AIM news service brought a report from Pristina by Shkelzen Maliqi on 7 March 1998.

After the massive armed operation in the Drenica region considered by the Serbian authorities to be the main stronghold of the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo (OVK), many domestic and foreign reporters and analysts believe that after maintaining the status quo in Kosovo for several years the regime in Belgrade has lost patience and decided to resolve the crisis by war.

It is claimed that the scenario resembles those used to provoke war in Croatia or B&H. They point out that special police and military units as well as paramilitary forces already "specialized" in earlier ethnic cleansing operations were used in the operation. The logical question arises whether the main aim of Belgrade is actually to create a new territorial and ethnic configuration and not, as claimed, to liquidate Albanian "terrorists." Drenica is an important Albanian "wedge" which separates the eastern and western parts of Kosovo.

Serbian units are systematically "combing through" the Drenica region trying to destroy OVK strongholds. Punitive units are surrounding and attacking Albanian villages leaving behind demolished and burnt down houses. The Albanian population, primarily women, children and the elderly, have started to leave their homes and seek shelter in forests. Columns of refugees have started to arrive in surrounding towns where they are accommodated by relatives and other citizens.

The men fit for military service have remained in the villages and are striving to resist the attack and protect their homes and territory. It would seem that the resistance is greater and better organized than those who planned the operation had assumed. This significantly slowed down its course. After the first surprise attack on the village of Prekaze at dawn on 5 March in which many houses were burned to the ground, the punitive expedition needed much more time to reach other villages.

Developments since the evening of 6 March escalated to what could be called a small local war. The regime's pursuit of "OVK terrorists" might end up provoking a new "Drenica rebellion" similar to the one at the end of the Second World War when Yugoslav partisans put an end to the powerful units of the local commander, Shaban Polluzha.

Most speculation over the past few days has been on the strength of the resistance and the number of arms it has at its disposal. Evaluations range from a few hundred to a few thousand armed combatants. If there are just a few hundred, while the conflict is very dangerous, it will not inevitably expand. But, if the reaction to the Serbian punitive expedition has led to wider mobilization and the formation of units with over one thousand men and a central or coordinated command, then the conflict could become much more serious. We would then see an expanding spiral in which new military forces are engaged and increasingly heavy armament used with the conflict spreading to other regions where tensions are already high.

Since a strong emotional and political mobilization of Albanian public opinion has already started in Albania and Macedonia in support of their brothers in Kosovo, there is a risk that everybody's catastrophic scenario could develop with the general destabilisation of the region.

All will depend on the way Belgrade chooses to move on from the present situation. If it recalls the punitive expedition in time and the Drenica Albanians are able to return to their homes, tensions in the region will still be great, but at least the earlier balance of fear and status quo would be reestablished. There are, however, justified fear that the current operation has, either due to police stupidity or more likely intentionally, profoundly and irreparably undermined the fragile Kosovo status quo.

The significance of the OVK has clearly been exaggerated in the sense that it is still not strong enough to dictate developments. The Albanian political scene is still controlled by moderate forces which are not inclined to war. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader who enjoys majority support, has not given up on a political resolution of the crisis and even declared recently that he was ready to meet Milosevic in the presence of a third party which would guarantee that the talks are serious. At the rally of support in Tirana, Rexhep Mejdani, president of Albania, replied to the more militant demonstrators that Albania was in favour of a peaceful and political solution to the crisis in Kosovo.

Only Milosevic can have any interest in fanning the flames by provoking local rebellions such as the one which may develop in Drenica, in order to obtain a pretext to extend his armed operation. It is evident that Milosevic is the one who is dictating the nature and speed of events. He is in fact pursuing a two-track policy, on the one hand intensifying the conflict and bringing it to the verge of a new war and, on the other hand, reopening negotiations on certain political concessions to Kosovo Albanians, primarily concerning the education agreement, as demanded by the international community.

But his concessions demand signatures signed in blood. The price Kosovo must pay is the bloody massacre in Drenica and the humiliation and beating up of peaceful demonstrators in Pristina. Although he is ruling a bankrupt state which is forced to compromise, Milosevic is determined to show who is master of the house. Perhaps this is the most logical explanation of the events over the past few days. The bloody showdown and the threat of a new war are intended to retain international and domestic fascination with the inevitability of the factor called Milosevic.


Source: "AIM" News service, March 3, 1998