CroatiaInternal political events
Frano Cetinic Petris discusses in the June 12, issue of Split weekly "Feral Tribune" some aspects of the current developments in the bosnian crisis.
Bosnia
Weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje" brought on its issue of July 13 -20, 1995. a review of S. Kasalo on two new peace initiative originating in Bosnia.
One of independent news pool's correspondents from Sarajevo, Mladen Paunovic reported on June 27, 1995. on the internal political events in the Muslim/Croat federation in Bosnia.
Croatia
The chief commentator of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", Damir Butkovic, analyses in the magazine's issue of June 23, the current activity of the ruling HDZ party to attract into its ranks some of the prominent politicians from the opposition.
Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" in the magazine's issue of June 19,1995, also tackles the subject of the attacks of the ruling HDZ party on the Croatian opposition. Macedonia
Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija" brought in its issue of June23,1995., a commentary on the formation of a coalition of nationalistic Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian nationa party PDP.
The same Skopje daily also carried in its issue of July 11, 1995. a commentary on the introduction of passports on the border between Macedonia and FRY.
T. Stanisavljevic of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni"discusses in the magazine's issue of June 16, 1995, the reasons behind the coalition of the national parties of Hungarians and Muslims in Serbia.
Relations between Serbia and Montenegro
"Monitor" journalist Vladimir Jovanovic writes for the AIM news pool through( the Belgrade radio B92 e-mail service) on the developments in the relations and further strains between Serbia and Montenegro.
In a separate report, Velimir Ilic of the same AIM agency, wrote a report on July 7, concerning the possibility of Slobodan Milosevic becoming the federal president.
The theme of relations between Serbia and Montenegro was also examined in detail by weekend edition of the independent Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" of July 1-2, 1995, in a text by Dragoljub Vukovic.
Serbia - Kosovo: possible opening of the dialogue
Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" brought in its issues of July 1-2 and July 3, two detailed texts by its Pristina correspondent Bahri Cani on the possible opening of the dialogue between Serbian authorities and Albanian opposition parties in kosovo, particularly after the round table on national relations, held in Belgrade.
In a continuing article of July 3, 1995. Cani discussed the internal relations within the Albanian parties in Kosovo.
Pristina Albanian language weekly "Koha" carried in its issue of July 11, 1995, its comment by Ylber Hysa on the round table in Belgrade.
The relations between
the Yugoslav army and the politicians in FRY
Podgorica weekly "Monitor" (author Beba Marusic) devotes its attention in the magazine's issue of June 16, 1195. to the scandal concerning the lease of one of touristic valleys in the city of Ulcinj to the Yugoslav army.
Well sourced journalist of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, writes in the June 16 1995, issue of the magazine about the relations of the Yugoslav military and political structures in the Federation, particularly Serbia.
Comments and analyses
Croatia
Predrag Lucic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" gave an editorial comment in the magazine's issue of July 10, 1995. concerning the political games evolving around the European basketball championship, and the move of the Croatian national team during the medal ceremony.
Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" carried in its issue of june 30, 1995. a comment by Tatjana Tagirov on creeping racism in official Croatian politics. Montenegro
In its issue of June 9,1995. Podgorica weekly "Monitor" brings an analysis of its regular contributor, sociologist Slobodan Inic, who attempts to differentiate between various types of ethnic cleansing. Serbia
The editor of the Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", Nebojsa Popov, discusses in the magazine's issue of June 1-15, 1995., the basic political concepts of the current regime in Serbia.
President of National Peasants' Party, Dragan Veselinov, comments and analyses on the same issue.
Media
Croatia
Vanja Novak reports (in an ironic tone) in the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" on the campaign in Croatia (after Serbia and Macedonia)on the activities, particularly tied to the media, of the "Soros foundation".
Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" brought in its issue of July 5, 1995. a comment by renowned Croatian journalist Jelena Lovric on the public burning of the independent weekly "Feral Tribune" in Split.
Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" brought in its issue of June 23, a conversation with Georgije Maric, the chief of the project "Hate Speech" of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee of Serbia, who discusses the situation in which the media production of hatred has become a "natural" and privileged form of expression. The killing of people was preceded by the killing of the language and by language.
Interviews
Skopje weekly "Puls" in its issue of July 7, 1995. carried an interview with Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, whose excerpts are brought here.
Forcible Mobilisation of Refugees in Serbia
Written by Filip Svarm, Dejan Anastasijevic, Jelena Grujic
Written by Filip Svarm and Milos Vasic
Frano Cetinic Petris discusses in the June 12, issue of Split weekly "Feral Tribune" some aspects of the current developments in the bosnian crisis.
Will Milosevic recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina, asks Cetinic. This is the question behind the affair with the UN hostages. Milosevic's count is following: for the good services in the hostage affair he expects from the West to be confirmed from the West as a responsible statesman, with bright prospects of the sanctions being lifted, unfreezing of the Yugoslav financial property abroad, approach to the IMF. But, to "knock some sense into Mladic and Karadzic", he promises them prolongation of the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Milosevic will recognize Bosnia, but this will not happen before he sees who has won: NATO or Pale. This all due to the fact that the West, with its behaviour, has all the prospects to repeat the Bay of Pigs, Indochina, or Somalia. The key question now has the West crossed "the Mogadishu line" - the military and political elite of the World is still rewinding the movie of the humiliation it had suffered when it attempted to switch from the mandate of peacekeepers into the mandate of peacemaker, returning, with shame, home from Somalia.
The democracies, which, according to Cetinic, suffer from strategic arthritis, are afraid that in Bosnia a trap of larger and wider confrontation awaits them, and this fear is to be commended. But these mitigating circumstances do not excuse their self - proclaimed political elites and oligarchies to act so cowardly and to show so much blindness and make so many mistakes in their analyses and prognostics.
Refusing to accept the war in Bosnia - and before it in Croatia - as the biggest challenge to their security and as a diversion intended to break their integration systems, the leading European countries have, unwittingly, found themselves in that war.
The cumulation of continuous retreat has its limits: that is the wall. The European countries are in front of a wall - they are separated from it by a thin line, the one that separates capture and humiliation of hostages from their individual or collective liquidation. Every retreat and defeat of ones, and every advance and success of the others, makes that line ever thinner. We have entered the deadly zero-sum game: the win on one side is equal to the defeat on the other.
America is to far, and Germany is strikingly absent ! It is left to Paris and london to summarily gather some nucleus of European defense. The "rapid reaction force" could be it. There are, of course, opinions that behind the whole affair there lies a wish for the retreat from the Balkans, lifting of the arms embargo and leaving everything to the war option. This dangerous precedent could inflame the whole Balkans, and threaten with a larger continental conflict. Even if it does not come to that, Moscow has enough maneuvering space to play with disunited European states.
And, a little fear from the Russians by the Europeans suits americans fine, thinks Cetinic. That fear is not dispelled by whistling in the night but by calling for their help. This returns them to the position they enjoyed during the cold war.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", June 12, 1995.
Weekly international edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje" brought on its issue of July 13 -20, 1995. a review of S. Kasalo on two new peace initiative originating in Bosnia.
Professor Muhamed Filipovic, the leader of the oppositionary Muslim LBO party has proposed holding of a conference of all democratic forces, on which a minimal agreement on political goals would be reached. Also, Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the state Presidency and president of the SGV - Serbian civic council, propagating a similar proposal in a meeting with the heads of the ruling SDA party, stated that such a gathering would bring a platform for reaching peace and re-integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kasalo analyzes both of these proposals.
As the LBO proposal states, this political conference would have as its goal to indicate the shortcomings of the current policies, find the ways for their overcoming, but also to overcome the deep and hardly bridgeable gap in the stances of SDA and HDZ. This political conference would deal with the matters that cannot become a subject of a deeper Parliamentary debate, since, as LBO thinks, it has been shown that the parliament is to narrow a forum for a broader political agreement. LBO also prepared a Memorandum which contains the assessment of the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It states, among other things, that "we have to reach an agreement what will Bosnia look like and how it will be governed".
This political conference proposed by LBO in essence is almost the same with the proposal of SGV, thinks it author dr. Mirko Pejanovic. Such a political gathering would have to come up with a political platform for reaching peace and re-integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Pejanovic also thinks that it would be necessary that the conference would have to include people who are now in exile, as well as democratically oriented individuals and organizations from occupied parts of Bosnia. Pejanovic thinks that a joint political conference could have influence on the larger part of Serbian people in the territory controlled by Radovan Karadzic.
Expressing his opinion, one of the heads of the Socialdemocratic party, Nijaz Durakovic, thinks that every political conference which would affirm the key principles of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be harmful.
Ismet Grbo, the spokesman of the ruling SDA stated that everybody has the right to give an initiative for holding of a political conference, but that it is a question of consensus whether it will be held.He stressed that if the goal of such a conference is to discuss things and hold a dialogue," we are for it", but if it is to search for something that would be alternative to the parliament, then "it is completely unnecessary".
The conference idea was also supported by president of the Council of Bosniak intellectuals, Atif Purivatra. On the other hand, representative of the Muslim-Bosniak organization (MBO) Mujo Kafedzic, considers such a conference "a loss of time", and Croatian peasant party and Union of bosnia nad Herzegovina social democrats" did not want to comment on the idea, since "they were not formally informed about it".
Source: International weekly edition of Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje", July 13,-20, 1995.
One of independent news pool's correspondents from Sarajevo, Mladen Paunovic reported on June 27, 1995. on the internal political events in the Muslim/Croat federation in Bosnia.
The news did not seem that important in the first instance, says Paunovic : an initiative, originating directly from Alija Izetbegovic was motioned in the Parliament that the president of the Bosnian Presidency would be chosen by the members of the Parlement, and that the constitution should be changed accordingly.Until now, the president was being chosen by the members of the collective Presidency, after the end of the mandate of the previous one.
In the placed proposal for the change of the constitution it is also envisaged the introduction of the vice president of the Presidency, which did not exist so far (no matter what Ejup Ganic used as his title so far). This position would also be chosen by the members of the Parliament, and he would deputize the president in his absence, but also he would replace him automatically if the president would not be able to execute his post anymore for any reason.
This initiative has already been transformed into a formal proposal for the change of the Bosnian constitution and the members of the Parliament will decide on it already at the next session .
Even though it has been covered in the democratic foil of "the Parliament as the highest legal an democratic organ of government", the SDA explanation of the newest initiative for the change of the constitution is naive and see through, thinks Paunovic. Who doesn't know that besides not very numerous opposition the Republican parliament is represented by the MP's from SDA party ?
Since the outbreak of the war there are no representatives of the Serbian SDS, the representatives of the Croatian HDZ do not participate in its sessions since they only recognize the Federation and its parliament, but not the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In such a situation, any outcome of the vote is known in advance.
So, contrary to the explanations of "greater democracy", this is a case of additional party security and the wish for further strengthening of the already dominating power of the SDA party. Some leaders within the party are not even hiding this fact, explaining this with the war situation and the explanation that in that case the state has to be headed by "Bosniaks-Muslims".
Since it is not a question of a Bosniak but of Bosniaks at the top of the state and since the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic is not in doubt, it is obvious that the request for the change of the constitution concerns the final legalization of a situation that exists for a number of years, where Ejup Ganic acts as the vice president, but also to confirm his political position. This only confirms the stories hear through Sarajevo that the party and political rating of Ejup Ganic is rising on the account of former favorite protege, prime minister Haris Silajdzic, to whom party, it seems, did not forgive a number of conflicts and polemics.
The Presidency as the collective chief of state composed of seven members in which there was equal representation of Muslims, serbs and Croats, represented in front of the domestic and foreign public the multiculturality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning the country as a democratic community of equal nations. The numerous support from abroad came to Bosnia on this basis. Changing the place of the election of the president to the Parliament and through the introduction of the post of vice president in the body that is called "collective head of state", is an obvious attempt to stifle the basic character of that institution.
If they are chosen by the parliament, the president and the vice president would have the obligation to report on their work to those that chose them - meaning their members of parliament, and not the other members of the Presidency - which further paves the way to inequality of other members of the "collective head of state", and slow transition to the presidential state system.
The concentration of power only in the hands of the members of only one nation, and solely from one exclusive national party of that nation, surely is not the way of forming Bosnia and Herzegovina as an equal community of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Of course, without these three nations, there is no unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this manner, the concept offered by the ruling SDA only moves towards gradual formation of the Bosniak - Muslim state.
In any case, concludes, Paunovic, not paying any attention to the arguments that speak against their initiative, the representatives of the ruling SDA party have sent their motion on the change of the Constitution to the Parliament, and the epilogue will not be long in coming.
Source: "AIM information pool, through B92 daily e-mail service, June 27, 1995.
The chief commentator of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", Damir Butkovic, analyses in the magazine's issue of June 23, the current activity of the ruling HDZ party to attract into its ranks some of the prominent politicians from the opposition.
Butkovic states that Damir Zoric, vice president of the Lower house of the Croatian parliament and one of the key politicians of the largest oppositionary party (the Liberals - HSLS), should be, according to rumors spread by the members of HDZ , joining the ranks of the ruling party soon, in its action of destroying or destabilizing oppositionary parties, which it has been leading successfully for the last few months.
During this action so far, the "Croatian National Party" (HNS) has practically been eradicated (although its leaders deny this) - having now only two members of the parliament - Savka Dabcevic - Kucar and Srecko Bijelic (formerly prominent communist politicians). It is important to stress that by incorporating Mirko Tankosic of HNS in its ranks, HDZ has, for the first time, included a Serb in the party top.Also, Denis Jelenkovic, who joined HDZ from the ranks of the Istrian IDS party, is at first authentic Istrian, first politician from Istra which was not implanted from Zagreb (like some others) and who has a high position in the party.
The "transfer" Damir Zoric, the only politician from Herzegovina in the top of the Liberal party, would round of the HDZ project of weakening the opposition front of the elections. Zoric himself is denying these rumors.
When the ruling HDZ started the new offensive a few months ago against the opposition, it was only a continuation of a six year old politics. This policy, as Tudjman openly stated a number of times, boils down on the formation of a bi-polar political system in Croatia. This means that Tudjman is seeking only one or two strong oppositionary parties, while all others would have to join or integrate with the survivors.
More than four years ago, Tudjman has caused a split within the ranks of then existing Demochristian party of late professor Ivan Cesar: a part of the demochristians, lead by Stjepan Herceg, who later became the public prosecutor, joined HDZ.
More than a year ago, HDZ attempted through a member of the Croatian diplomatic service, Ante Babic, a former emigre and a long - standing expatriate member of the HSS (the Croatian Peasant Party), to put that party under control too. Babic was supposed to form his own "statehood" peasant party, which was to confront the growing popularity of the original HSS party. Today, nobody even remembers what this party was called.
Lastly, HDZ begun a serious action this year for the destabilization of the opposition parties. The results of this action are already known: HDZ already has 78 members of parliament and a very secure majority in the House of representatives.
Butkovic also discusses the methods used by HDZ for these party switches. according to an unidentified source, the recruiting jobs are carried out by the lower quality party members which Tudjman holds close to his side, but of whom he has a very low opinion. The model involves taking a close look at the weak sides , personal or business, of the possible targeted oppositionaries. The offers made by the ruling party are usually very firm and take a short time to be realized. One oppositionary told his party chief that he was offered 200 thousand DEM in cash and a high state position for his "transfer".
Another was supposedly offered half million DEM: part in cash part in privileged business contracts. One politician who recently switched to HDZ has supposedly done that due to his gambling debts.
Political promotion is another incentive. Mirko Tankosic, a Serb who recently came from HNS (Croatian national party) will now become the vice president of the Parliament, instead of Milan Djukic of SNS.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus" June 23, 1995.
Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" in the magazine's issue of June 19,1995, also tackles the subject of the attacks of the ruling HDZ party on the Croatian opposition.
Culic says that it has once again become obvious that when they are having big problems the ruling HDZ party and the opposition react in a completely deferent.The ruling party somehow collect the conflicting pieces and withdrawal into their snail house until the storm is over, the opposition, on the contrary, exactly at that moment begins to fracture further.
The opposition has recently suffered a series of attacks, greater than ever, without an end to them in sight. One parliamentary party (HNS - Croatian national party) has been reduced by half, the other has lost a member in one of the parliamentary chambers, the third (IDS - Istrian party) is threatened with the same fate.
All oppositionary "migrant birds" have seeked the asylum in the ruling HDZ. If you add to this that the tremors in the largest opposition party -HSLS (the Liberals) seemed to be also caused by the ruling party - it becomes clear that HDZ remains what it was so far - the "sun" around which rotates the whole shaky planetary system of Croatian parliamentary parties.
All of them, excluding those that do not have enough influence to change something substantially, rotate in the orbit of the national interest, formulated and dictated by the ruling party, where they think that any distancing would be dangerous, but if they move too close, they become devoured or simply burned out of existence.
The possible oppositionary coalition seems shaky, even the "sure one" between HSLS and the Peasant party - HSS. HSLS recently became conscious of the fact that they made too many concession to HDZ but that this has not brought a relief from the pressure of the ruling party, on the contrary. They were duly accused that they have not supported enough operation "Lightning"(retaking of Western Slavonia) and that they are plotting with Nijaz Durakovic (oppositionary bosnian muslim politician) to re-form Yugoslavia, finally receiving a strong in-house conflict, which has only been partly calmed down.
The brewing conflict within the ruling party itself (on the relation between Tudjman and prime minister Valentic) calmed down when the prime minister was able to secure the reduction of some budgetary requests after a direct meeting with Tudjman. But, in much of the manner in which HDZ pretends to become a "front" in which flow in and disappear other parties, it itself could loose the marks of a political subject and turn in a social club which supports and claps to the "father of the nation" as, since recently, the official daily "Vjesnik" calls Tudjman.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", June 19, 1995.
Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija" brought in its issue of June23,1995., a commentary on the formation of a coalition of nationalistic Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian nationa party PDP.
This week's the top subject among the Macedonian public is the announced cooperation between the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP , that was mentioned on Monday ((20 June)), during the visit of the VMRO-DPMNE leadership to the Assembly of the Tetovo Commune. As it has been already reported, Ljupco Georgievski ((VMRO-DPMNE leader)) stated that his party is opened for cooperation with the Party for Democratic Prosperity, through coalitions on the level of communal assemblies.
The explanation for this was that such a coalition already exists in the Kicevo Assembly, and that an identical cooperation will follow in the Tetovo Assembly, as well as in the Skopje Municipality. Ljupco Georgievski repeated his statement to our newspaper two days later, emphasizing that such a cooperation will contribute to a greater stabilization of Macedonia on the interethnic plan.
Abdurahman Aliti, the PDP leader, said that this is an inter-party concordance of the interests on a local level, that is that there will be talks on coalition on the communal level wherever delegates of the VMRO- DPMNE and of the PDP dominate. Both presidents agreed that all hitherto inter-party discussions had been led on a lower level, without the participation of the parties' top leaderships.
The possible coalition between the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP, regardless of the degree, level, or form, has attracted significant attention, because it is a definitely known that numberless debates in the former assembly had demonstrated that these political parties have diametrically opposite stances and views on many vital state or national interest. Let us not mention that each one of these two parties has been building its political image in the past by launching attacks and disqualification against the other party, referring to it as to its strongest political opponent. Actually, a great number of the VMRO-DPMNE leaders have, on many occasions, stressed the danger of the Albanian factor for Macedonia, while the PDP has often spoken about the threat of Macedonian nationalism personified in the VMRO-DPMNE.
Reactions were, normally, expected from the respectable milieus. Such reactions first arrived from the VMRO-DPMNE branch in Tetovo, which disagreed with its presidency's stance. We have unofficially found out that other communal committees of the party reacted to the announced possibility for cooperation with the Party for Democratic Prosperity as well. It is now becoming clear that the background is the election of the Skopje mayor, and the possible combinations for a joint action of the delegates of the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP.
Vladimir Golubovski, the coordinator of the new election coalition VMRO-United enlightened this at a news conference two days ago. He sees the announced cooperation between the VMRO- DPMNE and the PDP -- in the context of the election of the new Skopje mayor -- as a dramatic step toward destabilization of Macedonia. Golubovski called the VMRO-DPMNE leaders "traitors", because they put themselves at the service of a befogging concept of the PDP which, according to him, basically remains unchanged and is directed against the most vital Macedonian national and state interests.
Ilijaz Halimi, president of the People's Democratic Party ((NDP)) has an interesting view on the same issue. In his opinion, it is obvious that the VMRO-DPMNE, with such a coalition, is trying to get any power possible which is of vital interest for it. Halimi has doubts on how successful this might turn out, but he says that it is clear that every party entering a coalition has, first of all, its party's interest in mind. The leader of the NDP thinks that the reason why the PDP is entering this coalition is because they realized that their coalition with the Alliance for Macedonia brought them nothing, and therefore, now they hope to get more, although only on the level of local authority. Halimi concludes that this initiative only shows that there is less moral and honor in policy-making today.
It is a fact that the announced cooperation between the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP, regardless of its internal party character, opens and creates some interesting and unusual situations. For instance, we must not overlook the fact that the PDP is already in coalition with the government, in which it has four ministers. This is why it is interesting to hear the opinion of the SDSM ((Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia)) secretary Ljupco Popovski, who thinks that pragmatism in policy makes sense as long as it does not turn into fraud against one's own voters and members.
"While the PDP is interested in cooperation on a local level, the VMRO-DPMNE is more in favor of a stronger coalition, including joint participation in the future parliamentary elections," Popovski says. "This VMRO-DPMNE view came as a shocking surprise to its voters, because this party was the main promoter of the anti-Albanian inclination in Macedonia, which was the focal point of its program and party actions in the past period," he says.
It was also interesting to hear the opinion of the representatives of the Liberal Party ((LP)), whose delegates in the Skopje Assembly, after the announced coalition between the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP, remain empty-handed in the division of the local power.
This question was addressed to the deputy president of the LP Risto Ivanov, at a news conference that was held yesterday on the occasion of the forthcoming assembly of the party, but unfortunately, he did not want his meeting with journalists to be burdened with questions that were not related to the forthcoming LP summit. He briefly replied that it is the right of the parties to make political assessments on all feasible coalitions and inter-party cooperations. "Our general view is that in this state everyone has the right to communicate and cooperate provided that there are such interests, and that is up to the parties to decide," Ivanov said.
As for the president of the Democratic Party Petar Gosev, this coalition is not a surprise because he claims that the partners in the Government do not function as one body anyway, but that the PDP, the SDSM, and the LP formed this "alliance" ((Alliance for Macedonia)) strictly to hold on to power.
"It is logical to believe that when two parties make a coalition, they have at least a minimum common platform. The question now is how some parties can make a coalition if, until that moment, they had diametrically opposite views on fundamental questions? It is up to them, and I would not like to comment on this," Gosev pointed out.
Tomislav Stojanovski, the president of the Democratic Party of Macedonia ((in Tetovo)) gave a very strong commentary on the occasion of the latest coalition formed on "his" turf. "The announced coalition is not a surprise because we constantly hear stances and opinions from the VMRO-DPMNE and the PDP which have one thing in common -- it is a befogged attempt to destabilize the state, and this was also indicated by in their opposition to Macedonia's admission to the Council of Europe," Stojanovski categorically claims.
"The cards are on the table," he emphasizes, "and it is now obvious that there is no cost for obtaining power and that all other interests are of secondary value. It is fortunate that the VMRO-DPMNE has finally disclosed its long-range strategy and the citizens will be able to judge the real intentions of 'the most national' party in Macedonia." The men of know say that a great number of fans and members of the VMRO-DPMNE in Tetovo will be strongly afflicted by the action of their leader, for which they claim "will not bring success here," while the DPM is waiting for them, the disappointed, with outstretched hands.
Source: Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija", June 23, 1995.
The same Skopje daily also carried in its issue of July 11, 1995. a commentary on the introduction of passports on the border between Macedonia and FRY.
The introduction of the passport regime by the FRY, practically at the start of the tourist season, when a number of Macedonians are leaving for their vacation in Montenegro, but also at a time when in neighboring Athens, as never before, the Greek-Serb relations were undergoing the most serious test of honesty and endurance, brought a certain doze of confusion in the sense - was exactly that decisive for such an unexpected decision, or is the reasons something else? The speed with which the passport regime with FRY started brought a lot of unpleasantness to the Macedonian citizens, but also strengthened the impression that this move has a political background which, as it is interpreted, is nevertheless at Macedonia's disadvantage.
Knowing the political level of the Macedonian-Yugoslav relations, as well as the insistent refusal to accept the principle of reciprocity, i.e. to respond to the passport regime introduced by Yugoslav citizens by Macedonia, with the exclusive recognition of the Macedonian passports upon the crossing of the border, this move should, however, bring more joy than bitterness.
Since, it actually indirectly recognizes the Macedonian-Serb border as indisputable, it recognizes and accepts, for the first time, the Macedonian travelling documents, which could be a step closer to the recognition of Macedonia and normalization of the relations between FRY and our country.
Even more so that the crossing of the border with I.D. cards, which no matter how liberal and in line with European trends, basically, didn't reflect the harmony in the Serb-Macedonian relations, but the problems in the diplomatic communication between the two countries.
The reasons for this latest decision of official Belgrade, are probably numerous and difficult to define because of the habit of the FRY to keep the subtle questions with Macedonia far away from the interest of the public.
Therefore, the presumptions and speculation remain, which give this whole episode political weight and according to which it can be assessed whether something else can be expected after the introduction of the passport regime on the plan of normalization of the relations with Macedonia, or is it a question of a move for only one use, which has practical meaning for our northern neighbor.
Namely, it has been clear, for some time now, that the normalization of the relations with Macedonia is one of the conditions for the lifting of the sanctions against FRY, and knowing the other conditions, as well as the stance of the government in Belgrade that there aren't any more serious problems on the line with Macedonia which could not be solved - it is the easiest one to fulfill. Furthermore, that the Macedonian side is not making any obstacles to that normalization and the economic, geographic and other conditions make it an interest to both countries.
In contribution to this thesis is also the recent visit of the vice-president of the Socialist party of Serbia Goran Perchevich to Macedonia, who was a guest at the Congress of the Macedonian socialists, but also held talks with the highest Macedonian official figures, which, as a fact, was very positively received in FRY as well.
This visit, as well as the insulting anti-Serbian outbursts at the basketball stadium in Athens, to which the Serbian spectators responded by demolishing the Greek embassy in Belgrade, was received in Athens as a signal that the relations between FRY and Macedonia are growing closer, and that the Greek-Serb alliance is not standing on such strong ground. Is the recognition of the Macedonian passports actually revenge of the Yugoslav government over the anti-Serb hysteria of the "close Greek people," or did Belgrade use the incident as an alibi to start with the normalization of the relations with Macedonia?
Whichever way, with the introduction of the passport regime, Macedonia took away a small diplomatic victory, Greece got a lesson on the theme "building friendship on the basis of hostility toward another country," while Montenegro - which views this as a devised attack against its tourism, will have to wait some ten more days, until the Macedonian tourists obtain the necessary travelling documents.
Source: Skopje daily "Nova Makedonija", July 11, 1995., through MAK e-mail service;
T. Stanisavljevic of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni"discusses in the magazine's issue of June 16, 1995, the reasons behind the coalition of the national parties of Hungarians and Muslims in Serbia.
That anything is possible here in its own way is confirmed by the formation of an unusual political coalition in Serbia between Hungarians and Muslims form the Sanjak region. The leader of the "Democratic union of Vovodina Hungarians" (DZVM), Andrasz Agoston and the leading man of the key party of Sandjak Muslims, (SDA), Rasim Ljajic, have agreed to cooperate more closely in the future.
At the meeting the held on June 11, in Becej, they reached a conclusion that DZVM and SDA have many close points in their political orientation and that their cooperation should be based, first of all, on the concept of the autonomy of Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, made by DZVM. Ljajic saw this concept as very close to the similar ideas of the Muslims in Sandjak.But...
How atypical this coalition is from the standpoint of classical principle on which political partnerships are formed is best seen from the following facts: besides the fact that these are ethnic groups that speak different languages, the fact is also that in question are two confronted religions. The first live in economically and culturally most developed province in current Yugoslavia, the latter in one of the most backward regions in this part of the world, and so on.
To make everything more unusual, DZVM has five members of parliament in the Serbian parliament and two in the Federal one. SDA is not a parliamentary party.
The simplest answer to this question could be searched in the statements of Agoston and Ljajic that actually the Serbian regime pushed them to cooperation. The national minorities are, as they say, in a tougher position in relation to the Serbs as the majority population. Both of these politicians believe that Serbia has to start its return to the international community by solving the minority questions of non-Serbian populations on its territory.
Both these parties have oppositionary political organizations in their national groups, probably due to the fact that both Agoston and Ljajic are open to the idea of dialogue with Serbian authorities. They both have held talks with Serbian governments through the years on the position of minorities, but both complain that the authorities are still not ready to seriously undertake the solution of the questions of national minorities.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", June 16, 1995.
"Monitor" journalist Vladimir Jovanovic writes for the AIM news pool through( the Belgrade radio B92 e-mail service) on the developments in the relations and further strains between Serbia and Montenegro.
During the bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions around Pale at the end of May, the key news on Belgrade television was that Serbian president Milosevic received the presidents of the Constitutional courts of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Federation. Serious analysts, who do not believe in incidental political steps of Milosevic see the main reason in the beginning of the campaign for the regulation of legal/political situation in the federation, with the goal to prepare the terrain for the arrival of a new federal boss, Milosevic himself, who, of course, could not be satisfied with the current prerogatives and the position held by Zoran Lilic.
So, for the new king, a new royal suit, says Jovanovic. But, something is not falling into place correctly. At the southern end of the federation, i Montenegro, resistance is developing to the finely prepared plan of the Serbian president. This resistance, as sen in Belgrade, could not be exclusively tied to Slavko Perovic and the Montenegrin liberal movement. Actually, the accusations for separatism are now squarely laid on the cocky Montenegrin prime minister Milo Djukanovic, and this is not only of a current date.
Djukanovic entered a serious confrontation with Serbia in mid-1993., when this republic blockaded the Montenegrin border near Prijepolje, introducing a specific trade embargo. Djukanovic got angry, introducing trade relations with Albania, and through it with Macedonia - including oil and the rest. Big money started to circulate due to state contraband, so Djukanovic has recently stated proudly:" Montenegro is self-financing itself completely first time in its history!".
The sum of money turning around the Montenegrin prime minister which collects "state racket" through various taxes has become so large last year, that it secures him a position out of direct control of anybody, even Belgrade.
But, the Serbian police, which duly makes sure that nothing "unforeseeable" could happen in Montenegro, saw immediately where this process is leading. The first reaction came from a former close friend of Djukanovic, current Federal customs chief, Mihalj Kertes, attempted last year to install his customs officers on the Montenegrin-Albanian border, under the control of certain Jovan Markus, who was supposed to secure that contraband money should mostly reach Belgrade.
Djukanovic took measures to prevent that, even writing an open letter to the state influenced Podgorica daily "Pobjeda" in which he exposes Kertes to open criticism. This was just a first step in an open conflict of the montenegrin prime minister with the Serbian police and official Belgrade.
A counter attack was soon to follow. The "Yugoslav Automobile federation" (AMSJ) is the only federal institution dominated by Montenegrins. It is also the only organization of relevant importance that has not been excluded from international associations and is in direct connection with the functioning of customs.
It seems also that very large sums of hard currency are circulating through the AMSJ. Vukasin Maras, former general secretary of AMSJ and currently the head of the Montenegrin secret police, also gave harsh resistance to Kertes' people activities against Djukanovic, who also the president of the AMSJ.
During 1994., at least on two occasions, Serbian secret police, accompanied by members of financial police, entered the premises of AMSJ, to look into possible illegal activities. Once, they interrupted a meeting presided by Djukanovic, involving even a show of automatic rifles. These "drop in-s" also include one excursion of unidentified para-military unit, supposedly from Serb Krajina, requiting racket money for the Serb cause across Drina.
Another activity included, as Jovanovic calls it, the "specialty of the house" (of the Serbian secret police), where Djukanovic, during his frequent visits to Belgrade an to various parties at plush locals, was to meet a folks singer "of fatal curves". The Serb police would make audio and visual recordings of the possible meetings, which would then be put into circulation. Djukanovic did not catch the bait, mainly due to timely warning of Maras, who was then placed on the Serbian police "black list".
Parallel to this, the Serbian police activates its intelligence network in Montenegro. This though included a choice of verified people and the last "line of defense" in the Montenegrin police high levels, controlled by the Serbian police. The key activity was collection of written material concerning alleged heavy criminal acts of Djukanovic, which then, through various channels are given to the public, which was to form the least favorable impression of the Montenegrin prime minister.
Djukanovic reacted with firing and jailing, but more importantly, all this resulted in the cooling of relations between Montenegrin and Serbian police. Supposedly, the Serbian police requested "better" cooperations with their colleagues in Montenegro, but in Podgorica they saw that as an attempt at "covering" of their service. So, Belgrade then wants federal police - now existing only on paper - with Podgorica retorting: all right, but first lets return the situation to the state prior to your incursion into the federal police premises in October of 1992.
At the top level of the Serbian police there is growing mistrust towards the tendency Djukanovic has shown to strengthen his police force and "separate" it from the Serbian one.
The Serbian estimates say that Montenegro currently has 4 thousand policemen dressed in , what irritates them most, American uniforms. There are reports out of Bijelo Polje, a montenegrin city of strategic importance to Serbia (a place where Arkan had an "excursion" previous Autumn), that there is a concentration of Montenegrin police there (some 400 men), armed with automatic rifles and at least two armoured carriers, something that, according to this Serbian police report, resembles a slow emerges of the Montenegrin "paramilitary Montenegrin army".
Maras, who after leaving the AMSJ and after the purges in the Montenegrin police, took over as its chief of secret operations, was spotted by the Serbian police as having contacts with former Montenegrin police officials purged in the late Eighties during the Milosevic ascent to power and suspected of having sympathies for the project of an independent Montenegrin state and that they are logistically supporting some montenegrin parties.
All this is having direct complicating influence on the relations between Podgorica and Belgrade, even though this is being covered up at the moment, cohesion being kept on the undecided fate of the experiment named FRY.
Except the customs war, the Serbs are attempting to take out of Djukanovic's hand the strong control over the complete economy of Montenegro, masking that through the draft legislation on the enterprises. As heard in Belgrade, the plan of this law is the "return of factories to workers", which would open the terrain in Montenegro for the strengthening of social discontent and return of populism, meetings and similar.
So, Djukanovic is centralizing the financial flow in Montenegro, and it seems that money is securing political power. So this leads to the conclusion that Djukanovic will not be to eager with the idea to give an already bitten cake to somebody else. And that "somebody" might be Slobodan Milosevic himself, who desires unitary federal power, with strong control of everybody, including the monetary flow. Djukanovic is the leader of the caste of "interest" Montenegrins, which lead very pragmatic policy, and does not have some deeper, particularly national convictions, making further predictions on the fate of the union quite murky at the moment, concludes Jovanovic.
Source: Independent news pool AIM, through B92 e-mail service;
In a separate report, Velimir Ilic of the same AIM agency, wrote a report on July 7, concerning the possibility of Slobodan Milosevic becoming the federal president.
A joke is being told in Belgrade, says Ilic - the Croats have it easy, their president is older. This remark, of course, being made as an allusion to the life-long presidency of Tito until his death in 1980.
Milosevic was first elected to a term of five years in 1990.,but received the voters' confidence again in 1992 at the extraordinary elections. The serbian constitution envisages that same person can be chosen to be president only two times, excluding, in the form it is now, the possibility of Milosevic being elected again. His opponents for the post so far, have either retired, or currently have more serious political things to do. The only person showing any serious intention to replace Milosevic at the presidential post, Vojislav Seselj, has been quite effectively marginalized : he is in jail for the second time, and the intentions of his Radical party to indent the Serbian politics in the manner that the party name states, have almost no chance in the current balance of political power.
In the circles of the Serbian opposition there is relative self - confidence present that Milosevic will, due to the fact that he has "betrayed the Serbian question" and proclaimed all-serb unity, destroy himself with the new policy towards the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. But, the Serbian president is keeping himself in good political shape. Through his presidential office there is a march of world diplomats engaged in the peace process, and in his own backyard" nobody can still do anything without his knowledge and agreement.
The lethargy that took over the political public has been shaken by the mediation (many say a manufactured and not a spontaneous one) in the UN hostage crisis in Bosnia, promoting his influence through the use of "personal envoy", the chief of state security, Jovica Stanisic. This has somewhat improved his rating with the interlocutors from the world.
At the same time, he made sure that the domestic public, through the controlled state media gets, or strengthens the picture of him as a peacemaker, which he has begun to cultivate from the moment he has introduced the embargo towards the Bosnian Serbs.
Some analysts of Milosevic's "collected works" tend to assume that he seriously counts he will adjust his stateman's, diplomatic, political and even party activities, to his undeniable wish to remain number one. If his ambitions end up at presiding over Serbia - current Serbian constitution excludes that possibility.
So, if he intends to be elected again, he needs to forge out a constitutional change that would favour another election. Judging by the capabilities so far to use the parliamentary majority of his Socialist party and its collaborators in the Serbian parliament to achieve anything he wants, this would also seem a possibility, since the current opposition did not present itself as an opponent that could more seriously "tangle his threads".
In other words, that possibility would be conditional by the retaining of power, influence and possibly favorable results which Milosevic would have to achieve in peace negotiations, relief from sanctions, and first of all, solution of the national question.
On the other hand, if Milosevic's ambitions are geared towards leading the federation, the situation would be further complicated, or a new version of the Federal constitution would be in order, since the current one does not allow a segment of authority to which Milosevic is used in Serbia.
Besides that, according to article 97. the president is being elected by the Federal parliament, where the balance of power in current circumstances does not guarantee an easy favorable outcome. This more, that the other member of the federation, Montenegro, already feels inferior in relation to the "other eye in the head", and according to the logic of things, the next president should be a Montenegrin. In any case, Milosevic's promotion in that case, would mean changes of the Federal constitution. It seems though, that nobody believes in the possibility that Milosevic would retire after the end of his mandate.
Source: Independent newspool "AIM", through B92 daily e-mail service, July 7, 1995.
The theme of relations between Serbia and Montenegro was also examined in detail by weekend edition of the independent Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" of July 1-2, 1995, in a text by Dragoljub Vukovic.
While in Serbia there is an open season of "hunt on people" exiled from Serb and non-Serb regions from the other side of the Drina river, in Montenegro, the other member of the state that wants to be the successor of SFRY, not one case of mobilization of exiled Serbs has been registered.
The refugees that have found themselves in the Montenegrin "ecological state" are not, though, left without fear that at one point there could be knock on their temporary homes by Knin or Karadzic policemen, alone , or accompanied by their montenegrin colleagues. But, potential Karadzic and Martic warriors encourage themselves with the belief that montenegro is something else, or, that Montenegrin authorities are a bit more scrupulous from the Serbian one and that it will not return them to the places they ran away from. So far, their hopes did not sour, and the Montenegrin regime can write itself a positive point.
This new show of difference between official Belgrade and official Podgorica again opens the dilemma: are the regimes in Serbia and Montenegro identical twins or just "simple ones", which differ also in their character structure, asks Vukovic.
The Montenegrin regime, surely, cannot be looked out of the wider context of the policy personified by Slobodan Milosevic, nor can it be overlooked that it is in a form of vassal relation towards the regime in Serbia. The manner in which it has been put into place and the armature which has tied this regime with what has been created during the last number of years in Belgrade, gives quite a strong alibi to anybody who gives equal critical treatment to "both eyes in the head". But, does the Montenegrin one look at thing a bit more mildly ?
It seems that the Montenegrin leadership has concluded a bit earlier the internal and external limits of the policy which excavates the underground layers of nationalism. Whether it was the youth of Bulatovic, Djukanovic and Marovic, fear from conflicts in their own backyard and undefined future or political enlightenment, but at least those people sometimes showed the wish to exit the charmed circle of Milosevic policies and shine the light on their difference.
To spotlight the difference between the big and the small federal unit the best example could be the relation towards the property transformation. It cannot be overlooked there that the Montenegrin authorities, in differing to Serbian ones intend to completely end with the "social" property. Due to undoubtful rejection from Podgorica to the law which would further protect the property that is "everybody and nobody", the proposed draft regulation was withdrawn from the procedure and returned for reworking.
On the international plane, while he was still the head of Montenegrin foreign service, Miodrag Lekic (current Yugoslav ambassador in Rome), Montenegro attempted to play somewhat different role. Lekic gave a personal touch to this approach, but he also had the support of Djukanovic and Bulatovic.
Since, after all, the differences between actions of Podgorica and Belgrade did not reach such depth that would be unbridgeable, there could be an founded impression formed that the different approach of Podgorica might be a simulation , personally verified by Slobodan Milosevic. But, looking at the history of recent relations between Serbia and Montenegro, one can still reach the conclusion that Montenegrins were able to allow themselves the luxury of independence and difference in those things that did not seriously and essentially bring into question the general political line drawn in the dust of current time by Serbian president.
It would be unrealistic to expect that Montenegro, as the younger and economically dependent partner in the federation would become the bearer of changes. The Montenegrin deference is limited by sister's hand and it shows itself more as a potential than as a realized possibility. In current circumstances this is an additional argument for those which support a sovereign Montenegro, concludes Vukovic.
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", July 1-2, 1995.
Serbia - Kosovo: possible opening of the dialogue Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" brought in its issues of July 1-2 and July 3, two detailed texts by its Pristina correspondent Bahri Cani on the possible opening of the dialogue between Serbian authorities and Albanian opposition parties in kosovo, particularly after the round table on national relations, held in Belgrade.
With the political metamorphosis of the Belgrade regime, one could expect that the possibilities for the normalization of the situation in Kosovo would become a current topic again. The round table "Democratic processes and ethnic relations", held under the patronage of the "Democratic centre" (of Dragoljub Micunovic) serve the purpose for vice president of the ruling Serbian socialist party, Goran Percevic, to "remind" his interlocutors from the ethnic communities on the " openness" of his party - and in that respect Serbia - for a dialogue. It is quite clear that he will not be reprimanded for this.
It is an important fact that present were representatives of all (except one) parliamentary political parties of Albanians, Hungarians and Muslims, as well as international community. The expectations were fulfilled: the biggest attention was caused by the statements of Goran Percevic and the delegation of kosovo, comprised of vice president of LDK, Fehmi Agani, Veton Surroi and Behluli Becai.
After three years, this was a first opportunity for the interlocutors to tell one another directly everything what they wanted and it is quite natural that in many cases they did not agree. Butt, it is an encouraging fact that all participants expressed a high level of tolerance and readiness to listen to a different opinion - which for domestic circumstances is not so little.
Reliable sources told the author, though, that everything did not pass only in "listening". Concrete agreements were reached. The participants agreed that, at the moment, the story of union of all Serbian states is debased and that it is necessary to redefine Serbian national interests. The need to redefine the approach to kosovo problem, as came out of the closed doors, was laid out by Fehmi Agani, which was accepted by all participants, including Percevic. It remained a secret what this re-definition means.
The course of the two day discussions could lead to the conclusion that "re-definition" is closely tied to the strategy and approach to problems. A conclusion was reached that there should be an "urgent" solution of schooling, health, employment (meaning return of Albanian workers to their former jobs), as well as the question of administration.
This approach of gradual (one by one) solution of concrete problems, is a product of compromise in which the albanian side "subscribed" itself not to (while it is not reached) raise the question of final status of kosovo, and in return, the Serbian side will not refer to Albanians as a national minority. In the closed part, also, it was said that sanctions must be lifted - since abroad, albanians, as the citizens of FRY, have great problems.
Whether it will be realized, it remains to be seen in later contacts, but it remains a fact, as was confirmed to the author by Hungarian member of Parliament, Pal Sandor, that an agreement was reached between Vojvodina Hungarians and Percevic (eye to eye) that the dialogue begun four years ago is to be continued.
Agani told the author ("for the record") that the whole gathering passed in somewhat surprisingly good tone, coming to the conclusion that the Serbian side looks at the Kosovo problem with more understanding. Discussing the possibility of establishment of more serious Serbian-albanian dialogue, Percevic said that, in one manner or another, it was lead until now too. . He also gave a positive evaluation of the presence of the Albanian side at this gathering.
In a continuing article of July 3, 1995. Cani discussed the internal relations within the Albanian parties in Kosovo.
The barometer of certain state media in Serbia, says Cani, as far as Kosovo is concerned, shows that "cracks" in the Albanian movement are getting so deep, and that Ibrahim Rugova has collected so many mistakes that it is only a question of the day when he will have to leave the game, being replaced by Mahmut Bakali, Adem Demaqi, Reqep Qosja, Azem Vlasi...
Rugova himself though, recently had a tour in Spain and US, meeting high officials of those governments. If one is to judge the opinions of around twenty sources polled by the author (including the ones mentioned as the replacements) the peace policy of the leader of kosovo Albanians still enjoys the confidence of the larger part of the establishment there. But, it is also evident that putting of the kosovo problem on the "waiting list" and repeated statements of the high international officials that high level of autonomy for kosovo is the maximum, has stressed the need for regrouping among Albanian political forces and unification of internal factors.
Overdimensioning of the outside factor and diminishing of the internal one is the most often cited objection to Rugova's LDK. The author became aware of the fact that the last session of the presidency of the Socialdemocratic party of Kosovo came to an official stance that a moratorium is put in place on the activities of political parties until the Kosovo question is solved.
Llulleta Pula, the president of this party said that this initiative was started after they came to the realization that the "political parties have become bureaucratized and have lost touch in their base". As an alternative until the final solution of the kosovo problem, a National council should be established, where a complete national potential would be gathered - the political parties - the Academy of sciences, unions, educational workers, but also individuals of name and authority. The similar line was also recently stressed by Adem Demaqi. The need for the concentration of national potential in one political body is stated by Mark Krasniqi, president of the Kosovo Demochristian party.
To reach the goal of formation of the National council there are already discussions conducted. Their broad agreement was given by Qosja, Bakkali,Demaqi, Socialdemocratic, Parliamentarian, National parties and other factors.
On the other hand, says the author, without the acceptance of the LDK, the strongest party in Kosovo, to participate in this initiative, such a Council would not have enough political weight. At the moment, though, it does not support this idea.
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", July 1-2., and July 3, 1995.
Pristina Albanian language weekly "Koha" carried in its issue of July 11, 1995, its comment by Ylber Hysa on the round table in Belgrade.
The international round table "Democratic Processes and International Relations" celebrated last week at the "Intercontinental Hotel" in Belgrade, attempted to start a debate with quite ambitious goals.
Participants from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Novi Pazar, Prishtina, USA and different European states tried to find answers to many questions imposed by the disintegration of the the Former Yugoslavia, the possibilities for democratization and the discussion about inter-ethnic relations within this context.
Apart from participants from Serbia and Kosova, other participants were also people holding political and scientific posts, as Wimmer from the OSCE Assembly, Imben, the Vice- President of the European parliament, Arens from the ICFY, Kasoff from Princeton, Bianchini from the University of Bologna, etc. The meeting, which was not completely open to the media, didn't conceal the satisfaction of the organizer for having gathered so many participants from different parts.
The first part of the meeting was an attempt to explain the reasons of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the internal motives (the "inherited partisan conscience about resistance against the whole world" - Desimir Tosic, or "the closed national-Communist economy of '74" - Vuckovic) or the external motives ("why did the second Yugoslavia fall apart in the same lines as the previous one" - asked Academician Macura and "what was the role of the foreigners" - asked Stojanovic).
This introduction feared to become a broad theorization, but became very concrete with the speech of one of the mediators, Alean Kasoff, Director of the Project for Inter-Ethnic Relations of Princeton University, who said that it was known that Yugoslavia would play an important role in the fate of the Balkans and that if Serbs don't face this, then the democratic processes will be slow here, meanwhile "Serbia has set the demarkation lines between itself and Europe - at the cost of itself and its citizens".
America understands its role in the assistance towards European integration, he said, while Micunovic, from the "Democratic Center", also one of the organizers of this meeting, explained in his introductory statement that the former concept of sovereignty on non-involvement in internal affairs was surpassed long ago!
The first session, apart from the abstract theorizing and a ping-pong about the causes and the blame for the destruction of the SFRY, could also be stressed with Rasim Ljajic's statement, who said that insisting to claim that this is a civil and religious war, means that the real reasons of the war are trying to be concealed.
The government here can't wash its hands from this war with statements about peace - said Ljajic, but with mechanisms which will stop hatred, to add later that the thesis on the impossibility of coexistence of nations in Bosnia would mean that Serbs and Muslims can't live together in Sandzak either! `fait accompli which can't stand from the legalistic point, but also because the juridical status of Kosova was ruined with the use of violence and without the will of the people (Surroi). In this aspect, it is interesting to stress a reaction of Gert Arens according to whom "FRY" is not a creature created with the consumption of the right to self-determination.
The second remark in this aspect came from Fehmi Agani who through "a retrospective digression" elaborated why Kosova can't be treated as a problem of minorities and why self-determination is the most compatible framework for this aspect. The reaction of the other participants to these remarks was not noisy and there was quite some tolerance, normally, differing, in this case, the standard Serb standpoints about the solution within the borders of Serbia or maybe even a compromise solution (Percevic from SPS and some other participants) which could have created the impression that the participants didn't want to "burden" the meeting with many argu™ments, but maybe more with a willingness to talk, even more knowing that this was the first time in which representatives of different political structures were gathered in one place.
Nevertheless, dissonant tones were heard - Kosova can't be observed in the ranking of the minorities in Sandzak and Vojvodina, as Tosic said, or "there are too many Albanians to call them a minority" - as Ilija Djukic from the Democratic Party, and former Foreign Minister in Panic's government (and such postures were also heard from Pal Sandor and Rasim Ljajic). In this context, what Paul Shoup, the American expert on inter-ethnic relations in the Former Yugoslavia, said, was interesting: "The democratization of Serbia depends on Kosova!".
Maybe the list of non-ordinary statements can also include Micunovic's statement in the part where he spoke of the need to calm down the passions, talk about Bosnia and Knin and also about solutions for Kosova which could go over the broad autonomy. Finally, if "a million Albanians want this, why shouldn't there be talks about it"! If the mentioned figure used to describe the number of Albanians is not a lapsus lingua, then it could be a suggestion, maybe a solution for half of the Albanians!
Such parallelism became even broader in the session about the purposes of the Serbian national program, which among others should give an answer about what is the real Serbian national interest in Kosova. "The war had also wrong definitions of national programs, based on ethnic-concepts" said Dusko Janjic, who in his statement about the "equality" of the Serbian people in Bosnia was asked by Behlul Beqaj whether the status of Serbs is looked upon from the geo-political and democratic aspect, for according to this logic, Albanians too have the right to "equality".
In regard to the definitions of the goals of the Serbian national program, it was mainly discussed on the grounds of the needs for democratiza™tion and integration in European processes and especially economic strengthening, but there were also approaches grounded on "interests" (Academician Macura).
In this aspect, the statement delivered by the Vice-President of the European parliament, who according to a narration on the flow of integration of the Eastern states in European structures, declared that states like Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Macedonia as "black holes" of this Europe and they are nowhere! Anyhow, this meeting which tried to give answers to many acute questions, "threw" the issue of Albanian-Serb relations, which within the "democratic processes" was focused the most during this gathering.
The discussion about this problem came as result of analysis of the actual situation, including the recent diplomatic pressures in relation`Christopher and Rugova). This is how could the joint discussions of the representatives of the ruling party and the others, especially the Albanians. This is how maybe Percevic's public pronunciation can be explained. He declared to some Belgrade media that Serbia is ready and open to a dialogue with Albanians, i.e., that "Albanians have an open path towards dialogue".
This meeting too - said the vice-chairman of the SPS at the end of the meeting, "proves the tolerance reigning in Belgrade"! This statement, combined with the need for public pronouncement, as if it intended to achieve two things: to be used in times of pressures against Belgrade (about the recognition of Bosnia) for external needs, to show that Belgrade is willing to have a dialogue with Albanians, and on the other hand use it for internal needs, to assure the "highway" for dialogue with Albanians even without the assistance of "the third party". Translated into diplomatic language, this means buying time in the unpleasant situation of pressures.
But,on the other hand, Agani replied to this public pronunciation by saying that "The round table was not a Serb- Albanian conversation"! Anyhow, it is not easy to dispute the good intention of the meeting, if it is understood as a willingness to solve problems with political means. But, how big is the capacity of the seriousness to approach the conversations and how should this be understood outside the doors of this meeting?
This is maybe the announcement of the possibilities of discussing some segments of the Kosovan crisis, something like education, sports, etc., for there were rumours about this in the hall-ways... Even more, the visible presence of "Nova Demokratija" in this meeting, which participates in the government coalition, suggests some possible directions of the future contact between Belgrade and Prishtina.
The preparations, in the sense of the offers for contacts are visible in this Party, while the vice-premier of Serbia, who is also member of this party, was the host to all participants of this meeting (but the ones from Kosova). Krstic, with his balanced rhetoric tried to show the guests, especially the foreigners, that there was willingness for dialogue and democratization. How much is this willingness a disposition imposed by the circumstances, or a wish to overcome the problems, this could be seen from the conversion of the will into something concrete.
It seems as if in this "conversion", Belgrade is somewhere between the amorti™zation of the foreign pressure and the inertia to continue the standard policy towards Kosova. Maybe between these two extremes, segmentary talks about sports and education could be expected... And maybe this is the "road" towards dialogue with Albanians announced by the SPS vice-chairman!?
If the logic of this one sided path is followed, then Albanians will have only the side-walk. Unless Percevic is told that the way to Kosova has to pass through an international highway...
Source: Pristina weekly "Koha", July 11, 1995.
Marusic says that the dose of servility of the Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic expressed at the celebration of the Day of the Yugoslav naval force in Kotor, has gone completely overboard. Equating himself with Montenegro, Bulatovic has merrily announced the decision to give for use to the naval forces the suburb of Pinjes in the city of Ulcinj, of around 6,500 square meters, as well as the decision to allow the building of a naval port in the valley of Valdanos in the same city.
Of course, there is no basis for this generosity of Bulatovic in the Montenegrin constitution. This is in the domain of the requests made from Belgrade, which the Montenegrin president duly fulfils, guarding the crumbs of his power.
The interest of the army to take over one of the most beautiful oasis on the Montenegrin coast conditioned an additional debate in the Parliament. First, the chief of navy announced the building of new military objects on the montenegrin coast, and then the Parliament "decided" to change the Spacial plan of Montenegro. Strong protests from part of the opposition did not change anything.
What did the president of the state to which tourism is supposed to be the highest priority give to the army of FRY, asks the author, giving the following data: the Valdanos valley has been described in the experts' study as covering 14,000 square meters, with the capacity of 1,400 to 2,00 bathers, backed by the largest olive orchard in Europe and no environmental pollution.
For the president, the key advantage is the naval fleet. Only a week before the announcement, the official daily "Pobjeda" wrote about "another attractive touristic complex soon will start functioning", meaning the complex "Pinjes", which the government has bought for around three million dinars (one million DEM current rate). The sudden reversal in announcements on the purpose of use of this complex brought to the fore again the story of Serbian and Montenegrin faction within the ruling regime in this republic.
There are no illusion, says Marusic, that Boka kotorska bey will, after these moves, be left without the presence of military hardware, even though the international community will insist on the demilitarization of the belt around Prevlaka. Elimination of "long guns" from Boka does not mean complete demilitarization. The submarine docks will remain at Lustica, and the military commanders are announcing that a naval academy will be opened in Kotor.
So, a complete domination of the military over the Montenegrin coast is to come about. On one side Boka, on the other Ulcinj, and in the middle, something that is not open to general public - operative takeover of bays in equidistant spreads. The military circles will point out the strategic importance of Boka and the advantage which Mavrijan heights over Valandos give for the control of Otranto. All this under the constant and creepy premise about some pretenses on Boka and enemy surroundings.
A particular angle of looking at things is given by the thesis of transformation of the Yugoslav military, supported in part by the Montenegrin regime. The announced reduction of the naval fleet is not a result of the declared project "ecological Montenegro", but a result of the objective state of the vessels it is composed of. No matter how much Bulatovic attempts to stress the bravery of the navvy in pulling out the main part of the fleet from "seccessionistic" Croatia, he can hardly deny the fact that this fleet is old and conceptually set up for sudden attacks from island positions, which does not suit current completely open coast.
A larger part of the navy is not envisaged for stronger seas, and the ships start jumping like cans when stronger winds blow. A larger part of the fleet should be "pensioned", but even this will not help Montenegro realize that a successful concept of defense could be built on an effective coast guard like that of Malta, instead of cumbersome army, which in our case represents an element of political control. The choice of Valandos in another aspect is not a coincidence - Ulcinj has a strong concentration of Croatian and Albanian population.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", June 16,1995.
Well sourced journalist of the Podgorica weekly "Monitor", Vladimir Jovanovic, writes in the June 16 1995, issue of the magazine about the relations of the Yugoslav military and political structures in the Federation, particularly Serbia.
Since Slobodan Milosevic changed his policy towards the rebelling Serbs in Bosnia, the high officers of the Yugoslav army use every little opportunity to show passive resistance to such a policy. To rebel more openly - they did not have the guts, and such a situation at the beginning of this spring gave the impression of a conspiracy in the high command. Alarmed, Milosevic used the case of colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic to warn chief of staff, general Perisic and company, who did not seem to have drawn the right conclusions.
It seems that general Perisic made enemies with Milosevic when in April of this year he supported the petition of pensioned and active high officers (some 200 of them), who expressed their discontent to Milosevic about the border on the Drina river.
This was given proof by the speech held by Federal president Zoran Lilic on April 11 in the "High Officers house" in Belgrade, when he said that a judgement about the Army cannot be given on the basis of actions of individuals, whether former or current officers of the Army are in question. At the end, he delivered Milosevic's message: "we have to disable those who disgrace the image of the army. Such conduct has to be stopped by all means, including their removal from the Army ranks!".
The situation had further developments. At the end of May, during the Air force day celebrations, general Perisic stated that the only things functioning in the state are "the Army and the currency". It was a type of a critical remark - known to whom - which has a deep meaning and a clear goal. The statement did not get publicity, and as Jovanovic says, according to his sources, this whole ping-pong match between Milosevic and the army could end up with a new set of punishing and already traumatic pensioning, by the beginning of autumn at the latest.
The president of the Highest military court has already been pensioned, coming after, it seems, not so inane statement of general Aleksandar Vasiljevic to "Monitor" about the situation in the military legal system. The key question remains though, will the purge begin at the top, meaning general Perisic ?
The situation concerning him is quite delicate, and can be described in dark colors. Among other things, Milosevic was particularly revolted by the situation at the celebration of Serbia's statehood day, March 28, when instead of a real military band, he received a group of recruits with "playback".
After that, the second, larger group of pensioned and active officers - roughly named the "communists" - put into internal circulation a material with authentic statements and unknown facts on the warfare activities of general Perisic., which was - according to that version - far from what current chief of staff presented to the then army top. This was obviously done in support of Milosevic, and the conflict with nationalistic officers is not without its ideological moments.
The material states, that during the blockade of the artillery academy in Zadar (Croatia) in 1991. Perisic cried and spread defeatism, covering up the situation by eliminating a high officer of Macedonian origin now living in Belgrade, who was replaced and later pensioned. The material also gives a serious criticism about his war conduct near Mostar in 1992.
It seems that the most serious contender for Perisic's positions the Air force commander general-major Ljubisa Velickovic, who was put to that position by Perisic himself in 1993.Velickovic has the support, it seems, of the "communist" group., something that Milosevic seems aware of.
It is obvious that the army top is in strategic defensive in relation to Milosevic. This defensive results from the balance of power and wrong political estimates since March 9,1991. (the military stifling of protests in Belgrade), but also of strategic-doctrinary nature, since general Kadijevic and the rest accepted Milosevic strategic principles of warfare for greater Serbia. Army first defended communism, then "rump Yugoslavia", then itself from the programmed affairs, and is now defending the minimum of dignity and "officers honor" from the downgrading Milosevic is putting it through.
On the other side, the strategic concept against "Wienese stable hands" (derogatory name used by the Army for the Slovenes) fell into water. The Serbs, including Serbia, do not have such a military might with which they would be able to impose forceful solutions and dictate conditions. This was felt by general Mile Mrksic, until recently Perisic's assistant, who went to Knin full of optimism.
But, he recently suffered a defeat from Croatians in Dinara mountains. The enormous technical equipment Mrksic commanded in the Vukovar lowlands and in Bosnian and Dalmatian rough hillside does not mean much - in that region human soldier means more that the technical material; there the Bosnians and Croats have the advantage.
In Belgrade, such an outcome receives nervous reactions. The things are going downhill in the operative sense ever since the Bosnians broke the fortified positions on mt. Ozren previous june. This defeat was received particularly hard in the chief of command, since when there is consistent insistence with Milosevic to react, at least with an intervention in the Northwestern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not stopped until now.
It seems that his answer to these initiatives is only contempt. Milosevic is systematically destroying the personnel structure of the military, keeping the army in the untenable financial situation. According to the generals, he is without mercy: in the last four years he has deposed of more than 300 of them, some were , like Kadijevic and Zivota Panic, put through a dirt "media grill". What will, then, become of Perisic ?
The loosening of his loyalty will definitely be punished, particularly Perisic has kept the side of rebelling Serbs in Pale and Knin. Milosevic wants to see as the chief of staff a devoted officer, without to many political or financial demands. It seems, that Milosevic's defence concept from possible outside aggression is based on the "deterrence strategy" of ballistic rocket systems, targeted at the capitals of neighboring countries, then on the numerical size of armoured units (cca 900 tanks), while Kosovo has been placed under the control of the actual key military force in Serbia - the police.
This is Milosevic's "pretorian guard", the guarantor of internal stability, whose members are ready to anything. In such a situation, he does not see the necessity to have a "warfare general" as the head of the army, who could even be too popular: the army could now become the hotbed of support for the nationalistic part of the Serbian opposition and counter balance of naked force to the police in Serbia.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", June 16, 1995.
Predrag Lucic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune" gave an editorial comment in the magazine's issue of July 10, 1995. concerning the political games evolving around the European basketball championship, and the move of the Croatian national team during the medal ceremony.
It has been shown again that there is no real defeat which we are not able to turn into our moral victory,says Lucic. Such a victory that with its historical value overcomes the meaninglessness of the simple basketball game, which gave enough reason to the commentators of the official bulletin of the Croatian ministry of defense, where it is state verbatim that by"semi-final defeat we have escaped from participating in a sport shame and scandal without a precedent in the newer history of the game", and further that "it was our additional pleasure that we did not participate in that game".
Following this are the congratulatory remarks on the account of the Croatian team members, since they "after receiving their medals they left the stage, refusing to listen to the national anthem of the country which has brough so much evil to this nation and this is a positive move".
It is a scene which even a trained "statelover" in full playing power cannot believe: propaganda worker of the ministry of defense describes the action in which "our beautiful ones" scored a decisive point, giving the nation the title of the moral victor of "Eurobasket', without asking himself: wasn't the victorious descent from the podium a "travelling" violation ?isn't there a dark spot on the Croatian moral victory, not so big as the dark spot on the medal of the "So called", bit still a dark spot ?
The answer is simple and stark: Croatia deserved the title of the moral victor as much as the "So called" did the title of the official European champion. This for one reason only: the moral victory that was set by the strategists of the state basketball army could have been won anywhere but in Athens. The acceptance by Croatia to participate at the tournament in which the team of the "So called" also participates was an act which at the start denied the possibility of any victory over the representatives of an aggressor state except at the basketball floor.
Since for such a victory, at the delight of the military analysts, the most elementary preconditions were not set, since we sent Lithuanians into the decisive battle, it remained that we apply the Kosovo mythomanic model and state that the honor is saved calling upon the stupid logic that the shame of playing in the hall where there is a so called flag is being covered by similarly shameful listening to the so called national anthem.
The quacking of those that have to play the role of stateloving journalists had to accept the dictate of world sport powers is only a new proof of limitless hypocrisy of the propaganda machinery whose sole purpose is to turn Croats into fools.
Since, how would it be possible that the world mighty were able to force without any resistance the Croatian basketballers to promote the so called with their presence in Athens, while they still are not able to force the Croatian authorities to turn Croatia from "the most democratic state in the world" in purely plain, normal, civilized state in which the individual will at least be guaranteed that he will not be killed without impunity, humanely resettled and dislodged, continuously robbed, regularly frightened and proclaimed a traitor for his publicly stated opinion ?
The answer is again simple and stark: the Croatian authorities does not accept the game played according to the civilized rules, since "Normal State of Croatia" would mean its defeat. Actually, in Athens it saw a chance to claim the victory of the basketball team over the so called for itself. But, at `Eurobasket' the only thing won was a suspect moral victory.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", July 10, 1995.
Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" carried in its issue of june 30, 1995. a comment by Tatjana Tagirov on creeping racism in official Croatian politics.
The whole thing was started in 1990. - the instigation of racial, national, religious and other hatreds in the country which its head calls "the most democratic in the world". In five years, nobody was called to responsibility for any statements, not one act that falls under the Penal code which speaks of racial (in our conditions, particularly) national and religious intolerance.
Our president, says Tagirov, begins his every statement to the public with "Dear Croats (in male and female gender)", and citizens, if he does not forget them, come in second place. Not even the numerous cover ups by the Croatian diplomats, nor the presidents humbling excuse to the Jews did not help that the world forgets his statement that "he is happy that his wife is neither Serbian or Jew".
In the state where everybody has mouthful of democracy, Europe and thousand year old Croatian culture, the publication of a fascist paper "Vinkovacki vjesnik" is tolerated; whose editor, with calling cards that bill him as "an independent ustashi" is a well received guest at the monthly presidential press conferences, where editors of "Feral Tribune", "Globus", "Arkzin" and Bumerang" are not welcome... and where after the anullment of the shameful tax on "Feral", the same is taken off the fascist oriented press.
In that atmosphere, says Tagirov, it is not strange that racial slurs mushroom, including the fact that the time has come to attack the African race. At a recent parliament session, Antun Vrdoljak, former director of the Croatian TV, and recently elected Croatian member of the IOC stated that "Croatia is selling its best players, and in return is buying Negroes", and further that, "our children want to be carpenters, doctors and so on, but I do not know of want that wants to be black".
This is not a first similar statement by Vrdoljak. He stated for the opposition leader Drazen Budisa that "his noble heart and clear mind is enriched by byzantine blood", due to the fact that "shamefully there is a Serbian grandmother in his family tree", to which Budisa quickly started excusing himself, which says more about "tolerant and democratic climate" in Croatia then about the two of them.
More indicative, thinks Tagirov are statements of vice president of the Croatian government, Bosiljko Misetic, who stated, for example, that it is positive element with Savka Dabcevic Kucar (leader of the oppositionary HNS party) that she has realized that the "more ustashi line in the party is more acceptable for the Croatian people"..."since where there is a Croatian ustashi, the Serbian is scared". Even more indicative is his statement that there is a collective Serbian guilt, since it has to be brought also by the co-nationals "which did not bloody their hands ... first of all those living in Croatia".
These were only two in a long series of similar Misetic statements, so that in attempting to give excuse for him in the Parliament, prime minister Valentic stated that Misetic "is not a racist, but a nationalist".
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", June 30,1995.
In its issue of June 9,1995. Podgorica weekly "Monitor" brings an analysis of its regular contributor, sociologist Slobodan Inic, who attempts to differentiate between various types of ethnic cleansing.
Inic says that the types of ethnic cleansing could be differentiated by the method through which they are conducted. As far as the results are concerned, they are always the same: killing of people of different nationality and religion or their persecution and expulsion - destruction and looting of property...
The first type of ethnic cleansing is state-homogenistic: conquering in its intentions and aggressive in its methods. Its timing coincides with the years 1991-92, when most of these "ethno-hygienic " operations took place. Mostly hit were cities like Prijedor, Visegrad, Trebinje, Bijeljina, Banjaluka, Doboj, Zvornik, Prnjavor, sanski Most... It is the characteristic of this type of ethnic cleansing that they were conducted along with strong military operations of the JNA and Serbian formations in the conditions of direct clashes with Croat and Muslim forces.
The second type of ethnic cleansing is defensive in its form ("they do it to us, we do it to them"), but inexcusable all the same. In essence, it is also revanchistic and revengeful. It is not always clear though how much this is "tit for tat", and how much only an excuse, using the crimes of the other side to achieve the same results: killing and persecution of people of different nation and religion.
The third type of ethnic cleansing has an implosive character and is less drastic in its form and means of conduct. It is not conducted by the authorities or military formations as a direct attack on the population of other nationality and religion. TIt is more a result of an unbearable atmosphere, different pressures from the surroundings, the feeling of loneliness, violence of those expelled from other areas, desertion from your neighbors, no protection from the authorities...
This type of ethnic cleansing is more sophisticated , meaner and what is worse , it is an expression of not only deep disruption between national groups in a given moment but at the same time diminish the last hopes that joint life is possible.
This form of ethnic cleansing results from relations of former neighbors, former friends, and co-citizens. If the first two forms of ethnic cleansing are a direct product of military conflicts and ethno-fascistic plans, this form of cleansing is directly in their function, although to people themselves it might not seem that way at first.
Since, if the goal is, for example, of the Serbian forces to separate, since it is not possible to live together anymore, then to this goal, not only is every killed or prosecuted Muslim or Croat welcome, but also a Serb! Killing and expelling Muslims and Croats "under their reign" the Pale leaders, actually, wish that the same happens to the Serbs in the territories under Muslim and Croat control.
These are those more than necessary proofs that joint life is not possible: it remains only that the Muslims catch the bait. This will simply alleviate the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The technique of the so called "humane transfer" of ethnically different population is the fourth form of ethnic cleansing. It is an offspring of two new conditions. first of all, the fact that all the ethnic cleansings so far, no matter the level of brutality, evil and extend by which they were conducted did not produce the desired results so that it would be possible to talk about definitive formation of ethnically pure territories, but have reached such a stage that it seems necessary that the last step in that direction should be taken.
It also stems from the fact that the international community and world public opinion are giving stronger resistance to those forms of direct ethnic cleansing that were undertaken at the beginning of the war. In this respect, the cases of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are somewhat different, thinks Inic.
In Croatia, under the international pressure to accept the "Z-4" plan and the threat of peaceful re- integration, particularly those territories where Serbs were a minority, the Serbian leadership there is attempting to form ethnically as compact a territory, which would, as such, have a more specific weight.
In the future of Croatia, the Serbs should play that role that Croats played in Yugoslavia since its inception in 1918. In that light one should look at the recent tragic events in Western slavonia, as well as the attempts to make the expelled Serbs settle in Eastern Slavonia. The supposed humane resettlements in bosnia and Herzegovina have another purpose. They are directly in the function of concluding earlier violent ethnic cleansings and rounding off of Serbian ethnic territories.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", June 9,1995.
The editor of the Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", Nebojsa Popov, discusses in the magazine's issue of June 1-15, 1995., the basic political concepts of the current regime in Serbia.
For months, a guessing game is on whether Milosevic will recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. A string of negotiators is "coming to his feet". The public is not given much information about the subject of these negotiations, except that Milosevic is the key negotiator on the Serbian side.
At the same time with the confirmation of his key role in international negotiations, in Serbia itself there is growing denial of his role as a national leader, he is even accused of betrayal of national interests. At the same time, Milosevic's power is growing and falling. How can this be, asks Popov.
The commentators of the secret contents of these negotiations and puzzling stand of Milosevic in them, often mention "buying of time" as his political virtue. And really, as the time passes by, he looks more and more as a strong figure, unchangeable, in the negotiations and in domestic power. But differing with those who see this as "buying of time", Popov sees this as denial of time, and that this is the actually the key foundation of the political regime in Serbia.
At the time when he was starting the "anti-bureaucratic revolution", Milosevic presented himself as the protector of the Serbian folk and the leader of the national revolution through which Serbs will become "theirs on their own". With such proclamations, riding on the strong apparatus of power of the previous regime, Milosevic gained followers in the rising populistic tide, when he was toppling his rivals for power, then in election victories; he was coming forth with effective slogans: "with us there are no surprises", "that is the way it should be done", "Serbia will not bow".
The personal power, in such a manner, gained electoral, democratic legitimacy, finding its support in irrational strata of "simple people" and from the masses mobilized by the regime.
The Dictatorship with a democratic legitimacy ("demotatorship") could be denied from a number of vantage points. If we leave aside international standards of democracy which "do not work" here, you could substantially attack the regime that, not only "nobody can beat the people' (Milosevic's slogan) , but hundreds of thousands have lost their lives on the warfronts and around them, and millions are suffering in poverty, while Serbs are looking more and more negative in the eyes of the international public.
The remote outbreaks of dissatisfaction and strikes through previous years have not shaken the regime in a more serious manner. The military-police apparatus of the previous regime, widened by the regime propaganda, though, presents a strong fortress of the current authority, but it owes it power more to the destruction of any rational starting point for the rejection of an irrational regime.
The main foundation of the current regime in Serbia i in the murky but infinite goals of a national revolution; the mightier and greater Serbian state seems as a ravishing dream from previous centuries and who knows how many future centuries. Where are the borders ?
Besides the war slogans like "Karlobag, Karlovac, Virovitica", and multitude of maps, nobody can say for sure where the boundaries of the national state are. Neither can the method of reaching such a murky goal be clear. How long should the war be conducted with other national states, and even with the whole world ? Who should be relied on ? Still there are calls upon some future, orthodox Russia, as the key ally in this war. From the standpoint of some far away goal every sacrifice is being condoned. For long reaching goals longstanding regime is needed; for timeless goals - timeless power. The myth was and remained out of time. With denial of time, the ground for denying mythological power is removed.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", June 1-15,1995.
I am surprised. Belgrade's opposition and Charges D'Affaires are announcing a certain Serbian diplomatic sensation over wine at dinner parties and coffee at press conferences. Is there anyone in Belgrade who thinks with their own head instead of the hamburgers from the American Embassy?
I know this: Milosevic won't recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our diplomatic reports, analyses and sources are unreliable My friends say: he has to recognize it. Why does he have to? Who is forcing him to: the people, Serbs, Seselj, Kostunica, Karadzic, Albanians, Montenegrins, Djindjic and the popular capitalists, the army, police, Arkan, Vojvodina Hungarians, strikers in Rakovica, voucher economists from the university, real estate dealers and farmers from Banat?
My friends say: ``the people are hungry, factories are rotting away, we have to work.'' Yes, yes but who's politically endangering the Serbian president and Socialist authorities? No one. Danger to the president only comes from the Right and only if he recognizes Bosnia not if he doesn't. There's danger from General Perisic who wants to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and who Milosevic can't topple without fighting the entire elite of generals.
There's danger from half the police who have been blinded by Serbdom and crime. The Serbian Patriarch and his ecclesia militans are turning bells into swords and sharpening them on the stones of the double Jasenovac tragedy, the second of which they caused themselves. There's also danger from an alliance of Karadzic and Seselj.
My friends won't relent: ``but the president can't keep Karadzic's Bosnia blockaded forever without speaking up about the Serb union.'' He can and that suits him. He doesn't need a rival, armed opposition in the common Serb state.
The Serbian president has put the Bosnia issue and Greater Serbia on ice for at least 10-20 years since that is the only way the Serb program won't be completely destroyed, the nationalist and fascist opposition in Belgrade won't unite and he'll avoid the Bosnia war spilling over into Serbia. He has to continue the blockade on the Drina even at the expense of the total defeat of Biljana Plavsic's democratic empire. The arrival of 10,000 dangerous Anglo-French commandos in Sarajevo shows what would happen to Serbia after two years if he unites with Karadzic. Today Pale falls, tomorrow Dedinje. Serbia's adventure in Bosnia is over.
My friends continue: ``Isn't it smarter for Milosevic to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately?'' No it isn't and he won't do that until he exhausts the populist power of Serb nationalism and removes the danger of a coup d'etat. Many people don't see that a coup has already happened quietly in Serbia; I repeat, Milosevic doesn't have the power to topple General Perisic and he wants that more than anything.
The army can't run Serbia directly because it doesn't have the political infrastructure of power and it's afraid to turn power over to the radical nationalists. The latter would impose terror and cause a civil war within a month. The Serbian President can't start an open fight with the nationalist by recognizing Bosnia for another reason: he can't rule without nationalism until he gets Western economic aid and starts an economic and political reform of the social system in Serbia. He needs nationalism because of Kosovo and the Albanian issue as well. He can't get rid of the Belgrade nationalist opposition radically. If he did he would have to impose a dictatorship with no ideology. Non-ideological self-rule usually lasts a short time and end in bloody rebellions or assassinations.
The Americans are so wrong to force Milosevic into recognizing Bosnia Herzegovina. They should have made him do that in 1991 and threaten him with thunder and lighting if he dared cause a war on Bjelasnica and Igman. Now it's too late.
But now the Serbian president is doing more than recognizing Bosnia! He is blockading Karadzic, his kith and kin! Let Milosevic keep Karadzic in chains and continue weakening Seselj, the Church and the generals; that's the best way for recognition of Bosnia today. Tomorrow, in two-three years, it will be formally recognized by a `train of friendship'' between Belgrade and Sarajevo which will be driven by a new foreign minister without Vladislav Jovanovic's implanted smile.
My Friends again: ``If Milosevic shouldn't recognize Bosnia, what should he do?'' His speech to the Americans probably went something like this: ``If I recognize Bosnia now, I'll have trouble in Serbia. I'll settle it but the risks are high. I recognize Bosnia through the isolation of Karadzic and suppression of the imperialist nationalist opposition in Belgrade. I can last a long time that way but not without dictatorship and threats of civil war and national clashes in Serbia. So I need financial aid from the West and development loans. The lifting of the sanctions means little to me if I can't adapt to the international market. I know you hate me and that you'd prefer to take me to court but I still can't be toppled and I'm less dangerous than a crowd of nationalist ideologists. If you don't give me money, between two and three billion dollars to start, and you lift the sanctions and make me recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, you will be wrong and you're worse politicians than I am. And that's not easy. If my recognition of Bosnia is linked with the lifting of the sanctions but without Western money I'll be attacked from two sides in Serbia: from the nationalists and fascists. They'll use the poverty of the people for a nationalist-fascist revolution. and there's your chaos in the Balkans.''
To get rid of Karadzic and the Belgrade national-fascists and militarists, Milosevic has to get industry moving, employ more people, return part of the robbed savings to the population and secure stable prices of bread, milk and meat. He has to turn public opinion from concerns of war to concerns for rebuilding apartments, car parks and communal problems.
Few politicians have destroyed their countries so thoroughly as Milosevic did and are still considered deft politicians by their opposition. That's because most of them are no different ideologically to him. Everyone who wants a union of all Serb lands or recognition of Bosnia immediately are worse than he is. Some Charges D'affaires in Belgrade are even worse.
Vanja Novak reports (in an ironic tone) in the Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin" on the campaign in Croatia (after Serbia and Macedonia)on the activities, particularly tied to the media, of the "Soros foundation".
The don't have it easy, says Novak. Every day they have to invent a new enemy, uncover some new conspiracy, denounce some hidden haters of Croatia...
In any case, the current lineup of the national team is an excellent one, it is synchronized, well played, with a lot of games in its feet. The rarely make mistakes, so it seems we are going to confront a summer in which the regime will show its muscles to everybody else. We have to show that we have friends from great America to might China, that the confederation is lie an Eldorado, that only cowards and apatrids are leaving Croatia, and that the internal situation in the most stable of all stable democracies is undermined only by foreign mercenaries - judas which will, for a fistful of dollars, sell themselves to the old muckraker, Jew George soros, who pathologically haters the Croats, like most Jews, anyway.
This mudslinger - it is a general knowledge -has a lot of money which he uses only to destroy our hope that is two hundred years old - our young Croatian state. soros, according to that idea, holds "Feral Tribune", "Arkzin", "Bumerang", "Start", "Novi List", he even holds "Globus" - as was stated by the one that should not make a mistake there, the editor in chief of the official daily "Vjesnik".
Of course, he does not hold only these obscure anti-Croatian papers, but also is behind IDS, ASH, SDU. So, finally, no matter what the price - his road has to be cut. That is why this campaign against Soros is actually a campaign against the remnants of the non-Tudjman media, but also against non-Tudjman political vision. It is more ferocious than anything before it: low hits, including clear fakes, lies and slanders. The method seems to work well, as seen in Serbia, where soros's neck has been broken.
The new elections, the reason behind this action, will bring a new wave of strong xenophobia, sharp campaign against anything that could be labeled "pro-Yugoslav", continuation of "humane resettlement of people" with" secondary lightnings" and other.
The same concept is present in all states formed on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Present are the same goals: domination of our nation over the rest of foreigners that have not been humanely re-settled - their gradual reduction to "reasonable" measure - and then, hiliyalistic peace of ethnically pure states. Scandinavization of the Balkans.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly "Arkzin", June 30, 1995.
Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba" brought in its issue of July 5, 1995. a comment by renowned Croatian journalist Jelena Lovric on the public burning of the independent weekly "Feral Tribune" in Split.
A week ago inquisition happened in Split. Two angry Croats, returning from Australia have arrange a burning stake for "Feral Tribune". They were forcibly taking from the callporters, from the kiosks, tearing it apart, burning it in front of numerous passers by. Journalists and TV cameras found themselves there - they knew in advance what was to happen - but no station showed the pictures.
In the "Feral" offices they say that no official organs attempted to stop them, even though their orgy lasted for a while, circling around the city center. A litigation procedure was started, but police did not make any moves yet. The editorial team thinks that the fiery incident is a beginning of a wider action, started again against "Feral" recently. They have received information which indicates there will be attempts to definitely prevent its further publication.
The Croatian Helsinki committee states that there is also a pressure exerted on potential "Feral" buyers in Zagreb, since they are subject to threats. In the committee they say that they even recognized people who did the same thing for former authorities too.
Expressing its fear that the public burning of "unseemly" papers represents introduction to some other stakes, CHC warns to the equally worrisome fact that the oppositionary parties did not utter a word about this, as well as professional and cultural associations.
The Helsinki committee has the honor to be the first to name, in many details already evident fact that the reduction of democracy is not happening only in accordance with the will of the regime, but that oppositionary parties and the public are participating in this.Mostly with silence, but in other ways too. Reactions to the burning of "Feral" came from "Socialdemocratic Action" of Mika Tripalo, "Dalmatian Action" and Istrian party IDS, who offered to the Split daily to move to Istria.
But there was also reaction from Mladen Schwartz , leader of the "New Croatian Right" who insists that "Feral's" place is on a stake. Since the regime does not have the strength to close down `Yugo-communistic kitsch as Feral", he continued, his party has "all it needs for the fight with other methods".
In spite of Schwartz's screeching, it seems that he has possessed without foundation"Feral's " burning pyre.It seems that in this case Schwartz is covering himself in somebody else's feathers. All indications are that somebody mightier than him stands behind this pyromaniac organized spontainiety. It could happen that buying some papers in Croatia in the future may really understand courage.
Source: Belgrade daily "Nasa Borba", July 5, 1995.
Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" brought in its issue of June 23, a conversation with Georgije Maric, the chief of the project "Hate Speech" of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee of Serbia, who discusses the situation in which the media production of hatred has become a "natural" and privileged form of expression. The killing of people was preceded by the killing of the language and by language.
"The freedom of speech" in Serbia has proven itself in a pathological, demonic form of "hate speech", a team of experts, lead by lawyer Georgije Maric, compiled a study named "Hate speech as freedom of speech", in an attempt to examine the current state of "hate speech" in Serbian media. The period examined was between november 11 and December 31 of 1994., covering the key daily, weekly and TV newscasts.
Maric says that the key intention behind the project was the feeling of pressure exercised through the media speech - whether it was the question of the language itself, the pictures, or the composition of those symbols. The same team has already been involved in a similar project named "Hatred speech", which resulted in a publication presented in Serbian and English by the "Center for Anti-war action" from Belgrade. The intention was to continue where the previous project stopped.
Maric say s that the team felt as its moral obligation to record what has been done by this "hate speech", so that it can be remembered as what it is - war propaganda, stimulation of hatred, national xenophobia. The second intention was to stimulate all those whose profession is touched by this eight year process of re-formulation of consciousness in Serbia, to deal with it in the manner it is required - through scientific research.
Legally, in the former and in current Yugoslavia, it is forbidden by law to instigate media propaganda of war, but it also remains a fact that nobody was prosecuted for this. This a passive segment of what can be named state codification of the "hate speech" - non - application of the law even though the obligation for that exists. The second, active segment is the creation of an ambient in which the mistrust between people of different nations, religions, readiness to commit evil, became acceptable only because, through the mass media, it was disseminated that it is acceptable to hate, loot and kill, and that this is neither theft or murder, as it was in our lives up to this war.
What we are confronted here , says Maric, is a process in which one segment of the society was supposed to lose confidence first in other parts of the society, and then to start to hate, entering such an internal situation in which he is ready to go to war. It is interesting that a campaign was begun here that consciously went for a situation where the people who were instructed, during their joint army service, to fight against a third party, to fight between themselves..
Using the undeniable respect of the daily "politika" in the Serbian political and social public, the regime actually started the practice of "hate speech" in this paper during the forceful cancellation of the autonomy of the province of Kosovo. The influence of this paper on the Serbian public opinion is almost deadly in the period when the foundations of state sponsored "hate speech" were being laid.
One of the key promoters of the "hate speech" was "Politika Express", and it still remains in the same role. The explanation for this lays in the estimate that it is necessary to retain the high negative emotional charge in relation to real and fabricated enemies of the Serbian national programme.
"Borba" (now "Nasa Borba"), in the realms of its capabilities, reported on all events that represented the realization of the "hate speech". This paper did not take part in the presentation of the goals of the Serbian national programme, but has in the last tow years, opened the pages to different propagators and representatives of these goals, without giving a comment. This refers to its use of the messages transmitted by the Croatian and Bosnian Serb news agencies ISKRA and SRNA.
"Vecernje novosti" are the creator and recycler of the hate speech, through which, during the course of this war, it dreams of some Third world war in which all Serbian enemies will disintegrate and that all the crimes committed would be forgotten.
"Vreme"does not practice hate speech,while "Telegraf" bases its media approach on the premise that the values of the Serbian national programme are self-explicitly acceptable, so it does no propagate them, but it also does not promote the values of the humanitarian law, nor does it address the breach of human and civil rights of minority groups in Serbia.
"Pravda" nurtures the hate speech in its essential forms.
"Srpska Rec" did not participate in the instigation of the hate speech, while "Duga" is the paper where the hate speech first appeared in the Serbian public texts. This paper systematically propagates the ideas and projects whose realization is only possible when Others are being hated and are being put down for exactly the reasons why they are Others.
"The Evening news" of the Serbian TV at 19,30h has the role as all the other informative/political programmes of the RTS - to propagate the policies of the regime and to persuade the public in the correctness of those policies, and not to inform correctly and timely about the things of interest for the citizens and public of Serbia.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni", June 23, 1995.
Question: What are your evaluations of the ethnic relations in the country? The wounds inflicted by the attempt to establish a university in Albanian in Tetovo are still open. Some say the policy of co-existence will bring Macedonia to a co-death.
Answer: As of recently, there have been frequent attempts to present the ethnic relations in black and white. Unfortunately, I could not say I was satisfied with the current situation, either as a president or as a citizen of Macedonia. Tension and anxiety have already been created, but this is not in the interest of any segment in the state.
The politicization of the issue is so strong that it even goes beyond the frames of the real economic, social and political abilities of Macedonia as a state. The damages thus imposed are immeasurable, primarily on the development of the concept of a civilian state and on the implementation of European criteria when dealing with minority problems.
The so-called Albanian-language university in Tetovo, which had political instead of educational goals, is a typical example of this. It is really pitiful to see such an event as the one resulting from the initiative, come in the way of finding right solutions for the real educational needs of Albanians in the country. I could by never agree that the policy of co-existence will lead us to a co-death.
This is an extremely irrational and inhumane thesis. The co-existence principle includes respect for the human being and his dignity, guarantees for basic human rights and equality and protection of ethnic varieties and rights. Therefore, the co-existence can only lead toward full integration, tolerance and respect for the ethnic identity and rights.
On the contrary, it is policies of ethnic isolation, parallel systems, separatism and extreme demands that lead to conflicts. Unfortunately, I must say, these are the platforms of certain radical political parties in Macedonia and the initiators of actions of the type of the so-called Albanian-language university. I believe that the road we have stepped on will lead to a solution to the problem and consequently to a greater trust and mutual understanding.
Question: Whenever a civilian state is mentioned, some are inclined to understand it as opposed to a national one. Again, any mentioning of a multicultural community seems to neglect the fact that there is a majority population in Macedonia. Why this lack of a more determined reaction to thesis claiming that Macedonia is about to enter some kind of an experiment and build a multiethnic society which, in fact, is nothing else but a euphemism for a federation, special status's, autonomies, and the like?
Answer: It is the essential need of any nationalist platform to simplify the civilian society concept to a vulgar degree. It is really ridiculous to claim that the civilian concept is non-national. This is already proved by the so many European countries that have been developing on the civilian concept for almost a century now. The citizen status no how brings into question the national identity of the individual. Quite the opposite, it grants him equal rights and obligations with any other citizen in society, through a respect for his national, religious and political affiliations. This even expands the scope of human rights, as it starts from the individual and goes up to the community as a whole.
Traditional sovereign national states of the 19 century were based on a quite different concept; they were structured on the basis of the absolute power of the community, primarily on ethnic bases. They established a hierarchy that made human rights completely irrelevant.
This is why I said that ethnic concepts of sovereignty only show the radicalism of certain nationalist platforms nowadays present in Macedonia. I think the notions 'mulitculture' and 'multiethnic' are vulgarized in the same way and mostly for the same reasons. It is true that the Macedonians are a majority nation in Macedonia, but the country is also populated by many other nationalities, such as Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romas and Serbs.
So, Macedonia is evidently a country with a complex ethnic structure. Conclusions on the multiethnic structure of the Macedonian society, with emphasis on the majority nation, cannot lead to any new experiments. It would be even a greater mistake to claim that the existence of nationalities in Macedonia by definition leads to a federalization.
I believe that the official stance of the Republic of Macedonia, as written down in the Constitution, quite resolutely expresses its firm decision to build a civilian state upon tolerance and respect for the rights of minorities.
Exactly because of this, it would be also irrational and hardly reasonable to go for restrictions or limitations of the rights of minorities, which is a guarantee for ethnic peace. This would also be a policy of direct conflict and essentially opposed to the civilian concept, as it call for classifying the citizens into first, second or third-rate citizens. I simply feel urged to remind of certain huge achievements of Macedonia in the past period.
First of all, all nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia have the right to form their own political parties, which are today a part of the pluralistic political scene. They are included in the Parliament and representatives of the largest party of Albanians are even a coalition partner in the government. The latter results exactly from the policy of mutual ethnic understanding and the position that all problems must be dealt with within the legal framework of the system and with a mutual responsibility for the peace and stability of the country.
It is a fact that the situation in the sphere of education of minorities is improved, although unfortunately this came slowly. I am here referring to the high-school education and the fact that the Pedagogical Academy has been raised to a university level, as well as to the positive selection in the enrollment of minority students.
The minority-language programs on the national television has been expanded, the periodical Flaka e Vllazerimit became a daily newspaper and a large number of radio and TV stations in minority languages have been open. Therefore, in my opinion, the road to success leads only through patient and continual acceptance of the rights and liberties of citizens and nationalities.
Question: What do you think of the current situation in the dispute with Greece and do you believe that time is on Macedonia's side, when it comes to the main goal of preserving the identity of the nation and the state?
Answer: The Macedonian-Greek negotiation in UN have been renewed over the past two months, under the mediation efforts of Syrus Vance and Matthew Nemitz. I will repeat the general impression that there is a hope for positive progress of the talks.
Having in mind the previous experience from the talks, however, I could not say that I am an absolute optimist. Especially not as long as the Greek embargo is in power. Meantime, this irrational dispute has greatly damaged both Macedonia and the entire southern Balkans. The Greek embargo imposed damage on Greece itself. And yet, despite all this, the embargo neither fulfilled its task nor can it ever fulfill it. I sincerely hope that we will be able to agree on a series of practical issues, as this is in the interest of both sides.
As for Macedonia's position in the negotiations, the most important thing now is to maintain our equal position and to continue reiterating our readiness to sit at the negotiation table and make good faith steps.
Issues entering the territory of Macedonia's national identity have never been, nor can they ever be, negotiable. Macedonia even now assures that it has more reasons to establish good relations and cooperation with Greece than disputes of any kind. Our two countries have no problem with territorial ambitions of either side.
Greece is a NATO and EU member country, and Macedonia is of a firm European orientation and determined to obtain both NATO and EU membership. Macedonia and Greece have very close cultural traditions; our majority nations are of the same religion and similar customs. Let alone the fundamental fact that Macedonia is Greece's road to Europe and Greece the Macedonia's exit to sea. Therefore, we have many, many more essential economic, political and cultural reasons to establish good relations than to enter into disputes.
Question: In your talks with the WEU Assembly parliamentarians, you stated belief that the efforts of Mr. Vance will yield results and that, provided that both sides show good faith and readiness to compromise, a solution can be reached that will contribute to peace and stability in the Balkans.
Is your optimism now, after the last or one of the many last meetings between Minister Crvenkovski and Vance, based only on the constructive approach of Macedonia, or do you also take into account the Greek stance and even maybe the position of the wider international community?
Answer: Well, I already said that there is a hope that Mr. Vance's good efforts will yield results. This, of course, is also conditioned by the both sides' readiness to compromise and good faith steps, as well as their awareness of their own responsibility to the peace and stability in the region.
In this context, Macedonia has already made several concessions - we clearly stated in our Constitution that we have no territorial ambitions toward any of our neighbors. This was also reiterated with the solemn Declaration of the republic of Macedonia, during my inauguration speech last year.
The minimum we expect from Greece in return is that it suspends its embargo. I said the minimum, since this is a precondition to raise our negotiation positions to an equal level. I will also repeat that, if there is sincere willingness to contribute to the success of the negotiations, the two countries could easily find solution to the problem through direct talks, without any mediation whatsoever. Our hope for a success of the negotiations is based not only on our constructive approach, but also on certain movements in the position of the Greek side, and even the international community, as well.
After the talks were interrupted on a request of Greece in 1994, today Greece expresses willingness to reopen the negotiations under UN mediation. The Greek opposing to Macedonia's entering the other European institutions creates a certain dosage of anxiety even among the international institutions themselves, as it has created absurd and unprecedented situations.
The Greek veto on Macedonia becoming a full OSCE member, for instance, is deeply contrary to the very essence of the organization. The same goes for NATO's Partnership for Peace program, as well as for Macedonia's relations with the European Union. At the same time, due to the current political and security situation in the Balkans, it is of prime importance to have relations between Macedonia and Greece normalized.
Source: Skopje weekly "Puls", July 7,1995., through MILS e-mail service;
The job has just begun it seems. Throughout Serbia the police from all Serb lands are arresting men originally from outside the FRY, concentrating them in Volga street, the Bubanj Potok barracks and Sremska Mitrovica and sending them to the front in Rumatrans and RSK army busses.
They grab them from apartments, refugee camps, jobs and the streets, regardless of whether they're refugees, illegal aliens or people who have been citizens of Serbia for years. No one who fits into that category has had a good night's sleep and they don't sleep at home.
The most worrying thing is that few people care about the evident, mass violations of the law and constitution. ``Only the Serbian and Yugoslav police have the right to detain people,'' lawyer Rade Mikjelj told VREME. ``From a legal point of view, the RSK and Bosnian Serb (RS) police are the same as the Austrian police for example and don't have the right to ask for identification or detain anyone on the territory of Serbia, not even illegal aliens from Krajina. That's a case of illegal detention which is a crime.''
When it comes to refugees the law is clear: refugees are subject to military obligations but only on the territory of Serbia (although even that is contrary to international conventions which Yugoslavia signed). In the case of people with citizenship, Mikjelj said, the constitution has been violated since it explicitly bans the extradition of FRY citizens to the organs of other states.
The hunt for Krajina cannon fodder in Serbia was indicated in conclusions by the RSK parliament session in Knin on May 29. Deputies unanimously agreed to ask the Belgrade and Podgorica authorities to ``immediately hand over deserters from the Krajina,'' i.e. ``to turn them over to the disposal of the RSK military authorities.''
Confirmation that the decision was not taken accidentally is seen by many in the form of Radmilo Bogdanovic, chairman of the FRY parliament board for relations with Serbs outside Serbia. Bogdanovic was at the previous RSK parliament session in Borovo Selo. He said then that the fate of the people in the RSK and RS are an integral part of Serbia's concern, whatever that means.
Finally, the newly appointed RSK army commander, general Mile Mrksic, ordered a reorganization of the army and declared the start of a fierce fight against ``trade with the enemy'' and demanded the return of deserters. Then the hunt began.
Informal sources reported that the hunt is a joint operation by the Serbian and RSK police and RSK army officials. It's based on lists of anyone who was ever entered into army lists on Krajina territory and then ended up in the FRY. Refugees, people who lost refugee status, citizens with ID documents issued in Serbia... As far as we know they're also grabbing anyone who isn't registered anywhere.
The operation, unlike similar ones in the past few years, has no deadline. On the Krajina side the main organizer is Slobodan Peric, a leader of the SDS party and internal affairs minister in the Mikelic and probably the incoming Babic governments.
Our sources reported that the lists include 18,000 names but assume that the hunters would be happy with 6--7,000 to start with. They said the RSK authorities are especially interested in prominent former Krajina residents (doctors, lawyers and such) former officials and public figures. Their goal is a demonstration of unity and restoring order.
Men, no matter what their age, are not allowed out of the RSK. VREME sources said some 2,000 deserters have already reached the RSK. The oldest was born in 1950, the youngest in 1974. After getting them together in barracks in Belgrade, they're taken to Sremska Mitrovica and then by bus (Serbian and RSK plates) via Sremska Raca to the RSK army base at Zeljava (former airport bear Bihac).
From there they get transfers to combat units. The sources said the idea is to send them for five months of training at Slunj once the numbers are big enough and later to group them throughout the RSK as regulars with an unlimited period of service. Some say they'll be in units similar to punitive battalions where deserters would be given the chance to redeem themselves for causing Martic concern that they haven't been dying for four years.
Serbians who went through something similar in 1991 don't seem to be too concerned and some are even gloating openly. Four days into the hunt for the deserters and not one political party spoke up while the state media are keeping quiet as usual. Only the Center for Anti-War Activities sent an open letter to presidents Lilic and Milosevic, prime ministers Kontic and Marjanovic demanding an explanation but without much hope of getting one.
The UNHCR office in Belgrade said an average of 50 people a day contact them asking for any kind of help and protection. The only thing UNHCR could do is protest to the RSK bureau in Belgrade and voice concern to the FRY authorities. Both were taken into consideration and that was that.
Buba Morina, Serbia's refugee commissioner, said she had no information about the mobilization although she had heard that ``they took away some lad who was selling ice cream on the street.'' ``No one contacted us or consulted us, nor do we have any responsibility for these events,'' she said decisively and denied that the police got the names and addresses of refugees from the commissariat.
``No one asked us for information on refugees, nor can anyone provide that information without my knowledge. Obviously there are people in this city who know where people go.''
Morina and several other commissariat officials held posts in the state security service once and they probably know what they're saying. Less than a month ago Morina told VREME that her commissariat ``cooperates with the police and many other republican and federal ministries.''
Morina's aide, Vladimir Curguz, said they ``did nothing to endanger the status rights of refugees in the FRY. I contacted the authorities and was told that this is not a mobilization but a solution to the issue of people who are in Serbia illegally and are a problem for Serbia.'' When the commissariat said refugees were being taken, the ``competent authorities'' replied: ``What're you complaining about, you keep saying there are too many refugees and that you can't feed them all.'' Curguz would not specify the competent authorities, but commissariat sources discreetly indicated Radovan Pankov, minister for relations with Serbs outside Serbia. No one in that ministry would, or could not, talk to VREME.
The question now is why official Belgrade decided to hand over everyone who is following the official line defined in Belgrade by not fighting in Martic's army. We know that ``peace has no alternative'' and all problems should be solved ``through a dialogue between Knin and Zagreb.'' If Martic wants to talk it isn't clear why Milosevic, who publicly does everything to achieve peace, is strengthening his hand by deporting men who won't fight.
There are several rumors. The most frequent is that it's a trade of the UN hostages for deserters. That's hard to believe since the hostages were taken by the Bosnian Serbs whose deserters are being hunted only sporadically.
The second assumption is that a large-scale Serb counteroffensive is being prepared against Bihac (that's why the deserters are being taken to Zeljava) in response to the offensives they suffered in the past few months. Serbia couldn't but meet the needs of the militarily endangered Serbs across the Drina; since it can't help directly because of the international community at least she'll send the men they need. But many voiced skepticism over the combat readiness of men mobilized like that and added that the only way they'll fight is if ``loyal'' units are behind them with rifles ready.
The third, most serious assumption, is that Milosevic understands that the only way he can continue being an ``unavoidable factor of peace and stability'' is if there are Serbs across the Drina.
If the current trend of migration from those Serb lands continues peace mongering is pointless. So the Serbs from west of the Drina have to go back, get rifles and serve as the cheapest cannon fodder for political deals and concessions. The forced mobilization will satisfy local extremists and the families of the mobilized men are expected to follow them sooner or later. So it's a kind of ethnic cleansing, this time among the Serbs.
The constitution and law, international conventions, obviously mean nothing. The hypocrisy was perhaps best portrayed in a speech by Branislav Ivkovic, vice-chairman of the SPS Belgrade board and republican minister. He told an SPS tribunal that: ``hundreds of thousands of refugees of all nationalities, fleeing from the war and destruction, found refuge here. We expect them not to support the people who would return them to war and expect them not to become the army of self-proclaimed Vojvodas.''
After three BiH army artillery shells crashed into Bijeljina, the St. Vitus day parade by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) was canceled. The Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) army paraded in peace and quiet at its base in Slunj. TV coverage showed, among other things, the Krajina surface-to-surface missile (range around 100 kilometers) and Kosava grenade launcher. Both weapons are claimed to be locally produced.
After the parade army commander, General Mile Mrksic, said that was just part of the arsenal his army had which is a guarantee for the Krajina's survival and safety. He's not alone in that opinion which telegrams on his army day from Yugoslav Army (VJ) generals Dragoljub Ojdanic and Mirko Vucinic showed.
There is no doubt that the Serb leaders across the Drina, Radovan Karadzic and Milan Martic, and their generals are happy with the current situation. A short time ago, they were under pressure from official Belgrade to start negotiating and now the Serbian police is handing over manpower. The manpower are all the men of army age who didn't want to kill or get killed, and who know that with Karadzic and Martic even their children will be soldiers for who knows how long.
Interestingly, the Montenegrin authorities haven't taken up the expulsions. All those men, caught in Serbia in unprecedented raids and deported to.the Krajina and Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) sign a statement that they are volunteers as soon as they arrive. Informal sources said that some 80 men became volunteers when they arrived in Pale in shorts, pajamas and slippers and some with handcuffs.
A few manage to contact their families. There are rumors that some of them have had their heads shaved and been forced to shout: ``I'm a deserter.''
Their panicking women quote ``well-informed friends'' who told them some had been killed during the latest fighting around Sarajevo; families held a press conference in Belgrade and claimed men who said they were Arkan's approached them asking 5,000 DM to get their menfolk back.
The Helsinki Human Rights Committee tried to get more information from the Knin authorities on whether at least some of the men who were either citizens of or residents in Serbia would be returned. The short answer: ``No way.''
When the Serbs across the Drina took up arms in 1991 and 1992, their leaders assured them they were defending Yugoslavia. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic claimed ``There were not enough Serbs in Serbia to abandon their brethren across the Drina.'' That meant that since the Slovenes, Croats and Muslims don't want to live in Yugoslavia, the Serbs all have to live in one state.
Most political and war steps were justified with the struggle to achieve that idea. After five bloody years, the Serbs across the Drina now face a draft citizenship law which allows them no opportunity to become Yugoslav citizens. Higher national interests gave them citizenship of their self-proclaimed republics.
The RSK and RS are not recognized by anyone, not even officials in Belgrade. The strength of the belief in statehood in the RSK and RS is shown by their ID documents. An ID card issued in Knin says Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rights under RSK. The Serbs across the Drina get their passports (the old former Yugoslavia passports) in Belgrade.
Another difference is also interesting: persons born on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina with ID issued in Serbia have RS written under republic of birth, while persons born in the RSK have Croatia in the same place. Does that mean something politically?
There are assessments that the Serbs across the Drina will end up closed in reservations. If they want out they'll have to accept Bosnian or Croatian citizenship. And there's more: Croatian President Franjo Tudjman is now speaking of ``Croatia's borders on the Drina,'' of ``Croatian Boka Kotorska,'' that he's president of all Croats etc. He hasn't spoken of all Croats in one state yet, but Croatia's citizenship law says ``members of the Croat people who are not resident in the republic of Croatia can acquire citizenship if they meet legal requirements under article 8, points 1,4,5 of the law, and sign a written statement saying they consider themselves Croatian citizens.''
That article says possible citizens ``have to know the Croatian language and Latin script'' and that ``their behavior shows they respect the legal order and customs in the republic of Croatia and accept Croatian culture.'' In other words, anyone who feels like a Croat gets citizenship.
Serbs born in Drvar, Trebinje, Petrinja or Donji Lapac, no matter how hard they fought for the common state, can't get FRY citizenship. Serbia is cleansing itself of the Serbs from across the Drina. Cases of Serbians accidentally taken across the Drina are creating hatred between the old-timers and newcomers.
One refugee told the Helsinki committee that Sremska Mitrovica residents, revolted by the RSK police who took 24 of their neighbors across the Drina pointed out men born in the Krajina to the police. All that shows that Milosevic has played out his hand with the Serbs across the Drina and is now leaving them to their uncertain fate. The Serbs across the Drina now know that things didn't turn out as promised and that they are no longer a reliable electorate as they were in 1993. Official Belgrade needs them a while longer to keep the Serb issue open and get concessions from the international community.
Karadzic's and Martic's profit from the soldiers caught in their beds and forced to the front is less important; the fate of women, children and parents is more important since they've been left behind to the mercy of the citizenship law and its interpretations. Some consistency is to be expected from anyone in power so why should the families be any different to their drafted men.
Most of all the basic difference between the Serbs and Croats is coming to light: the Croats are formalists and legalists, they first adopted a citizenship law and later embarrassed themselves by denying ID cards to unwanted people; the Serbs are pragmatic, they first expel the unwanted then they adopt a law.
At one point, world leaders and diplomats found themselves having to justify their actions before their own public and having to prove that no one promised anything to Karadzic in return for the liberation of hostages.
Well, now it appears that a swap did take place after all, but primarily between Pale and Belgrade, the currency being Serbs from Bosnia and Krajina capable of military service who found themselves in Serbia.
Slobodan Milosevic was thus in a position to pay for the liberation of United Nations troops and for an improved standing in the eyes of the world. That is why we had to watch, over and over again, the greatest Serbian policeman Stanisic as he interpreted the President's merciful deed to the hostages, while the cameras tried to catch the glimpse of at least a sigh of relief, if not of admiration or gratitude, on the soldiers' faces.
The hostages have been released in small groups, almost one by one, probably in order for the sight to be repeated over and over again, and thus enable the world to learn a lesson about generosity and nobility, and forget all the nasty things that were once said about Milosevic.
However, only the first part of the transaction was intended for the eyes of the public. After the last hostages were escorted and the lights turned off, and after foreign TV cameras rushed off to some other carnival, it was Milosevic's turn to fulfill his part of the deal.
As he already demonstrated the ability to look on the bright side of things, it could have been expected that swapping Martic's and Karadzic's refugees for the international hostages would seem to him clean and fair. He is only helping people to return where they came from and where they belong. But knowing that this hypocritical world is very easily shocked and astonished, he decided for the transport of refugees to be a less festive affair, without anybody holding speeches telling the refugees to whom they should be grateful.
We were thus denied the sight of those who are being taken, handcuffed, to the place where they will be able to ``share, with their brothers, the extent of the victory and the glory of human and national honor.''
Regime controlled media do not boast with the size and success of this action, so it is still unknown how many candidates for honor and glory managed to board the coaches for Knin and Pale, and how many of them are still wandering around Serbia waiting to be found and rescued. Only rare and personal accounts have reached several independent media while this Serb-Serbian case is of no interest to the foreigners. Presumably they are unable to change, at such a short notice, the newly formed picture of Milosevic as the liberator.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the affair is that this is not a case of a ``one for one'' transaction, but ``all for all.'' Although the Blue Helmets were systematically counted and despatched, in Serbia raids could last for months and not everybody is likely to get caught, though Karadzic can certainly count on getting ten men for each soldier that he freed, pretty soon.
Some will manage to buy themselves out, either here or over there, and thus avoid the front line. Some have already become part of the establishment over here and proved to be both loyal and useful. Some got ready for life in cellars, agreed secret codes with their collaborators above the ground and will wait for the war to end, while in the cinemas Kusturica's new film is being shown, the subject of which is, if anything, their destiny. But no one will either dare or wish to make the comparison. Who needs reality when we have a movie?
For the time being children, women and the old are safe. It appears however that among them there are those with rather remote connections with either Bosnia or Croatia, for example the fact that they were born there. It is something that they could have easily forgotten, until, during some raid, such a fact, noted in their ID caught up with them, like an ancient prophesy of an evil fairy and dragged them away from their families, friends, profession, habits, civil and possibly any kind of life. Police here have no sense or time for nuances, especially during such massive operations. And if you are in addition an opposition party activist?
First go and die nicely and then you can appeal. If any one asks what use to Karadzic are soldiers with hands tied behind their backs, his answer is likely to be quite simple. No one has been squatting in the trenches for the past three years because they like it that way. People are brought to the front line, a rifle is shoved in their hands, and the rest takes place naturally. When they fire at you, you fire back. If they are trying to hit you, you better not fire in the air. Since there is no way out, you might as well convince yourself you are a patriot and a hero.
As far as Serbia is concerned, I don't know which is worse: the fact that the refugees are being chased by Karadzic's and Martic's police, or the fact that Milosevic's police are helping them. There is no law that would enable the former to either be here, or stop people and inspect their IDs, while the latter have no right to hand over anyone without adequate checks and legal procedure.
It is a question of sovereignty for a country not to allow some other police to arrest people on its territory. Serbia once refused such a demand made by the Austrio-Hungarian empire, which resulted in a war. And refugees, no matter where they seek refuge, would receive better rights and protection than those offered by Serbia to Serbs from outside Serbia.
The roots of various misunderstandings among the Serbs themselves, and of their misunderstandings with others, with the modern world, democratic institutions or the rule of law must be sought somewhere in this ability not to distinguish. All this was not that evident before the war.
That is why militant nationalists have the least right to complain about Milosevic's tyrannical methods. In fact, they probably have nothing against the refugee hunting which is going on, since they usually get a kick out of any kind of violence by the state which does not effect them personally.
In any case, the fact that Milosevic is sending reinforcement to Karadzic is likely to please them more than police beastiality, the arrests, handcuffing, and expulsion of thousands of people from Serbia is likely to upset them.
In the hospitable and large-hearted Serbia there will, of course be many of those who will greet this initiative by the police on the ground that it will create more living space and job vacancies, as well as cleanse the environment of different, surely barbaric dialects, customs and habits. However, one open question remains. Does all this lead towards a closer relationship between Belgrade, Pale and Knin and the unification of Serbs, or does it further accentuate the existing divisions among the Serbs between those who are obliged to fight, whether they want to or not, and the rest.
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