herzegovina withrow from the mobilized units of JNA and return their arms. They actually did do that, leaving the 343. motorized unit from Prijedor, 327. motorized unit from Derventa, 6.motorized unit from Doboj, 345, motorized unit from Brcko and the batallions of the Zvornik garrison, where the worst slaughters afterwards took place, without any serious resistance being put up, mostly to the paramilitary units.

    In Sarajevo, in the conditions where Government military organization did not exist, a number of local defense heroes cropped up - Musan Tepalovic, Zlatko Pejakovic, Ramiz Dodalic, Cibo Bajramovic and finally Juka Prazina. almost a year later, when the internal regime became more organized, these heroes were either killed (Prazina and Topalovic), put in jail, or disciplined.

    A similar situation occurred in other places: In Mostar, former JNA officer Pasalic, with some thirty people organizes a complete corps, which fought HVO on the Neretva river, and in its rear with Serbian forces. A need for city guerilla, where courageous boys with shady background fought Serbian tanks with light arms was lost with time; the central authority built a national army.

    This characterizes the relation towards paramilitary units on Serbian and Croatian sides: the volunteer groups from Serbia were extensively used in last instance around Zepa, Crecka and Konjevic Polje in February and March of 1993., and in 1992. Arkan was kicked out of the front around Benkovac in Croatia.

    The units of Tomislav Mercep in September of the same year committed atrocities against Serb civilians in the so called "Medjacki dzep", after which he would be thrown out of the Croatian armed forces, and also seems to be among the certain passengers for the Hague. Another, maybe the most important motivating factor for the departure of paramilitary units into war disappeared with time: the looting factor, rape and "easy warfare".

    On the domestic terrain, concludes Jovanovic, it became also hot for many: those paramilitaries disloyal to the Serbian police were caught by a wave of never uncovered murders.
    Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", April 14, 1995.


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