"Arkzin" on the weak links in the Dayton agreements
"Feral Tribune" on the effects of the agreements on Croatian politics
"Vreme "on the developments in the Serb-held part of Sarajevo
"Globus" on the possibility of a Croatian military action in Eastern Slavonia
"Feral Tribune" on the developments in Mostar
"Vreme" discusses the situation concerning Prevlaka penninsula
"Nezavisni" and "Koha" on the "" on the events in Kosovo
" " and "Nezavisni" on the succession of the former Yugoslav state
"Vreme", "Nezavisni" and "Feral Tribune" on the situation with refugees and minority human rights
"Vreme", "Monitor" ,"Feral Tribune" ,"Nova Makedonija", and "Nezavisni" on the internal political events in Bosnia,Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia
"Monitor" and "Nezavisni" on the possible change of the constitution and election law in FRY
"Vreme" on the strengthening of the police force in Serbia
"Vreme" on the conflict in the Serbian Orthodox church
Post "Dayton/Paris" developments
Grubisa reminds that the Dayton agreements are the fourth attempt of the international community to mediate in the Balkan wars. This plan though, presupposes almost an "instant reconciliation" of all warring parties, aggressors and the victims of aggression. It is obvious that this Agreement had for its starting point the urgent need of the Clinton administration to "produce" peace for a direct political use, in this case the shaken prestige of the Clinton administration.
In first instance, says Grubisa, it is an illusion to expect that the process of separation of warring sides, demilitarisation ad the return of refugees will take place in the given time frame of one year. The UN peace mission showed that nothing can be done in such a short period of one year, particularly such a complex process as the return of refugees. To that effect, the one year time frame is an illusion, in which not even the NATO strategists believe in, nor does president Clinton. But, due to his domestic public opinion, he was forced to give "firm guarantees, that the American troops will return within a year.On the surface, he is not risking anything: within a year he will, or will not be, re-elected as the president.
The second weak point in the Dayton agreements are "thre confidence building measures"- even if only the conflicts in the thwentieth century are looked at, for such a process to be successful the time frame of one year is too short. Particularly for this war it is naive to believe that people will reconcile within A yeatr, peacefully living next to each other.
The third neuraligc point of the Dayton agreements os the principle of the punisment of those responsible for war crimes. The strict applications of the war law show that even the victims are able could also cross the critical point of human behaviour and committ war crimes. Tudjman's decisino to promote an officer at the time a procedure was initiatred against him as a war criminal, does not give "positive signs' in the direction of the implementation of the Dayton agreements.
The fourth problematic point is the allowing of introduction of "special connections" of Republika Srpska with a neighbouring state, meaning Serbia.Implicitly, this means opening of doors to the legal division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a debacle of a unified Bosnia nad Herzegovina as a multiethnic stAte. The fact itself by which the "asymmetrical frederation" was created and a concession to the ethnic principle on which Republika Srpska is constituted means either naive beleif that the process of unification with the mother-state-Serbia- will be under control, to which the events so far in this war do not lead to; or it means the concession to political realism, where the factual division of Bosnia and Herzegovina is accepted as given, but there is an attempt to mask this with the veil of superficially unified Basnia and Herzegovina.
The fifth neuralgic point of the Dayton agreement is the naive beleif in the quick reconciliation of Muslims and Croats in the Bosonian/Croat federation. All indicators so far show that the seeds of division and catastrophic Croatian policy towards Bosnia caught deep roots and that not even two year of European administration over Mostar did not succeed to heal the wounds to which the Croatian-Muslim confrontation has lead.
All these neuralgic point of the Dayton agreement speak that the American diplomacycame into this whole Balkan endeavour with noble intentions, but with a lot of naivite, applying its own standards of conduct on the sides in the conflict. It is obvious that "warring sides" in the Balkans do not act in accordance with the logic of the mediation process, and that the American diplomacy has underestimated the malignancy of not only the Serbian nationalism, but also of other nationalisms caused by Serb aggresion.
The war has become a "life style" in these regions, and the capitalism that is being born on the ruins of the Balkan war is, above all, "wild capitalism" of war speculators and profiteers, blackmarketeers, corrupted political and local "gods of war".
The American sponsorship over the negotiations speeded up the road to peace, and the Dayton agreements, and compared to the war that has been lead so far, it is truly a crossroad. But, the foundations that it is laying down are not firm, since these foundations are not based on the will of the warring parties for a real peace. That is why it is hard to beleive that, when NATO troops leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lights won't be turned off again in the Balkan inn and war inflame again in these regions. For that reason, the Dayton peace has to be accepted cautiously, as the best and most effective truce so far. But for it to turn into a real and stable peace much more is neccessary; needed is, what seems impossible att this moment: that plans of national leaders for pure ethnic states fail, and that all refugees return safely to their homes, without fear of repression or revenge.For that what is really needed is a different "state of mind". Dayton peace, probably, put an and to the horrors of war. But it was not able to do away with the fears of an unstable peace.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", December 22, 1995
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The same theme is also explored by Marinko Culic in Split weekly "Feral Tribune", of December 18, 1995.
Culic states that the Pariuis agreements have put the question of Croatian borders back into the zero state, with general possibility when it does come up for discussion, it would be stripped off demands for territorial concessions.
But is is obvious that nobody is giving any confirmations to this effect, including the international mediators, but it seems that the key move towards dismantling of former inernal borders of SFRY was made in Dayton. Accepting too lightly that the signatories of the agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina also be the presidents of the two neighbouring states, the Americans have actually accepted that the signatories of that deal would be the nations, or more precisely, their political leaders.
When Tudjman ventured into the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems even before the war even started, and particularly after he insisted that Croatia has rounded itself off in its "historical and ethnical" borders, immediately after the signing of the Dayton agreement everything started to become shaky, or more precisely, Tudjman himself started rocking the Croatian boat.
The reason why Tudjman thinks that he has made a good deal in Dayton could be explained only by his fixation, which he doesn't even hide: that is thev re-establishmet of a duchy of Croatia,which he has even proclaimed as done at his press conference upon returning form Dayton, with the exception of Bosnian Posavina, which will go to the Serbs. This is quite an unprecise comparison, since the Croatian dutchy established in 1939 included eastern Croatia and Prevlaka, which are now doubtful, although on the other hand, Croatia is today enlarged by Istria, which was Italian then, and for a good part of Western Bosnia, conquered in 1995.
The real scandal of this comparison lies with full force on another side, since it implies that the whole are of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered part of Croatia, which Tudjman practically said in front of the world statesmen in Paris. By doing this, he has not only overturned the essence of the Dayton agreements, but also the definition of the Yugoslav war, formally accepted by the international community.
This is not any more a war between state-forming republics, among which an aggressor and a victim were identified, but among state forming nations, meaning civil war, as was always stated in Belgrade, and at least for a certain period of time denied in Zagreb. This has, at the same time, rehabilitated FRY.
Connected with this is the second fixation about which Tudjman has been speaking about since recently, and that is getting rid of Serb as the "disturbing factor". According to him, tihs is such a holy goal, that he has openly admitted that it was worth sacrificing Bosnian Posavina, while some of his closest associates add that comparet to this, some of the questions stemming from the succession of the former state are "peanuts".
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", December 18, 1995
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Belgrade weekly"Vreme" published in its issue of December 18,1995, a report by Bojana Lekic, Radio B-92 journalist, on the current situation in the Serb-held parts of Sarajevo.
By a certain stroke of irony, Serbs in Bosnia feel more uncertain now, after the Dayton agreement was signed than during all the war years. It is probably so because practically no one, including the top officials, know the details of the Dayton agreement. Bosnian Serb officials only saw the maps drawn out in thick markers, which meant that they didn't know the real separation lines. Namely, if we translate the proportions on to the ground, we find around 600 meters of territory covered by markers. Or, precisely: the extremely important FAMOS car factory found itself under drawn line. During the war, the factory, despite being in the region of one of Sarajevo's most severe front lines, managed to carry on its production. Even Radovan Karadzic couldn't answer the question of the fate of FAMOS after the Dayton agreement, which severely shook his credibility as a leader.
In order to avoid such unpleasent questions, Karadzic chose to make his public appearances as rare as possible to the point where he did not attend a single protest meeting, nor did he use the opportunity to, be one of some 80.000 people who came out for the referendum on December 12.
However, numerous meetings, actions and statements broadcasted on Pale television, carried one message: ``Stay here---since that is your right.'' The alternative of a life together wasn't even mentioned as a possibility.
The same image, varied and multiplied, of candle light and almost completely packed families is not the only reason why the world has come to realize that the implementation of the agreement will be more difficult than imagined. Simultaneously with international assurances that the local population's rights shall be guaranteed, troublesome statements have arrived from the Bosnian side. On Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Radio Television, the minister for relations with UNPROFOR, Hasan Muratovic, stated that ``the Serbs should turn their backs on the authorities from Pale and stop taking their children to the meetings, because their children will thus acquire police records which will follow them for the rest of their lives.'' B-H President Alija Izetbegovic stated that safety shall be guaranteed to all those who did not participate in the fighting.
In such an atmosphere, despite the referendum results which show that 98.7 percent of the citizens of Sarajevo under the Serb control are against the decision from Dayton, there is quite a large number of those who have, for days now, been seeking new refuge in Serbia. ``I live in Vogosca (a municipality which will revert in three monzhs to control of the Muslim-dominatewd governemnted note) and I got permision to leave,'' says Rada, a woman who took the bus to Pale from Sabac (Serbia), where she went to see whether there was room for her family there. She further explains that in the other municipalities those that wanted to leave did so usually at night, sneeking out in order not to avoid problems with police whose members in most cases are their neighbors.
``You know in Ilijas, the municipality president Ratko Adzic was terminated just because he turned blind eye on people running away with one bag.'' Even Adzic, who used to be Minister of Interior, was replaced. People close to the ruling circles of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) refuse to allow the ``Krajina syndrome''---flight before defeat.
Source: Brelgrade weekly "Vreme", December 8, 1995
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Davor Butkovic of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", in the magazine's issue of December 22, discusses the persistent information in the Zagreb diplomatic circles on the possibility of the Croatian military intervention in Eastern Slavonia.
These circles state, says Butkovic, that Tudjman will wait to collect what he considers proof that the peaceful re-integration is not posible, then ordering the military takeover.It is thought that the key question will be the demilitarization of Eastern Slavionia and the deployment of the new international peacekeeping troops.
The most important obstacle would be - if Milosevic does not accept recognition without the exchange of territories - that Croatia is not punished with the imposition of sanctions. Butkovic also estimates that, such a military action would cause massive resettlement of Serb population to Yugoslavia, but if the action is undertaken in military correct way, without violence against civilians, the international community would not see this as ethnic cleansing. This due to the fact he says, that the international assements say that this population would re-settle to Yugoslavia, even if the re-integration was peaceful. The American assasment that he cites, say that only 30 percent of the current Serb population would remain in Eastern Slavonia after the re-integration, while the Croatian estimate is between 15 and 20 percent.
Butkovic thinks that the demilitarisation process will not have the tempo insisted on by Croatia, the military intervention of the Croatian army is expected.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", December 22, 1995
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Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" discusses in the magazine's issue of January 15, 1996, the situation that is developing in Mostar and Herzegovina, after the Dayton agreements.
The tense situation in Mostar, which resembles a gradual but unstioppagble sliding into a war, afer all, will not end up in a new Croatian-Bosniak conflict. The reason lies in IFOR, whose mighty presence is a warning enough to both sides that it would not be wise to enter such a situation. But, NATO has shown itself to be a only clumsy and unintelligent armour when another matter comes into question.
It seems that IFOR has decided to cool some hot heads in Mostar, in such a way that it placed itself between the two sides, along the street innocently named the Boulevard, which has completely betrayed the Dayton architecture. The agreement says that the troops willl be placed on the borders between the two entitites Serbian and Bosnian/Croat, and not to make up another one only a week after they had arrived. This has obviously been to the liking of the Bosnian Croats, seen by the statement of the mayor of the right half of Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic, who, when asked why doesn't IFOR patrol all streets in the city and not only the Boulevard, said:"Oh god, not that, what would they do there?".
Knowing that the Croats will not give up on the division of the city, but also that nothing will stop them at that, Hans Koschnick has threatened to resign.
After newest excesses and the deaths of a number of people, the Croats have retreated from the joint police force, which is the only guarantee of peace in the city, and this could also be the sign of freeezing of all of the obligations from the Dayton agreement. Since the Bosnian side is keen on the reintegration of the city and Herzegovina on the whole, it is quite obvious whom the recent incidents suited more, as well who has incided them in the first place.
The goals is to prove by all means that joint life is impossible, even if the Croats themselves are guilty of that, so there is no negating that the shooting in Mostar came from their side.In an obvious attempt to "relax" bitter and foaming Herzegovina Croats, Tudjman has, with a lot of media pomp, forced the holding of a session of a Joint council for cooperation of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo.This Council is to replace the confederation, which disappeared with the Dayton agreements.
What remains in the game is the Bosia and Herzegovina Federation, from two very important reasons. Without it, Tudjman's ambition to form a Croatia within "duchy borders", but also while it exists, it is not necessary to give the Bosniaks a leeway to the sea.
All in all, the attempts of Herzegovinians to provoke a conflict in Mostar, so that they could force with it the disintegratioon of the Federation, for the moment have no chance of success. Their only hope is to suck out all essence of the Dayton agreements, as something that cannot be caried out, and show IFOR as incompetent for anything more than an armed buffer between the two sides.
Source: Split wekly "Feral Tribune" January 15, 1996
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Velizar Brajovic, analyzes the current situation concerning the Prevlaka peninnsula in the December 25, 1995 issue of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme".
``A military solution to the problem of Prevlaka is excluded,'' stated Momir Bulatovic, President of Montenegro, upon his return from Paris, explaining that a military option only ``further complicates the whole thing.'' Due to that, President Bulatovic calls for patience, assuring others that, since a solution for Prevlaka was not found in Paris, it shall come about soon, that is at the moment when the Croatian side solves certain internal problems and makes steps towards therealizations of the agreement on Prevlaka as achieved in Dayton.
President Bulatovic did not specify how long a wait it would be, but he told the journalists that two neighbors can drag each other through court for years for a piece of land, and for a solution to the problem of Prevlaka it is necessary to achieve an agreement on land, as he says, of only 10 hectares. After Paris, however, the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the diplomatic chief, Mate Granic, look upon that issue in a completely different light. In a HTV program ``Slikom na Sliku,'' Minister Granic was decisive: ``We shall not sign a single agreement on which Prevlaka is mentioned.'' President Bulatovic takes offense at such remarks, showing surprise that the people believe President Tudjman more than President Bulatovic.
Even prior to his departure for Dayton, President Bulatovic told the Montenegrin public that he would solve the problem of Prevlaka there. His conviction was further strengthened by President Tudjman who, during one of his leaps from Dayton to Zagreb, mentioned a possible triple exchange of territories.
Shortly afterwards, the Montenegrin President's victorious statement appears from Dayton which states that the question of Prevlaka, as part of justifiable demands of the Herzegovinian Serbs for access to the sea, shall be resolved in Paris. There was no end to Bozidar Vucurevic's, Mayor of Trebinje, happiness in the statement he gave to VREME, in which, without any reserves, he claimed that Herzegovina is pledging a good part of its territories for an access to the sea and the purchase of Prevlaka: ``It doesn't matter whether it shall be Montenegrin or the Republic of Serbia's, the only important thing is that it's Serbian.''
Shortly after, a ``cold shower'' from Croatia drowns optimism. VREME's journalist, from a certain Montenegrin Dayton guest who wishes to remain anonymous, is given a statement that ``it is only a question of modalities how that problem is to be solved, even we don't know the details, since, as we were leaving Dayton, the maps were still being worked on.'' All hopes are crushed by the official Dayton map. Dubrovnik's hinterland, that is a third of the Trebinje municipality which was looked upon as security for the territorial exchange, became a part of the Croatian Muslim entity. In Croatia, dissatisfaction is seething because of the division line in Posavina, and a true eruption of dissatisfaction in Konavli and Dubrovnik is caused by the mere mention of possible border changes in the zone of Prevlaka. True, certain Croatian officials have justified the intentions of President Tudjman to agree ``under certain pressures'' to a possible territorial exchange. Various Croatian strategists, as the Croatian newspaper Obzor has published, were clarifying that ``in these times when war is conducted by sophisticated deadly means, a kilometer more or less literally means nothing,'' alluding to the very peak of Prevlaka, while others claimed that ``that very kilometer is of vital significance for the control of an area.'' Zarko Domjan, a high Croatian official, states that ``Croatia must think in a pragmatic way. I would say that we have overestimated and mystified the cape, which is of no strategic value. Therefore, the peak of Prevlaka has no military significance,'' concludes Domjan and adds that ``negotiations can be held about everything and all can be changed, therefore, why couldn't borders be changed as well? Nothing is absolutely given...''
Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, the president of the Committee for the Borders of the Republic of Croatia, however, categorically states to the Zagreb >>Panorama newspaper: ``We shall defend that territory and Croatian sovereignty in that area should not be questioned.''
From the protest meetings held in Dubrovnik, a clear message is being sent on discarding the models of ``territories for peace.'' Dubrovnik's hinterland is now secure and has as much as it needs. Therefore, even Dr. Mate Granic had to travel to Dubrovnik and announce that ``to exchange Prevlaka for even a part of eastern Herzegovina is out of the question.''
``The idea of exchanging Prevlaka,'' says Granic, ``has reappeared during the negotiations in Dayton after three years. This time, only the Serbs insisted upon it, especially the Montenegrins. The Croatian strategical interest, prior to the departure for Dayton, was to preserve the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. We succeeded in that. Prevlaka is not mentioned in a single Dayton document, a single annex. We announced in Dayton that, in order to exchange Prevlaka, we would be obliged to get a two-thirds majority vote in the Parliament as well as the support of our citizens by means of a referendum. We immediately informed the Americans that neither of the two are possible.
All of that was announced before Paris, where, as President Bulatovic was expecting, a miracle was to occur. It is difficult to say whether Podgorica and Belgrade kept quiet only to make it easier for Tudjman and Granic to calm the anxious public. Directly before Paris, however, in the Serbian-Montenegrin negotiating team, as stated by reliable sources, a slight emergency unfolded, so that even the signing of the peace was in question. The problem occurred regarding the international recognition of Croatia and Yugoslavia. It later came out that Prevlaka was a stumbling block. The Croats announced that they first demand recognition in the internationally recognized borders, after which, with an international arbitrage, the problem of Prevlaka could be resolved, which Milosevic and Bulatovic refused to accept.
Bulatovic bitterly sends word from Paris that he has met up with the fact that Croatia refuses to fulfill voluntarily accepted obligations from Dayton. Bulatovic calls upon witnesses, representatives of foreign countries, which is exactly what the Croats are doing. Whether any kind of Dayton agreement on Prevlaka truly exists is difficult to ascertain, yet Bulatovic demands that people trust his word, concluding that until that problem is resolved, there will be no normalization in their relations with Croatia. Bulatovic has ceased mentioning ``the justified demands of Herzegovinians for access to the sea.'' The question is, as he says, a territory of only 10 hectares.
That fact introduces a new dilemma, specifically as it is well known that Prevlaka is 2500 meters long and 500 meters wide, which makes more than the 10 hectares as stated by President Bulatovic. On top of that, the Croats are claiming territorial waters, which further complicates the whole thing.
According to President Bulatovic's opinion ``Prevlaka is only a synonym and name for the right to a free entrance and access to the sea and international law is on our side.'' How long would such a dispute last, nobody knows, but it is known that the whole issue is not making temperatures rise in Montenegro, apart from the fact that certain parties are reproaching the government for the manner in which they are conducting policies, reminding them that they had tied up their fate with the Prevlaka issue. As things stand now, there will not be a war over Prevlaka. President Bulatovic assures of that as well, who, obviously regretting even the first one, admits that he did not face the lined up young men with pride.
As the most realistic version of the solution of the Prevlaka question, appears the one which will be forced by the mutual interest of the Dubrovnik and Montenegrin riviera. Namely, the businessmen do not care where the border shall be. Croatia is impatiently awaiting hordes of foreign guests in Dubrovnik, wishing for peaceful and as passable as possible borders. The idea to demilitarize the wider region is on the agenda again, that is, to exchange the soldiers in Prevlaka for tourists. Croatian officials mentioned that from the Croatian side, which is navigable for all boats, Boka could be entered undisturbed by all Montenegrin passenger and fishermen boats, that is all except naval ones.
The flag of the United Nations on Prevlaka will most probably as word goes soon be replaced by the Croatian checkerboard. Anyway, rational Montenegrins are saying, what need do we have of a third Prevlaka when we already have two, the one in Tivat and the one in lake Skadar.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", December 25, 1995
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Jan Briza of the Novi Sad wekly "Nezavisni", discusses in the magazine's issue of January 12, 1996, the possibilities of the diualogue in Kosovo, after the Dayton/Paris agreemenets.
Briza says that after the Dayton agreement on Bosnia, and clear signs that the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb is only a question of time, it is Kosovo's turn now. This is quite evident. But the untangling of the crisis there is quite unpredictable.
There is hope, though, that the Kosvo problem will be solved oat the negotiating table, and not on the battle field as in Bosnia and Croatia. Some recent encouraging signals point in that direction. One of those is, of course, the message of ther Albanian president Sali Berisha, that Tirana will neutralise every possible "adventuristic tendency" in Kosovo and that it willl help the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, to "finally tutrn in the direction of a political dialogue with Belgrade".Rugova himself gave a similarly encouraging message, saying that he he is "woorking intensively" towards such a dialogue.
With the recent request for the opening of a representation ofice in Kosovo, the US government has put a nnotice to the regime in Belgrade that it is not indiferent towards the fate of Albanians in Kosovo and the respect of their human rights. On the other hand, presenting the request, Richard Holbrooke, also retirated that the US sees Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, underlininig that there is no support for the separatistic tendencies of extreme nationalists. To all this, Serbian president Milosevic did not utter a single word.
All in all, says Briza, it is undisputable that kosovo is the "mother of all Yugoslav crises". This, due to the fact that there this regime has shown its true, undemocratic face. Also, the question of the Kosovo autonomy was never national, but always predominantly a question of democracy. If Serbia was democratic state, as it is not, things would develop differently, not only in Kosovo, but in other parts of the former SFRY.
Since the Milosevic meeting in Gazimestan (Kosovo) until today, a lot of blood hAs been spilled in the ex-Yugoslav region, but Kosovo remainred relatively peaceful. Partly responsible for this is Rugova, who used his great authority in the population and wioith "Gandhi methods" of resistance towards the regime, prevented Albanian extremists to take up arms.
There are, of course, other explanations for peace in those regions. One of those is a mutual frear of both Albanians and Serbs of armed conflict. They are both aware that to such a conflict, thpse in Bosnia and Croatia would be a child's play. The danger of such an apocalyptic scenarion is now much lower since NATO started demonstrating in the Bosnian neighbourhood what comes to the bullies that make a mess in Europe.
When Milosevic finaly decides to enter serious discussions with Rugova, which will probably happen soon, he will soon realise that he made a serious mistake that he did not decide to do that sooner. For him the greatest problem lies in the fact that the other side definitely knows that economically drained and politicaly ever unstable Serbia is not in a position to hold the control of Kosovo by force indefinitely. They also know well that Milosevic cannot count to the return into international financial institutions, even less financial help from the West, if he continues with the current policies in Kosovo. That is why Milosevic will have to accept not only a dialogue with Rugova, but also the concessions about which he did not even want to speak about until yesterday.
Who, knows, maybe in the end true decentralisation and democratisation of Serbia will start in Kosovo.
Source: Novi Safd wekly "Nezavisni", January 12, 1996
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ASTRIT SALIHU of the Prishtina Albanian weekly "Koha" discusses the same question in the magazine's issue of January 17, 1996.
There have been many rumors circulating lately about the establishment of non-formal contacts between the Albanian and Serbian parties for the beginning of the Albanian-Serb dialogue. The previous initiatives of Nova Demokratija which were verified and made public, came out to be unsuccessful. It seems that the initiative, this time, is not coming from an opposition association or subject, but from much more important decision-making centers. In the informed Belgrade circles, it is said that these conversations are in a way a direct initiative of the Serbian president who wants to come out with a concrete step towards an ever more serious Serbian problem called Kosova, before the congress of the Socialists starts by March this year.
It seems that there is another instance standing behind. The American, which has started pressuring both sides to start the dialogue. Will the dialogue for the solution of Kosova's problem start, or will it be only about some aspects of the problem, as are information, health care and education, still remains to be seen. Reliable political sources in Prishtina tell us that consultations of our representatives about dialogue which is expected the begin, have been taking place. Even, still according to these sources, these preparations have started since the American initiative.
In his last press conference, president Rugova said that "we wish Richard Holbrooke takes over the mediation". Holbrooke, on the other hand, when referring to the opening of the USIS office in Prishtina said that "The US doesn't support the secession and independence of Kosova". This more or less gives the complete features of the Albanians-Serb dialogue which is expected to begin, and in which Holbrooke is desired as a mediator. Wishing for Holbrooke or the American involvement also implies playing the game by their rules, and this as stated in public, is autonomy. This should not be only a game of words. Everything will start to be finished within the frame of the autonomy.
But, there is another aspect which should be discussed regarding dialogue before anything. Who will be involved in these conversations, who will they talk with, what Albanian political subject will take the responsibility of getting into the conversations? According to what can be seen and according to other sources, it seems that these conversations will be conducted by the LDK. Thus, these conversations will not include a large number of experts on our political issues, which will weaken their position. At the LDK, we were told that they will include the parliamentarian groups and commissions in the conversations about concrete issues as education or health care, if these groups or commissions exist. Adem Demagi's last interview in "Telegraf" promises his direct involvement in politics and even Rugova's replacement if necessary. This will make Rugova and the ones he chooses enter the dialogue in a slippery field, a terrain which has other options, a terrain with an alternative.
But all of these say more than the first sight impression. If the preparations for the conversations have started now, five years after the unanimous call for dialogue, then our politics is full of improvisations. This means that the experts' teams have not been prepared in the past five years in which we waited for the dialogue, as if a miracle were expected. And the other distressing question is: what if conversations start on grounds of improvisations? Now, if they have eventually started, they are not favoring Albanians, but will end who knows how if our team which represent us in the conversations, are being formed and preparing themselves now. Our representatives would then enter a dark tunnel whose end can't be seen.
Source: e-mail edition of the Pristina weekly "Koha", January 17, 1996
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Despite fierce arguments, an agreement on sharing out the property of the former Yugoslavia has been deadlocked for three years. All the suggested methods of determining the legacy and its division have been annulled by ``joint action'' by Serbian and Croatian experts. The only evaluation method left is the IMF key which was accepted by the Milan Panic government agreed in 1992: the founding assets in the IMF will be shared out so that the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) get 36.52%, Croatia 28.49%, Slovenia 16.39%, Bosnia 13.2% and Macedonia 5.4% of all rights and obligations.
That method is just provisional and that is shown by the fact that Slovenia has agreed to repay 18% of the former Yugoslavia's commercial debt on the condition that the Paris Club frees it of the clause on solidarity under which debtors can claim payments for the entire debt from the party that is liquid (and that is only Slovenia at present). But if debtors agree to that condition the other inheritors won't.
Kosta Mihajlovic, member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science and Milosevic's economy advisor, explained that disagreement saying all issues have to be resolved as a whole. Mihajlovic heads the FRY delegation at the commission for succession in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in Geneva.
In an interview to Ljubljana-based independent weekly ``Mladina'' he said that the FRY delegation submitted a collection of 9,000 methods of determining succession based on the general principle that the former Yugoslavia did not break up but that some of its republics broke away (four out from six republics) and added that the property has to include everything that was state owned in the former state. He also noted that even the Conference secretariat caved in to pressure from the breakaway republics and secretly adopted a document on division which would give the FRY just 5% of the legacy and 62% of the debt. That is worse than what the Slovenians and Croats are demanding in public: 36% of the property and debts for the FRY.
Ten days ago Slovenian finance minister Mitja Gaspari said the former Yugoslavia's property stood at a total of around 100 billion dollars in late 1990 and that the most difficult part to cover in the division is the clearing account.
Bozo Marendic, head of Croatia's delegation in Geneva, said that property stood slightly lower at 60 billion dollars with 75% of it being army property. Slobodna Dalmacija daily in Split speculated that an agreement has already been reached on sharing out the property and claimed that Serbia will get 30%, Croatia 20%, Bosnia 20%, Slovenia and Macedonia 10% each. The daily said Croatia is also demanding 60 M-84 tanks, three MiG 29 fighters, 24 combat helicopters etc. Croatia is also demanding a division of National bank foreign currency reserves and gold which are estimated to have been at close to one billion dollars.
Some experts in Yugoslavia believe that Croatia has assessed that it has grabbed a lot and added that Tudjman will now concentrate only on the private property of Serbian citizens in Croatia. i.e. that Croatia will propose that the FRY takes on debts to its own citizens for that property which they can't reclaim.
The FRY faces the worst situation since it failed to come up with a method that would place debts on the breakaway republics (a conclusion reached because the delegation is spending more time hiding documents from its public than from the international mediators). The only point in its favor is the fact that is has no money, having spent even what it managed to hide during the breakup.
All the parties involved in the split have hired specialized agencies and lawyers. Allegedly, FR Yugoslavia's consultants discovered a 30 billion dollar error in the other side's documents at first glance.
Seventy years of life together and common diplomatic history left a rich diplomatic legacy to the successors of the former Yugoslavia. That fund of embassies, residences, consulates, apartments covers 125 buildings of an estimated value (including the land they stand on) of 500 million dollars.
Apart from a few unsuccessful attempts to take over embassies based on the fact that the current ambassador opted for his newly proclaimed state (that happened in Chile and Argentina---Croatia) all the other embassies belong to FR Yugoslavia which has pretensions of continuity with the former Yugoslavia.
No one can say for sure what criteria will be used to share out the diplomatic legacy.
All the state property abroad was either built or bought over the 72 years of life together. The oldest (date of purchase age) is the building in Calea Dorobaktilor in Bucharest which was bought in 1919. Although it was registered as property of the then newly-formed kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, there is basis to believe that Serbia bought it before the union was declared and brought it into the union along with all the rest of its property abroad. The missions have all been fundamentally changed in the meantime but their sales meant purchases of other buildings which will secure some rights for Serbia in the final analysis certainly stronger than moral rights.
The division will be additionally hampered by the unclear circumstances in which some of the buildings were bought, informed sources believe.
Statistically, the most of the diplomatic missions and residences were bought during the ``second history'' of Yugoslavia. Non-alignment as the longest foreign policy orientation of Tito's Yugoslavia left a truly rich legacy in third world countries. Embassies and residences, as a rule in luxurious villas with large parks, were built from the late 1950s to the early 1980s in Lusaka, Dar Es Salaam, Pnom Penh, Harare, Nairobi, New Delhi, Jakarta, Brasilia.
Apart from the buildings and grounds, the diplomatic legacy should also include the rich art collection of 2,600 pieces, most of them >>paintings. Those paintings along with sculptures, vases, furniture and dishware were decorations in Yugoslav diplomatic missions abroad. Although the federal registry covers all art objects, the question is whether the inheritors (except the FRY) will be able to hold pretensions for them. Namely, according to some information, most of the art objects were transported to Belgrade through special channels (which was probably not registered anywhere).
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", December 18,1995
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The December 15,1995 issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", brought an editorial article concerning the succession of the former Yugoslav state.
It is stated in the editorial that the former Yugoslavia is non-existent for four years now, but the succession discussions on its "inheritance" are not yet in sight. Accoridng to some estimates, the property "of the "decesed" was about 60 billion dollars. Almost three fourths of thsat number falls on the former JNA and there are no contestable categories there.
The similar situation will happen with the debts, whose sum circolles around 10-15 billion dollars. Slovenia and Croatia have already stated to the creditors that they are ready to take ove their part.
But,for all, at this momenyt the most interesting element is the cash sum - some billion dollars, some of it in money, some in gold, placed in the safes of the banks throughout the world. After the opinion of the "Badintter Commission" the IMDF has comee out with the formula that ythe inheritance of the SFRY should be dividied in this manner: FRY-36,52%;Croatia-28,49;Slovenia-16,39;BiH013,2 and Macedonia 5,4%.What is obviously missing, is the right of Montenegro, as well as Vojvodina and Koosovo to appera at the succession discussions. It is of no doubt that Vojvodina, as second in the level of development in the former country (after Slovenia) has invested most in Serbia and Kosovo, and its part in the formation of the whole property of the former country is not negligible.It is also a fact that foreign credits were used on a smaller scale than elswehere in Yugoslavia.
The most cursory estimate would come to the sum of 1012 percent of the inheritance, which should belong to Vojvodina. That is why the people in Vojvodina expect from its authorities will take appropriate measures in that respect, concludes the editorial in "Nezavisni".
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", December 15,1995
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It has been next to impossible to enter the office of the Belgrade Helsinki Committee over the past few months. After the exodus of the Serbs from Croatia, the refugees were coming to fill in the forms by which they requested to be enabled to return home or to get compensation for the lost property. This was more than a paradox---``the Serb traitors,'' as the Helsinki Committee was often called, were the only ones who offered this kind of help to Serb refugees. The forms, which have been filled in by over 20,000 people, contained also the ``remarks'' column which proved to be a precious source of statements and comments.
Over half of the people who filled in the forms (52%) said they wished to return to Croatia immediately, without setting any conditions on their part. Another 35% are willing to return under certain conditions. The conditions vary---some people expect just the guarantee that they would have the right to live or that they would have the basic human rights or a chance to live decent lives, while others would return if the ``ustashi government'' in Croatia changed. Only 13% do not wish to return to Croatia ever and all they want is compensation for their property. A large number of statements from the first, most numerous group, are contrary to the theory that the Serbs ``are rebels who never wanted to respect the Croatian authorities,'' that the Serbs ``care only about a Serbian state'' and that ``the Serbs and Croats cannot live together ever again.''
A refugee from Knin (aged 40) says: ``I was born and lived in Knin. I went to school in Zagreb and Ljubljana. I worked for the Railway Transportation Company in Zagreb and I did not want any changes in that respect. All I want now is to return to my home-town, to Croatia as its loyal citizen which I always had been.''
A refugee from Benkovac (aged 45) says: ``I personally did not want this war and I am very unhappy because of it. Before the war, I lived happily and was not burdened by nationalism. This is why I wish to return to my home-town.''
Most of the statements indicate the motives for return. Nostalgia and the sense of belonging to a region dominate, but there are financial reasons, as well. A refugee from Donji Lapac (aged 47) says: ``I am treated very poorly here. I am being accused of not fighting for Krajina. They are terrible. Whatever you ask for---they are impudent and disgusting. I want to return to my Lika, to the rocks, even though my house may have been burnt down. I dream of my Lika. And now the people blame the Serb leadership for having pushed them into all this and for not having accepted autonomy. I am willing to respect the laws of the Republic of Croatia. The graves of my great-grandfathers and grandfathers and father and mother are there. That's why I dream of the rocks and of Lika.''
A refugee from Krnjak (aged 39) said: ``I was born there and I want to live there. That is where I belong.''
There are touching statements made by children, such as the one made by a five-year-old boy from Srb: ``I don't have my home, I have nowhere to play. This is very difficult for me,'' or by a thirteen-year-old girl from Vojnic: ``I want to return as soon as possible, please.'' However, the oldest refugees feel more homesick than the others and they are the most resolute in their decisions to return---at all costs. This can be seen from the following statements: ``I have been informed that my house was burnt down, but I want to go back in spite of it,'' (aged 70 form Vojnic); ``I want to go back---TODAY,'' (aged 73 from Derengaj); ``How could I go home to prepare wood for winter? I want to return right away. I cannot live here. If I had known, I would have stayed, even if I got killed.'' A refugee from Ervenik (aged 68) gives instructions: ``Let Pero work in my vineyard and on my land until I return.''
There are other motives, too. A refugee from Knin (aged 39) says: ``I own a four-story building in Knin with three five-room apartments 450 square meters. I have a tire-repair shop on the ground floor, which is fully equipped and so are the apartments. I want to return home, to use my house and to pay taxes to the state.''
The greatest obstacle for going back is fear. A refugee from Topusko (aged 48) says: ``Since I left all my property, job and safety in Topusko, the life here is very difficult, impossible. I have no financial means, nor a job. However, when I think of going back, no matter how much I would like to, I feel great fear.'' Even those who had no reason to be afraid of Croatian authorities feel fear. A refugee from Ploce says: ``I want to return and I fled not because I did anything to anyone, but because I was frightened, and who wouldn't be frightened in war-time?''
A special curiosity is the fact that a large number of refugees---as many as 43%---criticise the way they are being treated in Serbia. The percentage would probably be even higher if the forms contained a question on it. Their criticism refers partly to the Serbian authorities and partly to the obnoxiousness of the people they have been in touch with.
A family from Knin are exasperated: ``We are deprived of the right to work here, so we are unable to offer our children a decent life and education. My husband and I are dissidents here. There is no future for him, me and our children here. We want to return to the free, democratic Croatia and to our home. Another refugee from Knin (aged 58) says: ``I don't feel attached to Serbia in any way, I have no rights here and I don't want to live here.''
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights was obviously one of the few places in Serbia where the refugees got a ``shoulder to cry on.''
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 13, 1996
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Igor Vukic of the AIM news pool wrote in the December 29, 1995, issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" about the situation awaiting Serb refugees returning to Croatia.
A woman received the permission to return from FR Yugoslavia, and as soon as she entered Croatia she was sent to Osijek jail, where she was handed an idtitement for participation in athe armed rebellion. Around ten persons returned to Western Slavonia, and all of them were called at least seven times to the police for questioning.
This data was compiled and handed to journalists by Veljko Dzakula, one of the rare Serbian politicians in Croatia that remained there after the Croatian military operations in Western Slavonija and Krajina. He has also been elected as the president of the SDF - Serbian Democratic Forum, non-party, non-governmental organization, dealing in protection of the rights of the the Serbian national minority in Croatia.
Dzakula also informed that he had direct contacts with dr. Adalbert Rebic, Head of the Croatian national bureau for refugees, who he handed the list of 626 people who wanted urgent retur to Croatia, due to familiy reasons. Although Rebic promised to continue thecooperation, nothing materialised. A day after Dzakula's press conferenvce, Rebic's deputy held a similar one, partly confirming Dzakula's statements.Discussing the returmn of the refugees, the Deputy Heda of the Croatian bureau for refugees stated that many of the requests for the return stated "unrealistic demands", lke the change of Croatian government, and that four years of war "simply cannot be forgotten". These four years will reflect in such a manner, that the police on the local levels will havewa free hand for questioning that wqas mentioned, and that the judiciary, already on the verge of collapse in Croatia, due to the lack of judges, will take summary decisions.
Source: Novi Sad wekly "Nezavisni", December 29, 1995
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Zoran Daskalovic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", discusses in the magazine's issue of December 22, 1995, the position of Muslims, particularly the ones originating from Bosnia and Herzregovina in Croatia.
Daskalovic says that the leaders of the SDA party in Croatia, often repeat that the members of their nation and religion in Croatia are actually "Croatian hostages over whose back reflect the relations between two nations and states. They also assess that when theere is problems in the relations between Croatian and Bosnian leaderships, a series of Human rights violations follow towards Muslims in Croatia.
The political lreadership of the Bosniak muslims talk today of constant pressures by which it was attempted to force them to accept the policies of Fikret Abdic and his concept of autonomy of Wstern Bosnia. The president of the Croatian SDA, Semso Tankovic estimates that this goal has still not been given up in the Croatian policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina: "Tudjman did not give up on Bihac, because he considers it a Croatian town".
A number of incidents againstv the Muslims is rising: recently in Rijeka the
police openly stopped all worshippers coming out of the Rjeka mosque asking
them for documents, while the still fresh in the memory is the death of a
renowned muslim activist form Slavonski Brod, Sefik Mujkic, beaten up to death
by the police in the police station. A number of house bombings is also reported
from the Dubrovnik area, most of them belonged to Muslims who fought in the
Croatian army, rising the level of insecurity.
It is also evident that in the meantime there came complete marginalization
of influence of political parties and individuals, also supported by the
Croatian
authorities, which saw the Bosniak muslims as a part of the Croatian national
and political corps,. This is the case first of all of Croatian muslim
democratic
party, and Democratic union of Croatian Muslims. In the meantime, the Croatian
SDA, profiled itself as the strongest partry gathering Bosniak muslims in
Croatia.
In all this internal fermenting in the Bosniak-muslim community, every case of human rights violations, stimulates internal divisions, strengthening at the same time, probably radicalizing it, exactly the position of the Croatian SDA and its vision of the status of the Bosniaks in Croatia. Of course, their radicalization can provoke counter-reaction of the Croatian side. It would be worse, says Daskalovic, if the statements heard quite often recently from the political circles of Bosniak muslims - that it is a desire of Croatian authorities to solve their problem in the same manner as the Serbian question in Croatia, would become a reality. This would be, he concludes, really provoking the devil.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", December 22, 1995
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In its issue of December 30, 1995, Belgrade weekly "Vreme" brought a report of Drazena Peranic (AIM correspondent in Sarajevo), concerning the internal divisions within the Bosnian ministry of foreign affairs.
Peranic informs about a row between the Bosnian foreign minister, Muhamed Sacirbey, and the Bosnioan ambassador in London, Muhamed Filipovic, which became public when Sacirbey attacked Filipovic for an alleged misapppropriation of funds. Filipovic and the LBO party, which he presides rebuked thses allegations, counterattacking Sacirbey, saying that he is in fo a personal vendetta against Filipovic.
Filipovic insists that the loan of 30 thousand DEM which he took while he held the ambassadorial post in Berne, was necessary for the equiping of his residence, which was the obligation of the Ministry and not his personal one, and that the sum was actually nine thousand DEM. Filipovic also denied all other financial claims that Sacirbey put forward in public - particularly concerning his "extravagant dressing", Filipovic claims that the suits bought for a large sum of money are the property of the embassy and are used for Roayakll and other occasions.
The whole affair, says Peranic brought to light much more of the "dirty laundry" within the ministry, as well as many other machinations of the regime with the funds that are supposed to be appropriated for the help of all citizens of Bosnia. The first public allegation came from the LBO vice-president Salih Foco, who questioned president Alija Izetbegovic's donation to the Srebrenica refugees. Foco, asked where did the sum of 150 thousand DEM come from - Izetbegovic's private resources, or from elswhere, insisting that many of the foreign donations were seen and distributed only by a small circle of people at the top of the regime. Preranic also points to the casewhen the Bosnian government sent a request to UNPROFOR in 1994 asking it for help to recover a package that supposedly fell out of the helicopter while flying to Srebrenica. The packagwe supposedly contained 500 thousand DEM.Later, there was no report whether the money was actually missing, was it recovered, or whether there is a loss in that amount within the state treasury.
The stories of the nepotism within the Bosnian ministry are already widespread. Of the many examples of miusappropriations that Peranic cites, nost picaresque, thoug are those of the Bosnian ambassador in Austria and Switzerland, Hadzo Efendic the Austrian authorities do not want to see anymore, since they found an "unmeasurable" amount of gold in his luggage, while the ambassador in Italy Hsamdija Kresevljakovic had a row with his SDA party, since it did not allow him to take his mistress along with his family.
The initial conflict between Sacirbey and Filipovic seems to be ending in a draw - Filipovic is returning to Sarajevo, while Sacirbey will not bew able to name his father as the Bosnian ambassador to Zagreb, even though he is in favor of the Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", December 30, 1995
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Bozo Nikolic of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor" discusses in the magazine's issue of January 12, 1996, the possible fate of the current heads of the Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
The conflict of Karadzic and the generals, as well as Banja Luka to which graitates 80 percent of the industrial potential of the Serbian entiy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, And small village of Pale, reflects itself in two points of the Dayton agreements. The first is the return of the Sarajevo counties under the control of Bosnian/Croat federation. The other is the ou5tcome of the arbitration concerning the Brcko corridor.
The Karadzic loyalists like the president of the Parliament Momcilo Krajisnik, have formed a base of power around Sarajevo and want to delay or completely prevent the return of those parts of Sarajevo under their control.
On the other hand, Mladic, who is still the most popular person among the Serbs in Bosnia, has joined forces with one of the vice presidents of Republika Srpska, Nikola Koljevic in supporting the attempts of the Serbian president Milosevic to see the peace agreement through. Showing good will in the conduct of other elements of the Dayton agreement, they are more ready to compromise, counting that in that respect the international arbitration in the Brcko case will be more favorable to them.
According to the atmosphere in Banja Luka, the obsevers assess that Karadzic is in a poor situation, more and more attacked and isolated among the million Serbs that have glorified him until recently. In two oppositionary papers and the military controlled radio "Krajina", the Sebs from Banja Luka daily attack Kradzic for the dramatic fall in living standards, loss of territory around Sarajevo, and for general isolation from the world community.Karadzic, who still vcontrols the police and state TV,os, like Mladic, less and less present in the public eye.
It is insisted in Banja Luka that leadership imn Pale insists on the plight of Sarajevo Serbs so that it could save its skin. The assessment state that the demonization of Karadzic is also used as a vent for ordinary citizens to distance themselves form the horrors of the war.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 12, 1996
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In its January 8, 1996, issue, Split weekly "Feral Tribune" brought the article of Marinko Culic, who analyzes the current situation developed after Croatian president Franjo Tudjman refused to accept the nomination of an oppositionary candidate for the mayor of Zagreb, as well as the situation in the Croatian opposition.
Culic says that even with thee fact that Tudjman refused the nomination of Goran Granic as the mayor of Zagreb, what cannot come into question is that the opposition has scored it first big victory over the ruling HDZ party. This due to the fact that for the first time, the opposition was able to form a total coalition, due to which the failsafe tactics of the HDZ of dealing with the oppositionary parties one by one,while others keep quiet,horrified that something like that will not happen to them has failed this time. It was also evident than not one party wanted, or dared to go into the coalition with the HDZ in this case - so that even the sattelite HSP party of Antre Djapic in the end abstained during the vote.
The secret attempts at defamation of the high oppositionaryofficials showed itself as last in the line of bad moves undertaken recently by the HDZ, whiuich have as a base a same thing: that is the underestimating of the opposition, based on the beleif that these are "politically marginal figures", not able to carry anything to its conclusion.
The second mistake of the regime was that it attempted to blackmail the opposition concerning one point at which it remained truly oppositionary, and that is the parlamentarian procedure.On everything else, the opposition has made so many retreats in front of the ruling ones - from an early capitalism economy to an ethnically pure state - so that some form of a "great coalition", yearned for by Zdravko Tomac (SDP-reformed communists) already exists in some form. Asking the opposition to accept the multiparty system in the variant of the type of pluralism that would only suit the ruling party, and in that manner admitting that it is not necessary, meant pushing in in front of the wall where it would either die or unite, so that it culd at least survive. The latter happened.
Now, Tudjman is confronted with a choice - call new elections in Zagreb or intorduce simple dictatorship.But,Tomac thinks that if the Americans decide that they need Tudjman to realize the peace agreement, they will tolerate his "whims" in Zagreb.
Source: Split wekly "Feral Tribune", Januarly 8, 1996
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In the January 15, 1996 issue of the same magazine,its editor, Viktor Ivancic wrote an editorial concerning the methods used by the Croatian regime in the attempt to achieve results it wants in the clash with the opposition concerning the naming of the mayor in Zagreb.
Ivancic sasy that in front of Croatia there is approaching a bloody confrontation with the lack of external enemies. How to survive in the inhuman peacefull conditions - that is a historical goal that has to be urgently solved by the Croatian authorities, and wide national masses must give it wide and emotional support, peacefully or by force.
The reports from the terrain say that the first preparations for the oncoming plague of peace, for the possible tragedy of peace with unforseeable consequences are going on quite well: one gentle Christian intelectuall (Goran Granic- oppositionary candidate for the mayor of Zagreb) has been named as state enemy number one, and was presented to Croatians as the"resident vampire", a new national statue to spit on; one prime minister (Zlatko Matresa) with a smug maneouvre has recalled lated 1940's and has sent a message to the nation that from now on the symbolof greatest devotion to the state and country is when a brother (Mate Granic - Croatian foreign minister) renounces his brother (Goran Granic); one editor-in-chief of a lokal newspaper (Bozidar Balenovic) has biee forcefully mobilized, and than put in jail for fifteen days when he he protested against the official concept of his own editorial policy; one strike of socially estranged oil workers (of the state owned INA company) has been used as a pretext for the police to write down the personal data of all present journalists, so that the files can be enlarged for the oncoming times.
Particular optimism is raised by the fact that by the additional balancing of the state budget the sum allocated to the Bureau of national security from 3 million Kuna's to 75 million (3:1 to DEM), by which the state regime has shown that it is ready to kame even highest sacrifices - when the national security is in question-so that it will confront the end of the war welfare and pitfalls of the hated peace.
In perspective, every Croat has to be ready to take upon himself the responsibility of enemy activity against his state, when the historical moments demands that fdrom him, in the same manner that the bunch of national representatives have to bear the buyrden of changing into a chorde of national traitors, which will readily be denounced by the multitude of their families.
You see, a state without the enemy is a regime without Tudjman, and this would be, after all, a situation which counters the Constitution and the will of the people. This was clearly stated on the TV:" Tudjman will remain what he is - a man whose support are the nation and personal wise experience guiding him towards a clear goal": the interest of Croatia", concludes his ironic commentary Viktor Ivancic, editor of "Feral Tribune".
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", January 15, 1996
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On Januaray 11, 1996, main Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija" published an article concerning the developments in the investigation of the assassination attempt on the Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov.
Over a hundred days have passed since the assassination attempt on 3 October and the full course of the investigation and possible new findings about the possible executors or organizers of the terrorist attack against the head of the Macedonian state are still a mystery. The only possible new element or fresh information about the police engagement in the investigation was presented last week by the deputy secretary of public security in the Ministry of the Interior Dime Gjurev. Among the rest, speaking about the public security in the state in the last year, and in this context about the assassination attempt as well, the deputy secretary of the Ministry of the Interior stressed that the police has formed a special department that is composed of a group of people from all the structures of the Ministry. On this occasion Dime Gjurev said that all the evidences are forwarded to investigative judge Zdravko Vasilev who is in charge of the case.
On the other hand, although all roads lead to him, investigative judge Vasilev, who has all data and findings concerning the hitherto investigation, refuses to give any comments. According to his statement for our newspaper yesterday, "the assessment is that all the materials and findings about the assassination attempt are not for the public," by which he practically repeated that the competent representatives keep quiet "in the interest of the investigation."
In such cases ordinary things happen -- speculations and unofficial data on the possible executors of the assassination attempt of 3 October appear. In the past period many of them have been published, some of which exclude each other, and yet they are imposed on the public because of the official "wall of silence." It is interesting that every unofficial version starts from the logical examination of the whole case, and thus even the newest speculation brings about several "sensational and spectacular" discoveries that contain some logic. One of these days there was a news spread among the public that the Macedonian police has serious tracks which lead to the inspirers of the assassination attempt against President Gligorov. They are allegedly people from Macedonia and the assassination attempt was ordered here and paid with money of domestic origin. For this purpose, according to the unofficial version, some foreign experts for explosives had also been engaged, while the preparations for the act itself had been organized and executed by some people from Skopje. This speculation excludes all hitherto unofficial information about the involvement of foreign intelligence services and even the statement of Interior Minister Frckovski on 26 October last year on the involvement of a "multi-national financial grouping from a neighborly country," because it fully returns the whole case on domestic grounds.
In any case, the seriousness of unofficial speculations, constructions, and assumptions is rising and we are again faced with a situation in which by refusing to face the public and thus suggesting that something is hidden from its eyes, the opposite effect is created.
Source: Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija", January 11, 1996, through MIC e-mail service
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Radovan Balac comments in the January 12, 1996 issue of the Novi Sad wekly "Nezabvisni" the internal politiical moves of Serbian president Milosevic after the Dayton agreements.
While in Ohio he had to bargain and make concessions, on the domestic terrain Slobodan Milosevic is tightening his grip.This policy is lead in a coarse, arrogant manner and with no compromises.
The fact that Milosevic is sweeping within his party, is not surprising anyone, since that is more or less a "family affair". But, the broom went out of its yard, and caught its act in the Parliament corridors. Since for five years, he has, more or less patiently endured that there are oppositionary representatives in the parliaments, he has decided to change that. Since the populAtion did not elect a parliament with which he can nbe proud, Milosevic decided to amputate a part of it. The opposition has been simply thrown out from the Serbian parliament, and the same , it sems, will happen in the Federal one. Before that, both parliaments have been turned into sorry caricatures, where nothing of substance is discussed or decided. Not even after five years of multi party system in Serbia, the opposition has not been institutionalized like everywhere else.
That is why in Serbia the only strucr=ture that is growing and gaining in strength ids the police, to which more than half of the budget is earmarked. That is why it is absurd that there is more crime and criminals, shootings, murders than ever before.
So, the peace that has no alternative has not arrived in Serbia. Slobodan Milosevic has signed that he will not wage a war anymore, nor send people or armor, but he did not promise or sign that he will not wage a war in Serbia.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", January 12, 1996
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Zdrvko Huber of the independent news pool AIM discusses in the January 12, issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" the current situation on the Serbina political scene.
The turn of the ruling Socialists towards peace and pro-Karadzic orientation of the part of the Belgrade opposition, could temporarily create an impression that a new ,different polarization will occurr on the Serbian political scene among the parties. On one side, in the pezce block, saalong with Socialists, and their natural ally JUL, there were New DEmocracy, Serbian Renewal Movement, Serbian Citizens Alliance, as well as a greater number of the non-parlamentarian parties. Out of this block were those that did not support the new Milosevic policy towards Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, first of all the Radicals, Democratic party of Serbia, Democratic party, and the other part of the non-parlamentarian parties.
For a sohrt period, it seemed that the basic division between the regime and the opposition will be less acute, but this has been denounced clearly before the end of the 1995. On the eve of the New Year, 108 members of parliament from the oppositionary parties formed a parallel parliament, as a form of a protest against the decision to cancell live TV projections of parliamentary sessions.
These 108 MP, (ou tof 250 in the Serbiuian Parliament) has no pretensions that their sessions and decisions have legal power. This is a purely political act, which wants to prove the unity of the opposition versus the arrogant Socialist majority. A constituting of a shadow government has also been announced.
The whole activitiy with the parallel parliament is actually an exercise which should show whether thev opposition is really reeady to come out with a unified list for the elections, which everybody beleives will be soon. If it os shown that it is capable of something like that - this will be a n importan political event.
There is also a calculation that the Socialists might return the majority electorals system for the next elections, which would bring the oppositionary representatives, if they do not unite, into an even less favourable position. The oppositionary leaders believe that with the announcement of the pre-election unification they have found a good countermeasure for the arrogance of the Socialist majority, which due to the safe voting machine was so far able to ignore all initiatives and demands of the opposition, including those about TV sessions.
It is clear to everybody that united, only the four largest oppositionary parties - SPO,SRS,DS,DSS (where the enlargement of the coalition is a desired, but not a decisive detail) could win against the Socialisyts in the elections. But tr=there does not lie the greatest problem. Due to leadership ambitions, but more because of the large differences in the political programmes, their electoral partnership is not easily achieveable, even with their joint desire and interest to remove from power the social-communists.
Source: Novi Sad wekly "Nezavisini", January 12, 1996
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Jan Briza of the same magazine,expands on the same theme in the January 19 1996 issue of "Nezavisni".
Thev leaders of the six strongest oppositionary parties in the Serbian parliament have agreed, at least in principle, about the joint endeavor at the nex federal and republican elections. Vuk Draskovic of the SPO, Vesna Pesic of the GSS, Andras Agoston of the DZVM, Vojislav Seselj of the SRS, Zoran Djindjic of the DS and Vojislav Kostnica of the DSS have reachead an easy and quick agreement that a joint platform has to be reached for the next elections about a unified effort on thre basis of an undisputable minimum of joint goals. The differences, and big ones at that, cropped up at the moment when a discussion was begun about a joint electoral list. The biggest reservations there were stated by Seseljh and Agoston, each from different reasons.
Seselj openly stated that he beleives that the joint list of parties, of whixch some have directly opposing programmes, could more easily push away, than attract voters. He did not have to mention at that Vesna Pesic and Vuk Draskovic, let alone Agoston- so that it would become clear to everybody that his Radicals are not in favor od "big hugs" with the parties lead by "traitors of the Serbian nation".
Agoston, the leader of DZVM - the party of Vojvodina Hungarians was of the similar opinion, saying that it would be better to enter the elections with two or three opposition formations, tnhan with a unified one. The Hungarians could not be convinced by anybody that Agiostons has not gone mad if he would advise them to vote for one of Seselj's radicals which have persecutad and resettled them. For that reason, the leadership of the DZVM, a few days after the meeting came out with a public statemnt giving its vision of the cooperation with tjhe parlamentarian opposition in Serbia.
They said that in the current situation, they have decided to cooperate oout of tactical reasons, first of all because these parties are against "self-managing and socialist solutions in the economy", and because they have proclaimed decentralisation of the state apparatus, democratization of the political system and development of local self-governing.
The main reason the leaders of the DZVM are taking this cooperation course is becuase they estimate theat the current regime will have to democratize and decentralize under the pressure of the West, particularly US, in accordance with the obligations it undetrtook in Dayton. Tying themselves with the oposition, DZVM obviously wants to add pressure on Milosevic to fulfill at least part of the demands of this party.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" January 19, 1996
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The work on hte constitutional reform in the FRY is the secret uunder strongest embargo. Stll, something can leak out of this hermetical wll. The Monitor's "informed sources" state that the leadership of the ruling SPS party in Serbia sees this project as "provincialization" of the Serbian-Montenegrin federation,. The architect of the new reform, like in 1992., is Belgrade professor Ratko Markovic (member of the ruling party).
The German constitution is taken as the guidline for the conceptualization o the new constitutional solutions. The new scheme looks something like this: - federation would get much larger competences than the republics and would be based de fracto on a unitary concept; - the republics would loose a part of their current statehood and would note have a status of "state", which form the federation, but of federal "lands"(provinces).
- The federation would be constituted of five units with different level of
autonomy - four provinces (Serbia,Montenegro,Vojvodina and Kosovo) and one
uatonomy (Sandjak). Serbia and Montenegro would have the status of constitutive
units, Vojvodina and Kosovo would have a lesser level of autonomy than that,
and Sandjak one level lower than that.
- The federal authority would rely on the presidential systemm, witth strong presidential authority, compraed to the German chancellor.
-The political system, including foreign policy, would be centralized, while constitutive elements would have economic autonomy, but not in dealings with abroad (customs, foreign tourism, marine traffic, etc), which would be in the ingerences of the federation.
For now, Montenegro is against the drastic erosion of statehood, even in formal aspects. The whole story will be speeded up with the opening of the dialogue with the Albanians in Kosovo.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", January 19, 1996
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Velimir Ilic of the independent news pool AIM , wrote in the December 22, 1995 issue of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" about the changes in the ellectoral law in FRY.
Behind the closed doors and in total conspiracy a session was held of the Federal electoral commission in the Yugoslav parliament. The course and the content of the discussion remained a secret, but it trickled into the public that it concerned the change of the electoral law. Even if this information would not be completely correct, it falls into the mosaic of the inesant statement that the ruling Socialists will hurry with early elections, probably even in the spring.
Slowly, but without an official confirmation, conditions are created for the next, according to many, undisputable ambition of Slobodan Milosevic - to change in the forseeable future the chair of the Serbian president with the one of the Serbian-Montenegrin federation.
At this moment, the Socialists cannot secure two thirds majority in the Second chamber of the Federal parliament, and without those it is impossible to change either the Federal constitution or the electoral laws, for example, about the election of the president. Curent method of election of the predsident - by the decision of the members of the parliament does not suit Milosevic. That is why, according to the opinion of Milosevic's opponents, the work is on for the creation of conditions for election "by the will of the people", which would politically materialise in a favorable moment.
Milosevic's second presidential mandate in Serbia runs out at the beginning of 1997, and according to the valid Constitution, he coannot be chosen as the president for the third time. So, if that was his goal the Republican constitution would have to be changed. But, all indications speak that it is not so.
Although the change of the Constitution understands the parliamentary procedure and two thirds majority, which the ruling Serbian and Montenegrin Socialists do not have, following the logic that in FRY nobody respects or follows the rule of law, it is not out of consideration that a mechanism would be foundfor adopting the legality and legitimacy of the Constiution to the newly created situation, Without consideration of the legal norms, there is experience abond that such an operation is possible.
But, at this moment, at least not publicly, there is no real answer how would Montenegro react to such a decision. The Serbian opposition thinks that the agreement has been reached, taking into consideration the Dayton-Paris peace capital which should be enlarged by the cdivision of the spolis on the level of the joint federal state. At the same time, the nationalistic part of the opposition theere are estimates that there will be opposition of the "separatistic part" of the opposition in Montenegro, but that the two-part federation will be able to dampen possible political tremors.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", Dember 22, 1995
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``Serbia will see what the police academy means to the security of this country,'' dean Radojica Maksimovic said during last year's security forces day celebration.
Serbian citizens' glimps in the budget proposals adopted by the republican parliament in the last days of the year gave them some insight into what the academy means to them and their wallets. The academy was given 34,592,000 dinars (close to 10 million DEM). The academy takes about 115 new entries every year and is currently schooling three generations which means each cadet's schooling costs 30,000 DEM. In comparison the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences with its 181 members got 8.7 million dinars this year, i.e. around 15,000 DEM a member. That means this state values a police cadet twice as much as its top intellectuals.
Dean Maksimovic said the academy is based on diversity; there are 11 subjects in the first year and a total of 30 are required to graduate. Subjects are divided into five areas: police, crime, military, law and social sciences. The academy is a boarding school (which we weren't allow to tour). The cadets all get scholarships, housing, food and pocket money. To qualify a cadet has to be at least 172 centimeters tall, capable of doing 10 pushups in 10 seconds and there's a strict entrance exam.
This school year, over 1,000 young men applied and the school could afford to take the best. There's also a system of selection once cadets are enrolled: just two fifths of the first generation are still there.
The academy also schools another 40 cadets from the Bosnian Serb Republic and Republic of Serb Krajina and Montenegro. That last is interesting sine it casts light on relations within the federation; namely, if the academy schools personnel for both members of the federation why isn't it a federal institution.
That isn't the only question about the academy. The diversity Maksimovic mentioned is reflected in the subjects that are more military than police: if there's some logic to teaching a future police officer the basics of military strategy and weapons why do they have a subject called theory of military skill where they learn to move divisions, brigades and armies and why do they need to learn to drive tanks and direct artillery fire. That brings us to the question that was asked over a year ago when a police parade in Kosovo included armored cars, 120mm mortars and anti-aircraft guns. VREME asked then whether the separatists will attack the police from the air.
The symptoms of the military line in the police are evident in the new law which replaces existing police ranks (inspectors and such) with ranks from lieutenant to general. The government said the ranks were more suitable but didn't explain why. Why should a lieutenant be better a directing traffic than an ordinary traffic policeman? that is something some policemen ask: ``all those kids who graduate the academy will be convinced they have a superior education,'' a Belgrade inspector (future captain and law school graduate) said. ``A policeman is only as good as his contacts with various people. No academy can teach you to talk to criminals and solve some situations and they'll have trouble understanding that. There'll be a lot of friction between the old and the new people.'' Neither he nor his colleagues have any clear opinion on what the new ranks will mean; all they know is what they read in the newspapers since no one has formally informed them.
That will cost a lot: although former Serbian police minister Radmilo Bogdanovic proudly stressed that the new insignia and new uniforms won't require additional funding, we know the Yugoslav Army (VJ) barely managed to finance a redesigning of its insignia. Also, there's the fact that there are 35,000 active military personnel and twice that many police. The additional funding won't be needed because it's already there in the budget allocation. Police salaries will consume 1.3 billion dinars (almost 400 million DEM) which is half the amount required by the Yugoslav Army for its maintenance needs.
The VJ is aware of the discrepancy and they view the new police ranks cautiously. ``Will Radovan Stojic Badza and Franko Simatovic, as assistant ministers, become generals and what will Sokolovic (Zoran Sokolovic, Serbian Police Minister) be,'' asked a high ranking army officer who doesn't want his name published. VJ circles are especially bitter that the police ranks will be awarded by presidential decree while army ranks are given under stricter criteria. ``For a captain to become a major, he has to go through the general staff academy or get a masters degree from a civilian school; for a colonel to become a general he has to go through national defence school or get a doctor's degree. The police will get their ranks overnight,'' the officer said and added: ``Objectively and internal army is being created here. They want an autonomous armed force that will regulate the situation at home and want to educe the army to border units. The regime basically dislikes the army and relies on it only out of necessity.''
On the other hand, the para-military organization of the police is not unknown in the world. ``What has been announced doesn't have to a bad thing in itself,'' said Budimir Babovic, former Interpol secretary general. He said the gendarmerie that exists in France, Belgium, Austria, Greece and Turkey are basically military organizations and often answers directly to the defence ministry. He added that Italy has the carabineri and Spain and the US have a national guard while Russia has the MVD. ``All these formations also deal with police affairs such as maintaining law and order and fighting crime. But their basic function is supporting the current state order,'' Babovic said.
There's one vital difference between those examples and the model here: all the gendarmeries and national guards are administratively separated from the police, primarily to exert efficient control. Here there has been no control since the breakup of the parliamentary constitutional protection committee.
Babovic the latest changes in the police stress the military angle. ``This looks like a concept that could be a mixture between the army and police. The introduction of the ranks could be aimed at preventing union organizing and the pluralization of political trends in the police. That points to the conclusion that the police will be even more rigid.''
As Maksimovic said, Serbia will see. The shape that is appearing on the horizon seems frightening.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", January 6, 1996
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At least ten Serbian Orthodox Bishops requested that Patriarch Pavle step down because he witnessed and guaranteed the document authorizing Serbian President Milosevic to negotiate on Karadzic's behalf. Church circles presume that Patriarch Pavle himself wished to step down, but say that there are fears his resignation would give rise to ``unnecessary radicalization,'' that Church law does not anticipate a Patriarch's resignation, only his shorter or longer absence or inability to chair the Holy Assembly of Bishops or the Holy Synod.
PAVLE: Patriarch Pavle (Stojcevic before he took holy vows) was born on 11 September 1914 in the village of Kucanci, Slavonija, to farmers Stevan and Ana. He went to high school in Belgrade, the Sarajevo Theological Seminary, the Belgrade College of Theology, attended graduate studies in Athens; he took his vows in the Blagovestenje Monastery in 1949, became protopresbyter in 1949, hieromonach in 1954, professor of church singing and Old Church-Slavic Language at the Prizren Theological Seminary ``St. Kirilo and Metodije;'' he was Chairman of the Holy Synod Committee for the translation of the Holy Bible which was published in 1984---the first translation of the New Testament officially approved by the Church. Pavle speaks Greek, Russian and German and was Honorary Professor of the Belgrade College of Theology. Bishop of Ras-Prizren Pavle was elected the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch in December 1990, at an emergency session of the Holy Assembly to replace German Djoric, who had headed the Serbian Orthodox Church for 30 years, but had been sick for a long time.
At that Assembly, two factions prevailed in the SOC: one headed by Metropolitan Jovan and the other by the students of Justin Popovic held prisoner in the Celije Monastery near Valjevo for years (Bishops Amfilohije, Atanasije, Artemije and Irinej). In 1991, the Bishops decided that priests and local Serbs in Croatia should rebury the innocent victims of the Second World War Ustashi and perform the funeral rites.
In the crisis that followed, the SOC remained loyal to the decision of the assembly of all Orthodox Patriarchs in 451 AD that the borders of a church coincide with the borders of a state. Patriarch Pavle, who heads the SOC, which is considered a national institution, had been a fervent and persistent advocate of Serbian interests during the war, but tried to underscore humanness, persistence, patience and restraint even in war.
Patriarch Pavle met with Milosevic, Cosic, Panic, Draskovic and other politicians. In 1991, he published his correspondence with Tudjman, he wrote to Boutros-Ghali, Russian Patriarch Alexei II, Croatian Cardinal Kuharic. He blessed Karadzic, persuading and protecting him more than was thought possible.
Like Milosevic, Karadzic presented him with the Bosnian Serb Republic Order, talked with him about peace in 1992, and it is quite possible he assumed the role of conciliator and diplomat at the time Milosevic broke off with Karadzic.
He prayed for the victims, after the Serbian exodus from Western Slavonija, he ordered the churches to toll their bells every day, he tried, without success, to pray in Jasenovac and the Pakrac Diocese headquarters which he considers his home.
Although he signed the SOC memorandum against communist rule in 1992, Patriarch Pavle has always treated Milosevic with deference and tact. According to a newspaper article, he once scolded him for smoking too much and Milosevic immediately put his cigarette out.
The Patriarch was booed in Belgrade in March 1991, when he called for reconciliation between the rally at Usce (Milosevic's supporters) and the student rally at Belgrade's Terazije square (in protest against the regime). Those same children began to like this spry old man later, they once stopped the bus he was riding in and chanted ``Pavle is cool!.''
ATANASIJE: Bishop of Zahum-Herzegovina Atanasije (rumored to have irrevocably resigned in protest against the Patriarch becoming the witness and guarantor of the Milosevic-Karadzic agreement) is of a different character, popularity and expression than Patriarch Pavle. He resembles a national crusader and political demagogue more than a priest.
Born in 1938, in the village of Brdarica, near Koceljeva, Valjevo, Atanasije graduated from the Theological Seminary ``St. Sava'' and Belgrade College of Theology and studied Theology at the Athens University in 1967; he was a professor at the Orthodox Academy in Paris, Professor and Dean of the SOC College of Theology; he is the author of theological and publicistic works (``From Kosovo to Jadovno---Travelogues of Hieromonach Atanasije Jevtic'' (1984), ``Suffering of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija in the 1941-1990 Period'' (1990), ``Serbian Homeland'' (1993).
Atanasije has published articles, polemics and books on genocide against the Serbs in WW 2 and the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo. In January 1985, Bishops Atanasije Jevtic, Irinej Bulovic and Amfilohije Radovic became members of the Association of Writers of Serbia. Atanasije sharply attacked Milosevic in March 1991 for bringing the army out on the streets and ``terror against Serbian children;'' in March 1992, he said over NTV Studio B that the ``warlock from Dedinje'' (elite part of Belgrade where Milosevic lives) is an arrogant and vile man, that life would be better for everyone when he stepped down.
In May 1992, when the Holy Assembly held a long session and adopted the SOC anti-Communist Memorandum, Atanasije personally requested to be transferred to the Zahum-Herzegovina Diocese.
From there, Bishop Atanasije attacked FRY President Dobrica Cosic for criticizing the Serbs in Trebinje who were reported to have expelled the town's Moslems and razed the local mosque. Those reports prompted Belgrade to ask the opinion of the Zahum-Herzegovina Bishop. In his response, Atanasije said that this was not the only shameful act by the authorities headed by President Cosic for not showing interest when Serbian churches and villages were burned and when a large tract of territory had been ceded to the Croats. In his reply to Atanasije on 16 February 1993, Cosic said that the shame on the Serbian people was inflicted not only by the authorities in Belgrade, Pale and Trebinje but also by the church authorities. Cosic said the Bishop should ask himself whether he, too, was one of the sinners.
Bishop Atanasije later even more sharply criticized Vuk Draskovic for protesting against the expulsion of Moslems. He even attacked Trebinje Mayor Bozidar Vucurovic for allowing the Adventist relief organization Adra to distribute aid.
Regarding the Vance-Owen Plan in late 1993, Atanasije wrote about the Serbian tyrant in Dedinje, who is ``suffocating the whole nation and forcing us to sign whatever the Western tailors of our fates decide to enforce in the Balkans.'' When the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Atanasije conveyed to it the SOC message that the decimation of the Serbian people could not be allowed again.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", December 25, 1995
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