Kosovo


One of the main Kosovo Albanian commentators, Skelzen Maliqi, writes on the current developments in the region in the June 20, 1998 issue of "Zeri" Albanian language weekly.

Milosevic has not loosened in the crucial matter. He does not concede to withdrawing the intervention police and military units. In fact, he conditions this with the revocation and the cessation of KLA activities. This condition, with the situation in the field as it is, undoubtedly impairs the fulfillment of other concessions agreed upon in negotiations with Yeltsin (the release of blocked road routes, the free circulation of people and goods, the return of the expelled persons to their homes, the continuation of negotiations on the status of Kosova, etc.). KLA probably does not intend to yield to Belgrade's promises, as it will not easily yield to the massages of Albanian political leadership in Prishtina and elsewhere, to cease actions and start a process of revoking their mission and demobilization.

After this maneuver by Belgrade, one could ask what will be the response of the Contact Group and other international organizations that are deal with security matters. The rebuff of the primary demand, the immediate withdrawal of Serbian police and military forces, should be punished with a concrete military measure from the list of measures NATO has prepared.

According to this procedure, the first step would be the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution, which Great Britain has already drawn and which has been dealt with beforehand by permanent members of the Security Council who have the right of veto. The adoption of the UN Security Council resolution would have legalized and facilitated the intervention of foreign forces in Kosova (NATO or other implementing formation), which could later not submit to the eventual blockades by Russia or China. Milosevic plays a risky game convinced in the silent support of Russia and China, which could use their right of veto in favor of not punishing more rigorously Serbia due to the fact that their relations with the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council (Great Britain and France) are complex and interdependent.

China usually takes a neutral stand or abstains in matters it considers unacceptable in principle to its interest, while Russia, since it is dependant on financial assistance of the most developed nations, not seldom adopts resolutions against Serbia/Yugoslavia. Such was the case when sanctions against Belgrade were adopted in 1992 and later. But, the Kosova crisis appears to have entered a course when its quick resolution is essential, not leaving room for Belgrade's tactics and maneuvers. The United States have engaged the authority of the first and the only world superpower for the quick resolution of the Kosova question, and cannot allow Milosevic ridicule Washington's ultimatum.

Another important basis for the quick action of the United States which, as it appears, this time again has the support of Great Britain, is the delicate situation in Macedonia, where the conflict could spread on the verge of parliamentarian elections, due for this Autumn. The other preferred effect of the fore running action would be Milosevic's destabilization or even his departure from power. Even though opposition circles in Belgrade believe that the intervention of the United States could prove counterproductive and continue and strengthen Milosevic's rule, Washington's intention is quite the opposite. Washington, in fact, intends to eliminate him from the political arena so it could open up perspectives for fundamental changes as far as the stability and development of this region. After the blow he got from Montenegro, when his protege Bulatovic convincingly lost in the elections, the plan is to take away another of Milosevic's dangerous toys © Kosova, through which he achieved a momentary homogeneity of the political arena in Serbia, as well as opposition from a part of people who are being victimized pointlessly.

As far as the Albanian factor, it is indispensable to begin an internal dialogue between political forces and KLA. First public appearances of KLA show that its leaders have big self©confidence and ignore the political subject. This is not a good sign for future relations with the foreign factor, that has not given up from supporting Rugova's political course. It would have been much better if leaders of the KLA were to show more sense for political developments and against frustrating the negotiating process, were they should also be included. But, this requires at least an armistice so to strip Milosevic of his major argument for the continuation of the war against civilians, and not against KLA. A more conscientious rather then a defying action against Albanian political structures is required.


Source: Pristina weekly "Zeri," , June 20, 1998