Regular contributor of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme" on the events in Kosovo, Dejan Anastasijevic, looks at the political background of the recent violence that occurred in Kosovo, in the March 21, 1998 issue of this magazine.

Even now it seems fairly clear that the bloodshed was the result of a series of wrong estimates of both Serb and Albanian leadership, which, each on its own, estimated at one moment that a little blood could bring certain political profit. On the Serbian side: when the media started to report during last year about the first armed clashes in Drenica, warning that the events could easily get out of control, the regime ignored the warnings, and stuck these reports under the carpet. "There is not a single step of the Serbian territory which is not controlled by the police," boasted police general Radivoje Markovic. Through time, the officials started admitting that something is happening in Kosovo, but did all to lessen the scope of the problem: as if this was nothing serious, that terrorism is a global phenomenon, that we'll solve all this one day "as it is being solved throughout the world"? The opposition parties, occupied with bargaining about the parliamentary and cabinet seats, have mainly made efforts not to spoil the game with unpleasant questions.

And then, when the smoke over Prekaz blew away, it turned out that the police had quite a good insight in what was going on. Even on the first day after the raid on the Jashari family estate, the government media published large chunks from the Adem Jashari dossier, with details about his whereabouts for the last few months. The official daily "Politika" recently published a complete police list of all, even the smallest incidents between the police and the armed Albanian groups ­ as far back as a few years. If all this was known to the authorities, why was nothing done much earlier, before Jashari and friends had a chance to arm well, organize and entrench themselves.

The response seems to be that it was estimated that it is better to let the enemy arm and organize himself, and use the oncoming armed conflict for political gain. As far back as a few months ago, the sources close to the regime said that the appearance of terrorism in Kosovo is not such a bad thing for our cause "because then the whole world will see that Shiptars are terrorists." It all ended up in the manner we saw in the last few days. The profit also came: the Serbian public opinion has been homogenized as never before, while Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic, whose government includes Albanian representatives, has been seriously shaken ahead of the elections in Montenegro. It still remains to explain this strategy to the families of the killed policemen, the number of which is much higher than was officially published.

But, the interpretation that the police did its job well, while the politicians did not let it finish it properly should be rejected.

The efforts of the police to evade civilian casualties in Likosani and Prekaz was essentially symbolic. It is true that the police in Prekaz gave an hour for the evacuation of women and children and for the surrender, but it is also true that it did not care much whether this call would be seriously taken. Anybody who even casually knows Drenica Albanians, is aware of the fact that it is a great shame for them if they let foreigners only see their women, so it was logical to surmise that they will not be allowed to leave the estate; that is why they should have been treated as hostages and not as terrorists. Besides this, even if the Jasharis were not stubborn enough to defend their estate, what were they to expect after the incident in Likosani, when ten members of the Ahmeti family were taken alive from their estate, only to be found in the Prishtina morgue, dead, after two days. Finally, the scandalous behavior of the judicial authorities should also be taken into consideration, which, breaching clear and indisputable Serbian laws, did not order the obduction of the dead and did not conduct an investigation concerning their death.

As far as the Albanian side is concerned, it is hard to find a single actor on their political scene who could, with a clear conscience say that he did all in his powers to prevent the escalation of violence. Busy with the manoeuvres within his own party and tours of Western capitals, Ibrahim Rugova, even today is not admitting the existence of the OVK, or is he condemning their methods: as far as recently he insisted that OVK is only a screen for the Serbian state security, and only recently did he start admitting that there are "frustrated people" in Kosovo, but according to him, they are neither armed or organized. During that time, other Albanian politicians, within the LDK and outside of it, openly flirt with OVK, hoping that this might bring them the nomination for the position of the leader of the political wing of this organization: Bujar Bukoshi, Hidayet Hiseni, Adem Demaqui, Lulleta Bequiri represent the most clear examples. When the pictures of the bodies from Likosani and Prekaz started to circulate around the world, all shouted in unison: "Ethnic cleansing!" and demanded an urgent NATO intervention.

On Thursday March 5, when cigarettes and flour ran out in Pristina, and the shadows of war pressed over Kosovo, none of them attempted to address the public with calls for restraint, nobody gave out calls for urgent negotiations. On the contrary, the Kosovo Information Center (KIC), with close ties to Rugova, all day pumped fake stories about tank columns, street combat in certain suburbs of Pristina, burned villages and thousands of refugees from Drenica, overheating further an already heated atmosphere. Similar behaviour was noticed also the week that followed, with synchronized attempts to present the events in Drenica as "new Srebrenica", with incessant stories about rape, mass graves and similar attributes associated with the Bosnian war. Only when it became completely clear that there will be no foreign military intervention, Rugova and his associates started to give out signals that they are considering negotiations.

In the end comes the biggest unknown of the Kosovo equation ­ the infamous OVK, which can after all, say that it is close to its final goal: a general armed rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo. Using the Jashari clan, OVK used in Drenica a method that should be well known to the Serbian police, since it was used in the initial phases of war in Croatia and Bosnia, during the mobilization of rural Serbs for combat against Croatian and Bosnian police. The scenario is as follows: armed "confidantes" are sent to warn the villagers that there is a certain police raid coming. The confidantes spread out some arms and persuade the villagers to ambush the "aggressors;" as soon as the first routine patrol comes around, shooting starts.

Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme," March 21, 1998