Bosnia and Herzegovina

The editor of the Sarajevo weekly Slobodna Bosna , Senad Avdic, looks at the political situation in Republika Srpska in this magazine's issue of May, 8, 1998.

The name of the text Slobodan Milsevic sent to Alija Izetbegovic, through Republika Srpska prime minister, Milorad Dodik is Joint Statement. The text, whose author is the Yugoslav president, in brief, offers the unconditional establishment of diplomatic relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and FRY. The central condition so far, the one that Milosevic has presented in every conversation when this subject was discussed, was the withdrawal of the case Bosnia presented to the International Court of Justice concerning the aggression of the Milosevic's state against BiH. In the Joint Statement, it is not mentioned at all. Event though as far back as October 1996, during a meeting organized by French President Shirac, both Milosevic and Izetbegovic agreed to unconditional establishment of diplomatic relations, until a few weeks ago, any conversation dealing with this subject was limited by the BiH case, that is, Milosevic's demand that it be withdrawn.

According to well informed sources of Slobodna Bosna in the top Bosnian political circles, Milosevic's proposal of the joint statement practically shocked the Bosnian president.

The unconditional recognition of a state on which he committed a horrible aggression is the best indicator in the Serbian public of the price and the results of the bloody Bosnian war adventure Milosevic undertook.

Talking with a few of high Bosnian politicians, Slobodna Bosna found out that all of them agree on the reasons why Milosevic chose this moment to send Izetbegovic such an enticing, dovish, basically capitulating text of a Jonit Statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia. Milosevic's policy towards Kosovo and Albanians there brought Yugoslavia to face a new round of international sanctions and complete isolation. That is why Milosevic is in such a hurry, to show the world, through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, that he, more or less, solved all misunderstandings and that he has closed all open questions with neighboring countries. Milosevic has done this previously with Croatia and Macedonia, now he wants to do this with BiH, so that practically, Kosovo would remain the only unresolved question for Milosevic. But, as the Yugoslav citizens have confirmed in a referendum, this is an internal question of Yugoslavia, and the international community has nothing to do with it.

This is the reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina will not hurry to respond to Milosevic's offer, even though it is estimated to be acceptable and fair. There will definitely not be a response by Izetbegovic to Milosevic before the international community announces concrete measures against Yugoslavia concerning the most recent events in Kosovo. This means that there will be no answer for at least a month.

What has to be said, though, is that, no matter that the Joint Statement contains principles on the establishment of diplomatic relations which are in many ways unexpected, they arrive at a moment when very detailed connections are being established between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Tens of Bosnian companies, particularly those from the Tuzla/Podrinje canton have entered large business deals with Serbian companies. All this is developing in a very subdued manner, without a large scale media noise, but this has been going on for a while, and these relations are becoming more stable every day.

Particular importance is given to Milosevic's initiative is given by the fact that the postman was Milorad Dodik. Milosevic gave him this role only twenty days after the attempt of the Pale leaders to depose of the Doddik government during the most recent Parliament session, for which they had considerable support of the Yugoslav president. Up until recently, all tasks dealing with the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina Milosevic was delegating to Momcilo Krajisnik. But, the fact that Milosevic chose Dodik for contact with Izetbegovic on this occasion testifies to the fact that he became very quickly conscious of the new political reality in Republika Srpska, where Dodik, and not Krajisnik, is the person without whom nobody, even Milosevic, is not able to conclude a serious matter there.

According to the Constitution of Republika Srpska, the Parliament of this entity does not have the capability to replace the member of the BiH Presidency who has been elected during a general election. But, Dodik's intention is to secure that the RS Parliament passes a no confidence vote for Krajisnik, after which a request would be sent to Carlos Westendorp, to use his mandate and depose of Krajisnik. It is not by chance that Dodik has chosen the following weeks as a target to attack Krajisnik, since then he will be returning from the donation conference in Brussels with a few hundred million dollars, without which RS remained without in the last few years, mainly due to Krajisnik's hard line. Milosevic's engagement of Dodik for mediation with Izetbegovic is a guarantee that the Socialist Party of RS will have an active role in bringing down Krajisnik, which with the votes of other parties that are sure to support this move, will guarantee the passing of no confidence vote.



Source: Sarajevo weekly Slobodna Bosna, May 8, 1998