Zoran Lutovac of the "AIM" news pool writes on the moves of the Americn diplomacy in Kosovo in the July 10, 1998 issue of Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni."

The most recent American moves in attempts to resolve the Kosovo crisis could be filed under the intention to pacify KLA by putting it under political control or to have the KLA recognized as a warring side, either as independent, or as a controlled armed force. In this phase of discussions of the US and KLA representatives, the talks are directed towards placing KLA under the political control of the Kosovo leader Rugova and its pacifying. This partly answers the question whether it is the intention to strengthen or weaken Rugova. But, even though with this Rugova's position in relation to Belgrade and to competitors among the Albanian leaders would be strengthened, his position in the intra - Albanian Kosovo scene would be practically weakened, because they would depend in the future on co-operation with KLA and the US. So, the intention of the US could be centralization of responsibility for the activities on the ground, so that possible breaches of an agreement could not be excused by lack of control over the KLA.

If this is really the intention, and if it was presented in this manner to Milosevic, it is quite probable that Holbrooke's meeting with KLA received support from the FRY president. So, after consent of the international community the responsibility on the Serbian side was centralized in the image of the FRY president, who has no prerogatives to decide on major political questions under the constitution, the same is to be done on the Albanian side, and than it is easier to influence the negotiators. A favorable circumstance for the acceptance of a possible agreement or an imposed solution is the fact that Milosevic controls "ultra patriots" - the Radicals, who are his coalition partners, and Rugova is positioned at the top of KLA, the only possible obstacle on the Albanian side. So, the intention is that, by recognition of the "situation on the ground," that is, inclusion of KLA in the negotiation process, the future situation on the ground is put under control.

Is it possible for Kosovo Albanians to reach a political goal which they are not giving up - independent Kosovo ? Would it suit Milosevic that Kosovo and Metohija remain in Serbia and FRY if he cannot control them anymore and he is not able to collect parliamentary seats from there ? Would his party ever win at the elections without those mandates ? All these are questions which already contain answers, and which indicate the possible other direction of movement for the Kosovo crisis, the direction which would probably lead to further escalation of the conflict. It is obvious that the stance of the international community that the Kosovo problem should be resolved within unchanged borders, Kosovo Albanians want to change in a manner which would prove that what is in question is armed rebellion, not terrorism.

By controlling the dose of violence, they are inciting unmeasured reactions of Belgrade so that they could show that human rights are drastically breached and that they have a right to rebellion. Also, armed actions show that Kosovo and Metohija within Serbian borders represent a factor of instability in the region, and that the creation of a new Albanian state would creat that stability factor. But, killing of civilians, kiddnapings and striking fear into non Albanian population, all directed towards ethnic cleansing are all compromising the so called freedom movement and show what kind of state they are fighting for: either completely ethnically pure state, or a state in which non Albanians would be considered the hindering factor.

All in all, if the initiated processes in Kosovo get out of control, a number of dangerous precedents are at hand: to speak with somebody who is using violence for achievement of political goals; to breach the international principles and international legal acts for the sake of "stability in the region," and to change the current international legal and political approach to regions which are, within a state, majority populated with minority population. All three precedents could cause unforeseeable consequences, in Kosvo itself, as well as in the international sphere.



Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni," July 10, 1998