IN THIS ISSUE:
Bosnia
"NIN" and "Feral Tribune" discuss the background of the possible deal between Tudjman and Milosevic, concerning division of Bosnia
"Monitor" and "Feral Tribune" discuss the effects of the conquest of Eastern Bosnia by Bosnian Serbs
"Monitor" analyzes the aspects of the new peace plan for Bosnia
"Feral Tribune" presents the current internal political scene after the conflict of prime minister Silajdzic and president Izetbegovic
Croatia
"Vreme", "NIN", "Monitor", "Feral Tribune" and "Nezavisni" comment on the retaking of Krajina by Croatia
Serbia
"Nezavisni" analyzes current political situation in Serbia
"Republika" discusses the key elements of official Serbian policies
"Nasa Borba" comments on the currents stance of the key Serb nationalist ideologues
"Vreme" behind the "Milosevic love affair"
Kosovo
"AIM"("Feral Tribune") analyzes Milosevic visit to Kosovo
"Koha" looks at the effects of the Croatian offensive on the Kosovo situation
Dossier: Interview - Vuk Draskovic
The author recalls the main points of the affair, mentioning that the leaders of the British Liberals, Paddy Ashdown, published in the "Times" a recount of the map of the possible division of Bosnia, Croatian president Tudjman drew him on a menu at the official "Victory day" dinner in London in May of this year. He says that the general drew to the curious Englishman the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ten years. Through it, runs a border in the shape of a letter "S". Of course, "Tudjman line" is somewhat more East than the middle. Meticulous Englishmen have transcripted that line afterwards on a real map. It came out that Banja Luka remains in Croatia. Serbia "got" Tuzla, Gorazde, but also Eastern Slavonia.Is there a plan behind all this chaos, asks the author ?
Napkin cartography suits the current Balkan reality says Reljic. Milosevic and Tudjman are meeting since the spring of 1991, in Karadjordjevo. Then through still "quiet Bosnia" ran a fear wave of a "Milosevic - Tudjman pact", which drew a line with rivers Neretva - Bosna - Vrbas. It was talked about "an agreement of gradual partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina".
It was worth nothing that everything was so obvious. The people cannot believe that something terrible could happen exactly to them. Then came the second, secret meeting, in April 1991. Along with the two presidents a meeting was held of an expert group. Serb representatives were Kosta Mihailovic, Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic i Vladan Kutlesic, from the Serb side, and Dusan Bilandzic, Smiljko Sokol, Josip Sentija and Zvonko Lerotic from the Croatian side. The heads were Mihailovic and Bilandzic. Bosnia was the main theme, and the majority opinion (6:2) was that Bosnia should be divided. In subvariants, from the Croatian side more of Bosnia was offered for Knin Krajina and Plitvice lakes. Bihac pocket was naturally understood to be Croat.
The main "instruments" of the experts were ethnic maps, where the Serb and Croat parts were divided by distinct colors. There was a completely serious consideration of population resettlement.Tudjman and Milosevic were informed of their "findings", then having an "eye to eye" conversation. Following meetings were held in October of 1991. in Moscow, under Gorbacov's auspices and in the Hague, during the first phase of the "Yugoslavia conference".
Afterwards, the two presidents accepted the "Vance plan". Afterwards, according to Adil Zulfikarpasic, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic refused Milosevic offer to become a president of a new Yugoslav federation under the condition that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains in it. After that, the maps drawn in Tikves resort could be put on top of the table again. After February 1993, and blitzkrieg overtaking of the Peruca dam, the Croats suddenly became the biggest experts for quick warfare in modern history. Since then, and all of Croatia's" blazing" actions, there is open talk, including the media all over the world about the deal between Milosevic and Tudjman.
Source Belgrade weekly "NIN", August 11, 1995
Culic says that the situation drastically changed from the Split agreement between Tudjman and Izetbegovic, whose essence could be described as follows: the weak Bosnians, whose capabilities were measured the best in the ambitious actions of braking the siege of Sarajevo and takeover of the line Doniji Vakuf - Jajce, have let the strengthened Croats pack the Serbs in their designated 49 percent,and if possible, less .They are the only ones capable in this part of ex-Yugoslavia to conduct large scale combat on the move, all others are nailed to the protection of the territory they hold, so the Bosnian Serbs are even admitting themselves that their "large advantage in technics and arms ... is melting, and the balance of power is changing " (general Gvero).
Croatia is beginning to dominate Western Bosnia, and from the edge of the table sheet is moving towards that eel-like line drawn by Tudjman on a "Guildhall" menu. If one is aware of the fact that the Split deal between Tudjman and Izetbegovic was done under the watchful eye of the American ambassador to Croatia Galbraith, it is absolutely clear that the West gave to Croatia on the same plate the possibility to overtake, both Croatian and Bosnian Krajina. So it is somewhat correct, as one of his aids later said,trying to defend him, that in Guildhall Tudjman has only lent his hand for the infamous menu drawing, but that he is not its author. The weak side of this defense, says Culic, is the fact that Tudjman's sighs for the division of Bosnia are remembered by the memory of witnesses, for more than thirty years.
Put into language without heavy historical comparisons, Croatia barely squeezed out of the West the permission to overcome "Krajina", but it then swallowed it by such a method which so much resembled yesterday's opponent, so that it itself became "Krajina" of the West - a a hard and unbreakable protection zone of the Western civilization towards unwanted Serbs and unworthy Muslims. Frightened with the fact with whom they entered the creation of the new Balkan "balance", the Americans are worryingly expecting the continuation of the story in Bosnia. It is then with no surprise with what feelings the Bosniaks are awaiting it.
Bosnian president Izetbegovic, who recently stated that the military situation was such that they had to enter into direct cooperation with the Croats, even if those could be guided solely by their interests, is himself guided by the stance of the "conservatives" in the SDA party (Bicackic, Sacirbey). If this line of thinking becomes key in Bosnia, one can expect significant aberrations from the concept of unified Bosnia and Herzegovina, since this is for them lower on the scale than a formation of a Muslim state, even if it was located in narrower space.
Still, this does not mean that as soon as tomorrow Izetbegovic will bow and accept that the Croatian-Bosnian federation is connected to Croatia and the "Pale republic" to Serbia. This form of "confederation" would be an inevitable end of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is still the possibility, although not a great one, that the American plan operates with a tri-lateral Federation (Bosnian-Croat-Serb). This would enable a survival of a weak Bosnia and Herzegovina, since confederal ties with the Eastern and Western neighbour would not in this manner mean its formal breaking up, even though , on the other hand, Bosnia would become will - less nucleus of some new Yugoslav community, whatever it would legally and politically mean. The other possibility to escape the breakup, on which Sarajevo seems to be playing is to harden up the peaceful ending, expecting that scavenging neighbors will break up internally.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 21, 1995
Kocan says that wise people have stated that if Karadzic and Mladic really decide to scorch Gorazde - it will be their last, but only due to the fact that there will nothing else left in Eastern Bosnia for them to take over. The experts agree that conquest of Srebrenica and Zepa, militarily speaking, was not some overly important task. But, it was not undertaken at the spur of the moment. New tens of thousands of people without a thing have been thrown from refugees into further refugee status, so that Tuzla and Zenica regions are becoming the largest refugee camps in the world.
This is not a metaphor.The ill feeling of the Croats there was not hard to predict. Their fear that the new wave of Bosniaks will disrupt the delicate national balance in the middle of Bosnia, will not further the strengthening of the already glass feet of the two nations. The usage validity of the new alliance between Croatia and Bosnia is much smaller than the "happy" TV footage of the Split negotiations signifies. Croatia will, if it becomes necessary, intervene in the conflict around Bihac, but not because Tudjman developed a love for golden lilacs (Bosnian insignia), but because he sees the Cazin region as his sphere of interest. The oppositionary circles in Croatia warn that Croatia, due to geography, is sincerely interested for the Knin region, but that the regime there is not particularly crazy with love for Krajina Serbs, so it will not be particularly unhappy if, after their military loss, they move to Bosnia. This would not be all bad for Karadzic either: for a long time he had overabundance of land, and chronic shortage of live force.
With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa the outlook for killers of Bosnia has risen sharply. It would have been more fair to call "the safe zones" from the beginning as the reservations for remaining Bosniaks. The readiness of the West to give them too to Karadzic, has broken the remaining hopes of the Bosniaks that the big world will defend the principles on which it supposedly lays. It is not intelligent to expect that the one who has permitted that the whole of Bosnia be turned into desert will fly to the defence of Gorazde. In most of the counties of Eastern Bosnia the Bosniaks were an absolute majority before the war. They are not there anymore; what remains are only the maps drawn by some experts, so that they would make a more beautiful Bosnia than Bosnia ever was.
After Srebrenica and Zepa there is nobody to hear the Sarajevo story. The killing of the cities on the Drina river is the last sign that Sarajevo is on its death bed. The death of Sarajevo is equal to the death of Bosnia and a whole nation. It will be seen soon, by the new proposals of the negotiators whether the world has finally decided to bring all of that to the altar of the idea whose chosen ones are being announced as participants in the trial, to which, if they finish their job, they will not take part in, concludes Kocan.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", July 28, 1995.
The editor of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Miodrag Vukmanovic wrote on the new peace plan for Bosnia in the August 28 1995, issue of the magazine.
How to divide Bosnia so that it remains whole, asks Vukmanovic. The Americans, he says, define the current situation as "new reality", under which they understand the changes that occurred in the balance of power on the terrain, which prompted them to undertake new diplomatic steps. They are counting that the reintegration of Krajina into Croatia, planned security of the protected areas, the simplification of the steps for the use of NATO air power and the threat of its massive use, then permanent pressure of the armies of the Muslim/Croat federation on all the lines of the front, as well as the conflict in the Serbian leadership, has created a situation which will force the Serbs to have a more flexible approach towards peace proposals.
To that effect, it seems that the Americans have advanced a certain revision of the territorial maps so that more "compact national entities " could be created, but in the given ratio of 51:49. Their analyses undeniably start from the premise that after the establishment of the peace and sovereignty, under the auspices of the world community, the tensions for a strict ethnic division would lessen, that the institution of primary existential interest would start operating, and that the irrational motives of the Bosnian Serbs to fight for foggy and unreachable goals would slowly disappear.
By the return of the larger part of refugees, no matter how that seems unreachable at the moment, by legal plebiscites, elections, reestablishing of the economic and other ties, which would all be guaranteed by the international forces, a more gentle ambient would be created for the final state formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concept of dual confederal ties, about which those that are hoping for a definitive division of Bosnia are now talking with relief, Americans do not understand as a delivery of part of Bosnia to Belgrade, particularly when this is looked at from the angle of rowing dissatisfaction of Serbs across Drina river towards their "saviours" in Serbia. Still, great uncertainties remain about this. Izetbegovic is adamant that the future "unified" state has to have joint security and foreign policy. Even though this is also hard to imagine at this moment, a question could be posed in a contrary sense - what would be the basis of this unity and sovereignty with two-three armies and two-three foreign policies ?
US has estimated that the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs does not have much room for maneuvering left. If Croatia would be able, forcefully or peacefully to regain "Sector East" and make run of Vucurevic (Trebinje Serb leader) corps through Popovo Polje, Mladic's state (after all, we finally know who is the boss in the house ) would start melting like "last years snow". It would be illogical to make concessions to Serbs now that their position is worsening. It does not seem that the American initiative has something radically different than what is contained in the Contact group proposal. Its primary goal is achieving peace, putting in perspective some new Berlin congress.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 18, 1995.
Gorinsek state that the fall of Srebrenica is a real indicator of the relation of the international community towards Bosniak nation, the largest victim of the aggression. It has proclaimed the "safe zones" only to take them off their conscience and mislead the world public that it is doing something concerning this.
He says that there is a plan of Karadzic and his generals to overtake the Eastern enclaves so that the connection of Muslims in Bosnia would be cut with those in Sanjak and Montenegro, which was named "green transversal" in Serbia (concerning connections with Turkey).
Estimating the current strength of the Bosnian Serb forces, Gorinsek said that the situation with the army personnel is such that it is composed of people of more mature age and connected to a certain area - mainly their own villages - so in that manner unsuitable for larger offensive activity. But this does not diminish greatly the striking force of the Serbian army, particularly after their troops were refreshed by Milosevic with new conscripts and officers, but also with new weapons. Of particular importance are rocket launchers S-300, whose use has been done by Serbs, but not by Croatian army, which also possesses them.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", July 17, 1995.
After submission of "protected" Srebrenica and Zepa to Karadzic and Mladic, a man of normal taste can only express disgust with Un, EU, and even humanitarians who are mostly quiet, says Vincetic. This signifies the fall of another utopia - the utopia of the "world political community" as the moral guardian over over-human state, from which all smart people ran away.
Today, we are spending this "idealistic" capital, particularly in ex-Yugoslavia, where the hands of those wretched are mixed in our blood above the elbows. Of course, all the responsibility for the Balkan tragedy cannot be placed on the "world lords", but it is a fact that someone like Milosevic is much closer to that establishment, as well as all of those who saw themselves in him, than a plain citizen, worker, intellligenscia, which have hoped that by swimming out of communistic totalitarianism they have finally felt "the glory" of the Western democracy.
Vincetic promotes the thesis that the UN has to disappear from the world scene, since it is actually a "super - state", exemplifying all bad elements of member states which these have brought into this organization.
In that manner, the UN, as a monster state, have brought the world events into dire straights, particularly those defined by conflicts, and this is this "political immorality" that is circling the world. Milosevic has fully understood that the mighty of the world are no particular opponents but partners. They are only afraid to be as open in their actions as he is, since the "cultural barriers" prevent them, but are actually rooting for him.
The world has only acted out its surprise and outrage at the overtaking of Srebrenica and Zepa, since it only falls into the logic of "encirclement of territories".
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", July 24, 1995.
By accepting the call of president Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his resignation he has written a week before that, prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has temporarily ended the crisis of the Bosnian government. But, nobody has any illusions concerning the brutal internal political battle that has begun in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which will, without any doubt, be continued. What has been badly covered up and kept secret for more than a year came out in the open with full force: Bosnia will keep receding into a "dark alley", being ruled by absolute power of a single, conservative, archaic and slowly bullying party, which, in the name of fake patriotism, keeps on grabbing power.
In the end, Alija Izetbegovic took the wisest step for him, making Silajdzic withdraw his resignation, so in that sense, says Dizdarevic, one can speak of his "victory".
But, it is almost certain that it is a question of a Pyrrhic victory, creating a serious doubt in the rank who support the "national president", while the young prime minister, for the time being, came out of the whole story visibly strengthened. If by nothing else, with open ovations he received anywhere he appeared publicly during the seven day "crisis".
There are two quite direct reasons for the offer of Silajdzic resignation, and a few for its withdrawal. The firs reason for the resignation was quite forced, in the manner of a bullying method by which a draft amendment on the Bosnian constitution was made, by which, the Presidency of the republic, practically is voted "no confidence" which is without precedent in the newer history of state and law. - the presidency is being denied the right to elect a successor to the president in the case of death of the current head of the body. According to the amendment, he will be chosen by the Parliament, where SDA has an absolute majority. By another amendment, passed also by force, a member of the presidency instead of the injured Ejup Ganic became Edhem Bicackic, vice president of the SDA and a distinctive conservative.
Silajdzic openly said that he was informed about the proposal of these amendments only few hours before the session of the Parliament in Zenica, and that he cannot state his opinion about them. At the same time, it came out that he also demanded that a number of his proposals on the revival of economic life be discussed at the same session, as well as to discuss the limit on the ingerencies of the military top in civil activities.
Since all of these proposals have been rejected at the session of the SDA MP's, Silajdzic resigned. Those "in the know", though say, that the problem was much more concrete: the prime minister demanded that the large sums of money "floating" through various private accounts of SDA members and the party itself be put under the regular financial control of the state, Government and the Central bank. The days that followed the resignation have shown a complete division in the population, with obvious advantage for Silajdzic, as well as serious divisions within the Army, whose lower, "working ranks" showed open dissatisfaction with the possibility of Silajdzic's departure.
Many intellectual circles, also among which "Circle 99" , have come out with statements unknown so far with the level of rage towards "the authorities". On the other side, "the strike of the empire" was also strong. Various gossip was spread around Sarajevo about Silajdzic, ending with accusations that is the same as Kemal Ataturk , even Salman Rushdie".
The culmination came when Silajdzic was to appear on TV with the explanation of his resignation, when the little electricity that flaws through Sarajevo magically disappeared - Edhem Bicackic being the director of the Bosnian electric company.
A day before the discussion of the resignation, Izetbegovic heard strong words about it from general Dudakovic, commander of the Bihac army, as well as "distressing" comments from some prominent American supporters of the Bosnian cause. This all prompted Izetbegovic to come to the wise conclusion: Silajdzic will be more dangerous if he is off the post, particularly since he announced that he is remaining in Sarajevo, with whispers on the formation of a new party.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 14, 1995
Serbs migrated in the past but never on such a massive scale. In this war they usually played the role of those before whom others fled. They referred to their historical and ethnic rights, it was said to be a revenge for all previous wars and defeats; doctrine of preventive banishment and the defence from those who were much weaker developed. Victory, might and the right that it brings were believed in.
Few in Serbia had time to notice someone else's casualties, someone else's misfortune, or lines of someone else's refugees. Now, with the greatest possible speed, in only three days, desperately and for ever the Krajina Serbs evacuated their villages and towns.
There is no justice in the whole thing; people do not deserve such vengeance and no one should observe this with malice. However, we all know that the world, and its Balkan part in particular, is not organized entirely in accordance with Christian morality and mercy. We rarely forgave each other in the past unless we had to. We have difficulties controlling ourselves while taking vengeance, and only repent for crimes we failed to commit. That is why Krajina's fate is logical, expected and should have been anticipated. That is why there is a clear blame, which lies mainly with Slobodan Milosevic and all those who once accepted him as leader of all Serbs, and who now scream that he conned and betrayed them.
He did con them, in the same way as the customers of Dafiment Bank were conned. Their greed made them naive and gullible. The national elite thus entrusted Milosevic with an open mandate to create Greater Serbia. Krajina Serbs, who were thus pushed into rebellion, then hurried to cleanse Croatian villages and inaugurate their own state.
It is not often that a state manages to disappear so quickly and so completely. Milan Martic is also a rare example of statesmanship capable of rejecting all negotiations and compromises, only to shock the world with the ease with which he capitulated and place himself at the head of the exile. One must search thoroughly through the history of most unfortunate peoples in order to find a similar example of such invincibility which lasted until the last possible moment before a catastrophe.
Milosevic is under no obligation to take responsibility for Martic's wisdom and concern for his people, but is responsible for such a person being in charge of such a state. He is the one who claimed that Serbs only know how to fight, he once even gave them weapons and invited them to protect their rights. It is true that he soon realized that he will never be able to keep Krajina and that Serbia has neither the will or the strength to get involved in an all out war with Croatia. He understood that he would be facing a real possibility of total Serbian defeat, and it is funny how most of his bitterest political opponents in Serbia accuse him of things he is not guilty of.
However, he is responsible for not stating and repeating unambiguously and with more determination that the Krajina Serbs must remain part of Croatia. He did advise them to accept the Z-4 plan, but it was persistently being said in Belgrade that it is their own affair and that nothing must be imposed, which encouraged Martic to loose everything, and gave Milosevic the opportunity to make a small profit. He used the Krajina disaster to demonstrate his pacifism, and the very fact that Tudjman's international standing weakened means that his own improved; the prospects for the sanctions being lifted also improved, as well as the chances of keeping Eastern Slavonia.
If the largest part of the outside world was, at least for an instant, excited about the incredibly easy victory of the Croatian army, that is the incredibly easy defeat of the Serbs whom everyone was sick of anyway, the pictures of a people in exile soon ruined their good mood. It is obvious that America and Germany pushed Tudjman, but I believe that the outcome is too heavy even for their stomachs.
It took Croatia three days to get rid of all its Serbs. We can be disgusted with their enthusiasm, but only as long as we are sure that we would not celebrate a similar exodus of Albanians with similar enthusiasm. If you know that your heart would rejoice, then forget the Croats and leave them to their happiness. We will never have an opportunity of meeting them or sharing anything with them again anyway. We had some nice moments together, but in total, things just weren't going our way.
Only Eastern Slavonia remains disputed, as an area over which there might be more fighting, though I somehow doubt it. If he exploits the Krajina disaster sufficiently well, Milosevic might be allowed to keep it, or at least postpone its surrender until his life long mandate is over.
There is Bosnia left, in which it seems the final borders of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia will be drawn. In any case nothing multicultural and multiethnic will be allowed to grow for a while. I think that neither of the two main actors in the Bosnian drama, Alija Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic, have anything to look forward to.
The former, with the help of America, lead the Bosnian Muslims to nothing. The latter created a military state, only to suddenly find himself without an army. Karadzic is an obstacle on the road to Grater Serbia, since he is too eager to have his own state, something Milosevic is now trying to destroy with the help of General Mladic.
The outcome of that conflict will greatly influence tha balance of power and the future regime in Serbia. The choice between Milosevic and Karadzic is a terrible one, but since we reached this point anyway, it appears to me that Milosevic is the lesser evil and Serbian opposition is making a mistake when turning to Karadzic. His indirect responsibility for the war, at least in the eyes of the world, is greater than that of Milosevic, and at the moment it is of paramount importance for Serbia to look good in the eyes of the world.
Is this disgraceful defeat in Krajina, which pushed the western Serbs to the east and reversed centuries of Serbian history not the price of the conflict with the whole world. If only the Serbs had not spent the last couple of years sticking up two fingers at the whole world, particularly at the West and America, Tudjman would not be seen as an epitome of democracy which deserves every help he can get. Though a bit too late, Milosevic understood where that leads. Milosevic is yielding to the west not because of his weak nature but because he has learnt that the other option is costly for him, and for us.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", August 14, 1995
Milosevic gives everything and is not getting anything, says Glisic.. Panic ? They felt that on the outside. They will ask more, and he will give more. nobody believes the story of the lifting of sanctions "just behind the corner", since this is not realistic; it serves only as a good slogan for the regime. The only thing he will get is - new refugees. Actually, he is afraid of those. The fear has grounds: those that are just coming are mumbling about treason. Nobody is mentioning Tudjman's fist, all are mentioning Milosevic not doing anything. What is worst, some of them, they say, are carrying arms. It is understandable then, that the controlled media do not represent the care for refugees as the care of the state and humanitarian organizations, but as work of the Orthodox church and county offices. To diminish and channel the rage, the Church becomes a collective humanist !
The official Yugoslav side says that for the tragedy and the exodus are the doing of the local leaders. But, most of them were invented by Milosevic, as to make them quarrel among themselves.. He held them like cards, holding them in the deck and shuffling them often. Only the naive or forgetful can ask themselves who elected Milan Martic. The quarrels have definitively brought down the myth about the Serbian military honor and courage. The apostle of peace from Dedinje lost the war in which, supposedly, he did not participate. Now comes the time of resentment.
Maybe Slobodan Milosevic is gaining in the international sphere while he is losing on the internal scene. But, he is the only one gaining, everybody else is losing, irrevocably and forever.
Source: Belgrade weekly "NIN", August 11, 1995
The Republic of Serb Krajina, in actuality a police domain of Milan Martic, has disappeared in the same manner it was formed - by force. When the Belgrade regime, after a long "friendly persuasion" from the big powers comprehended that the borders of the republics of the former federation will not be changed by force, the stubborn Krajina leaders, which came to like the power and state ceremonials, became the barrier to the political solution directed by Slobodan Milosevic.
If Belgrade , after it came to understand that there will be nothing left of the first version of Greater Serbia, was really concerned about Krajina Serbs, it would have helped them by formally recognizing the AVNOJ bordersof Croatia. No matter what would have been the resistance to this, the Krajina Serbs, dependent in many ways on the national foundation, would have to accept this. By accepting peaceful integration into Croatia they would come into possession of strong political cards, particularly in the international sphere, which would enable them to have a large degree of autonomy towards the goal of guarding national identity, if this was important to them at all.
But, Milosevic, due to domestic reasons, could not have appeared with such a solution in his public. Holding a knife to Croatia's throat he operated with sophistic phrases, feeding fake hopes of Krajina Serbs in the stability of their so called state. The Belgrade regime was setting its peace smiles in front of world emissaries, and at the same time its chauvinistic propaganda has recycled the stories about killings and genocide, debasing in that manner any possibility of joint life of Serbs and Croats.
When a series of attempts to soften the hardcore Krajina leadership with personnel sent from Belgrade, the defeat in Western Slavonia gave an opportunity to Milosevic to throw into the game one of his handy generals - certain Mrksic. This man has "organized the defense" in a manner to enable Croatian army to carry out an operation that will enter the strategic textbooks as an example of efficacy.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", August 11, 1995.
In the are of the 14 counties which were retaken with the operation "Storm", before this war lived around 170 thousand Serbs. Part of them has already previously joined the 245 thousand of those that have escaped to Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the rest of 120 thousand, which remained , by the estimates of the Croatian government, have almost all joined them. It seems the government is not counting in that number those that have joined the refugee columns from other territories in Croatia, as to fill the number of 200 thousand that international sources are citing.
But, if the estimates of the UNHCR about the refugee Serbs are correct, when all number are added and subtracted, when the last refugees from Kordun and Banija leave Croatia, at least 450 thousand Serbs, counting in those that have left Western Slavonia this spring, has already left Croatia. That number might be a bit smaller, depending on the number of Serbs which are still living in Baranja and Eastern Slavonia. This number could diminish if some decide to return, but it might also be enlarged if those that still remain in Croatia decide to join their relatives which will never return to Croatia.
According to this, says Daskalovic, it comes out that of 581,663 Serbs, the number registered by the 1991. census, there would remain only 130 thousand. When the war is over, when all refugee Croats return to their homes, but also some from diaspora, when their definitive home in Croatia is found by Croats that left permanently Bosnia and Herzegovina (the current number is around 200 thousand), Croatia would joint the ranks of nationally most homogenous states in Europe. The structure of its population, would definitely comprise of more than 90 percent Croats, at least 10 percent more than 83 percent registered in the 1991. census.
This would bring to life the words of Ivan Aralica, as well as many on the Serb side - like Milosevic and Karadzic, that the creation of national states in the region of former Yugoslavia will speed up the national homogenization, with the rounding of nationally homogenous states in the region.
In comparison to the Serbs from Croatia, the intentions of Karadzic and similar have also come to "fruition".Of the 450 thousand refugee Serbs from Croatia, almost half have for the time being settled on the territory now controlled by Karadzic army, which has almost completely been emptied of Muslims and Croats. Can this process of ethnic homogenization, as in Croatia, happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina , asks Daskalovic.
According to the first information about the newest American plan, the intention is to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina, at lest for some time, as the unified, but very fragile provisionary state, in whose midst will begin the life of three ethnically homogenous states - Serbian, Bosniak/Muslim and Croat, with respective confederal ties of the first to Yugoslavia, and the second two with Croatia. If this is so, it is obvious that in this manner the ethnic homogenization conducted almost completely by force and crime, will practically be recognized.
As the US Administration practically condoned the Croatian action in Krajina, it will not be a surprise if it agrees with the results, with some corrections, with the results of the use of force in the tailoring and re-tailoring of the ethnic borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina.. In that case, in spite of the formation of national states in Bosnia, the Serbs and Croats will continue to resettle in Serbia and Croatia respectively, particularly from the part of the country where Bosniaks/Muslims will be the majority.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", August 14, 1995
Without a doubt, says Briza, fall of Knin is one of the biggest crossroads in the development of The Yugoslav crisis so far. If many of the domestic and foreign analysts of the Yugo-crisis are to be believed, this event could be the beginning of its final untangling, a peaceful one at that, no matter how paradoxical that looks at the moment. Of course, no one can play out some new, more dangerous and bloody complication.The peaceful development, is, it seems, much more probable.
Adding to the estimates of a approaching end to the war and making of peace arrangements are more open and louder speculations that Serbian president Milosevic gave his wink for the Croatian offensive on Krajina.
Supposedly, he has done that in accordance with the infamous secret deal he made at the time with the Croatian president Tudjman in Karadjordjevo, (March 1991) about the division of "interest spheres" in the region of former Yugoslavia. According to those speculations, Krajina was swapped for Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.
The biggest doubts that a "set piece" was in question is created by an unbelievably quick fall of Knin and the whole of Krajina, almost without resistance, including the noticeably sustained reaction of Belgrade, which has not offered even a strong verbal support,other is not even to be spoken about. Key world powers , quite obviously, were not against this turn of events.Otherwise, Tudjman surely would not dare to undertake a great military adventure.
The relation of the world towards the Yugoslav crisis, great powers particularly is first of all pragmatic. This concerns the Krajina question too. Insistence on its reintegration into the Croatian state is motivated not only by formal reasons deriving from the fact that Croatia is internationally recognized state, but because Krajina, as a state within a state would tear Croatia in two parts burdening its communication between the mainland and the coast with insurmountable difficulties. This would then be a permanent generator of crisis and conflict.
As far as Eastern Slavonia and Baranja are concerned, Europe would desire the most - also from pragmatic reasons - that there is peace there, so that Danube in that part of its flow could be used safely as a transport way. As things stand now, this could be achieved most easily if both banks of the river from the Hungarian border on belong to one country and its control -meaning FR Yugoslavia.
During the recent clash in Pale between Radovan Karadzic and general Mladic there were strong words thrown about who is a war profiteer. But, says Briza, the real and largest war profiteers in the Yugoslav crisis will be, if something unpredictable does not happen in the meantime, presidents Milosevic and Tudjman. The first one, will become, after Karadzic is sidelined, the undisputed leader of "all Serbs", while the latter will, after entering Knin, will receive at least nine new medals and will surely win all forthcoming elections.
Tudjman's happiness is somewhat disturbed by that honest Swede Carl Bildt, who marked Croatian conquest of Krajina as "worst ethnic cleansing", stating that he will recommend the chief of the Zagreb regime to the Hague tribunal, since he "carries the responsibility for the artillery attacks on the civil population in Knin".
Milosevic himself is under more serious accusations within Serbia itself. He is branded by the refugees from Knin and the larger part of the nationalistically oriented opposition as the "traitor", asking him "to settle the accounts" for the defeats and suffering of the people. But, the probability that he will actually do so is practically negligible. The large wave of bitter refugees from Krajina amounting to some 200 thousand people, which could reach the "critical mass" for political changes in Serbia, probably will never cross this side of the Drina river. The largest part will remain in Bosnia, where those that can carry arms will be recruited into Mladic's army.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", August 11, 1995
Since August 4, of last year, until the same date this year (1995) many things have happened, but nothing that can be considered new political quality: official Serbia keeps on declaring that "peace has no alternative, but even more insistently it rejects recognition of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other ex-Yugoslav republics; Karadzic keeps on conducting the war for Serbdom until the last Muslim, conducting in secret on Pale "mountain preparations" for a match that would lead to the title of the leader of "All Serbs"; Izetbegovic is fighting to save, at least, the existence of his state, leading the war, also, to the last Muslim; Franjo Tudjman is biting Krajina piece by piece, persuading all of the remaining Serbs through the use of tanks and airplanes in the advantages of peaceful co-existence in idyllic Croatia; that thing we call international community through all that time travels from Dedinje (Belgrade), through Pale and Sarajevo to Banski Dvori(Zagreb), attempting to gather the threads of the Balkan nightmare, in which you cannot establish who is biting whose head off, although it is easy to conclude that in the end all will end up headless and pantless.
The Year of the announced peace did not bring us anything of the promises given at its beginning, Milosevic easily maneuvered domestic oppositionaries, who, do not have spare change for paper staples; Karadzic, on the other hand, has an army, police, media, hundreds of thousands of people which existentially depend on charity of his regime, which will defend him until the last bullet, since they know that his crash would also partially mean their sinking to the bottom. The historic tragedy of the Serbian nation (playing a bit with Cosic vocabulary) is in the fact that this is the only nation on the planet over whose one part rule the communists, and the other fascists. Two most dangerous ideologies of the dangerous twentieth century have found their recluse in this god forgotten country; a normal Serb today has to chose between two evils, without any hope that something good and normal could happen to us, something that will take those from Jul and the ethnic cleansers to the dumps of history, to stink where it is permitted and where they do not bother anybody.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", August 11, 1995
Tepavac says that nothing more can be achieved , neither by continuation of war, nor delaying of peace. There is only simple hope left, he says. There is, although, a not much hidden , but very thought out guided intention - that Serbia be drawn in, in any manner, into an open war for the survival of the Serbian states across the Drina river. There is not a small number of those who think that such a war against the whole world, could be, somehow won... Even for those more feeble minded this is too much!
Preceding such an attempt would be an all Serb civil war, or it would be its inevitable consequence. They do not call it for nothing "war madness". It should not be hidden from the Serbian people that the extremists in the political parties, army, even the Church demand from it new unforeseeable sacrifices for a disputable ideal of the survival and legalization of new Serbian states. Should such a high price be paid for an unsustainable nonsense that there is no life for the Serbs outside of Serbia without their nationally "pure" states and that there is no survival for them in a joint life with anybody else of a different nation and religion. Is it below the level of the Serbs outside of Serbia to live in such a status in which almost three million non - Serbs in Serbia.
With the acceptance of even so unperfect plans of the Contact group for Bosnia and Z-4 -the Serbs would be guaranteed greater rights than was enjoyed by any other national group in both of previous Yugoslavia's - and particularly in this third one..So, the war is not conducted, for the "protection of the people" but for the states which have to protect the rights of numerous, pretentious and powerloving statesmen, whose states, outside of their strangely winding borders, not a single soul in the world intends to recognize. After all, they are not formally recognized even by Serbia and Yugoslavia..
A painful moment of truth is approaching. The time is not working for the Serbs anymore, if it ever did, particularly for those in Bosnia and Croatia. There is no victory, no triumph.. The end of the story will have to be a sad one, for both the leaders and for the lead.
The capability to come forth to the events presupposes sageness and courage at the same time. Milosevic's negotiating capability will not be worth much if he does not have the courage to take a decision today that will cost much more tomorrow and if he does not wield the accord from those he is jointly coming to decisions with, if he is not deciding absolutely by himself !
He, perhaps, sees better than others also the troubles which follow after that, but he hardly sees better than others how unbearable is the state that is ongoing. The resistance of Serbia - in absolute and relative terms - is falling daily. While Serbia is weakening, all around it are gathering in strength, particularly those that are working and not waging war !
Nobody in the world of today (UN, great powers, OEBS, EU...) is condoning the continuation of the war, does not accept the disappearance of Bosnia as a state, does not permit its division between Serbia and Croatia, does not allow the legalization of ethnically cleaned independent states and is sickened by the violence and crime that all this is followed with. Yugoslavia has to accept and recognize these facts, as clearly and as decisively as possible, no matter how hard this comes to it. There lies the formula for the end to disintegration, final lifting of sanctions, the end of isolation and sliding into backwardness. All contrary attempts are not worth a single sacrifice of human life !
Conscious of all this are the "national" political parties, even those nationalistic, but they care more that Milosevic falls than that the fall into gutter stops.They are advocating the continuation of the war, not because they sincerely believe that ut can still be won, but because they think that this would be the way to topple Milosevic in the easiest manner.. Such unscrupulous collection of political points is a specific type of war profiteering which was used up until recently by the regime itself, until it came to the conclusion that the continuation of the war will bring it more harm than a late coming peace. And, the entrance of Serbia into war only guarantees entrance of war into Serbia. In the meantime, "the silent majority" is sending ever louder signals that it wants peace and normal life. It did, though, secretly wish Greater Serbia too, convinced that this is "good for us Serbs", but not at the price that her sons die and property gets destroyed.
Delay of the end of war will demand only a new, ever greater price for the suspension of sanctions than the one that is being offered now. In such a overheated public opinion, even a reasonable compromise will not pass easily as a negotiating success, and particularly it would not be able to show an inevitable defeat as a victory. If, along with all of the inevitable risks, this regime does not bring the promised peace, the war will be continued by another regime ! The fact that it could be only worse, is no compliment to the current one.
Serbia is stumbling under the imprisonment of the chauvinistic maximalism which it evoked from the depths of its belly. Not ready for hard answers for the inevitable challenges of modernization and enlightenment, Serbia abandoned the ambition to be better than others, letting itself be overcome by leadership pretensions to be stronger than everybody !
Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika " July 1-31, 1995
Since the late Eighties, the author says, Serbian, Croat, Slovene and other intellectuals competed in expressing their own nationalistic euphorias. The political leaders, then, had an easy job of putting to life their ideas. The intellectuals, who by the nature of their vocation, should resist the powers of horror, became its creators. Before the "peaceful turn" of president Milosevic, more often than politicians, national interests and strategies for its fruition was explained by a tested team of regular guests on Belgrade TV: Brana Crncevic, Momo Kapor, Gojko Djogo, Matija Beckovic, Antonije Isakovic, and a long list of respectable historians, philosophers and sociologists: Milorad Ekmecic, Vasilije Krestic, Ljubomir Tadic, Mihajlo Markovic and others. These days, when the largest refugee exodus of the Serbs is taking place in the regions of former Yugoslavia, one can get the impression that the Serb intellectuals, by far do not have a unified stance concerning these events, and particularly concerning the political moves that Serbia should take.
Serbian intellectuals - patriots, have split into those that are silent, those who are barely saying something and those that are talking nonsense.
The meeting of solidarity with those expelled from Croatia brought together only a few writers, Many did not show up. The key missing figure , even though he was not even announced was Dobrica Cosic. His presence at the gathering dealing with ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia would have been invaluable, since this writer at one point advocated the idea of "resettlement of people" as a method of "drawing national borders".
Whether "father of the nation" will go public soon and clear up to us "what is happening (to us) and why", remains to be seen. Missing are also those numerous academics who have stated so openly before the beginning of the newest war on the Yugoslav territory that "the genocide over the Serbs is total".
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", August 12-13, 1995
Did Serbia at last get its own real, large, court intrigue? Is it possible that Mrs. Mira Markovic (Mrs. Slobodan Milosevic) herself, without the help from inquisitive journalists and the tabloid press, in her own public diary, described her own family crisis and revealed that her husband has a lover?
Many over here interpreted Mrs. Markovic's tale about a high official who neglects his devoted comrade for someone in a short skirt, as an announcement of a divorce and a political clash which could, locally at least, change the course of history. According to this interpretation, it is a slightly curious example of the kind of affair about which everybody gets to know everything before anything was even suspected. The unprepared public is suddenly invited to pass a moral judgment. In the world of comrades, for example, this would have been seen as a modern and more democratic kind of friendly criticism.
But, it looks more like a misunderstanding. The better informed claim that the author had some other couple in mind, and that it was an observation of a general trend of roaming and moral relaxation among comrades in power who behaved very well until recently when certain irregularities emerged. This means that the text must be seen as a reply to Djilas' "Anatomy of a Moral'' written in 1954, which dealt with the hypocrisy of the Communist party purism. Mira Markovic, therefore, demands asceticism, and appeals to her comrades to hang on to their lawful wives and make sure that power doesn't go to their heads.
The reason why her text was misunderstood to be a confession, lies mostly in the fact that people believed that besides the ruling couple there were no other cases of such marital and ideological loyalty left from our communist prehistory. And who would have thought that in the land of Arkan and Dafina, a person from the ruling circles would dare express disgust at someone's extramarital affairs, unless she was personally affected?
But Mira Markovic does not live here and now. There is not much hope that she revealed Milosevic's infidelity. We would have known by now if he were the kind of person who is capable of looking around rather than straight ahead..
Serbia however, not without shame, must admit that its fate and future depends heavily on their marital harmony. Many nationalists are still hoping that the relationship will break up and that Milosevic will return to them, just as supporters and users of YUL are hoping that it won't. Those who don't belong to either of the two groups do not know what to hope for. In the week in which the nation, thanks to the ambiguity of Mira Markovic's text, worried about her marital happiness, her husband found himself on the front cover of the American "TIME'' magazine to which he gave one of those typical "milk is blue'' interviews.
He told about his readiness do his best to end the war in Bosnia in six months if the sanctions are lifted first, sanctions which were imposed because he started it. He claims also that it was not him who started the war but the Muslims. He knows little about war crimes committed by the Serbian side.
When they heard this, Karadzic and Mladic cried "that's right!'' and took the Serbian town of Srebrenica. There is only Serbian Zepa left, or maybe not; then Serbian Gorazde and Serbian Sarajevo. Then they will accept the plan of the Contact Group as a basis for further negotiations, while the world would realize with some surprise that meanwhile the other negotiating party vanished.
All of this is really none of our business any longer and there is no point in wasting our time on ourselves, our president, or the Bosnian Serbs. Karadzic and Mladic repeated many times what they have to say, and by seizing one of the UN declared safe areas they expressed themselves in the clearest of ways.
The world order is susceptible to anarchy and the recognition of the right of the stronger anyway, but everybody is in for a bad time if all principles and rules are formally abandoned. The problem however is how to find parents who would willingly send their son to get killed while defending the norms of international relations. InBosnia it is easier to explain to people why they must fight.
The fall of Srebrenica does not mark the end of the war, but clearly marks a change of sides in the conflict. Mladic's army is now fighting the UN as well as the Muslims, and is celebrating its first victory.
Boutros-Ghali sportingly conceded defeat but did not announce future battles. It all smacks of a withdrawal of UN troops in the near future and the withdrawal of the Rapid Reaction Force in the even nearer future. After that, fighting in Bosnia can carry on until Judgment Day without any interruptions. It would also mean that the Serbs won the most important war, the one against the world order and the world would probably cease to resemble the place we once knew. Milosevic and Karadzic would thus become heralds of a new era. Maybe Mira Markovic would get some kind of satisfaction out of it all and announce the end of the dominance of the West and propose the triumphant Chinese model to the Serbs.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", July 17, 1995
Maliqi says that Milosevic came to an almost surprising decision recently to visit Kosovo, where he did not travel since 1989. and the celebration of 600 years since the Kosovo battle.
This return if Milosevic, says Maliqi, was marked by a heated demagogic hypocrisy. In difference to the speech in Kosovo Polje in 1987. which brought him to power, or the one on the battle celebration, when he announced the possibility of "new battles", meaning the military untangling of the Yugoslav crisis, during his visit to the Kosovo Mitrovica key industrial plant, "Trepca", Milosevic held a speech which was dominated by reconciliatory tones and announcements of peaceful untangling of the Kosovo crisis.
Milosevic spoke in kosovo Mitrovica about peace as the biggest and most urgent goal, about national equality as the basic political principle, about the possibility of Kosovo becoming the region of mutual understanding, cooperation and joint life. But, so that nobody could come to the conclusion that his promises would be the obligation of the state he heads, Milosevic passed the responsibility for these obligations on the Serbian people. He also did not forget to make the distinction between "honest" and "dishonest" Albanians.
Milosevic's visit did not create a greater excitement among the Albanians. He was received coldly, with stressed ironic distance. How can somebody believe the peaceful rethoric of the person that brought Kosovo so much evil and who has so many times ruthlessly said so many lies about Kosovo and Albanians, asks Maliqi. The Kosovo media saw in Milosevic's sweetalk a "Greek gift", meaning "the announcement of new dangerous forms of violence". Ibrahim Rugova estimated that this was "an old dictionary and empty rhetoric", then "slipping his tongue" and stating that "Milosevic said much less than we expected", which some speculations saw as his confession that he was, probably through diplomatic channels, informed about Milosevic visit to Kosovo as the first step in the change of his policy and opening of the way for a Serb - Albanian dialogue.
In any case, besides the mutual hypocrisy and deep mistrust which is hard to overcome, more objective and cooler analysis of Milosevic visit to Kosovo and the changed tone of his speech, indicate to the possibility of change in the kosovo crisis. Milosevic's optimistic statement to the US weekly "Time" that the Balkan crisis could be solved in the forthcoming six months, if certain long lasting packaged political arrangements are made, may not be a simple political rethoric, but actually points to a corps of basic political agreements which he has reached during the intensive diplomatic consultations with world factor in the last few months.
On the other hand, Rugova and other Albanian leaders in Kosovo are today much more realistic in their estimates of the framework which the international community has set in the solution of the Kosovo problem, as well as the inevitability and necessity of starting a dialogue with Milosevic. This even though nobody is overtly optimistic about the outcome of the Serb - Albanian dialogue, meaning reaching a quick and easy solutions.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", July 31, 1995
The last two days of the Croatian warring week-end, offensive "Storm" which liberated Krajina, were followed in Kosova as if it were a foot-ball championship: in the evenings, whoever had a satellite antenna, was closely following HTV (Croatian TV), centring the attention on the whole list of towns and villages in which Croat "Rambos" were entering and which were fled by Serb "Kninjas" and their families. Even the ones lacking interest so far, started making deep geo-strategic analyses, making different comments in regard to the maps. The reactions heard in the town ranged from the happiness because it was proven that the Serbian army can be defeated (contrary to what the West was saying, trying to justify its own noninvolvement) and up to the question, what can this bring to Kosova?
Following, are some brief points which can clarify the "Kosovan balance" of the Croat offensive. The first thought about the Serbian defeat in Croatia is that the international negotiators can no more draw any parallel lines between the future constitutional position of Krajina (now former Krajina) and Kosova.
However unacceptable this parallel was from the previous constitutional aspect (Krajina was not a federal unit of SFRY), the parallel was also inapplicable in the way the positions were reached:Krajina, with a quite quick insurrection (now finalized),Kosova with an ancient dispute with Serbia.
But, the loss of one "K" in the drawn parallel leaves the international negotiators with only one "point of territorial pressure": the principle of the eventual victory of Karadzic (Mladic) must be applicable in the case of Kosova. Again the principle of violence and force in parallels which can't stand. And the orientation towards the "motherlands".
After four years under occupation, Croatian president Tudjman proved again that the best negotiators are the military: the stronger, less the negotiations needed. A great minus for Kosova.
The complicated plans are not valid any more. They must be as simple as possible, and they must split the people definitely. This is the bottom line of the Croat offensive, which solved the Serbian issue in Croatia with only one strike. The Serbs in towns, outside Krajina, were anyways not engaged in the insurrection, and can continue living as they have done so far. The total number of Serbs in Croatia could reach (if Serbs are lucky) the symbolic 5%.
A message for Kosova: the territorial division between Serbs and Albanians. This message should include also the presence of Serb refugees from Croatia: they must also become part of the division balance. As usually in these areas: by force. The solution of the Serbian issue in Croatia will further make Croatia try and find a final demarkation with the Serbs.
Eastern Slavonia is not that important as Bosnia is: the finalCroat-Serb split will have the form of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, respectively, be in the option of a Serb-Serb confederation or the Croat-Bosnian confederacy. The same way the Serbs and Croats are settling their dues outside their states, there are opinions in Belgrade that Belgrade and Tirana must do the same thing about Kosova. Split.
Croatia did what NATO planes should have done: defend Bihac. It also did something else: freed itself from future negotiations about Krajina. For the international community, so far inefficient, there is a new solution: the balance of regional forces which arise from the former Yugoslavia. In the present split, Croatia gains the role of a Western power (with the American-German support), Serbia that of an Eastern power (with the Russian support). In the balance of the three main national issues arising from the former Yugoslavia, the third point of the triangle is missing: Albanians and Albania.
Source: Pristina weekly "Koha", August 28, 1995
Leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) talks to Belgrade weekly " Vreme "in its issue of August 21, 1995.
As a man who does not sing in the choir, as the one who, in the euphoria following the fall of Vukovar, had the courage to say that instead of celebrating we should bow our heads in shame, as a man who in the deafening noise of war drums warned that peace is what we need, as a man from the opposition who without any complexes gave support to the Serbian president after he made his U-turn towards peace... Vuk Draskovic always provides a motive for an interview. Vuk Draskovic had been arrested twice by the president of Serbia. Other opposition parties accuse him of collaborating with the regime, while he persistently repeats that the interests of the people are more important to him than the interests of his party. Last week, the leader of SPO once again attracted the attention of the public by paying another visit to Slobodan Milosevic.
I acquainted the President of Serbia with SPO's position about the quickest, most determined and wisest way to stop a total decline, both national and of the state,'' Draskovic reveals the reasons behind the visit. ``We want the final nail to be hammered in the coffin of the catastrophic anti-state, anti-national and anti-democratic policies which were in force a few years ago. We want to draw conclusions from the failure of those policies and start off in a new way. Serbia must gointo Europe, into the world. Serbia must become European within if it wants to be strong and become part of Europe.
I think that the situation in which we found ourselves is so dramatic that we can be said to be at crossroads: we can either continue in the same direction leading to a precipice, an enforceable decline of both the nation and the state, or we can take a turning which leads to salvation, to renaissance. The new way demands new people, a new program, new policies.''
VREME: It is considered normal for a president of a state to hold talks with leaders of opposition parties, but he seems to be talking with you more often than with leaders of other opposition parties?VUK DRASKOVIC: I never counted how many times others visite Milosevic. When I myself go to see him it is never with much enthusiasm. I usually go out of necessity, wretchedness, or a need to go. Milosevic is a very good listener, and is capable of adopting some of the things he hears, but only after a delay and after processing them in such a way that he can usurp them and present them as his own. Just compare Milosevic prior to May 1993 and Milosevic today and you will see that they are two different persons. Milosevic today pronounces whole passages from the SPO party program
It is also true that he adopts quite a few things when it is already too late. If you take a medicine on time you will be cured, if you take it after the medicine's expiry date, you can poison yourself.''Serbia cannot be defended in Knin, rather Knin can be defended in Serbia; life is our primary interest; peace-not war, cradles not graves, wealth, not poverty, cooperation with the world, not the world's prison.''VREME: Are you trying to say that the Serbian president is takin out-of date medicines?
VUK DRASKOVIC: He took more or less all medicines a bit too late. He was in favour of an asymmetric federation when a confederation was on the agenda, he was in favour of a confederation when a union of sovereign states was suggested, he was in favour of a union of sovereign states when the Hague document was on the agenda, and he was in favour of the Hague document when the Devil came to claim his share, and when it was all over. Since 1993, Milosevic took part in peace initiatives and accepted projects suggested by the international community without delay. However our trouble lies in the fact that old policies which fueled national hysteria, vanity, primitivism and arrogance created a very dangerous and widespread opinion that since 1993. Milosevic has been out of his mind. Milosevic's policies created a whole array o little Napoleons, national furers, and unreasonable people which make Milosevic look like an angel. If you analyze the current political scene and compare all those who oppose Milosevic, you will realise that things could be worse than they already are, that things can be worse than bad, and that worse cannot be an alternative to bad.
VREME: In your letter to the Contact group you wrote that Milosevic changed his policies. Does it mean that you consider him no longer to be a pyromaniac in fireman's clothes?
VUK DRASKOVIC: As a politician, I prefer not to get involved into any psychological analysis of the president of Serbia such as whether he is sincere or not, I can only conclude that he is currently pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to the one he pursued in the period between 1990 and 1992. I suppose he is not finding it easy, because people do remember such things, and there are written records of who said what andwhen. However he also shouldn't be finding it too difficult because the right to notice and correct one's mistakes and illusions is fundamental human right. I am trying to knock on the fastened door of an ideological mind whic either remains closed or opens slowly with a loud squeak. I spoke to Milosevic last week, in the most dramatic moment for our nation this century, I laid out before him a project of national renaissance, the only way out of this horror, uproar, misery and death, while he even failed to mention that he sent Vladislav Jovanovic off to New York, and brought Milutinovic to Belgrade instead. I was telling him about the government of revival, about projects of regeneration he listened and nodded, without mentioning that he was doing the exact opposite. But what does it all mean that I must never talk to him again and must never push that door again? I will carry on pushing every door and it will loosen; the harder I push, the more it will loosen.
VREME: What do you say about the claims that by softening his policies,and particularly by ``softening'' the military might of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, Milosevic also weakened his negotiating position?
VUK DRASKOVIC: I agree. Milosevic can now get scared by Tudjman's glory after the fall of Krajina. Suddenly, Tudjman is stronger, because his stick is longer. I think that all those in the Balkans who believe in the power of the stick are doomed to failure. I think that Tudjman is totally out of his mind, that he is staggering like a drunkard, thinking he is some kind of a Balkan Napoleon, forgetting a key fact he ha neither seen or met General Kutuzov yet! I think that in the eyes of the sensible, democratic world Milosevic is the winner over Tudjman. Until recently, Milosevic's stick scored points for Tudjman while now things are turning the other way.
VREME: You were sickened at Serbian xenophobia. You were open towards the West and were convinced of its righteousness. Do you nonetheless think that in the most recent tragedy, in Krajina, the action of the West was hypocritical?
VUK DRASKOVIC: I do. I agree absolutely, but again it was assisted by our stupidity. Tudjman attacked Krajina when it suited him best, and these ideal conditions for attack were created by Serbian stupidity. Croatian offensive took place while the world stood shocke before pictures of Srebrenica, Zepa, ethnic cleansing that took place there, and crimes committed by our side, while the world was still bitter about the handcuffing of UNPROFOR troops to lamp posts. The world observed the whole affair with one eye, the one which sees only our sins and crimes. Finally, if only the Serbian side, two days before the offensive began, announced that it unconditionally accepts the Z-4 plan as a basis for future talks between Knin and Zagreb I am sure thatneither the Germans or the Americans would allow Tudjman to carry o with his adventure.
VREME: What exactly did you have in mind when you said that there is nobody in Serbia who is not in some way responsible for the fall of Krajina?
VUK DRASKOVIC: It was repeated, for years, that Krajina can only exist as part of Greater Serbia. Such madness and absence of reality were so strong that they entered both the consciousness and the unconscious of a large proportion of people. All those who fed people with such a dangerous illusion are guilty. On the other hand, it appears that those of us who neither thought or spoke that way were incapable of explaining to the people that they were greatly mistaken, that they were being ruined by those who should have been leading them to prosperity, and that the stuff they were given as medicine was in fact poison.
VREME: You warned of evil. You are considered to be the prophet of Serbian politics. Recent developments indicate that many of your worst prophecies came true, and you could be considered some kind of the proverbial black raven. You forecast that the war will either end in the summer, or it will intensify. How does it look now?
VUK DRASKOVIC: My worst premonitions came true. I not only warned of what will happen, but always of what will happen unless we do either this or that. We failed to do what SPO said we should, and that is why my darkest premonitions materialized. We are now coming out with another proposal, a program of national revival, but at the same time I am warning that unless we follow this road, a catastrophe will strike this nation and it will suffer for centuries to come. If Serbia does not soon set off down this new road suggested by SPO, there will be no peace in Bosnia. The Big world will find a way to instruct either the Croatian or Muslim side to reject the new peace agreement in order to give the strengthened Muslims and Croats more time to defeat the already weakened Serbian forces, which will lead to an exodus of further half a million refugees who will all come to Serbia and turn this country into a refugee camp, a camp for the homeless, the desperate, a country of humiliation, hatred, anger. In that case, we can hardly be expected to avoid blood being spilt here in our own home. Quite a few of our seams will burst. As if it is difficult to guide the Serbs in a wrong direction. The Partisans will fight the Chetniks, Milosevic's fans will fight Seselj's, those on the left will fight those on the right, those on the right will fight those in the middle, the newcomers, the refugees will fight the natives, and in that case the possibility of a conflict erupting in Kosovo cannot be excluded. Therefore, we must now chose between renaissance and the above. Those who cannot see what lies ahead might reject radical reforms and a radical new course. If they do, they will have to accep responsibility for the biggest national disaster in Serbian history.
VREME: You are the charismatic leader of the largest Serbian opposition party. You are also a charismatic participant andspeaker at public rallies. If you were to organize a protest now, what would it be against?
VUK DRASKOVIC: If those leading Serbia fail to draw adequate conclusions from all that happened so far, and it will soon become clear whether they failed, and if they continue down the old road, we will have no option but to engage in all kinds of political activity, including political rallies, in order to prevent the terrible outcome of the Yugoslav crisis which I already outlined.
VREME: But that outcome seems to be increasingly less dependent on Serbia?
VUK DRASKOVIC: No, no, the keys to our misfortune are ours and the keys to salvation are also in our hands. They are not in our reach, but whether they will be taken, inserted in the lock and turned, after which the door to revival will open, does not depend on the SPO.
VREME: Are you an optimist?
VUK DRASKOVIC: (long pause) I am sad and miserable because others fail to see what SPO sees.
Source: Belgrade weekly " Vreme ", August 21,1995.
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