This theme is further expanded in the analysis of the independent Belgrade news agency "BETA" in its September 27, 1997 weekly electronic report.Last week Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic started a series of meetings with representatives of the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities, which were "crowned" with her arrival in Belgrade, on September 24, and a four-hour meeting with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. With this, a new shuffling in Republika Srpska began, which will possibly result in the further weakening of the Pale leadership's position.
In the afternoon of September 24, the Serbian state-run television and radio interrupted their regular broadcasts to air an announcement by Milosevic's office, saying that Plavsic and Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency Momcilo Krajisnik had reached an agreement on the resolution of the crisis in Republika Srpska. The agreement envisages holding of early parliamentary elections on November 15, and holding of early presidential elections and polls for the Serb member of the Bosnian presidency on December 7. In line with the agreement, the RS state-run television Banja Luka studio, controlled by President Plavsic, and the studio in Pale, will take turns every other day in broadcasting informative program for the whole territory of Republika Srpska.
According to well-informed sources, Plavsic refused to be photographed together with Krajisnik. The Serbian Broadcasting Corporation did not broadcast any photographs showing Plavsic and Krajisnik together, but only the photographs of each one of them together with President Milosevic.
Though it is still early to predict who will profit the most from the agreement, it may well be said that Pale's position has been weakened. The ruling Serb Democratic Party is very likely to lose its majority in the pending parliamentary polls, in which the Serb National Alliance, a party recently founded by Plavsic, will also partake. Thus, the most the incumbent Pale leadership could hope for in the future is to participate in the government. Several weeks ago Plavsic demanded the alternate television broadcasts between the Pale and Banja Luka studios, and said that presidential elections were possible if demanded by the Contact Group, and if simultaneous polls for the Serb member of the Bosnian presidency were also held. In short, she had achieved almost everything that she asked for.
By using "her" television studio in Banja Luka, Biljana Plavsic has more time to prepare for presidential elections. Pale may nominate deputy premier Aleksa Buha as her rival. The alternate information program broadcasts,
however, will probably undermine the state-run Pale studio propaganda efforts.The arrival in Belgrade of President Plavsic was prepared by Serbia's state security head, Jovica Stanisic, considered to be President Milosevic's confidant. Stanisic visited Banja Luka on September 19, and met with Biljana Plavsic and the RS police chiefs appointed by her.
Well-informed sources in Banja Luka say that this visit served to establish permanent contact with police loyal to Plavsic, which is now considered by Belgrade not a "para police," but a partner. Stanisic promised that Belgrade would no longer support police officials from the Banja Luka region dismissed by Plavsic because of being loyal to Pale.
According to well-informed sources Stanisic also promised that the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities would not turn a blind eye to a possible assistance and backing offered to the Pale-controlled police by the Serbian Radical Party, or by armed groups controlled by the Serbian Mafia.
Since the escalation of her conflict with the Pale leadership controlled by former RS president Radovan Karadzic in June, Plavsic had on several occasions avoided meeting with Slobodan Milosevic. Facing parliamentary and presidential elections in September, Milosevic intended to present himself as a mediator who had managed to reconcile Banja Luka and Pale and convince them to work together again. Believing that Milosevic is favoring Pale, however, and that in case she settled for a compromise she would have been easily and quickly eliminated by the two, Plavsic had rejected negotiations.
Therefore, it seems beyond doubt that, this time, President Plavsic came to Belgrade as a partner, and not as someone who should be pressured into accepting a dialogue with Pale and making concessions in that direction. Thereby, at least when Milosevic is in question, she has attained the same position held by Pale until recently.
The fact that the powerful Serbian Broadcasting Corporation interrupted its regular program to carry a report on the Plavsic-Krajisnik agreement, shows how important the agreement is for the Serbian and the Yugoslav authorities. At a moment when the ruling leftist coalition is losing the majority in the parliament and is about to enter a highly uncertain presidential run-off, Milosevic is attempting to present even the ostensible reconciliation between Pale and Banja Luka as his major political success.
The state-run television placed a special emphasis on the fact that the agreement was reached in Milosevic's presence. It is certain that the Yugoslav president has reluctantly accepted a dialogue with Biljana Plavsic, with whom he has a long record of discord since the times when the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was still in progress. He was forced to act in such a manner because it is increasingly obvious that the international community does not intend to cease supporting Banja Luka. In addition, the Pale leadership has been marked by the Contact Group as an obstacle in the implementation of the Dayton agreement.
An additional explanation to Milosevic's rapprochement with Plavsic lies in a surge in popularity of the Serbian Radical Party, confirmed by the Serbian elections of September 21. This party supports the Pale leadership, branding President Plavsic as a traitor to the Serb interests and as the "West's hireling." Milosevic has every reason to feel uneasy over the strengthening of the ties between the Radicals and Pale, and is now in a rush to restore his influence in Republika Srpska. Furthermore, in this way he is sending a message to the international community that he is no longer ready to extend his unconditional support to Pale.
Milosevic started his dialogue with Plavsic at a moment when she had already consolidated her international position. This is to say that he cannot use her for his political goals, in the same way in which he used to take advantage of the Pale leadership. Biljana Plavsic has become the international community's foothold in its intentions to eliminate Radovan Karadzic's influence. It appears that Milosevic has understood that, for the international community, he is no longer the "only factor of peace" in Bosnia, and is now in a rush to make up for his loss.
Only a day after Jovica Stanisic visited Banja Luka, the police loyal to Plavsic took control over the security center in Prnjavor, some 60 kilometers to the east of Banja Luka. Sources in Banja Luka say that Stanisic had approved of the action, and that he even had a say in choosing the new Prnjavor police heads.
Pale's response was fierce. On September 21 it sent a special police unit from Bijeljina in order to retake the local station. Two police forces clashed some 15 kilometers from the town and in the ensuing shoot-out one Banja Luka policemen was wounded. Despite desperate Pale's attempts, the Banja Luka police managed to hold on and preserve control over the entire Prnjavor area.
The ruling Serb Democratic Party in Prnjavor staged demonstrations against the dismissals in the police, but there was no massive response by the population. SFOR deployed its forces in the region to prevent possible escalation, and the local citizens failed to carry any actions against them.
The police loyal to Plavsic was not content to take only Prnjavor. On September 23 the police leadership in Prijedor, a city to the west of Banja Luka, was also dismissed. In this instance the Pale loyalists did not offer any resistance.
It is, of course, of crucial importance for Banja Luka to continue its thrust towards northern and eastern parts of Republika Srpska in which Pale still exerts full control. There are indications that actions similar to the one in Prnjavor are soon to be organized in Modrica, a city in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Banja Luka obviously counts that its rapprochement with Belgrade will ensue in a drop of morale among the Pale supporters. Thus, it may even happen that some heads of the Pale-controlled police switch to Plavsic's side on their own volition.
Pale is still compelled to remain on the defensive. The Pale-run police can only carry actions of limited range in order to prevent the abrupt loss of influence in the cities in the north of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is entirely incapable of coming forth with any serious political moves that could restore the central authorities' former influence.
A high-ranking RS official told BETA that from the very outset Pale had been expecting that Bosnia and Herzegovina would soon be divided between Serbia and Croatia. "Had we stayed together, we could have resisted more strongly to the return of Muslim refugees and pressures to accept unified Bosnia. The world would have grumbled for a while, but would finally have to accept the reality," the official said.
The words of this highly-placed official reflect the true position of Pale and show that two concepts for the resolution of the problem lie at the core of the political conflict in Republika Srpska. While Pale had been relying on the support of Serbia and expecting a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banja Luka and President Plavsic concluded that such an approach had no future. Consequently, Plavsic started to openly cooperate with the international community, attempting, at the same time, to preserve the Serb entity's independence. Judging by the most recent events, Belgrade itself appears disinclined to persists in its wish to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Pale prospects remain to be seen.
Source: Belgrade news agency "Beta" weekly electronic report.
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