Gojko Beric writes on the recent Tudjman Bosnia initiative in the November 17, 1997 issue of 'Feral Tribune'.

The Bosniaks see the new Tudjman proposals, changed within days from a confederal one, to one on special relations, as 'Greeks bearing gifts'.

Zagreb repackaged its offer of a classic confederation after Sarajevo, with somewhat unsuspected nonchalance, refused even to spare time for it. In the new packaging, the motives and goals remain the same. And these are of a political, and not economic nature. If this wasn?t so, the contract on the use of the Ploce port would be regulated with a global agreement on special relations, and not as Croatia proposes - with an additional annex.

And even though the continuity of Tudjman?s policy towards Bosnia is recognizable to everybody, the case is interesting based on the fact that this is the first open attempt by Zagreb to present as legitimate and institutionalize the state, political and territorial appetites of Croatia towards the neighbouring state. With it, Tudjman would gain what was not brought to him on a plate by the guardians of the seal of the para state 'Herceg Bosna', and on a doubled territory at that. It is clear that Bosniaks could not have any dilemmas about that, recognizing in Tudjman?s idea a dangerous trap, both for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state, and themselves as a nation which was able to survive this genocidal war.

First time after Dayton, Izetbegovic was able to receive the unreserved support of the opposition here, as much as Tudjman was exposed to the criticism of his own opposition. At home, Tudjman is being accused of an attempt to recreate some new Yugoslavia - which is a well crafted empty phrase, since the Croatian president himself is afraid of such an idea . There is no discussion here about the renewal of Yugoslavia, even in political anecdotes, but it is clear to everybody that by accepting Tudjman?s proposal, Izetbegovic would sign the death warrant to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The explanation is simple: as soon as tomorrow Republika Srpska would sign a confederal agreement with Belgrade.

Some confusion was created by the dilemma to whose address Tudjman sent his proposal. He presented his idea in a letter to Alija Izetbegovic, but it is not clear whether he wrote to him as the leader of Bosniaks, or as the president of the state Presidency. Judging by the reaction of Kresimir Zubak, him and Krajisnik were not involved in this matter. In accordance with his obligations towards the central office in Zagreb, Zubak informed ?the president of all Croats? that the refusal of his initiative could only be ?a private position of Alija Izetbegovic, or the Muslim - Bosniak side?. Zubak actually wanted to say that he and the Herzegovina lobby have nothing to do with this.

The installment of 'special liaisons' into the Dayton agreement was done with the goal to dampen the centrifugal forces which have taken over the majority Srbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they soon presented themselves as black holes of that agreement and the biggest danger for the survival of the internationally recognized, but unstable and fragile state.