Dejan Anastasijevic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme, writes on the Milosevic - Rugova meeting for the AIM news pool, and published in the Kragujevac by-weekly Nezavisna Svetlost on May 21, 1998.

How did Holbrooke succeed in organizing this meeting ? Diplomatic sources say that, as on previous occasions, the American diplomat did not come to Belgrade without a long stick. Holbrooke showed Milosevic a draft order of President Clinton, which included a detailed list of property under the control of Serbia and FRY, which would be frozen in case of Milosevic' s uncooperativeness. The same document included also a long list of Serb officials who would be prevented from travelling to the West. Finally, FRY president was warned that a mechanism was secured by which the abovementioned sanctions would be accepted automatically by the EU, with obligatory consequences fro all members, including Serb friends such as Greece, Italy and France.

Faced with an offer he couldn' t refuse., Milosevic accepted to receive Rugova personally and end in that manner the farce played once week in Pristina by Ratko Mrkovic and his buddies.

Breaking Rugova' s resistance to speak with Milosevic without a mediator went a bit less smoothly. Still, in a situation he found himself after the breakup of his party and the possible loss of legitimacy within the Albanian scene, Rugova had to accept the offered straw. In return, he received a promise that the American government will strongly support him, as well as that it will undertake steps to prevent the extremists in the Diaspora, who are giving financial and political support to OVK.

It remains to be seen whether this will be enough to save the shaken authority of the Albanian leader. Two members of his negotiating team Hydaet Hiseni and Bujar Dugoli have already resigned as a sign of protest against Rugova' s decision to speak with Milosevic without a mediator. Academician Rexhep Qosja was not thrilled with this meeting either, stating that, what happened in Belgrade is not showing any promise for the Albanians. OVK still did not make any official statements, but from their previous statements it is obvious that they will not respect any agreement between Milosevic and Rugova.

Besides Holbrooke, the largest political profit out of this mission was acquired by Milosevic: he was able to muster the annulment of the decision by which foreign investment is forbidden in FRY, he was also able to prevent the introduction of new sanctions, and he, again, became a factor of peace and stability in the Balkans. In return, he did not give anything except his promise that he will not obstruct the dialogue. The fact that the will of the people, expressed in the referendum has been breached, will be taken as a point only by that part of the Serbian opposition which still thinks they can compete in nationalism with Milosevic.

Still, Milosevic has not too many reasons to be happy with this short-term success, because on a long term basis, Kosovo remains a stone round the neck of Serbia, while the price of Serb administration in the region (expressed in human lives) is growing by the day. It will be hardest for Rugova, though, who finds himself pressed in between OVK and the bully position of Belgrade. This is a va banque game, and Rugova will get out of this crease only if, in due time, he gets concrete concessions from Milosevic.



Source: Kragujevac by-weekly Nezavisna Svetlost, May 21, 1998