Nezavisni(AIM) on the new
Serbian information minister
Ljiljana Smajlovic of the Belgrade weekly Vreme, discusses in
the magazine's issue of June 29, 1996, the commencement of the election
campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If all refugees return to their homes, Serbs will be a minority in their
own republic. When the senior EU official in Sarajevo says that, he does
not conceal this thought pleases him. And the best would come after the
elections. If everyone votes in their former hometowns, Serbs will be
left without power in their own republic. The spirit of Dayton will triumph
and Bosnia-Herzegovina's reintegration will have been achieved.
What is most important is that the latter can be achieved without the
former. Moslem refugees do not have to return home to vote in the
Bosnian Serb Republic, but the outcome of the elections can dramatically
improve their chances of returning home after the elections. This is
precisely what makes the Dayton elections the most complex
ballot-casting in the history of democracy.
Freedom of choice can be defined in various ways. Never have the Bosnian
citizens had the freedom to choose the residence where they will vote as
they will on September 14, 1996; and they never will, most probably. If
they want to vote in the place they lived in the spring of 1991, during
the last census, they can do so, personally or in absence, be they
in Malme, Sweden, or Belgrade, Yugoslavia, or, in any other Bosnian
town. If they want to vote in the place they have moved to in the
meantime, either since the spring of 1991 or after the Bosnian war broke
place they lived in in 1991 nor now, but in a third, desired and planned
one, they can. In that case, they have to appear in that place and vote,
even if they still have not moved there.
Under this criterion, therefore, these elections will be the most free
in history. Besides parties and leaders, Bosnian citizens will also
choose their voting sites. They would probably be glad to exchange this
haggling that had gone on among them, for this chance of being the
guinea pigs of the first elections of the kind.
In keeping with the principle that refugees and displaced people have
the right to return to their homes, it was first said in Dayton that
``it is expected'' that all Bosnian citizens vote in their prewar
hometowns, personally or in absence. This was simultaneously a
concession to the Moslem side. The Moslems, partly because they make up
the majority of the Bosnian population, are interested in achieving the
prewar Bosnian population.
Subsequently, through talks and concessions, haggling and pouting, the
Serb side cajoled the Frowick Committee and OSCE into adding to the
election rules the exception that those who do not want to vote in their
prewar hometowns, will be able to cast ballots in the places in which
they have settled in the meantime. Bosnian Serbs are not vociferously
demanding to go back to their homes (except maybe back to Drvar and
Grahovo) and the option of everyone voting in his current place of
residence probably suits their leaders the most. The Serb third of the
former Bosnian population has settled in half of the former Bosnia, holding
a convincing majority there after the ethnic cleansing. It is highly
probable that the Bosnian Serbs will turn the exception into a rule and
vote in the Bosnian Serb Republic as a rule. The problem Bosnian Serbs
have, however, is that there are not as many of them and that the
refugee Bosniaks can frustrate their designs, if they decide to merely
vote in absence in the places where they had made up the ethnic majority
before the ethnic cleansing. As in Srebrenica, for example.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, June 29, 1996
Sarajevo weekly Svijet (author Gordan Kovac) discusses the same
question in its issue of July 4, 1996.
The September elections are tailor made for losers. A more hypocritical
decision than the one which set the Bosnian elections for September 14,
has not been taken in a long while, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
is used to such treatment of its destiny from the international community.
The international monitors came to the conclusion that the conditions for
the holding of the elections do not exist, but that they still have to be
held. Admitting that the conditions are not fulfilled is supposed to calm
the conscience. On the other hand, calling the elections, fulfills the political
imperative of taking some, so much needed, great step in Bosnia.This potency
should be the life line for the next three months, until the election results.
Then, a series of new circumstances will crop up which will make it possible
to create excuses for the bad electoral effects. What would be at work is
a well tried Bosnian scheme, which, unfortunately, at this balance of power
and relations there is no real alternative. Bosnia is doing what it is forced
to, and not what it needs to do.
The decision on September elections did not surprise anybody , particularly
the political parties which have started with the electoral campaign much
earlier than Cotti's decision. In this manner, the time pressure was evaded,
in which the parties would realistically fall into.
It is hardest for every party during electoral preparation to enter (or
not) a coalition block. Ahead of Cotti's Vienna decision, most of the stronger
parties have solved that question, mostly according to expectations. The
only, although not such a big, surprise is the promises given in the so
called political center. The agreement between Haris Siljadzic, Muhamed
Filipovic and Rasim Kadic has been broken at the last moment. The parties
of the center (Bih Party, The Liberals, LBO), will enter the elections single
handedly. The deal was broken on the division of portfolios. This is how
it is done in coalition deals, the barbecue is being readied even before
the game is caught. But, the mentioned threesome has maybe overestimated
its capabilities to gain by themselves as much sympathies it would gain
through the coalition. It is then to be expected that these parties will
court other partners., which could lead to breaking of somewhat stabilized
division of power on the right, in the center and in the left. All of the
three mentioned parties have the programmatic and personnel potential to
move more or less painlessly to either side. If they make those moves, this
could visibly strengthen the positions of the left or right, depending on
which kingdom they would choose.
Here, the main importance lies with the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the areas controlled by the BiH Army, it is the strongest party after
the ruling SDA, somewhere along with the SDP, but with the possibility,
due to the course of events, to rise further more significantly.That is
why it could, from the local perspective, be the key holder of the whole
elections. If Siljadzic would again get close to Izetbegovic, then the
SDA party would not have to be afraid that it will not gain exceptional
advantage. If contrary is the case, by eventual alliance with the parties
of the so called Joint list, Siljadzic would push the weight
to the other side of the scale, even dramatically so. That is why the Cazin
attack on him caused such a furor, where the leftist parties are attempting
to definitively burn the bridges which still tie Silajdzic to SDA policies.At
that, the count that they would profit enough with the breaking of that
potentially unified party block, let alone if they would draw him to their
side.
The party positions are somewhat simplified with the division on the usual
standards (left-center-right), while the division is actually being distinguished
on the relations the regime-opposition. The so called Joint list
itself is composed of such different components, that some of them even
cancel each other out. What joins together SDP, MBO,UBSD,HSS and the Republican
party is the intention to push from power SDA, HDZ, and SDS, the three ruling
parties.
The clear exclusivity of the HDZ in the Croatian ghetto, remains
undisputable, but in the territory of the Serbian entity a frontal gathering
is visible against the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). It is also mainly
motivated by the smell of wanted power, and not by principled differences
in the outlook on the solution of the key political problems.
The removal of Radovan Karadzic will show that it will have almost no effect
on the elections. Behind Karadzic, his work remains. Even without
Karadzic the Pale political and election option remains dominantly in his
shadow. In itself, it does not promise anything good to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A lot can happen until the elections, but the key role in Pale will be played
by the SDS or SPRS (Socialist party - branch of the ruling SPS party in
Serbia), meaning the Karadzic or Milosevic line, and in that respect an
anti-Bosnian one. From its protagonists it is hard to expect to contribute
to the institutionalization of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian state. But,
it is actually the one element, chosen by the international community through
the process of negative selection in favor of the September elections, that
will have key importance. It is thought that the true integration of the
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this is correct, cannot even begin without
the creation of the institutions which were set up in Dayton, but is expected
- which is unrealistic - that this will be enabled by these elections as
they are., particularly under these circumstances.
Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet, July 4, 1996
The regular analyst of the forthcoming Bosnia elections of the Belgrade
by-weekly Republika, Dragan Janjic gave the following analysis
in the June 1-30, 1996, issue of that magazine.
It is obvious that the quick holding of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina
suits Belgrade and Zagreb, since they believe that with them the current
state will be frozen.That is why they applauded so loudly to
the American insistence that the elections be held at the set date. The
biggest reason for dissatisfaction have the authorities in Sarajevo, meaning
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic. Out of the latest round in Geneva he
came without either of his two demands satisfied - that the elections be
postponed and that Karadzic and Mladic be arrested.
The holding of the elections in the set timeframe, in a certain sense, could
mean the end of the political career for Izetbegovic. He is absolutely in
the clear that until September he cannot secure political support for the
idea of reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Bosnian
Serbs from the start refuse any thought of it. The election rules give him
the possibility to hold to power in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but there he has to share it with Croatian side. Future central authorities
will, as the things stand now, have relatively small ingerencies, and in
them he could only be one of the three, with equal rights as the Serbian
and Croatian representative.
After the meeting in Florence, the current regime in Sarajevo lost another
round, as it was forced to sign the agreement on the control of arms in
the region of former Yugoslavia. The refused to sign this agreement two times
before this instance, demanding that the representatives of the Republika
Srpska be barred from signing it.
The relation between the ruling parties and their most serious electoral
rivals in both entities is somewhat similar. Both the Socialists (in Republika
Srpska) and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the Federation), in
greater part consist of dissidents from the ruling parties, and their programs
have a strong national note. This means that, seeking electoral victory,
they strongly underlined the national goals and that their possible electoral
victory could bring only a bit more of a dialogue between the nations, and
not radical changes in relations. Both the Socialists and Bih Party are
from the beginning under strong pressure of the ruling parties.
Although the relations between Pale and Belgrade have recently been smoothed
over, the ruling SDS party in Republika Srpska cannot wait carelessly for
the elections. After its agreement with Pale, Belgrade has continued to
strengthen the Socialist party of RS. It is obvious that its influence is
growing and that Milosevic will further invest into that influence.
Socialists have gone well and skillfully in sucking in the parties akin
to them. Recently they have formed a coallitionary union of the center and
left, which was entered by the Independent Social democrats of Milorad Dodik,
JUL for RS, Social Liberal Party of Miodrag Zivanovic and two smaller, almost
unknown parties - the party of Private Initiative and New Workers party.
The absolute masters of this newly formed coalition are. of course, the
Socialists, and they will have a sovereign chance to decide what kind of
influence will be had by any of these parties. It is probable that JUL will
be given most, even though the influence of this party among the Bosnian
Serbs is not great.
Dodik and Zivanovic entered this coalition because they, simply, have no
other choice. If they would go by themselves in front of the electorate
they would fail, without ever entering the parliament.The Socialists also
see some interest in tying up with these two politicians who have considerable
esteem in the international community and strong ties with similar parties
in the federation part. At the same time, they will be much easier to control
as coalition partners.
Along with that block, certain chances to get seats in the Parliament of
RS are given to the Democratic Patriotic Block, lead by the former mayor
of Banjaluka, Predrag Radic. The block is actually given best chances in
the Eastern town of Bijeljina, where it was formed. It is thought that he
will not be such an influence in Banjaluka itself, where it is thought that
the Socialists will play the major role.
According to those that know the situation in RS, Milosevic has created
a relatively advantageous situation for him among the Bosnian Serbs. He
is attempting to create a mighty counterweight to the ruling SDS, deciding
only just ahead of the elections who he will actually support. The goal
of such policy could be the creation of a relatively balanced parliament,
in which Belgrade could, depending on the needs at the moment, to support
one or the other party and in that manner evade headaches which were given
to it by the monolithic organization of the RS parliament during the war.
It is clear though that even the eventual win by the Socialists would not
lead to substantial changes in the key political stances of the Bosnian
Serbs. They will continue to insist on their individual statehood and will
get closer to Sarajevo only when they must.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika, June 1-30, 1996
Jan Briza of the Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni explores the
election issue in the July 26 issue of that magazine.
July 22 was the date when the registration of refugees with electoral right
for September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in FR Yugoslavia.
The first day already showed that this will be mainly a fruitless affair.
There was no sight of the refugees. In some counties in Vojvodina, where
most of the unlucky ones from the other side of the Drina are currently
located, not one person registered at the allocated offices. A day later,
in Novi Sad, the assistant of the Serbian Commessariat for refugees Vladimir
Cucic gathered local activists who have the job of cathcing as many voter
as possible for our cause in Bosnia. He explained to them that
they are given the mission of highest national priority, since
we are threatened that on September 14 we might loose everything
we won in the war. He also appealed to the present journalists to
do as much as possible themselves to make the refugees realize that they
have to be Bosnians at least for that day.
The registration of voters for our cause in Bosnia is not going
easy also due to the fact that the refugees in these ares do not want to
find themselves on any lists. Even the one for the humanitarian help. They
do not know what might be behind it. They still remember forceful mobilizations
conducted by the Serbian police, and facilitated by the readiness of the
Serbian and Federal humanitarians to supply them with the addresses
of military able men.
The furor surrounding the elections began when in Pale and Belgrade they
realized that the Muslims there could easily, with the aid of the ballots,
win some ten counties in Republika Srpska, including Brcko, and their presidential
candidate Abid Djozic, even be elected to replace Radovan Karadzic ! The
danger for that lies in the great spread of the Serbian voters, split between
numerous politicians and parties - the Serbs have six presidential candidates,
the Muslims one.
The Muslims and Croats also have their Bosnians for a day, and
are counting on them on September 14. All sides in Bosnia are undertaking
all in their capabilities that the results of those elections mirror the
ones held recently in Mostar. Their goal is ethnic division of the country.
That is why they fought the war.
Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni, July 26, 1996
Bosnia - The situation in Mostar
Sarajevo weekly Svijet brought in its issue of July 25,
1996 an article by Gojko Beric, concerning the situation in the still divided
city of Mostar, after the June elections held there.
Mostar is under occupation ! This is insisted on by the mayor of its Western
part Mijo Brajkovic. The dust was risen because of some thirty contested
votes, but it is clear to everybody that it is a question of something else.
HDZ, the uncrowned king of the Croat souls, from Mostar to Siroki Brijeg,
has lost osme of its blundering sheep. And this is not A good sign. They
were mainly gathered by a former footballer of the local club Velez,
Joule Musa, who insists that Mostar is not run anymore by people of Mostar,
whether it is the Croats or Bosniaks. The real rage among the HDZ people
was created by the fact that all five members of the City council from
the category other nationalities was chosen from the List for
the Unified Mostar. With 16 out of 37 council members, HDZ cannot rule Mostar,
but with obstruction it can keep the tension going, leading to division
and chaos. But, in this case the obstruction represents a great risk, since
the EU authority has the means to punish the uncooperatives.
Herzegovina is traditionally the most clerical Catholic province in the
Balkans. One cannot deny the strong wish of the population there to live
within Croatia. The problem with Western Herzegovinians arose when Tudjman
installed his people into power there, promising them joining with the mother
state, in accordance with the ide of Greater Croatia.
But, the stones of Western Herzegovina are worthless without Mostar. Mostar
in itself is worth a big chunk of Bosnia. Its agony began when the political
agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina became public.
During the war, in the surrounded Sarajevo, it was hard to find at least
one Bosniak who would understand that Mostar is only a great chip in the
trade between Milosevic and Tudjman. Former JNA, after small harangues with
the Croats, left the city, taking along with them around 20 thousand Serb
inhabitants of Mostar. In exchange, Milosevic got the Posavina corridor.
Since then, Karadzic did not even mention Mostar. The deal was strong and
definite, confirmed by the fact that HDZ did not put up its candidates in
Posavina for September elections.
It is still not clear what role did the SDA party have in promoting Mostar
into a Croatian city. Ismet Hadziosmanovic, then the first man
of that party in Mostar now lives in Zagreb. It is a question whether the
situation in this case was the one of a catastrophic bad judgment or classic
case of treason - SDA should have gone public on that a long time ago.
In any case, Tudjman has the idea of making Mostar the capital of Herzeg Bosnia.
According with his statements that Muslims were to get a small
piece of land in Central Bosnia, the Bosniaks were supposed to be expelled
from the city in which they represented a majority, The leaders of the HDZ
are insisting today that Mostar will be the political, cultural and religious
center of the Croat people. The argument is as follows: The Croats have
a right to at least one of the larger cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This sounds familiar.
If the census figures are taken into consideration, if all Mostar Croats
voted for the HDZ, it would not be enough for that party to win. But as
far as Herzegovina Croats are in question, anything is possible. They are
probably the only tribe in the world whose members can vote at few places
in succession. The travel is sometimes arduous, but that is negligible in
relation to the pleasure that is counting Croat souls. At the same time,
this soul votes for Cohl in Germany, Tudjman in Croatia and Boban in Herzegovina,
Europe knows this, but is counting that it is better than a new war.
Tudjman is at pains. He was not able to snatch Mostar away with grenades,
but neither with ballots.
Source: Sarajevo weekly Svijet, July 25, 1996
The same issue is explored by Goran Vezic in the July 5, 1996 issue of the
Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin.
The division of Mostar was confirmed on the last day of June with the counting
of the votes. The divided city got the new, unified City council on their
local elections, consisting of the parties from confronted banks of a river,
which legalized the state of division with a new census, getting more drastic
contours than with the first democratic elections in 1990.
The joint list of five oppositionary parties, which was demonized for days
before the elections as the list of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Yugoslavs,
lead by former socialist power holder, but a great supporter of Mostar and
now member of the HSS party, Joule Musa, was not able, as was expected ,
to draw into the light by secret ballot the third Mostar, that
part of the city that is not accepting the situation within it now. Only
every thirtieth citizen of Mostar gave his vote to the Joint List. In the
city in which the (carried out() threats are a daily occurrence, it seems
that the pressure on those who think like Musa, after which four candidates
withdrew from the list, obviously worked.
The unified opposition achieved the best result, 10 percent in Oslo, and
those really originating in Mostar, on whom the Musa followers counted on,
have practically shown the division of their heart on the right and left
bank. The put their signature under the picture of a destroyed city.
Source: Zagreb by-weekly Arkzin, July 5, 1996
Marinko Culic of the Split weekly Feral Tribune, looks at wider
implications of the Mostar elections in the July 8, 1996 issue of the magazine.
The election aftermath did actually produce a clear situation, since Mostar
was formally divided, now by the will of the voters, exactly in the manner
it was previously divided by the party armies of HDZ and SDA.
The attempts of the most furious Herzegovina zealots to boycott the elections
have failed, with arguments that they reconstruct Yugo-Mostar
and Yugo-Bosnia. This though, might lead to a superficial conclusion.
Over the Mostar nightmare, in which there is brotherly participation of
the highest politics and deepest criminal underground, is overseen by larger
forces of internal self - regulation and control that might be seen in the
first instance. That is why the more reliable explanation for the peaceful
elections was the fact that everything was organized in advance. The EU
representatives were expected only to oversee that, and if they attempted
more than that, the two sides would simply stop cooperating.
So, the victory of the two nationalistic parties, was a more
or less guaranteed fact, which seems to suit everybody; including the international
community, as it got the alibi that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
are the ones that actually want the division, or that already in the Autumn
they can start disengaging their forces.
But, the Croatian side remains unsatisfied. It hoped to gain dominance over
the Joint List on the left side of Neretva, which would mean a clear victory,
but did not achieve that. Whatever steps are taken by HDZ, it will not be
able to lessen the defeat brought in by these elections: that is to overtake
Mostar at the ballot box., when that could not be done with grenades and
definitely turn it into a Croatian city, actually the
capital of Herzeg - Bosnia. All the shouts on the irregularity of
the elections were made to cover up and annul that basic defeat, even though
it is clear that this cannot achieve anything.
Even without this, Tudjman is showing more and more signs of dissatisfaction
with his Herzegovina clones, who are, even in the elections they cannot
win, loosing key points. Now, strengthened by the electoral legitimacy they
did not have, they might show signs of Karadzic syndrome.
The ongoing bungling with the idea, and even with the name itself of Herzeg
Bosnia, with which Zagreb, in the end, confused itself in the process, uncovers
the fact that the project of the creation of another Croatian state in Bosnia
and Herzegovina became too heavy a burden for its creators. But, also that
now it is becoming to hard to throw away that burden, since Herzeg
Bosnia, even with the Mostar elections, became stronger than ever,
while its integration within the Croatian state tissue is practically brought
to its conclusion. In such a situation, eventual dissolution of the Herzegovina
Croat state would practically equal amputation of own territory, so that
Tudjman is brought into the position of tragically- caricatural liberator,
who is force to swallow his own medals at the height of his glory.
Source: Split weekly Feral Tribune, July 8, 1996
Bosnia -
What is going on with general Mladic
Belgrade daily Nasa Borba of July 16, 1996 brought an analysis
by Swipe Sikavica concerning the unclear situation surrounding Bosnian Serb
army commander Ratio Mladic.
It was Belgrade weekly Vreme of June 29, relying on its 'confidential
and reliable sources close to the top of Republika Srpska, which announced
that general Ratko Mladic, due to paralysis of the right side of his
head and lost speech ability is, since June 20, at the Belgrade military
hospital, and that the situation with him is completely serious.
But, already the next day, the Belgrade agency Beta announced
that the military commander of Bosnian Serbs was seen
yesterday at the Vidovdan celebration of the Bosnian Serb army in Han Pijesak,
by which the information about his brain stroke is denied.
Still, the real confusion is created by this sentence in that information:
The sources close to the Bosnian Serb top have told the 'Beta' agency
that Mladic had a brain stroke, but that he feels better now!
When we thought that the situation with Mladic and his real or imagined
illness is clear, the Podgorica news agency Montena fax jumped
into the media game on July 4, according to which Ratio Mladic has been
exposed to repeated heavy brain strokes, which have even endangered
the general's life. This information was neither confirmed or denied from
any source.
So, the domestic political market is having a guessing game what is happening
with the general. In that context, a statement of Milosevic to Richard Holbrooke
about Mladic's mental state (he is clinically insane!) is often
mentioned. Actually, it would be least surprising if the general suffered
a brain or some other stroke, or that he went out of his mind.
Since, if the hundredth part of what was stated in front of the Hague tribunal
during the eight day hearing of evidence against him and Karadzic is true,
the general cannot have a quiet sleep for long time already.
Of course, the illness could be invented for different purposes, and the
main actor could start believing that with simulation he could get rid of
the pest called IFOR, which is breathing down his neck for a long time now.
It is to be supposed that Mladic's heavy illness would suit Serbian president
very much, since he would, in that manner, get rid of a great headache.
Tribunal apparatus cannot forgive Slobodan Milosevic for not arresting the
Pale duo (and he had the chance), so the prosecutor strengthened
that problem during the hearing, up to the request that the Security council
warns Belgrade due to its refusal to carry out its international legal obligations.Milosevic,
though, could not do that from at least two reasons: first, since the domestic
public opinion, in spite of its current political hibernation, would not
accept that a general would be deported to the Hague, while on both sides
of the river Drina he is still considered as an explicitly positive hero,
which would not suit the president ahead of probable autumn elections; and
secondly, Mladic could pull the leg in the Hague, leaving the
boss in the cold: how can he, with all his eloquence and tactical skill
explain to the international factors, for example, the war connection between
the General command of the Yugoslav army and the General command of the
Arm of the Republika Srpska.
Even if Ratko Mladic is in good health, he is still greatly troubled. First
of all because a lot of things are not functioning properly, either in his
army or the political entity, and secondly because the circle is tightening
around his underground fortification, or the so called Serbian Pentagon,
as his command post was named in the moment of inspiration by a domestic
military commentator. The commander of the Serbian army across the Drina
river has been often stating recently that he is not afraid of anything
or anybody because he is protected by his people.
Although his charisma is undisputed among the Bosnian Serbs, in his personal
security he is still counting on mainly on a strong personal guard
of special forces.
Since some form of clearance in Bosnia, which absolutely includes removal
of Karadzic and Mladic from the political scene, is in direct function
of the USA elections, it is more than certain that the two leaders of the
Bosnian Serbs will be put under continuous media, political and physical
pressures of the international community. But, since everything is taking
place in the circle of complicated relations, in which, for example, it
is for the American administration particularly important that in the possible
clash with Mladic units not one American soldier dies - it is clear that
the commander of the Bosnian Serb army and former president of the Bosnian
Serb entity could hardly be arrested and deported to the Tribunal without
the help of the key Balkan negotiator. And, he himself is particularly
conscious of this, so he is placing a very high price in his negotiations
with the West for his potential executionary services.
Source: Belgrade daily Nasa Borba, July 16, 1996
FRY - New Citizenship Law
In its issue of July 13, 1996, Belgrade weekly Vreme (author
Roksanda Nincic) analyzes the background of the new citizenship law of
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
A draft law that casts doubts on the status of several hundred thousand
people in Yugoslavia has been under consideration in police and legal
circles for years in expectation of the end of the Yugoslav crisis.
The Dayton agreement is seen as the end of the crisis but it was clear
before and after it that the greatest uncertainty hangs over some
700,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and people who have been living
in today's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for years but never had
republican citizenship in the former Yugoslavia.
To make things clearer, recall the fact that in the former Yugoslavia,
starting in 1974, everyone had dual citizenship---federal and one of the
six republics. But all former Yugoslav citizens had the same legal
status across the country. It was easy to get republican citizenship and
change it and every person who was of age could get the citizenship of a
certain republic if they lived there or married there regardless of how
long or their nationality. The only consequence was the loss of the
previous republican citizenship but the status of federal citizenship
did not change.
The real consequences came with the breakup of the country. Many former
Yugoslavia citizens found themselves citizens of the breakaway republics
and discovered that that fact became the most important thing in setting
their state citizenship.
The previous ease in getting republican citizenship has now brought a
huge number of former Yugoslavia citizens into an impossible legal
situation. There are some who found themselves living in a state (former
republic) whose citizenship they didn't have or on the territory of a
state whose citizenship they had but their families didn't. To
complicate things even more, remember that there were about two million
mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia and the citizenship children
got were often accidental (now we have siblings with different
citizenships).
Those problems are being solved through the new FRY citizenship law
which separates citizens into three basic categories. The first will
have to write requests, or will get citizenship automatically (the
people who said Serbian and Montenegrin citizenship prior to April 27,
1992 when the FRY was proclaimed) and their children.
The second category are people who did not have Serbian and Montenegrin
citizenship but were residents of the FRY when it was proclaimed. They
will get citizenship under a shortened procedure if they don't have
citizenship in some other state. The FRY has a large number of
inhabitants who have lived there for years but with the citizenship of
one of the other republics including a number who have relatives in
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and who tried to get citizenship
of those republics so they could stay in touch with their relatives. The
draft law says none of them can get FRY citizenship before they renounce
their dual citizenship.
This category of people has a huge problem. Take the example of a woman
who has spent 25 years in Belgrade and is originally from Banja Luka.
She kept her Bosnian republican citizenship and never got Serbian
citizenship. When she needed documents she wrote to Banja Luka and got
them without any problems. Now she has to file a request for FRY
citizenship and in principle she should get it under a shortened
procedure just because she resides in Belgrade. But there's a
condition---she can't have dual citizenship. When she recently asked for
documents from Banja Luka she got a paper saying she was a citizen of
the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) and was born there. The question the new
law does not answer is whether the FRY police will consider that as
being dual citizenship.
The problem isn't limited only to the
RS. Croatia's citizenship law says everyone who had Socialist Republic
of Croatia's citizenship automatically gets Croatian citizenship. That
means the FRY police can decide whether Croatian citizenship (the
obstruction to getting FRY citizenship) includes people who got it
automatically or only people who asked for it. All the Krajina Serb
refugees who fled the Croatian Army's Storm offensive might not get FRY
citizenship, but that's another story. So if the FRY police disregards
the automatic citizenship category and takes the real position of people
into account, those people will probably only have to state that they
have no other citizenship. It's not impossible that the FRY and Croatian
police will cooperate closely on this issue.
The third category covered under the draft law are refugees which are
not called that in the law but defined as citizens of the former
Yugoslavia who sought refuge in the FRY because of their national or
religious affiliation and urging of human rights and liberties. Goran
Svilanovic of the Belgrade university school of law says that definition
has certain advantages because it gives real refugees a chance at
citizenship even if they never asked for it before. So refugees and
displaced persons have to submit a request for citizenship and they will
get it if they can prove that they were persecuted because of their
nationality, religious beliefs or for advocating human rights and
liberties and have no other citizenship. The law specifies that the
request has to include a statement that they have no other
citizenship. Special requests have to be submitted for children under
age and all requests have to be submitted within one year of the law
taking effect with a deadline of three years being given for special
cases. The deadline for the police to resolve the requests is not
specified.
Why does it question citizenship issued by the current authorities? The
answer could lie in the differences in resolving the issue in Serbia and
Montenegro. Serbia gave refugees citizenship only in 1991 and early 1992
when the refugees were seen as heroes. The situation in Montenegro was
different. A republican police official said recently that 70,000
refugees had been given Montenegrin citizenship. In any case, both
republics let their police handle the issue.
Finally, the draft law envisages two ways of citizenship ending---by
removing it or renouncing it. Both ways are voluntary. The draft invokes
the FRY constitution and only formally abolishes the institution of
losing citizenship but keeps it there in provisions on investigating how
citizenship was acquired.
Source: Belgrade weekly Vreme, July 13, 1996
FRY- The situation in the Army
June 1996 double issue of the Belgrade by-weekly Republika brought
an article by Swipe Sikavica on the current political situation within
the Yugoslav Army.
The top command structure of the Yugoslav Army debated the fate of the three
officers of the former JNA - Mile Mrksic, Veselin Sljivancanin and Miroslav
Radic, accused of war crimes. The news of this went public through unofficial
sources, which was not either confirmed or denied by the military top.
The basis of the discussion at this meeting was the search for the answer
to the question: should the named officers be given to the Hague Tribunal
? This line formed the division among the generals and colonels. This was
not the only meeting within the Yugoslav army which debated about the
possible domestic passengers for the Hague in the military uniform. Reliable
sources said that the higher commands are for a longer period of time riddled
with the dilemma: agree with the deportation of the accused, or resist any
such decision, defending officers honor, with any means.In that
context, Ratio Mladic, as a charismatic figure in the armies and para armies
of the Serbian national corps, was a hot topic of official and unofficial
conversations, on all levels of the vertical and horizontal military organization.
According to the information of the author, this second stream, meaning
the one that is against, is in a numerical advantage, even
though the timed conclusions from the officers' meetings, of course with
the force of recommendation had a contrary meaning. This subject and the
ferocious debates about it, could be one of the more firm indicators of
the political mood in the Yugoslav Army.
Of the armies that were formed on the territory of the deceased federal
state, as the remains of the army which fell into the abyss in 1991, the
domestic one was the most numerous, technically best equipped, and in that
respect the strongest. Today, though, this primacy is brought into question.
It is not advisable to bring this thesis openly into public, as it is also
not advisable to bring the Army of Yugoslavia into any connection with its
birthplace. which is the JNA.
In the general command, as well among the officer corps there is a minority
of people which are able to critically question their own military organization
and the state which in its foreign and internal defense mainly relies on
that organization.
Although the place and the role of the Yugoslav army in the defense of the
country are determined by the constitution and the Law on the Army , many
questions connected with the Army and the defense remain open, or the cardinal
levers are mainly undefined: the concept of the defense, the policy of the
defense, military strategy and military doctrine. But it is an open question
could be clearly defined, when the federal state itself is absolutely undefined!
While the for group in the military top is in minority, the
against group of officers is thoroughly disappointed in the
current regime.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika, June 1-30, 1996
Similar subject is covered in the same issue of Republika,
by Miroslav Hadzic of the AIM agency.
The key question the author poses is: is a peaceful change of power possible
under the current situation and existing propositions in the FRY, and what
role would the Army and security services decide to play ? The question
has further merit, since the ruling party and their subordinates who control
the levers of force never publicly said that they will respect any results
of the election, including those unfavorable to them.
The more meritory question is whether the army and the police have particular
reasons to support ( at any price) the hold on power of the current regime,
or do they have any reason to, by acting constitutionally, support the normalization
of the political life ? Since it is a question of hierarchically organized
institutions, it is clear that the possible decision on their (political
) use , will be brought at a higher level, meaning the generals'
top.
The connection in the triangle the leader - the regime-the generals are
of a long term and more durable type. They are based and determined by a
same authoritarian-totalitarian source. The special war practice
of the revolution has freed the army and the police of state-forming conscience
and responsibility.When the decomposition of the former state began, instead
of protecting it, they started searching for and Idea-alibi that suited
them and for a new Leader. The war change of legitimacy connotation- from
the protection of socialism, across the protection of the Serbian nation
and securing his honorable exodus did not infringe any on their systemic
being, in the same manner that the mentioned populistic freedom fight revolution
did not result in a modern national state. The crossing point of the mutual
(interest) loyalty comes from the joint war baggage. Even though
they produced each other through the war, the army and the police owe more
to the regime than vice versa.
To the Army, after it used it to its and general Kadijevic's measure, it
gave a saving and forgiveness port and enabled the other to flourish -
to rise to unexpected heights. He even gave them new emblems and new uniforms.
But, if there was an electoral change of the regime, the baggage
would have to be opened. And, every public opening and inventory, to establish
the cost of war, would break down the current state of things. Whatever
party or coalition would win, it would have to, due to its own reasons,
deal with war and peacetime deeds of those preceding them. The owners of
the deed of the Serbian soul, body and borders are announcing the establishment
of the responsibility for the lost war and given Serbian lands.
The pro - democratic parties could, in the process of dismantling of authoritarianism,
deal with the mechanisms and the price of the war strengthening of the regime.
So, to the army and the police, so much needed quiet can be provided only
by the current regime. As they guarantee it secure and unbound rule.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly Republika, June 1-30, 1996
Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni looks in its issue of July 12, 1996,
at the possible changes at the Yugoslav military top.
Since Slobodan Milosevic introduced the blockade on the Drina river (towards
the Bosnian Serbs) the open dissatisfaction of the Army chief of staff,
general Momcilo Perisic began. It culminated with the fall of the Serb Krajina
in Croatia.The resignation he offered at the time, Milosevic supposedly
commented by saying that Perisic should then return the ranks he got through
all these years.
It seems that the most serious candidate to head the chiefs of staff is
the commander of the Air Force Ljubisa Velickovic, which has no war mortgage,
since at the beginning of the war he was the head of the Federal directorate
for the flight control, where he got the rank of general. Velickovic has
the advantage since, it is said, he is from Pozarevac (Milosevic birthplace),
is completely loyal to the political leadership and pacification of the
rebellious pilot, who are not leaning too much on his side.
Still, whoever takes over the command over the Yugoslav armed forces will
not have a pleasant duty. The Vienna agreement on the reduction of military
effectives in the Balkans, will deprive Yugoslavia of the greatest part
of the largest military junkyard in the Balkans, but also put it in front
of an enigma, what, where and how with the officers and junior officers
which will become unemployed.
It is estimated that the good part of the personnel from the technical services
will not have that much trouble to find work in civil sphere of life. The
police will buysome of the troop officers, but the largest part
of the unemployed will fall on the back of the state.
Nothing is yet forthcoming from the military agreement with Russia, pompously
announced by the minister of defense Pavle Bulatovic and recently deposed
Russian chief of staff Pavel Gratchov. Even though the embargo on arms imports
has been removed, the obstacle in the form of thin funds cropped up. The
replenishment of the air force with some helicopters (MI 24), new MIG 29's,
engines and spare parts will partly go on the account of the former debts
of the former USSR to former SFRY. Everything else, as stated by the sources
in the Russian ministry, will depend on the Yugoslav bank accounts abroad.
The Navy is slowly sailing towards the cutting port, with the tendency that
what can, will be sold to private companies and that the capacities intended
for the new war port Valdanos be reduced to two or three frigates, some
submarines and other smaller vessels.
The Army itself will still depend on the capabilities of domestic technicians
to keep in shape the existing firepower and systems which are desperately
outdated. From the highly touted production of the new tank Vihor,
there is no sign.
Ahead comes also the formulation of the new doctrine of the use of the military
force in the new circumstances. When everything is put into perspective,
the clamor concerning Ratio Mladic, Veselin Sljivancanin and comrades, as
well as the remaining national-patriotic forces is only the
public manifestation of a sick state. The Army has, obviously, played out
the role that was given to it. It is not needed anymore by the party in
power. The police is much more important.
Source: Novi Sad weekly Nezavisni July 12, 1996
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